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
# AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

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## CHAPTER I.

### PLATE I.

#### THE ARMED FORCES AND THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR.

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**The Confederation of the Southern States.**—In December, 1860, a convention of the people of *South Carolina* declared that the union hitherto existing between that State and the United States was dissolved. *Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana* and *Texas* soon followed the lead of *South Carolina* and in February, 1861, formed with her a confederation for mutual interest and defense. *Jefferson Davis* was elected President, and *Montgomery, Ala.*, was made the capital.

*Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee* and *Arkansas* joined this confederation in May, 1861, when their governors were called upon by the President of the United States to furnish troops to assist in suppressing the rebellion of the Confederate States against the authority of the Union. *Richmond, Va.*, was then made the capital.

The Confederation as finally formed consisted of eleven States whose population was five and a half millions of whites and three and a half millions of slaves.

**Military Strength of the South.**—At the time of its organization the Confederation had no armed force save State militia. Its military strength lay in the number of men of the white race who were able to bear arms.

A regular army was created by the Confederate Congress, March, 1861, but outside of its staff departments, and a few regiments of the line, this army was never raised.

The bulk of the armed forces of the Confederation consisted of a *provisional army* formed at first from quotas of volunteers furnished by the several States, and finally by conscription from the entire population.

The South was prompt in taking steps to form an armed force and as early as March, 1861, began to raise troops to take possession of the seacoast defenses of the Confederate States then in the possession of the State militia. Before a single volunteer was raised in the North, she had called into service 30,000 men.

The term of service of the first volunteers was twelve months; when in the month of May, 1861, the United States authorities called for volunteers for three years, the term of service of the Confederate volunteers was also extended to three years or to the end of the war. To encourage volunteering, a bounty of fifty dollars was offered to each volunteer for the long term.

The first conscription act was passed in April, 1862. Under it every male citizen between the ages of 18 and 35 was directed to enroll himself and, if able to bear arms, to join the military service. It was assumed that 720,000 men would come under this act of whom 60 per cent would be available for service. During each year of the war probably 50,000 young men entered this class, making 920,000 in all. Since the volunteers and conscripts were not subjected to a rigid medical examination, it is probable that this class furnished a higher percentage of those enrolled than the 60 per cent estimated.

In September, 1862, the conscription was enlarged to take in men between the ages of 35 and 45. It was assumed that 250,000 would come under this act.

In February, 1864, the limits were again enlarged to take in men from 17 to 50. Slaves were also taken into the military service for such duties as they could perform.

The sending of substitutes and the purchase of exemption from military service were allowed until December, 1863, and then abolished.

The actual number of men enrolled in the Confederate armies during the war is not definitely known. The estimates vary from 600,000 to 1,500,000. It is probable that 900,000 is approximately correct; this includes State militia.

The strength of the Confederate armies at various periods of the war is given in the War Records approximately as follows:

	Enrolled	Absent %	Present	Special duty, etc., %	Present for duty
December 31, 1861.....	327,000	21	259,000	19	210,000
June 30, 1862.....	328,000	31	224,000	24	170,000
December 31, 1862.....	449,000	23	304,000	17	253,000
June 30, 1863.....	473,000	33	307,000	15	261,000
December 31, 1863.....	465,000	40	278,000	16	234,000
June 30, 1864.....	316,000	40	195,000	17	161,000
December 31, 1864.....	400,000	51	196,000	21	155,000
April 1, 1865.....	359,000	56	160,000	22	126,000

The column headed "special duty," etc., is composed of men detailed as teamsters, ambulance drivers, hospital attendants, etc., in the Quartermaster, the Subsistence and the Medical departments, and the men on sick report, in arrest or in confinement.

The column headed "present for duty," includes the armed and equipped combatant officers and men, the non-combatants such as administrative and supply staffs, bands, etc., and the temporarily unarmed or unequipped combatants as the dismounted cavalry.

Col. Thomas L. Livermore in his "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America" has determined the ratio of the armed and equipped combatants to the "present for duty" in the two armies to be 93 : 100.

When the term "effectives" is used in the Confederate reports it means the men without the officers.

**Military Strength of the Union.**—The population of the twenty-two States that remained in the Union was about twenty-two millions, and was increased by immigration during the war.

In January, 1861, the actual military strength of these States, or the Union as they were collectively called, consisted of the Regular Army of 16,000 men and the militia of the different States. In May and July, 1861, authority was given to increase the Regular Army by nine regiments of infantry, one of artillery and one of cavalry. The volunteer service was however so popular that the authorities were unable to more than partially fill the new regiments before the close of the war. In the Army of the Potomac the regulars formed only two small brigades of infantry, one small brigade of cavalry, and about twenty batteries of field and horse artillery. There were fewer regulars in the other armies.

The bulk of the armed force consisted of volunteers. Each State raised a quota proportional to its population. Until 1862 the army was raised wholly by voluntary enlistment. In calling

out the militia in August of that year to fill their quotas, some States resorted to conscription.

The first national enrollment act for conscription or draft was passed in March, 1863. Under it all male citizens between the ages of 20 and 45 inclusive were enrolled. After that, whenever it was found necessary, quotas were filled from these rolls by lot. Because of its large population and its liberal system of bounties, it was not found necessary to resort to conscription to any great extent in the North.

Under an Act of Congress of July, 1861, a bounty of \$100.00 was paid to every soldier who volunteered for two or more years' service. In June, 1863, a bounty of \$400.00 was paid to every veteran who reenlisted for the war. Later a bounty of \$300.00 was paid to every volunteer who enlisted in any three-year regiment.

In making up their quotas, liberal bounties were also paid by the States and counties.

Exemption from service by purchase and exemption by substitution were allowed conscripts. The price of exemption by purchase was fixed by the government at \$300.00.

The volunteers were of two classes: short service men who enlisted for a term under a year, and long service men who enlisted for one or more years. The former were principally militia called into service to meet some emergency.

#### SHORT SERVICE MEN.

Calls.	Emergency.	Number.	Period.
April 1861	Bombardment of Fort Sumter.....	92,000	3 mos.
May, 1861	Bombardment of Fort Sumter.....	3,000	6 mos.
May, 1862	Jackson's threatened invasion of Md....	15,000	3 mos.
August, 1862	Lee's invasion of Maryland.....	87,000	9 mos.
June, 1863	Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania.....	16,000	6 mos.
Apr. to July, 1864	To replace troops sent from the defenses of Washington to reinforce the Army of the Potomac.....	84,000	100 days
		<u>297,000</u>	

Many of the men who first enlisted for short service later enlisted for long service and are included in the table given below.

The long service men formed the bulk of the field armies. They were as a rule men who enlisted for three years, or men



who enlisted for a shorter time in regiments originally enlisted for three years.

#### LONG SERVICE MEN.

Calls.		1 year.	2 year.	3 year.
May, 1861.....		9,000	31,000	658,000
July, 1862.....				421,000
October, 1863.....				369,000
March, 1864.....				292,000
July, 1864.....		223,000	8,000	153,000
December, 1864.....		151,000	5,000	55,000
		<u>383,000</u>	<u>44,000</u>	<u>1,948,000</u>
Total,.....				2,375,000

The strength of the Union armies at various stages of the war is given in the War Records approximately as follows:

	Enrolled	Absent %	Present	Special duty, etc. %	Present for duty
December 31, 1860...	16,000	6	15,000		
June 30, 1861...	152,000	17	130,000	17	108,000
December 31, 1861...	528,000	10	477,000	11	425,000
June 30, 1862...	624,000	20	502,000	13	433,000
December 31, 1862...	868,000	24	664,000	18	556,000
June 30, 1863...	848,000	25	636,000	17	530,000
December 31, 1863...	837,000	30	601,000	17	497,000
June 30, 1864...	1,002,000	30	683,000	19	555,000
December 31, 1864...	937,000	35	605,000	18	496,000
April 30, 1865...	1,052,000	30	734,000	15	622,000

It will be observed that the Confederate armies reached their maximum strength in June, 1863, while the Union armies reached their maximum strength at the close of the war in April, 1865.

The most serious defects in the Union military system were:

1. The failure to provide an efficient and uniform system of replacing the losses in the long service regiments.
2. The failure to provide permanent depots in which reserve troops were being continuously organized, trained and equipped.

As a result, veteran regiments became skeleton organizations and promising military operations were checked through the inability of the government to send prompt reinforcement.

After the first year of the war, the average strength of the infantry regiments was between 300 and 400 men present for duty. At the beginning of the campaign of 1864, there were as many as nine regiments in some of the brigades of the Army of the Potomac, yet the average strength of these brigades was less than 2,500 men.

**Firearms.**—At the outbreak of the war, the infantry arms in the possession of the government consisted of 560,000 smooth-bore muskets and 49,000 rifles. Of these 300,000 muskets and 27,000 rifles were in the Northern arsenals; the remainder were in the Southern arsenals.

Although the musket was at this time an obsolete arm, 180,000 of these were imported by the United States. In addition, about 550,000 rifles of various calibers and patterns were also imported.

The muzzle-loading Springfield rifle became the standard arm of the infantry, and the national factory at Springfield, Mass., was enlarged and private factories were equipped for its manufacture. In the year ending June 30, 1864, over 600,000 of these rifles were manufactured and the foreign arms were wholly replaced.

A limited number of regiments of sharpshooters used breech-loading rifles.

The standard carbine for cavalry was a breech-loader. At the beginning of the war about 10,000 were imported; these were gradually replaced by those of American manufacture. The carbines were supplied by private manufacturers. In 1864, many of the cavalry regiments had repeating carbines.

The repeating revolvers supplied to the cavalry and artillery were also of private manufacture.

The standard field guns were the bronze muzzle-loading smooth-bore 12-pounder Napoleon gun and the 3-inch muzzle-loading rifle. Two types of rifles were used: the cast-iron gun with a wrought-iron reinforcing breech ring (Parrott rifle) and the wrought iron gun. In the Confederate service a few breech-loading Whitworth guns were employed.

In the South, the output of both government and private factories never exceeded 35,000 infantry rifles annually. The South was therefore more dependent than the North on foreign importations of small arms and artillery.

**Organization and Tactics.**—The infantry organization was based on a regiment of ten companies whose minimum strength

was fixed at 867 and whose maximum strength was fixed at 1047, depending on the number of privates in the company which might vary from 64 to 82.

The brigade was formed of two or more regiments. At the beginning of the war two to four regiments usually formed a brigade; when the regiments became reduced by service, the number of regiments in the brigade was increased.

The infantry division was usually composed of two to four brigades.

In forming for the attack, the drill regulations prescribed the formation of the brigade in line of masses; each regiment forming a mass with a two-company front. Some of the most noted attacks were however made by the brigades in line.

As the regiments became depleted, brigade masses were substituted for regimental masses. The division was usually formed in two lines.

The normal cavalry regiment was formed of twelve troops with the troopers usually in double rank. When mounted, the regiment charged in two or more lines. For dismounted action, three-fourths of the troopers were dismounted and fought in single rank, usually as a skirmish line. Dismounted cavalry regiments were often able to act effectively against infantry, because of the superiority of their breech-loading carbines in rapidity of fire over the muzzle-loading rifles of the infantry.

In the Army of the Potomac, cavalry brigades were attached to infantry divisions until 1863. After that year the cavalry was organized as an independent unit. In the *Army of Northern Virginia* the cavalry formed an independent unit from the beginning of the war.

In the Union armies, a battery of light artillery was usually composed of six guns of like character. Until 1863, batteries were attached to the infantry divisions of the Army of the Potomac; in that year divisional artillery was abandoned and a brigade of five batteries was attached to each army corps. The Army of the Potomac always had an army artillery reserve of field and siege batteries.

In the *Army of Northern Virginia* the artillery organization was not systematized until 1863. Before that time the army had brigade, division, corps and reserve artillery. In 1863, a battalion of four batteries, 16 guns, was assigned to each infantry division

and in addition two battalions, 32 guns, to each army corps. There was thereafter no army reserve.

The engineers of the Union armies consisted of a single battalion of regulars, which was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and a number of volunteer regiments. As a rule, engineers performed the duties of pontoniers and bridge builders; they were also employed in sapping and intrenching.

Pioneer work on the roads was done by details from the infantry; since every army was deficient in engineer troops these details were also employed on other engineering work. The ponton trains were as a rule not regularly equipped with horses but were transported from place to place by the Quartermaster's Department.

Both wooden and canvas pontons were employed by the army. In the last year of the war, each corps of the Army of the Potomac had a regularly equipped train which marched with the army.

The Confederate armies had a less perfect engineer organization than their opponents.

The staff departments of both armies consisted of an Adjutant General's Department, an Inspector General's Department, a Judge Advocate General's Department, a Pay Department, a Quartermaster's Department, a Subsistence Department, an Engineer Department, and an Ordnance Department. In the North there were established during the war a Signal Corps, a Military Telegraph Bureau, a Military Railroad Bureau, and a Provost Marshal's Department. Similar bureaus were organized in the South. While the system required a great number of officers it divided the duties to such an extent that officers appointed largely from volunteers could administer and supply the armies.

One great defect of the staff organization was the lack of a General Staff of trained officers to keep the commanding generals informed of the military situation and to see that their orders were executed.

Another great defect was the lack of train and sanitary troops. The duties that are ordinarily performed by such troops fell on men detached from their regiments; this accounts for the difference between the men *present* and the men *present for duty*.

**Theater of War.**—The political and topographical features of the country naturally divided the theater of war into several more or less distinct theaters of operations.

**Virginia** (Plate 2).—The principal theater of operations in the East was the State of Virginia with its border States of West Virginia and Maryland. Virginia had a greater population than any other Confederate State and its capital, Richmond, was made the capital of the Confederation May 21, 1861. It formed a great bastion which could be invaded from the East by Union troops landed from transports on the shores of Chesapeake Bay or its tributaries; from the north by Union troops assembled along the Potomac; and from the west by Union troops assembled in West Virginia.

West Virginia, although a part of Virginia until 1863, was practically a separate and Union State by June, 1861.

The State of Virginia may be divided into three distinct sections: the *Tidewater*, the *Piedmont*, and the *Valley*. Washington, Fredericksburg, Richmond, and Petersburg mark the western limits of the Tidewater section. The Blue Ridge Mountains separate the Piedmont from the Valley section.

The Tidewater section is low and sandy and cut up by tidal streams and marshes. It was unfavorable for offensive military operations in all particulars save that its principal rivers, the York and James, are navigable to White House and Richmond, and formed excellent lines of supply for an invading army to the western limits of the region. It was traversed by a railroad from West Point to Richmond, one from Norfolk to Petersburg and one from Norfolk to Weldon, North Carolina, on the Roanoke River.

Norfolk was the principal seaport of Virginia, but its outlet was closed by the permanent fortress, *Fort Monroe*, then in possession of the United States troops.

The Piedmont section is higher and more uneven and is traversed by the fordable parts of the rivers that rise in the Blue Ridge Mountains and empty into Chesapeake Bay. In the northern part is the Bull Run range of mountains which extends from the Potomac to the Rappahannock River. The Loudoun Valley lies between the Bull Run and the Blue Ridge mountains. The Wilderness is a thickly wooded tract just south of the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers in which lie the sources of the Mat-tapony River.

Its principal line of railroad was the Alexandria-Charlottesville-Lynchburg railroad; branches ran from the main line to Leesburg,

to Strasburg and Mt. Jackson, to Covington, to Richmond, and to Petersburg. The junctions Alexandria, Manassas, Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and Lynchburg were important strategic points. Its principal turnpikes were the Alexandria-Winchester, the Alexandria-Warrenton-Luray, the Culpepper-Front Royal, the Gordonsville-Stannardsville-Harrisonburg, the Stannardsville-Fredericksburg-Richmond, and the Staunton-Charlottesville-Richmond turnpikes.

The Valley section consists of wide parallel valleys lying between the Blue Ridge and Allegheny mountains. In the north, the Shenandoah range separates the valleys of the South Branch of the Potomac and the Shenandoah rivers. Both valleys are prolonged northward into Pennsylvania.

The Shenandoah Valley extending from the James to the Potomac, is the most fertile region of Virginia. It was traversed throughout its length by an excellent turnpike, the Valley Pike, extending from Lexington to Martinsburg. An inferior road ran the length of the valley of the South Fork of the Potomac from Covington to Romney. The two valleys were connected by roads from Winchester to Romney, from Strasburg to Moorefield, from Harrisonburg to Franklin, from Staunton to Monterey, and from Lexington to Covington and Warm Springs.

Short branches of railroad ran from Harpers Ferry to Winchester and from Strasburg to Mt. Jackson. These were however little used, as they were destroyed by the Confederates in 1861. The former was rebuilt in the autumn of 1864, but the latter was only rebuilt after the war.

The principal roads through the Allegheny Mountains into West Virginia were the Staunton-Parkersburg turnpike via Monterey-Huttonsville-Beverly-Buckhannon, with branches to Grafton and Clarksburg, and the James and Kanawha turnpike from Covington to Charleston, West Virginia, via Gauley Bridge. From Gauley Bridge a road ran southward to Newberne and Tazewell in southwest Virginia.

The great east and west railroads in this part of the theater of war were Petersburg-Lynchburg-Chattanooga line, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad connecting Baltimore and Parkersburg. The latter crosses the Potomac River at Harpers Ferry and runs through Martinsburg which is several miles south of the Potomac.

Since there was no other railroad in West Virginia, this State served as a great barrier between the main armies of the East and the West.

The natural lines of invasion leading toward the Confederate capital, Richmond, were the Alexandria-Gordonsville-Richmond railroad, the Acquia Creek-Fredericksburg-Richmond railroad, the York River and the West Point-Richmond railroad, and the James River and the City Point-Petersburg railroad. Secondary lines ran from Clarksburg and Gauley Bridge, West Virginia, into the Shenandoah Valley.

The natural line of counter invasion was the Shenandoah Valley route which led into the fertile Cumberland Valley of Pennsylvania and toward Harrisburg, the capital of that State.

**Tennessee** (Plate 3).—The principal theater of operations in the West was the State of Tennessee with its border State, Kentucky. Tennessee was second in population of the Confederate States. Near its southern boundary was the great railroad, Lynchburg-Chattanooga-Memphis, which connected the Confederate armies in Virginia with those in the West.

The State of Tennessee is divided by the Cumberland Mountains and the Tennessee River into three parts.

In the east is the upper Tennessee Valley, at that time traversed by the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad but having no railroad connection with Kentucky or West Virginia. A large number of its inhabitants were Union men.

In the central section, at the head of navigation on the Cumberland River and also on the Louisville-Nashville railroad, is Nashville the capital of Tennessee. South of Nashville were the two railroads running to Decatur and Stevenson on the Memphis and Chattanooga railroad. Chattanooga in the southeastern corner of the State was the radial point of the railroads running to Nashville, Tenn., Memphis, Tenn., Lynchburg, Va., and Atlanta, Ga.

The western section is limited by two navigable rivers, the Tennessee on the east and the Mississippi on the west. It was traversed by the railroad from Louisville via Bowling Green to Memphis, and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Columbus to Corinth, Miss. From Jackson a branch road ran through central Mississippi to New Orleans.

The most important strategic points in the State were Knoxville in the eastern part of the State, Nashville and Chattanooga in the central part, and Memphis in the western part.

The most eastern of the natural lines of invasion that ran from the Ohio River into Tennessee was the railroad from Covington, Ky., to Lexington, and the ordinary highways from Lexington to Knoxville. South of the Kentucky River, the highways were earth roads which ran through a rough, sparsely-settled country.

Cumberland Gap on the Kentucky and Tennessee State line was the natural gateway into the upper Tennessee Valley and an important strategic point. The pass north of Knoxville was another.

Into central Tennessee the natural line of invasion was the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Bowling Green was the head of navigation on Green River and an important railroad junction. Any position taken by the Confederates north of Nashville could be turned by operations up the Cumberland River.

The Tennessee River, navigable to the southern boundary of Tennessee, was the natural line of an invading force which desired to destroy the Memphis-Chattanooga railroad or to invade eastern Mississippi. Convoyed by a fleet of gunboats it could reach Alabama and Mississippi without difficulty.

The natural lines of invasion into the western part of Tennessee were the Tennessee River, the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and the Mississippi River.

To prevent invasion along the rivers, the Confederate authorities constructed fortifications along the northern boundary of Tennessee; *Fort Donelson* at Dover on the Cumberland, *Fort Henry* on the Tennessee, and *Island No. 10* on the Mississippi. To protect East Tennessee, *Cumberland Gap* was fortified.

The most natural line of counter invasion led from the upper Tennessee Valley. A Confederate force could be quickly assembled at Knoxville by means of the Lynchburg-Chattanooga railroad, and could enter Kentucky in a few marches after leaving the mountain passes. Counter invasions by small bodies that could live on the country were found more practicable than those by large ones that could not be thus supported. The Louisville-Nashville railroad and the small garrisons left to protect the depots of supplies on the highways, were the natural objectives of the small invading parties.



**Arkansas** (Plate 4).—The State of Arkansas, with its border State, Missouri, was the most northern field of operations west of the Mississippi River. Arkansas being only tenth in population was much less important than either Virginia or Tennessee.

The operations in this field were at first limited by the Missouri River on the north and the Arkansas River on the south. The only railroads in this section were the lines radiating from St. Louis to Sedalia, Rolla and Ironton, Mo., and a short road opposite Memphis. The most important River in this section is the White River of Arkansas, navigable along the Black River branch to Pitman Ferry on the State line of Missouri and Arkansas.

Both in Missouri and Arkansas the border counties in the east and in the west were more densely populated than the intermediate ones. The natural lines of invasion and counter invasion from Missouri were the roads from Ironton and the Mississippi River at Cape Girardeau to Pocahontas, Ark., in the eastern part of the State, and the roads from Springfield and Neosho, Mo., to Van Buren, Ark., in the western part. Because of the absence of railroads only minor operations could take place along the border.

The best line of invasion into interior Arkansas was the Arkansas River, but this could be used by the Union troops only after the Mississippi was opened to the mouth of the Arkansas.

**North and South Carolina** (Plate 5).—In both of these States lodgments were made by the Union troops at points on the coast which were used as bases to operate against the Richmond-Wilmington-Charleston-Savannah railroad and to blockade the ports of these States.

North Carolina was fourth in population. Her coast was very favorable for landing operations because of the two great sounds, Albemarle and Pamlico, which penetrate deep inland. The Wilmington-Weldon railroad was but fifty miles from either Newberne or Washington on Pamlico Sound. The most important port of North Carolina was Wilmington near the mouth of the Cape Fear River. At the beginning of the war its entrance was protected only by a small permanent fort on the west bank.

On the coast of South Carolina, between Charleston and the mouth of the Savannah River, were a number of islands which offered great advantages as secure bases for operations of land

forces against either Charleston or the forts at the mouth of the Savannah River. Charleston, protected by the permanent work, *Fort Sumter*, and smaller works, was the principal port of South Carolina.

**Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi** (Plates 6 and 7).—In population, Georgia was third, Alabama fifth, and Mississippi sixth of the Confederate States. They were all protected by Tennessee from invasion from the north until Chattanooga and Memphis were securely held by the Union troops.

From Chattanooga a railroad ran southward to Atlanta, Ga., where it branched to Charleston, S. C., Savannah, Ga., and Montgomery, Ala. Atlanta was therefore an important strategic point. The most important port of Georgia was Savannah. It was protected by *Fort Pulaski*, a masonry fort on Cockspur Island at the mouth of the Savannah River.

In Alabama there was no railroad or navigable river running southward from Tennessee. This protected it from invasion by large armies. Its principal seaport was Mobile protected by *Forts Morgan* and *Gaines* at the entrance of Mobile Bay. Two lines of railroad traversed the State from east to west, the Chattanooga-Memphis line and the Savannah-Vicksburg line.

Mississippi owed its importance not only to its population but also to the fact that it bordered the Mississippi River and the Vicksburg-Meridian railroad formed the connecting line between the Trans-Mississippi States and the East after Memphis and New Orleans were taken. North of Vicksburg, between the Yazoo and the Mississippi rivers, the country is marshy and subject to overflow. It was therefore unsuitable for military operations. Vicksburg was an important point on the Mississippi River, since it was built on a high bluff commanding the river and was in railroad communication with all parts of the South.

The main lines of railroad which penetrated Mississippi from the north were the Mississippi Central from Memphis to New Orleans via Jackson the State capital, and the Mobile and Ohio from Mobile to Corinth via Meridian. The two were united by a line from Jackson, Tenn., via Holly Springs to Grenada, and by the Vicksburg-Meridian line.

**Louisiana** (Plates 7 and 8).—Louisiana was eighth in population and was important because it was traversed by the lower

Mississippi River. Just above its delta this river was guarded by two permanent forts, *Jackson* and *St. Philip*. The main line of invasion into the interior of the State was the Red River, accessible only when the Mississippi was open to its mouth. There was no important railroad in the State.

The Red River, navigable to Shreveport, La., was an important line of supply both for the produce of the adjacent territory and munitions of war and supplies brought from foreign countries via Mexico. Its importance was increased by the loss of Memphis and New Orleans early in 1862, and the tightening of the blockade with the progress of the war.

**Florida and Texas** (Plate 1).—Florida, the smallest State in population, and Texas the largest in area but only ninth in population, would necessarily fall if the more important States were occupied in force by Union troops. Operations in these States were therefore of a minor character, based on the occupation of points on the seacoast.

Jacksonville and Pensacola were the principal harbors of Florida, Galveston was the principal harbor of Texas.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1861.

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The principal military operations in 1861 were

- January . . . The seizure by the State militia of the arsenals and coast forts in  
February . . . the Southern States.  
April . . . . . Bombardment and capture of Fort Sumter by South Carolina  
troops.  
June . . . . . Engagement at Big Bethel, Va.  
July . . . . . McClellan's West Virginia Campaign, with the engagements at  
Rich Mountain and Carrick Ford.  
Campaign and battle of Bull Run, Va.  
August . . . Capture of Forts Clark and Hatteras, at Hatteras Inlet, N. C.  
Battle of Wilson Creek, Mo.  
September . Invasion of Kentucky.  
Capture of Lexington, Mo.  
November . Grant's attack at Belmont, Mo.  
Capture of Forts Beauregard and Walker, at Fort Royal, S. C.

#### PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS.

**Confederate.**—The Confederate States began the year of 1861 by seizing and garrisoning with State militia the permanent sea-coast fortifications along the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts.

**March.**—By March 1, all the forts south of the entrance of Chesapeake Bay were in the possession of the State governments, save *Fort Monroe* at the entrance of Hampton Roads, Va. (Plate 2), *Fort Moultrie* and *Fort Sumter* at the entrance of Charleston Harbor, S. C. (Plate 5), *Fort Pickens* at the entrance of Pensacola Harbor, Fla. (Plate 6), and the forts on the islands at the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico (Plate 1).

In March, President *Davis* called on the seven seceding States for 15,000 volunteers to replace the State troops in the coast defenses. Of these, 5,000 South Carolina troops were assigned to Brig. Gen. *Pierre G. T. Beauregard* for the capture of *Fort Moultrie* and *Fort Sumter*. An equal number of volunteers from the Gulf States was assigned to Brig. Gen. *Braxton Bragg* for the capture of *Fort Pickens*.

**April.**—*Fort Moultrie* was evacuated by its Union garrison which took refuge in *Fort Sumter*; *Fort Sumter* was later bombarded and captured on April 12 and 13. There were no casualties; it was surrendered simply because the United States Government found it impossible to supply or strengthen its garrison of 65 men. The garrison of *Fort Pickens* was reinforced and supplied, and resisted all attempts made by the Confederates to capture the work.

To defend the land frontiers, President *Davis* called for 20,000 volunteers from the seven original seceding States on April 9, and it was followed by a second call for 30,000, April 16.

**May-June.**—During May and June, the States of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas transferred their organized military forces to the Confederate government which then had 100,000 men present for duty but they were deficient in arms and equipment.

The officers selected by President *Davis* to receive the highest commissions in the Confederate Army were *Samuel Cooper*, *Albert Sidney Johnston*, *Robert E. Lee*, *Joseph E. Johnston* and *Pierre G. T. Beauregard*. All were graduates of the United States Military Academy and had resigned their commissions in the U. S. Army to offer their services to the Confederate States.

*Cooper* had been Adjutant General of the U. S. Army since 1852 and was made Adjutant General of the Confederate Army. *A. S. Johnston* and *Lee* were colonels of cavalry, *J. E. Johnston*, Quartermaster General, and *Beauregard*, captain of engineers, when they resigned. The last owed his commission to his attack on *Fort Sumter*.

All were given the highest possible rank in the army, that of general. The commissions of the five generals were dated respectively May 16 and 30, June 14, July 4 and 21, 1861.

**Union.**—On April 15, after the attack on *Fort Sumter*, President Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 militia. As these could be held in service for three months only, in May, he issued a call for 42,000 three-year volunteers and directed that the Regular Army be increased by about 23,000 men. The call for volunteers was subsequently increased to 500,000 men.

**July.**—By the 1st of July, 1861, there were about 130,000 men mustered in and present for duty, but like the Confederate troops at this time, all were not equipped.

At the outbreak of the War, the general officers of the U. S. Army, exclusive of the staff departments, were Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, general in chief, and Brig. Gens. John E. Wool, *David E. Twiggs* and William S. Harney. *Twiggs* joined the Confederate Army, Scott and Wool were too old for field service, and Harney, being from the South, did not wish to take an active part in the war.

To command the Regular and Volunteer forces, in May, President Lincoln appointed five additional major generals—McClellan, Frémont, Dix, Banks and Butler. None of these appointments were given to officers then in the Regular Army.

George B. McClellan graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1846 and having served in the engineers and cavalry, resigned in 1857. In April, 1861, he was invited by the Governor of Ohio to organize and train the Ohio volunteers and was a major general in the service of that State when appointed.

John C. Frémont had been in the Regular Army from 1838 to 1848. In the Mexican War he was a lieutenant colonel of mounted rifles. He owed his appointment however to his prominence as an explorer and a political leader. He was a U. S. Senator from California 1850-1851, and the candidate of the Republican party for President in 1856.

John A. Dix had been in the Regular Army from 1814 to 1828. He also owed his appointment to his prominence as a political leader. He was a U. S. Senator from New York 1845-1849 and was Secretary of the Treasury of the U. S. in 1861. He performed valuable service in raising volunteer troops in New York.

Nathaniel Banks had never seen military service and owed his appointment to his prominence in the Republican party. He had been Speaker of the U. S. House of Representatives in 1856 and Governor of Massachusetts 1858-1861.

Benjamin F. Butler was a political leader of some prominence, but he owed his appointment also to his being a brigadier general in the Massachusetts militia. His brigade was one of the first that responded to the President's call.

McClellan and Frémont were commissioned in the Regulars, and Dix, Banks and Butler in the Volunteers.

In the Confederate service, the high commissions were given for military service and reputation; in the Union service, for political service and reputation.

## THE WEST VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.

### PLATE 2.

**May.**—On May 14, 1861, McClellan was assigned to the Department of the Ohio, which comprised West Virginia, Kentucky and the States north of the Ohio River.

**June.**—In June, he moved a force of 20,000 men from Ohio and Indiana into West Virginia, and occupied the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as far east as Cumberland, Md.

There was at this time, in the eastern part of West Virginia, a small Confederate force of about 5,000 men, under Brig. Gen. *Robert S. Garnett*, which had come from Staunton, Va. *Garnett*, with four and a half regiments and four guns, was at Laurel Hill on the road from Beverly to Philippi and twelve miles from the former place. Col. *John Pegram* with two regiments and four guns was at Rich Mountain, on the road from Beverly to Buckhannon and seven miles from Beverly. Both positions were intrenched. A reserve regiment was at Beverly.

In these positions the Confederates guarded the pass through the Allegheny Mountains on the Staunton-Parkersburg turnpike and threatened the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

**July.**—On July 6, McClellan had concentrated three brigades at Buckhannon and one at Philippi.

His plan was to threaten *Garnett* from Philippi, and attack *Pegram* with the force at Buckhannon. If his attack was successful he could capture Beverly and cut off *Garnett's* retreat.

**Rich Mountain.**—On July 11, Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, with four regiments of the Buckhannon column, made a long detour by a mountain trail and reached the Beverly road in rear of *Pegram's* position. Here he encountered half a regiment with two guns which was put to flight; a half regiment sent by *Pegram* to assist these troops was also defeated. The Confederate troops thus engaged made their escape to Beverly.

While Rosecrans was making his detour, McClellan with five regiments was threatening *Pegram's* front.

On the night of July 11, *Pegram*, finding his communications cut, marched along the mountains northwards to join *Garnett*.

**Carrick Ford.**—On the afternoon of July 11, *Garnett* was informed that *Pegram* had been defeated and that the Union troops were in possession of Beverly. He at once decided to retreat over an almost impassable road which led northeastward to the Grafton-Moorefield road. He started on the morning of the 12th and was pursued by three regiments of the Philippi force. Being embarrassed by a wagon-train, he was overtaken at *Carrick Ford* on the Cheat River. Here *Garnett* was killed and his command was compelled to abandon a gun and some wagons.

When *Pegram* reached Laurel Hill, *Garnett* had already departed. As his position was entirely surrounded by Union troops, *Pegram* surrendered his regiment and battery to McClellan, who had crossed the mountains to Beverly.

At the close of the campaign, the Union troops took up a strong position covering Huttonsville.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN THE WEST VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.

##### *Union Forces.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan.....	4	1	4

##### *Confederate Forces.*

Brig. Gen. Robert S. Garnett.....	2	1	1
Strength—Union forces...12,000	Confederate forces.....		5,000
Casualties—Union forces.. 70	Confederate forces.....		600

**Comments.**—At the beginning of the Civil War, West Virginia was a part of the State of Virginia; it was admitted as a separate State only in 1863. The people were divided into two very unequal parties, the larger of which was opposed to secession. The aim of the United States authorities was to expel all Confederate troops from the State so that it could be organized as a separate State; the Confederate authorities aimed to hold at least the main gateways through the Alleghenies and thus facilitate the movement of troops from Virginia to restore the State authority.

At the opening of the campaign the disposition of the Confederate force was a faulty one, since the two small brigades of



*Pegram* and *Garnett* were in the presence of a greatly superior force and not within supporting distance of each other. *Garnett's* natural line of retreat ran through Beverly which would fall if *Pegram's* small force were defeated. The road northward from *Garnett's* position to Moorefield was barely passable for wagons, and ran close to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad held in force by Union troops. Both brigades should have been near Beverly or between it and Huttonsville.

Had *Garnett* been provided with a competent staff to keep him informed of the true status of affairs, he might have made his escape through Beverly as McClellan did not reach that place until the afternoon of the 12th.

Immediately after this campaign, Brig. Gen. *William W. Loring* was appointed to command the Confederate forces on the West Virginia frontier. The five regiments that escaped into Virginia were reinforced by twelve new regiments.

These troops were assembled at Monterey and Huntersville during July.

**The Kanawha.**—While McClellan was operating in northern West Virginia, he sent a brigade under Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox up the Kanawha to take possession of Charleston then held by a small brigade under Brig. Gen. *Henry Wise*.

Cox took possession of Charleston July 25, and then pursued *Wise* to Gauley Bridge, where he established an intrenched post. *Wise* fell back to Lewisburg.

To reinforce *Wise*, two additional brigades were raised. These were commanded by Brig. Gens. *John B. Floyd* and *John McCausland*.

**Carnifex Ferry and Cheat Mountain.**—In August, Gen. *Robert E. Lee* took personal charge of the forces in West Virginia to recover the territory lost in July.

**August.**—*Loring* with his command moved on Huttonsville while *Floyd*, reinforced by the brigades of *Wise* and *McCausland*, moved on Gauley Bridge.

McClellan having been ordered to Washington, Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans remained in command of West Virginia. There were at this time 3,000 Union troops at Gauley Bridge, 10,000 in the vicinity of Huttonsville, and 7,000 at Sutton.

**September.**—*Floyd* was defeated at *Carnifex Ferry* on the Gauley River ten miles east of Gauley Bridge, on September 10, by Rosecrans who had marched from Sutton. *Loring* was repulsed at *Cheat Mountain* on Sept. 12 and 13 by Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds.

These engagements closed operations in West Virginia for 1861.

**November.**—In November, *Lee* with one brigade was sent to Charleston, S. C., to take charge of the defense of that State. *Loring's Army of the Northwest* was broken up. *Loring* with three brigades went to Winchester, Va.; *Floyd* and *McCausland* went to Bowling Green, Ky.; one brigade was sent to the *Army of Northern Virginia*; *Wise* with his brigade went to Norfolk, Va.

**December.**—At the close of the year, Brig. Gen. *Edward Johnson* was at Monterey with five regiments and Brig. Gen. *Henry Heth* was at Lewisburg with two regiments.

## THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.

### PLATES 2, 12 and 14.

**Opposing Forces.**—About the first of July there were in northern Virginia two Union and two Confederate corps.

**July.**—On the south bank of the Potomac opposite Washington and extending from Alexandria about ten miles northward was a Union corps of 27,000 men under Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell. At Martinsburg, Va., in the Shenandoah Valley, was a Union corps of 14,000 men under Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson of the Pennsylvania State troops. Both commands consisted largely of three-months militia whose term of service was about to expire.

Along the Bull Run, in the vicinity of Manassas, Va., was a Confederate corps of 18,000 men under *Beauregard*; on the banks of the Potomac and Occoquan rivers, twenty miles to his right, was a brigade of 2,000 men under Brig. Gen. *Theophilus H. Holmes*; at Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley was a Confederate corps of 10,500 men under *J. E. Johnston*.

The authorities in Washington directed McDowell to attack *Beauregard* and drive him from the railroad junction at Manassas; they directed Patterson, whose advance from Harrisburg, Pa., had caused *Johnston* to fall back from the Potomac, to prevent the latter from going to *Beauregard's* assistance.

On July 15, the day before McDowell's advance, Patterson moved forward to Bunker Hill, twelve miles from Winchester. Here however he stopped; and on the 17th, the day after McDowell began his advance, Patterson moved back to Charlestown on the Harpers Ferry railroad, twenty-two miles from Winchester, in order to base himself on Harpers Ferry.

**Concentration at Bull Run.**—McDowell moved forward on the afternoon of July 16, with a field force of 30,600 men and reached Centerville, on the Warrenton road four miles from the Bull Run, on the afternoon of July 18. At this time *Beauregard's* 18,000 men were along the south bank of Bull Run between the railroad and the Warrenton pike.

The distance between *Beauregard's* flanks was six miles and McDowell was only four miles from either Confederate flank. Had McDowell made a vigorous attack on the morning of the 19th, he would probably have won the battle. For various reasons he delayed his attack until the morning of the 21st.

The authorities at Richmond, when informed of McDowell's movement, at once sent orders to *Johnston* at Winchester and to *Holmes* on the Occoquan to reinforce *Beauregard*.

*Johnston* received his orders at midnight on the 17th, the very day that Patterson moved back towards Harpers Ferry. He started his troops at once for Manassas via Ashby Gap. By marching half the distance and by using the railroad for the remaining distance, his first brigade reached Manassas about noon July 20, and his last brigade at noon on the 21st.

*Johnston's* corps, *Holmes'* brigade, and some regiments sent from Richmond, raised the Confederate force to 32,000 men.

McDowell therefore lost the advantage of numbers by his failure to attack on the 19th, the day after his arrival at Centerville.

**Battle of Bull Run** (Plate 9).—In the battle of Bull Run, McDowell had four infantry divisions—those of Tyler, Hunter, Heintzelman, and Miles.\* According to his plan, Tyler was to advance to the Bull Run and threaten to cross at the stone bridge on the Warrenton road. Under cover of this threat, Hunter and

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\*For organization see p. 26.

Heintzelman were to cross the river at Sudley Springs ford and compel the Confederates to retreat from the bridge. The three divisions were then to form line on the Warrenton road, march down the south bank of Bull Run, with one flank resting on it, and drive the Confederates beyond Manassas. Miles was to remain in reserve, guarding the fords below the stone bridge and the trains at Centerville.

Tyler's division opened fire with artillery early in the morning, but as he did not advance with his infantry, Col. *Nathan G. Evans*, who was guarding the bridge with two regiments, decided that his operation was merely a feint. Seeing clouds of dust towards Sudley Springs, *Evans* decided that the attack would be made from that direction and moved off to meet it.

Hunter crossed at Sudley Springs about 9.30 a. m. and after a short rest, his leading brigade under Col. Ambrose E. Burnside, moved on and encountered *Evans* near the fork of the road. The battle on the north side of Young's Branch now began. In it four brigades of the divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman were opposed to the brigades of *Evans*, *Bartow* and *Bee*.

Towards noon Col. Wm. T. Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division forded Bull Run north of the bridge and came in on the Confederate right.

Gen. *Bee* now ordered the three Confederate brigades to the plateau south of Young's Branch, where *Thos. J. Jackson's* brigade had formed line. This line was also reinforced by regiments from two brigades of *Cocke* and *Bonham*.

Heintzelman's two brigades and Sherman's brigade now followed the Confederates and formed line along the Sudley Springs road south of Young's Branch, facing east. One of Hunter's brigades was along the Warrentown Pike, just east of the Sudley Springs road. Erasmus D. Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division crossed the bridge but did not join the other Union troops.

At this stage, McDowell ordered two batteries to the plateau in front of Heintzelman's line. These batteries were soon put out of action by a Confederate regiment coming up from Manassas.

The remaining battle consisted of individual charges of Union regiments to retake these batteries.

The Confederate brigades of *Early*, *Holmes*, and *E. Kirby Smith (Elzey)*, coming up on the Union right flank from Manassas,

turned the tide, as Heintzelman had only Col. O. O. Howard's brigade, which reached the field in the afternoon, to protect this flank.

At 4 p. m. the Union troops began to retreat, and the retreat soon became a rout.

Not being able to reform his corps at Centerville, McDowell retreated to the defenses of Washington.

**Comments.**—The plan of the Union authorities was faulty strategically, in so far as it assumed that Patterson would be able to prevent *Johnston* from going to the aid of *Beauregard*. A glance at the map will show that Patterson at Martinsburg, with a raw body of militia without adequate transportation, was in no position to intercept *Johnston's* movement. Patterson, who was at the time held responsible for the failure of the campaign, was at fault only in retiring from Bunker Hill and in sending too confident and boastful telegrams to Washington.

In planning this battle McDowell erred in not reconnoitering the Bull Run. He would have found it fordable above the bridge and might have crossed where Sherman did, thus saving time and the fatiguing march to Sudley Springs.

In executing his plan, McDowell should have deployed along the Warrenton Pike as he originally planned. By deploying along the Sudley Springs road, he separated the divisions of Heintzelman and Hunter from that of Tyler and thus deprived himself of three of Tyler's four brigades.

On the Confederate side, *Johnston* deserves great credit for the prompt manner in which he marched to *Beauregard's* relief. He has been criticised for not pursuing the Union army to Washington and capturing that city. Since the Confederate troops were also much disorganized and were without adequate transportation, the criticism is unjust.

The Confederate victory was due largely to *Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson*, whose brigade stood firm on the hill south of the Warrenton road and gave a point of support about which the other troops could rally.

## OPPOSING FORCES IN THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

*Union Forces.*

Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell.

	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
	Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler.....	4	—	4
Brig. Gen.	Colonel David Hunter.....	2	1	3
Irvin	Colonel Samuel P. Heintzelman.....	3	—	2
McDowell	Colonel Dixon S. Miles.....	2	—	3
		—	—	—
		11	1	12

*Confederate Forces.*

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.....	4	1	4
Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard.....	7*	1	4
	—	—	—
	11	2	8

Strength—Union forces...30,600      Confederate forces.....31,900

Casualties—Union forces.. 2,896      Confederate forces..... 1,982

\*Including Holmes' brigade and other reinforcements.

**August.**—After the battle of Bull Run, McClellan was placed in command of the Department of the Potomac. He confined himself to the holding of the bridge-head at Washington and the guarding of the crossings of the Potomac River above it.

**October.**—In the latter part of October, a Union brigade under Brig. Gen. Edward Baker crossed the Potomac near Leesburg, Va., and was disastrously defeated by a force of twice its strength under Brig. Gen. *Nathan G. Evans* at *Ball's Bluff*.

**December.**—In the latter part of the month, an unimportant engagement took place near *Dranesville*, Va., between a Union brigade under Brig. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord and a Confederate brigade under Brig. Gen. *J. E. B. Stuart* in which the latter was defeated.

## WILSON CREEK CAMPAIGN IN MISSOURI.

## PLATE 4.

The State of Kentucky having assumed a neutral attitude which the Confederate authorities desired to respect, operations in the West were at first confined to Missouri.

Missouri was in the Western Department, formed in July, which comprised all the territory between the Mississippi River and

the Rocky Mountains. It was commanded by Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont with headquarters at St. Louis, Mo.

The Confederate sympathisers in Missouri having been organized by Maj. Gen. *Sterling Price* and Brig. Gen. *M. Jeff. Thompson* of the State troops, these generals called upon the Confederate authorities for assistance.

**August.**—On August 1, there was a combined force of Missouri, Arkansas and Louisiana volunteers and militia of about 10,000 men under *Price* and Brig. Gen. *Ben McCulloch* at Cassville, in southwestern Missouri near the Arkansas line. They were advancing on Springfield.

At Pochontas, in northeastern Arkansas, Brig. Gen. *William J. Hardee* was organizing a force of 5,000 Arkansas volunteers. Near him was a small Missouri force under *Thompson*.

At New Madrid on the Mississippi was a force of 6,000 Tennessee troops under Brig. Gen. *Gideon J. Pillow*. To protect his communications, *Pillow* had fortified *Island No. 10* in the Mississippi River on the Kentucky-Tennessee line.

These independent commands were expected to cooperate and advance on St. Louis.

On August 1, there was a Union force of 6,000 men at Springfield, Mo., under Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Lyon. The remaining Union troops in this section were at Ironton, and along the Mississippi River between Cairo and St. Louis.

Upon learning of the approach of *McCulloch* and *Price*, Lyon moved from Springfield to meet them, and attacked them at *Wilson Creek* on August 10. Lyon was killed and his corps was obliged to retreat to Rolla.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN THE WILSON CREEK CAMPAIGN.

<i>Union Forces.</i>				
Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Lyon.....		4	3	1
<i>Confederate Forces.</i>				
Maj. Gen. Sterling Price....	Missouri Troops	Organizations not known definitely		
Brig. Gen. Ben McCulloch....	Arkansas and Louisiana Troops .....	2	-	2
Strength—Union forces....	5,400	Confederate forces.....	10,200	
Casualties—Union forces....	1,317	Confederate forces.....	1,230	

**Comments.**—In this campaign Lyon made the common mistake of underestimating the strength of his adversaries. Notwithstanding the fact that he was greatly out-numbered, he further divided his force on the day of battle to make simultaneous attacks on his enemy's front and rear.

**Lexington.**—*McCulloch* refused to pursue the retreating Union troops and retired to Arkansas. *Price* took possession of Springfield and then advanced northward to the Missouri River where on September 20 he captured a Union brigade at Lexington.

**October.**—In October, Gen. Frémont took personal command of the troops operating against Price, 20,000 men, threatened *Price's* communication with Arkansas, and compelled him to fall back to southwest Missouri. The Union army advanced as far as Springfield, where Frémont was relieved of the command of the Western Department by Maj. Gen. David Hunter. The latter withdrew the Union army to Rolla. *Price* remained near Springfield until the following spring.

**November.**—In November, the Department of Missouri was formed of the States bordering the Mississippi River and Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck relieved Maj. Gen. Hunter, who took command of the Department of Kansas.

In southern Missouri there were several minor engagements but nothing important was accomplished by the Confederate generals. Early in September, *Pillow* and *Hardee* crossed the Mississippi River and took possession of Columbus, Ky., and left *Thompson* alone in southeastern Missouri.

**Belmont.**—On November 7, Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant took a brigade from Cairo in transports, landed on the west shore of the Mississippi opposite Columbus, Ky., and attacked a confederate camp at *Belmont*, Mo. Although at first successful, he was finally compelled to retire to his transports when reinforcements were sent across the river from Columbus.

## ADVANCE INTO KENTUCKY.

### PLATE 3.

**September.**—Until the month of September, there were none but local troops in Kentucky. Early in that month however the Union troops at Cairo took possession of Paducah and Smithland



at the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, and the Confederates took possession of the bluffs at Columbus. These positions were intrenched for permanent occupation.

About the same time, Union troops from Cincinnati took possession of Louisville and Covington, and the Confederates advanced from Nashville and Knoxville to Bowling Green and the Cumberland River.

There were no important engagements in Kentucky during the year, but both sides strengthened their posts as much as possible.

The Confederate troops occupied a line running from *Cumberland Gap* via *Barboursville*, *Monticello*, *Bowling Green*, *Hopkinsville*, *Fort Donelson*, *Fort Henry*, and *Union City*, to *Columbus* on the Mississippi. Gen. *Albert S. Johnston* commanded the entire line and was in personal command of the *Army of Central Kentucky* at Bowling Green; Maj. Gen. *George B. Crittenden* commanded the troops on the upper Cumberland, and Maj. Gen. *Leonidas S. Polk* those west of the Tennessee River.

The Union troops occupied a line running from *Pikeville* in eastern Kentucky via *Booneville*, *London*, *Somerset*, *Columbia*, *Munfordsville*, *Elizabethtown*, *Calhoun*, *Smithland*, and *Paducah* to *Cairo*.

The States of Kentucky and Tennessee formed the Department of the Cumberland from August to November, 1861, and were commanded in succession by Brig. Gens. Robert Anderson and Wm. T. Sherman.

In November, the middle West was divided between the Departments of the Missouri and the Ohio. The part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River was assigned to the former, and the remainder of the State to the latter.

The Department of the Ohio was commanded by Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell; the District of Cairo of the Department of the Missouri was under Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant.

## OPERATIONS ALONG ATLANTIC COAST IN 1861.

### PLATES 2 and 4.

**Southeast Virginia and North Carolina.**—In May, 1861, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler was sent with a Union division to reinforce the garrison of *Fort Monroe*, Va., and occupy the outlying territory, which became the Department of Southeast Virginia.

In this department occurred the engagement of *Big Bethel*, June

10, in which a Union force was repulsed by a much smaller Confederate force under Col. *John B. Magruder*.

In August, Maj. Gen. John E. Wool succeeded Butler in command of the department, but Butler retained command of the volunteer forces.

In the latter part of August, Butler cooperated with Flag Officer Silas H. Stringham in an attack on two small Confederate forts, *Hatteras* and *Clark*, at the entrance of *Hatteras Inlet*, N. C. The forts were captured and a brigade was left on the coast as a permanent garrison.

These were the only operations during the year.

In September, Butler was relieved in order to organize in New England a force to land at some point on the coast of the Confederate States.

**South Carolina** (Plate 4).—On the last of October, a second expedition sailed from Hampton Roads to make a descent on the South Atlantic coast. This consisted of a fleet of seventeen wooden cruisers under Flag Officer Samuel F. Dupont which convoyed a land force of 15,000 men under Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Sherman.

On November 7 the fleet bombarded *Forts Beauregard* and *Walker* at the entrance of *Port Royal Sound* and drove the defenders from their works. The army then took possession of them. Port Royal Sound was made the base of operations for expeditions along the coast of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST IN 1862.

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- February . . . Capture of Roanoke Island, N. C.  
March . . . . Capture of Newbern, N. C.  
                  Engagement at Kernstown, Va.  
                  Engagement of Monitor and Merrimac, Hampton Roads, Va.  
April . . . . . Peninsular Campaign including siege of Yorktown, Va.  
                  Capture of Fort Pulaski, Ga.  
May . . . . . Peninsula Campaign including engagement at Williamsburg and  
                  battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks.  
                  Shenandoah Valley Campaign including engagements at McDowell,  
                  Front Royal and Winchester, Va.  
                  Engagements at Flat Top Mountains and Lewisburg, W. Va.  
June . . . . . Peninsular Campaign including battles of Mechanicsville, Gaines  
                  Mill, Golding Farm, Savage Station, Glendale and Malvern  
                  Hill, Va.  
                  Shenandoah Valley Campaign including engagements at Cross  
                  Keys and Port Republic, Va.  
August . . . . . Manassas Campaign including battles of Cedar Mountain and  
                  Manassas or Second Bull Run, Va.  
September . . . . . Antietam Campaign including engagement of South Mountain,  
                  capture of Harpers Ferry, and battle of Antietam, Md.  
                  Confederate invasion of W. Va. including capture of Charleston,  
                  Buckhannon and Weston, W. Va.  
October . . . . . Stuart's Chambersburg Raid, Pa.  
                  Confederate withdrawal from W. Va.  
November . . . . . Beginning of Fredericksburg Campaign, Va.  
December . . . . . Battle of Fredericksburg, Va.

### MILITARY SITUATION IN THE EAST JANUARY 1, 1862.

**Confederate.**—On December 31, 1861, the strength of the Confederate troops in the East present for duty was approximately as follows:

Department of Northern Virginia, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston . . . . .	62,000
Department of Norfolk, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger . . . . .	11,500
Army of the Peninsula, Maj. Gen. John Magruder . . . . .	13,000
Army of the Northwest, Brig. Gen. Wm. W. Loring . . . . .	9,500
Department of North Carolina, Brig. Gen. Robert C. Gatlin . . . . .	10,000
Department of South Carolina, etc., Gen. Robert E. Lee . . . . .	18,000
Total . . . . .	124,000
Total present . . . . .	153,000

The *Department of Northern Virginia* was composed of the *Potomac District* commanded by Gen. *Pierre G. T. Beauregard*, the *Acquia District* commanded by Maj. Gen. *Theophilus H. Holmes* and the *Valley District* commanded by Maj. Gen. *Thomas J. Jackson*.

In the *Potomac District* were the four infantry divisions of Maj. Gens. *Earl Van Dorn*, *Gustavus W. Smith*, *James Longstreet* and *E. Kirby Smith*.

In the *Valley District* at Winchester was the *Stonewall Brigade* and three brigades of *Loring's Army of the Northwest*.

In the *Acquia District* were two brigades and the heavy artillery necessary to man the batteries along the Potomac.

Before March 1, *Beauregard* had been sent to Kentucky, *Van Dorn* to Arkansas, and *E. Kirby Smith* to East Tennessee. *Johnston* took personal command of his field army and Maj. Gens. *Richard S. Ewell* and *Daniel H. Hill* took command of the infantry divisions of *E. K. Smith* and *Van Dorn*.

The troops in the *Department of Norfolk* under Maj. Gen. *Benjamin Huger* occupied Norfolk and the territory between the James and the Roanoke rivers east of the Blackwater River.

The *Army of the Peninsula*, under Maj. Gen. *John B. Magruder*, was in the vicinity of Yorktown, Va.

The *Army of the Northwest* (meaning *Army of West Virginia*), although given as a unit in the War Records was already broken up (see p. 22).

The *Departments of North Carolina* and of *South Carolina and Georgia* comprised the troops assigned to the defense of the towns on the navigable waters of those States.

**Union.**—The Union troops in the East present for duty on December 31, were:

Department of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan.....	174,000
Department of S. E. Virginia, Maj. Gen. John E. Wool.....	10,000
Department of West Virginia, Brig. Gen. Wm. S. Rosecrans.....	20,000
South Carolina Corps, Brig. Gen. Thos. W. Sherman.....	13,000
North Carolina Corps, Brig. Gen. Ambrose Burnside.....	12,000
	<hr/>
Total.....	229,000
Total present.....	272,000

The Army of the Potomac had been undergoing the process of organization ever since the preceding August when McClellan was placed in command. McClellan was made general in chief on the retirement of Gen. Scott in November, 1861.

The troops in southeast Virginia under Maj. Gen. Wool were in the neighborhood of *Fort Monroe*.

The troops in West Virginia under Brig. Gen. Rosecrans were organized into eight brigades; four were on the Kanawha River between Charleston and Gauley under Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox; one between Huttonsville and Monterey under Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy; one at Romney under Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck; two on the border between West Virginia and Kentucky. In addition to these brigades there were separate regiments along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

The South Carolina corps under Brig. Gen. Thos. W. Sherman had with the assistance of the navy seized a base at Port Royal, S. C., in the preceding November, and was preparing to operate against Charleston and the forts at the mouth of the Savannah River.

A division was being raised in New England and concentrated at *Fort Monroe* for the purpose of seizing a base on the North Carolina coast. This division was to be commanded by Brig. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside.

## ADVANCE ON MANASSAS, VA.

### PLATES 11 and 12.

**February.**—Urged by the public press, President Lincoln issued a general order directing all the Union armies to advance on February 22. The Army of the Potomac was to take as its objective Manassas Junction.

The Army of the Potomac was at this time composed of fifteen infantry divisions, about 150,000 men, a cavalry brigade, reserve artillery and engineers. Of the infantry divisions seven were on the south bank of the Potomac opposite Washington.

On February 23, Maj. Gen. Banks' division crossed the Potomac at Harpers Ferry and moved to Charlestown, W. Va. The division of Brig. Gen. James Shields, which had been guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between Cumberland and Hancock, was ordered to Martinsburg to unite with Banks.

**March.**—On March 8, President Lincoln directed McClellan to form five army corps, and designated Maj. Gens. Irvin McDowell, Edwin V. Sumner, Samuel P. Heintzelman, Erasmus D. Keyes and Nathaniel P. Banks as the corps commanders.

Each of the first four corps was given three divisions; Banks' corps consisted of his own division, now under Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, and that of Shields.

The division of Maj. Gen. John A. Dix was left near Baltimore and was not incorporated in one of the corps.

The regiments assigned to the defenses of Washington were placed under Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth.

On March 10, the Army of the Potomac began its advance on Manassas. The cavalry that preceded the army soon discovered that the Confederate army had been withdrawn behind the Rappahannock River. As it was not the intention of McClellan to operate in this part of Virginia, the Army of the Potomac retired towards Washington, leaving two divisions of Sumner's corps near Manassas.

When McClellan moved on Manassas, Banks moved his corps from Charlestown and Martinsburg to Winchester.

On March 11, McClellan was relieved as general in chief and retained control of the Army of the Potomac only.

Maj. Gen. Frémont was assigned to the Mountain Department, which included West Virginia, southwest Virginia, and east Kentucky, and Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck was assigned to the Department of the Mississippi which included central and west Kentucky and Missouri.

On March 22, by the creation of the Middle Department, consisting of the northern part of Maryland and the adjacent States under Gen. Dix, that officer with his division was removed from McClellan's command.

On March 1, Gen. *Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Northern Virginia*, which had remained near Manassas since the battle of Bull Run, numbered only 40,000 men. Not feeling able to hold this position against McClellan's forces, *Johnston* decided to fall back along the railroad behind the Rappahannock. This movement was completed just as McClellan moved on Manassas. From this position *Johnston* later retired behind the Rapidan. In his retreat he destroyed the railroad as far south as the Rapidan River.

The Confederate troops of the Acquia District fell back to Fredericksburg, destroying the Acquia Creek railroad north of that point.

## THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

### PLATE 10.

**McClellan's Plan.**—During the winter of 1861–1862, McClellan had been studying the military situation in Virginia and on February 3 he submitted to President Lincoln his plan of operation.

He proposed to move the main body of the Army of the Potomac by water to Urbanna, Va., near the mouth of the Rappahannock, and march from there to Richmond via West Point. This was the shortest land route to the Confederate capital and turned the Confederate positions both at Manassas and at Yorktown.

President Lincoln was unwilling to permit such a movement while *Johnston* was at Manassas, and therefore directed McClellan to advance against that place. In March, when he learned that the Confederates had retired behind the Rappahannock, the President gave his consent to McClellan's plan provided it was so modified as to furnish a reserve force in northern Virginia sufficiently strong to hold Manassas, and a strong garrison in the defenses of Washington.

To ascertain accurately what force would be required for these two positions, a board of generals was convened to investigate the matter. This board decided that the force at Manassas should be 25,000 men, and that at Washington, 12,000 men.

The plan thus modified was approved on March 13.

To carry out this plan, McClellan ordered Banks to bring five of his six brigades to Manassas and leave one to guard the Shenandoah Valley. To insure communication with this brigade a force of workmen was placed on the Manassas Gap Railroad to put it in working order. Should Banks' five brigades not average 5,000 men, there were 19,000 in the defenses of Washington which, according to the plan required only a garrison of 12,000. McClellan would take with him to *Fort Monroe* the other four corps of the army, about 150,000 men.

The base was changed from Urbanna to *Fort Monroe* presumably because of the better landing facilities at the latter place, and because the operations of the U. S. Navy in the Carolinas seemed

to indicate that Yorktown like Port Royal, S. C., could be easily reduced by a combined land and naval force.

The James River was closed to McClellan's transports by the Confederate ironclad *Merrimac* or *Virginia*.

On March 18, the first of the twelve divisions left Alexandria in transports for *Fort Monroe*, and on the 22d Banks left Winchester with Williams' division for Manassas. Shields was to follow.

On the 23d, *Jackson* made an attack on Shields at *Kernstown* near Winchester.

At this time Banks was east of Berryville, where one of his brigades had crossed the Shenandoah. He ordered this brigade to move on to Manassas and returned with the other two to Winchester.

With McClellan's consent, Banks with his five brigades started up the Shenandoah Valley after *Jackson*.

Two divisions of Sumner's corps were to occupy Manassas until relieved by Banks.

On March 31, Blenker's division of Sumner's corps was transferred from McClellan to Frémont and ordered to West Virginia via Winchester. On April 1, Sumner was ordered to withdraw his other division from Manassas and march to Alexandria where he was to embark.

**April.**—It was now observed by the authorities in Washington that McClellan had permitted Banks to remain in the Shenandoah Valley without making adequate provision for the force required at Manassas. McClellan having sailed for *Fort Monroe* on the 1st of April, on the 4th, President Lincoln personally detached McDowell's corps, which had been directed to follow Sumner to Fort Monroe, and ordered McDowell to remain and cover Washington.

By the President's order both McDowell and Banks were then detached from McClellan's command. The former was placed in command of the Department of the Rappahannock or northeast Virginia, and the latter of the Department of the Shenandoah or the Shenandoah Valley. They were to be under the direct orders of the Secretary of War.

After his plan of campaign was approved, Gen. McClellan thus



lost control of four of the twelve divisions of his field army and of the two divisions of Banks' corps.

McClellan went in person to the Peninsula April 1, and found 60,000 men of the corps of Heintzelman and Keyes ready to move. With these he advanced on the 4th, and on the following day was stopped by the *Yorktown line*. After a two-days' reconnaissance he concluded that the line was too strong to be forced. He thereupon encamped his army and sent for heavy guns to take Yorktown by regular siege. The navy too had decided that the water batteries were too strong to be reduced by bombardment.

**Lee's Plan.**—About the middle of March, Gen. *Lee*, who had been sent from western Virginia to South Carolina when Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Sherman landed at Front Royal, was relieved by Maj. Gen. *John C. Pemberton* and was assigned to the office of the *Secretary of War* to supervise the operations of all the Confederate armies.

*Lee* was informed of the Union movement to *Fort Monroe* as soon as it was made, but was unable to decide whether McClellan's true point of attack was Norfolk or *Magruder's* Yorktown line. A joint attack of McClellan and of Burnside who was then in North Carolina, on Norfolk seemed quite probable. His first step was to order a brigade from the *Army of Northern Virginia* to Petersburg to be ready to move by rail to Norfolk, or by water from City Point to the Yorktown line. Transportation was also sent down the James River to ferry troops across in the vicinity of Yorktown.

As the Union force near *Fort Monroe* continued to increase, *Johnston* was directed to prepare to move the *Army of Northern Virginia* to the relief of either point, and one of his divisions was ordered in advance to Richmond. It was not until April 4 that *Lee* was certain that the main attack was to be made on *Magruder*. Hence, the latter had been reinforced by the Petersburg brigade and some Richmond regiments only, when the Union army appeared in his front. He was then holding a line eight miles long with about 15,000 to 17,000 men.

**Yorktown** (Plate 10).—A few days later, the division from Richmond reached Yorktown and it was followed by all the troops in the *Department of Northern Virginia*, save *Jackson's* valley division, *Ewell's* division on the Rappahannock near Culpeper,

and *Charles W. Field's* brigade at Fredericksburg. *Johnston* took charge of the defense, and the troops of *Magruder* were put under his command. The four divisions of the *Army of Northern Virginia* on the Peninsula were now commanded by Maj. Gens. *G. W. Smith*, *J. B. Magruder*, *James Longstreet* and *D. H. Hill*.

During the siege of Yorktown, April 5 to May 3, *McClellan's* army was reinforced by Brig. Gen. *W. B. Franklin's* division of *McDowell's* corps which made its strength 112,000. *Johnston* gives his strength as 60,000 men.

**May.**—*Johnston* did not approve of the Yorktown line and advocated a concentration of his entire command in the vicinity of Richmond. He therefore evacuated his line on May 3, just as the Union siege guns were about to open fire, and fell back to a position in front of Richmond prepared by the Confederate engineers. In the retreat an unimportant rear-guard action took place at *Williamsburg, Va.*

On *Johnston's* retreat, *Huger* was ordered to evacuate Norfolk and fall back to Petersburg. Thereupon the troops at *Fort Monroe* under *Wool* took possession of Norfolk and advanced along the Petersburg railroad as far as Suffolk, Va.

When *Huger* evacuated Norfolk, the Confederate naval authorities destroyed the ironclad *Merrimac* to prevent its capture and thus opened the James River to the Union fleet as far as the batteries on *Drewry's Bluff*, seven miles below Richmond, where the fleet was repulsed May 15.

**Seven Pines or Fair Oaks** (Plate 11).—During the months of April and May, President Lincoln became convinced that he was retaining too many troops in northern Virginia. He therefore reinforced *McDowell* with *Shields' division* of *Banks' corps* and Maj. Gen. *Edward O. C. Ords' division* from the defenses of Washington, and directed *McDowell* to concentrate his four divisions at Fredericksburg and move southward along the railroad to cooperate with *McClellan*. To conform to this movement, *McClellan* established his base at White House, advanced along the railroad to the Chickahominy, and extended his right wing along the north bank of that river towards the Fredericksburg railroad.

When *Franklin's* division joined him, *McClellan* reorganized his army into five corps of two divisions each. The V and VI

provisional corps were commanded by Brig. Gens. Fitz-John Porter and William B. Franklin.

On May 24, the corps of Porter, Franklin, and Sumner were on the north bank of the Chickahominy and formed a line extending from the Hanover railroad to the West Point railroad; Heintzelman's corps was near the West Point railroad bridge over the Chickahominy, and Keyes' corps was on the same railroad several miles in advance of Heintzelman. The railroad from West Point to the Chickahominy had just been repaired and equipped with rolling-stock.

At Fredericksburg, less than fifty miles from Porter, McDowell had assembled a corps of 40,000 men and on the following morning was to start southward to unite with McClellan. Only a small Confederate division was in his front.

At this critical moment, word was received in Washington that *Jackson* had destroyed Williams' division of Banks' corps that had been left in the Shenandoah Valley. McDowell was ordered by President Lincoln to suspend his movement on Richmond and send 20,000 men to assist in *Jackson's* capture. He sent the divisions of Shields and Ord, and later that of Brig. Gen. Rufus King. The division of Brig. Gen. George A. McCall was left at Fredericksburg.

In extending his army to cover the advance of McDowell, McClellan had isolated the corps of Keyes. *Johnston* took advantage of the situation and planned an attack on Keyes with the divisions of *G. W. Smith*, *Longstreet*, *D. H. Hill* and two brigades of *Huger's* division.

*Johnston's* orders were not well executed, and when Sumner crossed the Chickahominy to Keyes' assistance the Confederate attack in the battle of *Seven Pines* or *Fair Oaks* of May 31, and June 1, was repulsed.

*Johnston* was wounded on May 31, and after the battle *Lee* was assigned to the command of the armies in Virginia and North Carolina.

**Seven Days' Battle** (Plate 11).—Immediately after the battle of Seven Pines, President Lincoln, in response to McClellan's repeated calls for reinforcements, sent McCall's division of McDowell's corps from Fredericksburg to McClellan by water and it was attached to Porter's corps. (For organization see p. 44.)

**June.**—During the month of June, McClellan readjusted his line and placed the corps of Franklin, Sumner, and Heintzelman south of the Chickahominy. They formed a line connecting the Chickahominy River and White Oak Swamp, six miles in advance of the West Point railroad bridge over the Chickahominy. The line was strengthened by intrenchments and obstacles. Porter remained north of the Chickahominy, and Keyes in reserve at the railroad bridge.

McClellan's disposition was a weak one, since Porter's corps was separated from the others by the Chickahominy. The Secretary of War had however on June 8 directed McDowell to again concentrate his corps at Fredericksburg and move overland to join McClellan. To assist in this movement it was essential for McClellan to keep at least one corps north of the Chickahominy.

The Army of Northern Virginia had also been strengthened and reorganized. (For organization see p. 45.)

*G. W. Smith's* division was temporarily commanded by Brig. Gen. *Wm. H. C. Whiting*; *Magruder* had command of his own division, the division of Maj. Gen. *Lafayette McLaws*, and the division of Brig. Gen. *D. R. Jones*; *Longstreet* and *D. H. Hill* commanded their old divisions; Maj. Gen. *A. P. Hill* commanded a new division made up principally of brigades sent from North Carolina and Georgia after the retreat from Yorktown; *Huger's* division was now united in front of Richmond and the defense of the country south of the James River was assigned to Maj. Gen. *Holmes* of the Department of North Carolina who established temporary headquarters at Petersburg. He brought one of his brigades to that point, sent one to Drewry's Bluff on the James River, and one to *Huger*.

About the 10th of June the divisions of *Jackson* and *Ewell* were near Swift Run Gap, in the Blue Ridge Mountains, where *Jackson* was reinforced by Brig. Gen. *A. R. Lawton's* brigade from Georgia. In response to *Jackson's* call for reinforcements, *Whiting's* division had also been sent to him.

When it became apparent to *Lee* that *Jackson's* operations had removed all fear of offensive movements by the Union troops in northern Virginia, he decided to take advantage of McClellan's faulty position and attack Fitz-John Porter's corps with an overwhelming force.

For this purpose he recalled *Jackson* with the divisions of *Winder*, *Ewell* and *Whiting*. *Jackson* was to march from Ashland Station to reach the right flank and rear of the Union position.

From the troops around Richmond, the divisions of *Longstreet*, *D. H. Hill*, and *A. P. Hill* were to join in the attack.

In the attacking columns there would be 27 brigades, or about 60,000 men, while in front of the corps of Sumner, Heintzelman and Franklin would be three divisions of 10 brigades, 24,000 men.

There being no accurate maps of the country through which *Jackson* was to march, *Lee* directed Brig. Gen. *J. E. B. Stuart* to reconnoiter it. *Stuart* took three regiments of cavalry, and about the middle of June, not only reconnoitered the country, but rode entirely around the Union army, passing close to White House and destroying large quantities of supplies.

This movement of *Stuart's* cavalry called the attention of McClellan to the weakness of his line of communications and led him to prepare to change his base to the James River.

*Jackson* informed *Lee* that he would be in position on the morning of June 26, and this day was fixed for the attack on Porter's intrenched advanced post at *Beaver Run*. *Jackson* however was one day late, and the attack made on the afternoon of the 26th by *A. P. Hill* and *D. H. Hill* on a part of Porter's corps at *Beaver Run* or *Mechanicsville* was repulsed.

On the following afternoon, *Winder*, *Ewell*, *Whiting*, *Longstreet* and the two *Hills* made a joint attack on the whole of Porter's corps, 27,000 men, at *Gaines Mill* where it had been concentrated. Porter made a vigorous defense and having been reinforced during the battle by 14,000 troops from the south side of the Chickahominy, withdrew his corps that night across the Chickahominy, leaving 2,800 prisoners and 22 guns in the enemy's possession.

McClellan was thus compelled to abandon his base at White House and West Point. He had however foreseen this contingency and had ordered all his wagon trains to join the army. He sent them at once under escort of Porter's corps to the James River. His transports were also ordered up that river to Harrison Landing.

McClellan withdrew his entire army towards the James River and was vigorously attacked en route at *Goldings Farm*, *Savage*

*Station, Glendale, and Malvern Hill.* The last was a position selected in advance and held by Porter's corps and the reserve artillery as a nucleus. In this last attack, July 1, the Confederates were decisively repulsed and the pursuit ended. *Lee* withdrew towards Richmond, and *McClellan* towards his new base, Harrison Landing.

**July-August.**—This closed the campaign; about a month later the Army of the Potomac was withdrawn from the James and sent to northern Virginia without fighting another battle.

In July, *Magruder* was relieved from the *Army of Northern Virginia* in order to take command of a department, and *Huger* was made Inspector of Ordnance and Artillery. Maj. Gen. *Richard H. Anderson* succeeded to the command of *Huger's* division and *McLaws* united *Magruder's* division with his own.

In August, Maj. Gen. *G. W. Smith* was placed in charge of the defenses of Richmond, and his division fell to Brig. Gen. *John B. Hood*.

The cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia under Maj. Gen. *Stuart* was organized into two brigades commanded by Brig. Gens. *Wade Hampton* and *Fitzhugh Lee*.

**Comment.**—The plan of Gen. *McClellan*, while strategically correct had one serious weakness, in that it did not meet with the hearty approval of President Lincoln who, as chief executive, was responsible for the conduct of the war.

Since the President insisted on a strong force at Manassas, *McClellan* made a mistake in allowing *Banks* to depart from the original plan and pursue *Jackson* up the Shenandoah Valley. *Shields* had already defeated *Jackson* and it would have been sufficient to intrench *Shields* temporarily at Winchester to guard the valley. *Williams' division* should have continued to Manassas. This, with one of *Sumner's* divisions, would have formed the garrison at Manassas and *McClellan* would have had ten instead of eight divisions in his field army even after *Blenker* was detached.

Since the main attack was to be made on Richmond and its covering forces, the authorities were wrong in detaching *Blenker's* division to send it to West Virginia where its operations could be

of only minor importance. It should have been left at Manassas to cover Washington.

Since McClellan had failed to carry out this part of his approved plan, President Lincoln was right in directing McDowell's corps to cover Washington at least until the Army of the Potomac had taken Yorktown.

McClellan's most serious mistake was in not making a vigorous attempt to carry the Yorktown line while *Magruder* was unsupported. On April 5 *Magruder* reported to Gen. *Lee*, "I have made arrangements to fight my small force, but without the slightest hope of success." Had a serious effort been made on the 5th or 6th, while *Magruder* was in this frame of mind, success would have been almost certain.

The capture of Yorktown would have given President Lincoln confidence in McClellan's judgment and he would probably have restored to McClellan the troops of McDowell, Banks, and Blenker.

The month's delay before Yorktown gave the Confederates time to strengthen the fortifications of Richmond and rally to its defense all available troops in the East.

When McClellan reached the front of Richmond he was no longer in condition to carry his campaign to a successful conclusion without considerable reinforcements; he therefore took up a defensive position and awaited McDowell's arrival. His position was weakened by the Chickahominy River, both banks of which he was compelled to occupy to cover his base at White House. He could not abandon this base so long as McDowell was under orders to join him.

President Lincoln made a serious mistake when he stopped McDowell's advance and diverted him to the minor operation of stopping *Jackson's* raid in the Shenandoah Valley. Had McDowell joined McClellan in front of Richmond while *Jackson* was still in the Shenandoah Valley, *Lee* could not have prevented the capture of Richmond.

When McClellan finally reached the James River at Harrison Landing, the Army of the Potomac was in a good position to operate against Richmond, but it would have been impossible to accomplish anything without adequate reinforcements. As the government was unable to furnish these, it was no doubt wise to withdraw the army to a base from which it could advance.

The credit of defeating the plan of McClellan must be awarded to *Lee*, who, as commander of the State forces of Virginia, ordered the construction of defenses at Yorktown in April, 1861; who, as directing general, assumed the responsibility of keeping *Jackson* and *Ewell* in western Virginia while McClellan and McDowell were threatening Richmond; and who, as commander of the *Army of Northern Virginia*, finally drove McClellan to the James River. He ran considerable risk in letting *Jackson* operate far from Richmond, but the events justified his conclusions that the moral effect of *Jackson's* movements on the authorities at Washington would warrant the risk.

That *Lee* was not more successful in the Seven Days' battles must be attributed largely to *Jackson's* unexpected slowness in his operations during this week and to McClellan's foresight in preparing for his change of base to the James River.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES.

*Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
II	Brig. Gen. Israel B. Richardson . . . . .	3	—	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick . . . . .	3	—	2
Edwin V. Sumner	Cavalry and Reserve Artillery . . . . .	—	1	2
III	Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker . . . . .	3	—	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Philip Kearney . . . . .	3	—	2
Sam'l P. Heintzelman	Cavalry and Reserve Artillery . . . . .	—	1	3
IV	Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch . . . . .	3	—	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John J. Peck . . . . .	2	—	3
Erasmus D. Keyes	Cavalry and Reserve Artillery . . . . .	—	1	4
V	Brig. Gen. George W. Morell . . . . .	3	—	4
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. George Sykes . . . . .	3	—	3
Fitz-John Porter	Brig. Gen. George A. McCall . . . . .	3	—	4
	Cavalry . . . . .	—	1	—
VI	Brig. Gen. Henry W. Slocum . . . . .	3	—	3
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. William F. Smith . . . . .	3	—	4
William B. Franklin	Cavalry . . . . .	—	1	—
		32		
Cavalry Reserve	Brig. Gen. Philip St. G. Cooke . . . . .	2	4	—
Artillery Reserve	Colonel Henry J. Hunt . . . . .	5	—	22

1 regiment siege artillery.



*Army of Northern Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell . . . . .	4	—	3
Thomas J. Jackson	Brig. Gen. William H. C. Whiting . .	2	—	2
	Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder . . . . .	4	—	4
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder . . . . .	2	—	2
	Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws . . . . .	2	—	2
	Brig. Gen. David R. Jones . . . . .	2	—	5
	Reserve Artillery . . . . .			3
John B. Magruder	Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill . . . . .	5	—	7
	Maj. Gen. James Longstreet . . . . .	6	—	7
	Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger . . . . .	3	—	6
	Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill . . . . .	6	—	9
	Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes . .	3	—	6
		—		
		37		
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. James E. B. Stuart . . . . .	1	11	1
Reserve Artillery	Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton . . .	6 battalions		23

*Strength.**Casualties.*

		Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	TOTAL.
Army of the Potomac . . . . .	105,000	1,734	8,062	6,053	15,849
Army of Northern Virginia . . . . .	90,000	3,286	15,909	940	20,135

*Holmes'* division, 9,000 men, included in the above, did not belong to the *Army of Northern Virginia*. One brigade was with *Huger's* division; the others were engaged only on June 30.

## THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN.

## PLATE 12.

When *J. E. Johnston*, in July, 1861, marched with his army from Winchester to Manassas, he left the defense of the Valley to the Virginia State militia. They were not disturbed until October when a Union force took possession of Romney and threatened Winchester.

*Jackson* was then sent with his brigade to Winchester to defend the Valley. Having little faith in militia, he requested reinforcements from *Loring's Army of the Northwest* and received three brigades.

**January.**—In January he retook Romney and directed *Loring* to hold it. Because of the protests of his officers, *Jackson* was directed to give up Romney and fall back to Winchester. One of *Loring's* brigades was now sent to Manassas and *Jackson* was left with a division of three brigades which, with his cavalry, made a force of about 9,000 men.

**March.**—Early in March, Banks' corps moved from Charlestown and Martinsburg, to Winchester.\*

The advance of this corps caused *Jackson* to evacuate Winchester, March 12, and retire up the valley to Mt. Jackson; Shields' division advanced to Strasburg and Williams' division remained at Winchester.

Banks now prepared to move his corps to Manassas as required by McClellan's plan.† On March 20, Williams started for Manassas via Berryville and Shields fell back to Winchester. Shields was to follow Williams as soon as practicable.

**Kernstown.**—*Jackson* being informed by his spies that a large force was moving out of the Valley, made a forced march and on the 23d attacked Shields at *Kernstown* four miles south of Winchester. His object was to retain Banks' command in the Valley. *Jackson* was repulsed and fell back to Strasburg. In this engagement Shields had about 7,000 men and *Jackson* 3,500. *Jackson* had left many stragglers on the road.

The news of this attack reached Banks, who was with Williams' division, just after one of the infantry brigades had crossed the Shenandoah River. This brigade was ordered to continue its march, but with the other two he returned to Winchester. Banks had now about 20,000 men to protect his communications to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and advance against *Jackson*.

**April.**—With McClellan's consent Banks decided to remain in the valley until *Jackson* could be disposed of. On April 4, he was detached from McClellan's command and placed in charge of the Department of the Shenandoah or in independent command of his two divisions. He advanced slowly up the valley and on May 1 occupied his most advanced position. His headquarters were at Newmarket at the junction of the roads along the two branches of the Shenandoah, and his advance guard at Harrisonburg.

\*See page 34.

†See page 35.

The advance of the Union troops up the Shenandoah was accompanied by a similar advance of the troops in West Virginia.

Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck's brigade moved from Romney to Moorefield and then to Franklin; Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy's brigade moved from Huttonsville to Monterey and McDowell. Blenker's division from McClellan's army had just reached Winchester en route for Romney. Frémont's plan was to reinforce Milroy with his entire command, as soon as Blenker's division joined him, and advance on Staunton.

*Jackson* had retired slowly up the valley as far as Harrisonburg; from that place he retired eastward toward Swift Run Gap where he would be in their front should the Union troops move on Gordonsville, and on their flank should they advance on Staunton.

When *Jackson* retired eastward from Harrisonburg, Brig. Gen. *Edward Johnson*, whose Confederate division of 3,500 men had been west of Monterey, fell back to the vicinity of Staunton.

While Gen. Banks was pursuing *Jackson* up the valley the situation east of the Blue Ridge Mountains was being materially changed.

About the beginning of April, *Johnston* began to withdraw the *Army of Northern Virginia* from the Rappahannock to go to the Peninsula. He left *Field's* brigade at Fredericksburg, and *Ewell's* division, 8,500 men, along the Rappahannock northeast of Culpeper. Besides preventing the passage of that river by McDowell's troops advancing along the railroad from Manassas, *Ewell* was to cooperate either with *Jackson* or with *Field*.

McDowell with his corps was also relieved from the orders of McClellan, April 4, and he was given command of the Department of the Rappahannock including all northern Virginia east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. From the vicinity of the Potomac he pushed his two divisions forward, and about April 20, drove *Field's* brigade out of Fredericksburg where by May 1, he had assembled two divisions under Brig. Gens. George A. McCall and Rufus King. At Manassas he formed a third division under Maj. Gen. Edward E. O. Ord from the brigade sent by Banks and one sent from Washington. A brigade was also guarding the repair of the Manassas Railroad.

When McDowell began to assemble his corps at Fredericksburg, *Lee* sent two brigades received from North Carolina to support *Field*. One took station at Hanover Junction and one be-

tween that point and *Field*. Brig. Gen. *A. P. Hill* was made a major general and assumed command of these three brigades, which became the nucleus of his division.

**May** (Plate 2).—At the beginning of the month of May therefore we have of the Union divisions *McCall* and *King* at *Fredericksburg*; *Ord* at *Manassas*; *Blenker* at *Winchester* on his way to *Romney* and *Moorefield*; *Williams* and *Shields* in the vicinity of *New Market* and *Harrisonburg*; *Schenck's* brigade at *Franklin*; and *Milroy's* brigade between the village of *McDowell* and *Staunton*. The aggregate of these forces was about 80,000 men present for duty.

Of the Confederate forces, *A. P. Hill* had three brigades south of *Fredericksburg*; *Ewell's* division was near *Stanardsville*; *Jackson's* division was at *Swift Run Gap*; and *Edward Johnson's* two small brigades west of *Staunton*. Their aggregate strength was about 32,000 men.

*Lee* was much puzzled as to the best manner of meeting all the various Union columns without weakening *Johnston*. It was essential to check *McDowell's* advance from *Fredericksburg* and to prevent *Banks* from crossing the *Blue Ridge Mountains*. If *Banks* could be compelled to retreat, it would greatly relieve the pressure, and release *Jackson* and *Ewell*.

**Jackson's Plans.**—At this stage *Jackson*, who had been studying the situation, submitted three plans: (1) to unite with *Edward Johnson* and attack *Milroy*; (2) to unite with *Ewell* and attack *Banks' advanced troops* at *Harrisonburg*; (3) to unite with *Ewell* and attack *Banks' communications* via *Front Royal*. *Lee* allowed him to make his own selection.

As *Edward Johnson's* retreat to *Staunton* had uncovered the road from the village of *McDowell* to *Harrisonburg*, *Jackson* decided to attack *Milroy* and prevent him from joining *Banks*.

**McDowell.**—Ordering *Ewell* to *Swift Run Gap* to watch *Banks*, and his own cavalry under Brig. Gen. *Turner Ashby* to cover *Staunton*, *Jackson* moved his infantry up the *Shenandoah* to *Port Republic*, crossed the mountains to the railroad and took the train for *Staunton*. Uniting with *Johnson* he moved to attack *Milroy* who concentrated his brigade at *McDowell* and called *Schenck* to his assistance.

On the 8th of May, Milroy attacked *Jackson* near *McDowell* as the latter was advancing and was repulsed. On the following day the two Union brigades retired towards Franklin pursued by the divisions of *Jackson* and *Johnson*.

At Franklin, Milroy and Schenck found Frémont with a part of Blenker's division and on May 12, the pursuit was checked. The strength of the Union forces at *McDowell* was about 2,300 and that of the Confederate 6,000.

When *Ewell* moved to Swift Run Gap, *A. P. Hill's* brigade was sent from Hanover Junction to Gordonsville.

On May 13, *Jackson* returned to *McDowell* and on the following day crossed the mountains and started on the road to Harrisonburg. At the foot of the mountains he gave his troops a two-days' rest and there learned the movements made by Banks' corps while he was operating against Milroy.

On May 1, Banks received orders to retire with Williams' division to Strasburg and intrench himself there. He was directed to send Shields' division to Fredericksburg to join *McDowell*.

On May 10, this movement was begun, and two days later Banks was at Strasburg and Shields was marching via Luray, Front Royal, and Warrenton, to Fredericksburg. *Jackson's* cavalry, which he had left in the valley, followed Banks towards Strasburg. *Ewell* was still at Swift Run Gap.

*Jackson* was advised by *Lee* to attack Banks and drive him across the Potomac if it could be done quickly; he was to remember however that at any time he, *Jackson*, might be called to Richmond to assist *Johnston*.

**Front Royal and Winchester.**—On May 19, *Jackson* started via Newmarket for Luray where *Ewell* was to join him; he reached its vicinity on the 21st. Here he found that *Ewell* had orders to go to Richmond and it was necessary to wait until these were revoked. On the 22d he started for Front Royal, thirty-two miles distant, and reached that place on the afternoon of the 23d.

At this time *Jackson's* command consisted of his own division of three brigades, *Ewell's* division and the two brigades of *Edw. Johnson*. As *Johnson* had been seriously wounded at *McDowell*, his brigades were assigned to *Ewell's* division. It is probable that *Jackson's* actual strength was between 15,000 and 18,000.

The command under Banks consisted of two infantry brigades

and one cavalry brigade; in the returns of the previous month this strength was given as 9,000 present for duty. Of these, a mixed brigade of 1,000 men was at Front Royal, the main cavalry force, 2,500 men, was south of Strasburg, and the main infantry force, 4,500 men, was at Strasburg.

The Union force at Front Royal made a stubborn resistance and delayed the Confederate advance. Word was sent to Strasburg and Banks took prompt measures. His trains were at once sent back to Winchester, his outposts called in, and his infantry ordered to march to Winchester early in the morning. The cavalry brigade was to act as rear guard and hold Strasburg until all supplies were either removed or destroyed.

The two infantry brigades were to follow immediately behind the trains.

From Front Royal, three roads lead to the Strasburg-Winchester road over which the Union troops were about to retreat. One runs to Middletown seven miles from Strasburg; one to Newtown ten miles from Strasburg; and the other to Winchester nineteen miles from Strasburg, and also nineteen miles from Front Royal.

*Jackson* acted on the assumption that Banks would probably remain at Strasburg or attempt to retreat by the railroad towards Manassas. He therefore moved with all his command, save two regiments of cavalry and a brigade of infantry, towards Middletown. As he had a march of twelve miles to make and his troops were somewhat exhausted, he arrived at Middletown late in the day and learned that all of Banks' troops, save some cavalry, had already passed that point en route for Winchester.

Two regiments of cavalry under Brig. Gen. *George H. Stuart* went from Front Royal to Newtown and arrived in time to attack the Union trains, but they were driven off by the infantry which followed the trains.

The brigade under *Ewell*, that moved by the direct road, was halted for orders half way between Front Royal and Winchester and came into contact with the Union troops only during the night.

Discovering his error, *Jackson* marched from Middletown for Winchester that night, but Banks' troops checked him long enough to save the trains; the following day, May 25, Banks followed his trains and made a forced march for the Potomac at Williamsport, thirty miles away, which he reached and crossed

in safety. His cavalry, which was separated from Banks by *Jackson*, made a detour westward and also reached the Potomac.

Not being able to pursue Banks across the river, *Jackson* turned his attention to Harpers Ferry which was guarded by two brigades under Brig. Gen. Rufus Saxton. *Jackson* had concentrated his command in front of Harpers Ferry when on May 29, he learned that Shields was approaching Front Royal to cut off his retreat. He at once fell back to Winchester.

**Cross Keys and Port Republic.**—On May 24, McDowell had concentrated four divisions, 40,000 men, at Fredericksburg and was about to start for Richmond, when he received orders to stop his movement and send 20,000 men at once to the Shenandoah Valley to assist Frémont in capturing *Jackson*. McDowell pointed out the futility of such a movement but complied with the order.

Shields' division was directed to return to Front Royal by the route it had come, and Ord's division was sent by water to Alexandria to follow the railroad to Manassas. Later, King's division was started on the route followed by Shields. McCall's division only was left at Fredericksburg.

Shields' leading brigade and a squadron of cavalry reached Front Royal May 30, and captured a number of Confederate stragglers gathered there. This day *Jackson* was concentrating at Winchester.

The following day *Jackson* reached Strasburg and held it long enough to unite his entire force; on June 1, he retired up the valley.

**June.**—When *Jackson* left Strasburg, Shields' division was at Front Royal, Ord's division on the railroad east of the mountains, and King's division was near Warrenton Junction. Frémont's corps, consisting of Blenker's division and the brigades of Milroy and Schenck, was five miles west of Strasburg. His cavalry was skirmishing with that of *Jackson*. The bad condition of the Manassas Gap railroad and the difficulty of supplying his troops had delayed McDowell's divisions, and the bad roads had delayed Frémont.

Having failed to cut off *Jackson's* retreat at Strasburg, Frémont decided to pursue him up the valley, while Shields pushed up the South Fork of the Shenandoah to Luray and beyond to get in his

rear. Frémont was reinforced by Bayard's cavalry brigade of McDowell's corps.

*Jackson* retreated slowly up the valley closely pursued by Frémont. To prevent Shields from uniting with Frémont, he sent cavalry to destroy all the bridges over the South Fork of the Shenandoah as far as Port Republic where he himself proposed to cross.

When he reached the vicinity of Port Republic he found it occupied by Shields' advance brigade. *Jackson* now had adversaries both in his front and rear. He therefore halted his army at *Cross Keys* and there fought an engagement on June 8, to stop Frémont's pursuit. After a day's hard fighting he was left in possession of the field.

Leaving a rear guard to hold Frémont, he advanced that night to drive from Port Republic the two brigades of Shields' division that had reached it. He defeated Shields' troops in the engagement of *Port Republic*, June 9, and drove them down the valley towards Swift Run Gap.

Frémont gives the strength of his command at 10,500; Shields' brigades numbered 3,000. *Jackson's* command had a strength of about 13,000.

This closed the campaign, as Frémont was ordered to fall back to Harrisonburg, Shields to Luray, McDowell to concentrate once more at Fredericksburg, and Banks, reinforced by the two brigades from Harpers Ferry under command of Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, to advance to Winchester.

*Jackson* was reinforced by three brigades from Richmond to meet Frémont and Shields; when they retired, he was ordered with his entire command to Richmond to assist *Lee* in his attack on McClellan.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

##### *Kernstown in March.*

##### *Union Forces.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Brig. Gen. James Shields.....	3	-	3

##### *Confederate Forces.*

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson.....	3	1	5
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*McDowell in May.**Union Forces.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments. Cav.	Batter- ies.
Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy.....	1	—	2
Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck.....	1	—	2

*Confederate Forces.*

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson.....	3	—	6
Brig. Gen. Edward Johnson.....	2	—	—

*Winchester in May.**Union Forces.*

Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks.

Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams.....	2	—	3
Cavalry.....	1	5	—

*Confederate Forces.*

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson.

Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder.....	3	—	6
Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell.....	4	—	5
Brig. Gen. Turner Ashby* (Cavalry).....	1	3	1

*Shenandoah Valley in June.**Union Forces.*

Shields' division as given above divided into four brigades.

Frémont's corps.

Brig. Gen. Louis Blenker.....	4	—	4
Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck.....	1	—	2
Brig. Gen. Robert Milroy.....	1	—	2
Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard (Cavalry).....	1	3	1

*Confederate Forces.*

Jackson's corps as given at Winchester.

\*Killed in retreat in June.

**Comments** (Plate 2).—The result of the operations of the Union forces in northern Virginia demonstrates the futility of diverting troops to minor operations while an important campaign is in progress.

It is impossible to justify either Frémont's advance from West Virginia, or Banks' advance up the Shenandoah Valley, while such an important campaign as that undertaken by McClellan was taking place in the same theatre of operations.

Had Milroy's brigade remained at Huttonsville and Schenck's at Franklin, they could easily have guarded the approaches to West Virginia, and Blenker's division could have remained at Manassas. No permanent result could be accomplished by an advance on Staunton; the small detachments of Milroy and

Schenck only ran the risk of being destroyed by such a movement.

When Banks advanced up the valley, he was separating his own troops more and more from those of McClellan, while he was driving *Jackson* in closer communication with *Lee*. Had Shields been intrenched at Winchester after the battle of Kernstown, he would have covered the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and would have freed Williams' division for its proper duty of covering Washington.

By making Frémont and Banks independent commanders, the authorities sanctioned the operations that led to no adequate results, but removed the divisions of Blenker and Williams from their proper spheres of duty.

When Banks was ordered to intrench Williams' division in the valley and send Shields' division to McDowell, he should not have been ordered to take post above Winchester. His force was too small to hold both Strasburg and Front Royal, and protect his communications to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The Manassas Gap railroad should have been abandoned and the brigade assigned to guard it should have been sent to Banks.

The campaign of *Jackson* is probably the most brilliant of his career. Never has a diversion had such important effects on the conduct of a campaign. In only one movement did he seem to err in judgment. From Front Royal he should have moved straight to Newtown or to Winchester. There seems to be no good ground for his hypothesis that Banks would remain at Strasburg or retreat through Front Royal.

## THE MANASSAS CAMPAIGN.

### PLATE 13.

**Army of Virginia.**—Operations in northern Virginia under three independent commanders having proved unsatisfactory, on June 26 when *Lee* began the Seven Days' battles around Richmond, President Lincoln ordered the consolidation of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and Frémont into the Army of Virginia and placed it under the command of Maj. Gen. John Pope who had been operating in the West. (For organization see p. 65)

**June.**—When the order was given, the troops were distributed as follows:—King's division of McDowell's corps was at Falmouth

opposite Fredericksburg, and James B. Ricketts', formerly Ord's\*, division was at Manassas. Shields' division had been so demoralized by the Shenandoah campaign that it was broken up; two brigades were assigned to Banks and Ricketts, and two were sent to McClellan. McCall's division was with Fitz-John Porter on the Chickahominy. Bayard's cavalry brigade was at Warrenton. The divisions of King and Ricketts with Bayard's cavalry made a corps of about 21,000 men.

Frémont's corps was at Strasburg and numbered 13,000 present for duty. Frémont declined to serve under a junior and was replaced by Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel who had served under Lyon in Missouri at *Wilson Creek*.

Banks' corps was at Front Royal and also numbered about 13,000 men. He was obliged to detach troops to hold Winchester and Front Royal.

**July.**—Early in July, Pope began his campaign by ordering the concentration of his army along the Warrenton-Sperryville road. Ricketts was ordered to Warrenton, Sigel to Sperryville, and Banks to a point between them. In this position the army occupied a central position in northern Virginia. Pope desired to evacuate Falmouth and bring King's division to the vicinity of Warrenton, but the authorities would not consent to the abandonment of that place.

As soon as the corps began to reach their new stations, the cavalry, with a brigade of infantry, was pushed to the front and seized Culpeper. From this point as a center, the cavalry was directed to patrol all roads leading towards Gordonsville and Richmond for a distance of twenty miles.

On the 16th of July, there were three Union brigades of cavalry in the vicinity of Culpeper. This cavalry force was ordered to advance on Gordonsville, capture that place, and destroy the railroads in its vicinity. Pope hoped that his cavalry would even cross the James River and destroy the railroad west of Richmond.

The Union cavalry was unable however to accomplish the task assigned to it, as *Lee* sent the divisions of *Jackson* and *Ewell* to Gordonsville on July 13, as soon as he learned of Pope's advance. *A. P. Hill's* division joined them about the end of the month.

\*Gen. Ord was relieved in June and directed to report to Gen. Halleck, near Corinth, Miss.

When *Jackson* went to Richmond he left his cavalry brigade in the valley. This now joined him at Gordonsville.

During the remainder of the month of July Pope's army was stationary, while its cavalry was reconnoitering the country south of Fredericksburg and Culpeper and endeavoring to ascertain the strength and position of the Confederate forces. Pope was in Washington waiting for the repair of the railroad as far as Culpeper.

*Stuart* with *Fitz Lee's* (*Fitzhugh Lee*) cavalry brigade moved to Hanover Junction and thence towards the lower Rapidan.

Pope joined the army at the end of July. When he learned that King's division was to be replaced at Falmouth by Burnside's corps withdrawn from the Carolinas, he decided to advance on Gordonsville.

**August.**—On August 5, the Army of Virginia was ordered to the vicinity of Culpeper which was reached by Banks and Ricketts on the 7th; Sigel was still at Sperryville, and King on the road from Fredericksburg to Culpeper.

On the 8th, Pope was informed that *Jackson* had advanced from Gordonsville to attack him. He directed Banks to advance towards the Rapidan and check *Jackson's* advance in order to allow Sigel to reach Culpeper.

**Cedar Mountain.**—At *Cedar Mountain*, on the afternoon of August 9, Banks made a bold attack on *Jackson* who had just crossed the Rapidan with his three divisions. *Jackson's* advance was checked until dark when Banks fell back on Ricketts who stopped the Confederate pursuit.

In this engagement Banks had only 8,000 men while *Jackson* had twice as many. The audacity of the attack and the wooded character of the field combined to deceive the Confederates as to the real strength of their opponents.

Sigel reached Culpeper that night, and *Jackson* retired to Gordonsville on the night of the 11th.

On August 12, the Army of the Potomac began withdrawing from the front of Richmond in accordance with the decision made by the authorities in Washington about the 1st of August. It was the intention of Halleck, who was appointed general in chief of the Union armies July 11, to unite the two armies on the Rapidan or the Rappahannock by landing the corps of the Army of the Potomac either at Acquia Creek or at Alexandria and send-

ing them on to Pope. When the two armies were united, it was Halleck's intention to assume command.

The first reinforcements to Pope's army arrived at Culpeper on August 15; they were the two divisions of Burnside's corps from Falmouth. As Burnside ranked Pope, this corps took the field under Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno. Burnside remained at Falmouth. When Reno joined him, Pope took up a line along the Rapidan. Sigel's corps was west of the railroad; McDowell's corps astride the railroad, and Reno's at the fords southeast of Culpeper. Banks was in reserve at Culpeper.

On August 13, *Lee* became convinced that McClellan was withdrawing his army. Leaving the divisions of *D. H. Hill* and *Lafayette McLaws* with *Hampton's* cavalry brigade to guard the capital, he directed *Longstreet* to assume command of the divisions of *Hood* and *R. H. Anderson* in addition to his own, which was organized into two divisions under Brig. Gens. *James L. Kemper* and *Cadmus M. Wilcox*, and move up to Louisa, on *Jackson's* right. *Lee's* intention was to overwhelm and destroy Pope before the Army of the Potomac could unite with him.

*Lee's* first plan was to turn Pope's left flank. *J. E. B. Stuart* with his cavalry was to cross the Rapidan between Pope's army and Fredericksburg and destroy the railroads in his rear. *Longstreet* and *Jackson* were to force the fords in front of Reno and crush Pope's left wing. The movement was ordered for August 20, but was postponed two days because the cavalry was not ready. At this time *Jackson's* cavalry brigade under Brig. Gen. *Beverly H. Robertson* was assigned to *Stuart's* division.

On August 20, the Union cavalry captured *Stuart's* adjutant general. From papers found on him, Pope learned that *Longstreet* was concentrated opposite his own left flank. Realizing the danger to which he was exposed, he promptly saved himself by falling back behind the Rappahannock.

On learning that Pope had escaped him, *Lee* moved up to the Rappahannock and decided to make his next attack on Pope's right wing where Pope would probably not expect an attack. While *Longstreet* threatened the fords below the railroad, *Jackson* was to ford the river at Sulphur Springs on the Culpeper-Warrenton road.

*Lee* was correct in his hypothesis; Sigel, who recrossed the Rappahannock at Sulphur Springs, moved eastward to the rail-

road to meet the attack which Pope thought would fall on his left wing. Unfortunately for *Lee* his plan was defeated by a sudden rise of the river which prevented its execution.

When Pope learned of this attack on his right, he sent McDowell to Warrenton and directed Sigel and Reno to support him.

Reno's corps, which had been guarding the fords east of the railroad was relieved by John F. Reynold's division, formerly McCall's of McDowell's corps which had arrived from the Peninsula via Acquia Creek and Falmouth.

While Pope was adjusting his lines, *Stuart* with two brigades of cavalry crossed the Rappahannock on the Sperryville road, circled around Warrenton, and captured the railroad station at Catletts a short distance from Warrenton Junction. Here he captured Pope's baggage and in it found Pope's dispatch book. *Stuart* attempted to burn the railroad bridge over Cedar Run but was prevented by reinforcements sent to that post.

**Battle of Manassas.**—Having been defeated in his attempts to turn Pope's flanks, *Lee* now decided to strike his rear.

Withdrawing *Jackson's* three divisions from the river and replacing them by *Longstreet's* troops, he sent the former to attack the railroad in rear of Pope.

Starting at dawn on August 25, and making a forced march up the west side of the Bull Run Mountains, *Jackson* reached the Manassas Gap railroad and the next day followed it through Thoroughfare Gap to Gainesville where it crosses the Warrenton turnpike which runs from Warrenton to Fairfax C. H., via Gainesville and Centerville. On the afternoon of the 26th his command captured the station of Bristow four miles south of Manassas Junction and destroyed the railroad and telegraph lines. Leaving *Ewell* at Broad Run to protect his rear, *Jackson* took possession of the great Union supply depot at Manassas Junction on the morning of the 27th. *Stuart* with two cavalry brigades started on the night of August 25, and overtook *Jackson* at Gainesville.

The news that *Jackson* was between Pope and Washington produced consternation in that city. Pope however was not dismayed, for he had that day received reinforcements; Heintzelman with two divisions of the Army of the Potomac had reached Warrenton Junction from Alexandria where he had disembarked,

and Fitz-John Porter with two divisions of the Army of the Potomac had reached Bealeton from Falmouth.

**August 27.**—Pope at once gave orders designed to cut off *Jackson's* retreat. McDowell, with his own corps and that of Sigel, was to move along the Warrenton turnpike to Gainesville, while Heintzelman and Reno, followed by Porter, were to move on Manassas along the railroad and the roads running parallel with it.

That night McDowell and Sigel reached the vicinity of Buckland Mills on Broad Run without opposition. One of Heintzelman's divisions fought *Ewell* at the railroad crossing of Broad Run that afternoon and bivouacked there that night. The other division of Heintzelman's corps and Reno's corps were close in rear. Porter was at Warrenton Junction.

At midnight *Jackson* united his divisions at Manassas Junction and, after destroying the depots there, moved northward to avoid McDowell, whom he knew was advancing from the west on the Warrenton road, and also such Union troops as might advance from Washington along the same road.

His own division moved via Bethlehem Church to Sudley Springs. *Ewell* and *A. P. Hill* crossed the Bull Run to reach the same point by roads east of that river. The following morning *Ewell* and *Hill* recrossed the Bull Run on the Warrenton turnpike and joined *Jackson* west of that river. *Longstreet*, who had followed *Jackson* on the night of the 26th, was still west of the Bull Run Mountains.

**August 28.**—Gen. Pope's orders for this day were based on the hypothesis that *Jackson* would remain at Manassas Junction. He therefore ordered a concentric movement on Manassas Junction.

Pope marched with the corps of Heintzelman and Reno that day, and when he reached Manassas Junction about noon he found the place deserted. It was some time before he could ascertain the direction of the Confederate retreat, but he finally decided that *Jackson* had crossed the Bull Run and marched to Centerville. He ordered all the troops then at Manassas or converging on it to march to Centerville. That night his right wing encamped between the Bull Run and Centerville.

McDowell with the left wing was to send Sigel's corps down the road from Gainesville to Manassas on the morning of the 28th.

and echelon his own divisions on Sigel's left. This movement was not feasible and the troops formed column on the road. As the head of the column was marching towards Manassas, it was cannonaded a short time from the Warrenton turnpike by one of *Jackson's* batteries. Since this battery soon ceased its fire, it was thought to belong to some Confederate raiding party.

When the head of the column was at Bethlehem Church, McDowell received the order to move to Centerville, and turned northward. Sigel and Reynolds reached the Warrenton turnpike and encamped there that night on the battle-field of July, 1861.

King's division did not leave Gainesville until the order was given to concentrate at Centerville. His division therefore followed the Warrenton turnpike and its leading brigade was attacked by *Jackson* near Groveton (plate 16). The division was halted and after dark returned to Gainesville and marched to Manassas, via Bethlehem Church.

Rickett's division was sent on the morning of the 28th, from Buckland Mills to Thoroughfare Gap to detain *Longstreet*. He was attacked by *Longstreet* late in the afternoon and when he was about to be turned, he withdrew to Gainesville. When King went to Manassas, Ricketts marched to Bristow.

While Pope was marching northward from the Rappahannock his cavalry protected his rear and his left flank.

**August 29** (Plate 16).—The morning of August 29 found the position of the Confederate army much improved. *Jackson* was deployed along a ridge west of the Sudley Springs road between Sudley Springs and the Warrenton turnpike; *Longstreet* was advancing rapidly along the turnpike from Thoroughfare Gap. There were no Union troops save cavalry west of the Sudley Springs-Bethlehem Church road.

Pope's army was widely scattered. Some miles east of the Bull Run were the corps of Heintzelman and Reno; west of the Bull Run, at the intersection of the Sudley Springs-Bethlehem Church road with the Warrenton turnpike, were Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division, both under the command of McDowell; King's division was at Manassas; Rickett's division was at Bristow where it was resting from its fatiguing march of the previous day. Porter was marching on Manassas.

Pope reached Centerville early in the morning. From the in-



formation he received, he believed that *Jackson* was entrapped. Having heard of King's fight at *Groveton*, he was under the impression that McDowell and Sigel were near Gainesville where they had engaged *Jackson* on the previous evening. He ordered Porter to Centerville to unite with Heintzelman and Reno in the attack on *Jackson's* front to drive him back on McDowell.

A little later in the day he learned the true positions of Sigel, Reynolds, and King, and ordered Porter to move from Manassas to Gainesville to get in *Jackson's* rear. Porter was to take King's division with him.

About noon, Pope learned that McDowell had left Sigel and Reynolds, who were in front of Jackson, to bring King and Ricketts to assist them. He therefore sent a joint order from Centerville to McDowell and Porter, directing them to advance on the road from Manassas to Gainesville until they came in touch with his right wing, consisting of Sigel, Reynolds, Heintzelman, and Reno, which was advancing along the Warrenton turnpike. They were then to stop, as it might be necessary to withdraw that night across the Bull Run for supplies. Pope was confident that *Longstreet* was still west of the Bull Run Mountains and would not appear on the field that day and that *Jackson* would retreat.

When this last order was issued the situation was as shown in Plate 16; *Jackson* was still in line north of the Warrenton turnpike; *Longstreet*, who had four divisions on the field, prolonged *Jackson's* line to the Manassas railroad with part of his troops, and kept the others in reserve. *Stuart's* cavalry was on his extreme right facing Porter.

Heintzelman, Reno, Sigel, and Reynolds were facing *Jackson*, the latter being astride of the Warrenton road. To the left of Reynolds was a gap of two miles, then came Porter's corps with its right resting on the railroad. King was in column on the road in his rear and Ricketts was still at Bristow. Pope himself had not left Centerville.

When they received the joint order, Porter had just discovered that a cavalry force was in his front, and McDowell had just learned from the Union cavalry that 15,000 Confederates had passed through Gainesville that morning.

As they could see nothing of the Union troops on their right, McDowell considered it hazardous to advance and impossible to join the right by a flank march across the fields. He accordingly

advised Porter to remain where he was while he took King's division via Bethlehem Church and the New Market road to join the right wing.

Pope joined his right wing between 1 and 2 p. m. and found that *Jackson* had not retreated. He therefore ordered a general attack about 5 p. m. in which Porter, whom Pope believed to be in rear of *Jackson* without anyone in his front, was to attack *Jackson* in flank and rear. Pope's right wing was repulsed by *Jackson* and *Longstreet*; Porter's order did not reach him until nearly dark.

**August 30** (Plate 17).—Gen. Pope was dissatisfied with the outcome of his battle on the 29th and decided to concentrate all his troops on and north of the Warrenton turnpike. Porter was ordered in the night to join the right wing. At noon on the 30th, Pope had under his personal supervision the corps of Heintzelman, McDowell, Sigel, Reno, Porter and in addition some brigades that had joined him from West Virginia and from Washington.

As he persisted in the idea that *Jackson* had not been greatly reinforced and that he was trying to escape, at noon he ordered McDowell to assume charge of the pursuit.

Porter was to advance along the Warrenton turnpike supported in the second and third lines by the divisions of King and Reynolds of McDowell's corps. Farther to the right, Rickett's division was to advance on a country road supported by the corps of Heintzelman and Reno.

The advance was begun at 3 p. m. As Porter's movement brought him against *Jackson's* right division, it left *Longstreet's* entire front uncovered. *Lee* was quick to seize his advantage and when Porter was well involved with *Jackson*, *Longstreet* swept forward to turn the left flank of the Union line and get in its rear.

The Union army was compelled to seek safety behind the Bull Run. *Longstreet's* advance was checked by Union troops sent to the hills just south of the Warrenton road long enough to prevent the Confederate victory from imperiling their retreat.

**September.**—The Union army next took up a position at Centerville (plate 14) east of Bull Run. Here its right flank was attacked at *Chantilly* on September 2 by *Jackson* who had advanced by the Aldie road. By this time Pope's army was greatly disorganized by the campaign and he withdrew it into the defenses of Washington.

Franklin's two infantry divisions of the Army of the Potomac reached Alexandria on the 24th and 25th of August. McClellan was repeatedly ordered to send this corps to the front but it did not reach the front until the 30th, just in time to cover the retreat from the Bull Run.

Sumner's corps landed at Acquia Creek and relieved Porter's; at the close of the campaign it was withdrawn to Washington.

Bank's corps remained along the railroad during the withdrawal from the Rappahannock in charge of the trains and also retired to Washington.

**Comments.**—Pope came to Washington from the West where the operations of the Union armies had been almost uniformly successful. Like the authorities in Washington he was convinced that McClellan's lack of success was due to timidity. He believed that by operating boldly the Confederates in the East would be placed on the defensive and would seek safety in retreat. To the very last day of his campaign he therefore placed great reliance in any rumors or reports to the effect that the enemy was trying to get away from him.

His first plan was to unite his three corps near Warrenton and advance through Gordonsville to the James, sending his cavalry across the James River to destroy the railroads south of it. This plan was based on the hypothesis that McClellan was investing Richmond so closely that *Lee* could not detach a large force to operate against Pope. In order that McClellan should do his part he recommended that a superior to both should be appointed to supervise the operations of the two armies. This led to the appointment of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, also from the West, as general in chief of the Union armies.

When it was decided to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from the James River, Pope's original plan was no longer practicable. He now contented himself with concentrating his army in a central position where he could protect both eastern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley.

Pope's advance to Culpeper and the Rapidan was, under the circumstances, very hazardous. It was probably due to Pope's desire to capture Gordonsville. Halleck seems to have doubted the advisability of this movement but gave no positive order to prevent it. Neither Halleck nor Pope had yet correctly measured the ability of *Lee* and his lieutenants.

Pope made excellent use of his cavalry to reconnoiter the country in his front; it saved him from disaster on the Rapidan.

In retreating, Pope should not have stopped on the Rappahannock as it was then certain that he would be exposed to *Lee* without sufficient support from the Army of the Potomac. The two armies could have been safely united only on the Bull Run. Pope was not responsible for this error, his superiors had decided not to abandon Falmouth but to send part of the Army of the Potomac to him by that route.

*Jackson's* march up the west side of the Bull Run Mountains was reported by Pope's signal stations on the morning of August 25 and throughout the day. Both Halleck and Pope interpreted the movement as another Shenandoah Valley raid. Pope had no concern for his communications since Heintzelman's corps was on the railroad in his rear and both Franklin's corps and Cox's Kanawha division were in the defenses of Washington on their way to join the army.

At this time Pope's army was less than forty miles from the defenses of Washington and less than ten miles from Bristow station. Had either of the Union commanders suspected that *Jackson* would venture east of the Bull Run Mountains he might have been stopped by detrainning Heintzelman's corps at Manassas Junction.

When Pope learned that *Jackson* was on the railroad in his rear he was not at all demoralized, since he thought he saw in it an opportunity for a decisive victory. While it is improbable that *Jackson* would have allowed himself to be entrapped, it is certain that Pope would not have met defeat had he been able to get a correct conception of the military situation during the last days of August.

All his orders were based on wrong hypotheses as to the position and intentions of *Jackson*, and as to the position of his own troops. This was due to the absence of the Union cavalry in contact with *Jackson*, to the lack of a competent staff and intelligence bureau, and to his determination to adhere to his assumptions that *Longstreet* was still distant from the field and that *Jackson* was seeking to escape. The Union cavalry covered Pope's rear and his left flank in his withdrawal from the Rappahannock and there was none between his own army and *Jackson*.

The situation would have been greatly changed if, on the 28th,

McDowell had continued on the Warrenton road. Within a few miles of Gainesville he would have discovered *Jackson*, and all the aimless movements of that and the following day would have been avoided.

After leaving Falmouth, Fitz-John Porter made daily reports to Burnside; in some of these he criticised Pope. These reports were sent to Halleck who had requested Burnside to keep him informed of all that he could learn of the military operations. When Pope, at the close of the campaign, saw these reports, he assumed that Porter had intentionally failed to comply with his orders on August 28, 29, and 30. Charges were preferred against Porter and in November, 1862, he was court-martialed, convicted, and cashiered. In 1879 he was granted a rehearing before a court of inquiry, and succeeded in convincing the court that he was innocent of every offense of which he had been convicted. He was afterwards, on Grant's recommendation, placed on the retired list.

*Lee's* conduct in this campaign is characterized by the same energy and dash as in the preceding one. The movement of *Jackson* through Thoroughfare Gap on Bristow was a rash one, and was probably designed as his Shenandoah Valley raid to impress the authorities in Washington. *Lee* trusted to the ability and ingenuity of *Jackson* to extricate himself from any awkward position in which he might find himself. He hastened to support *Jackson* as soon as he learned that Pope had discovered *Jackson's* presence in his rear.

*Jackson's* success was due largely to the rapid marching of his troops and to the invaluable aid of *Stuart's* cavalry. On August 25 and 26, *Jackson's* corps marched from daylight until dark and on each day covered a distance of twenty-five miles.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN THE MANASSAS CAMPAIGN.

*Army of Virginia, Maj. Gen. John Pope.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
I	Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenk.....	2	-	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr...	1	-	-
Franz Sigel	Brig. Gen. Carl Schurz.....	2	-	2
	Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy.....	1	-	1
	Colonel John Beardsley (Cav.).....	1	4	-

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
II	Brig. Gen. Alpheus Williams . . . . .	2	—	6
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. George S. Greene . . . . .	3	—	—
Nathaniel Banks	Brig. Gen. John Buford (Cav.) . . . . .	1	4	—
III	Brig. Gen. Rufus King . . . . .	4	—	4
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts . . . . .	4	—	4
Irvin McDowell	Brig. Gen. John F. Reynolds . . . . .	3	—	4
	Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sturgis . . . . .	1	—	—
	Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard (Cav.) . . . . .	1	4	—
<i>Army of the Potomac.</i>				
III	*Maj. Gen. Philip Kearney . . . . .	3	—	2
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker . . . . .	3	—	1
Samuel P. Heintzelman				
V	Brig. Gen. George W. Morrell . . . . .	3	—	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. George Sykes . . . . .	8	—	3
Fitz-John Porter				
<i>Troops from North and South Carolina.</i>				
Maj. Gen.	*Maj. Gen. Isaac I. Stevens . . . . .	3	—	2
Jesse L. Reno	Colonel Edward Ferrero . . . . .	2	—	—
<i>Army of Northern Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee.</i>				
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson . . . . .	3	—	—
James Longstreet	Brig. Gen. David R. Jones . . . . .	3	—	—
	Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox . . . . .	3	—	2
	Brig. Gen. John B. Hood . . . . .	2	—	3
	Brig. Gen. James L. Kemper . . . . .	3	—	—
	Brig. Gen. Nathan G. Evans . . . . .	1	—	—
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	—	16
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Wm. B. Taliaferro . . . . .	4	—	8
Thomas J. Jackson	Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill . . . . .	6	—	7
	†Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell . . . . .	4	—	6
	Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart (Cav.) . . . . .	2	10	2
*Killed. †Severely wounded.				
Strength—Union forces . . . . .		75,000	Confederates . . . . . 50,000	
Casualties—Union forces . . . . .		16,000	Confederates . . . . . 9,000	

## THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN.

### PLATES 14 and 15.

When the Union troops retired into the defenses of Washington on September 2, *Lee* was reinforced by *McLaws'* division of four brigades, *J. G. Walker's* division of two brigades from the De-

partment of North Carolina, *D. H. Hill's* division of five brigades and *Wade Hampton's* cavalry brigade. *McLaws* and *Walker* were assigned to *Longstreet*, and *D. H. Hill* to *Jackson*. *Lee* now had an army of 55,000 men and 284 guns. He had 40 brigades of infantry and 3 of cavalry. (For organization see p. 75.)

**September.**—*Lee* was directed to invade Maryland and under cover of *Stuart's* three cavalry brigades, the infantry divisions marched to Leesburg and crossed the Potomac River on September 4, and were soon concentrated at Frederick, Md. The cavalry immediately followed and formed a screen to the east of the Monocacy River.

When *Lee* crossed the Potomac, he was compelled to shift his line of communications to the Shenandoah Valley. As this new line was exposed to the Union forces left by *Banks* at Winchester, and to the large Union garrison at Harpers Ferry, he decided to make an attempt to capture these forces before the Union army could be reorganized and take the field.

On September 9, *Jackson*, with the divisions of *John R. Jones*, *Lawton*, and *A. P. Hill*, was ordered to make a forced march to Williamsport and approach Harpers Ferry by Martinsburg.

*Longstreet* was ordered to send two of his divisions, those of *McLaws* and *R. H. Anderson*, to invest Harpers Ferry along the North bank of the Potomac, and *J. G. Walker's* division to invest it along the east bank of the Shenandoah.

Twenty-six infantry brigades were thus detached, and only fourteen infantry brigades with the three cavalry brigades remained with *Lee* and *Longstreet*.

After the fall of Harpers Ferry the army was to be concentrated either at Boonsboro or Hagerstown, Md.

At daylight on the 10th of September, *Jackson* left Frederick and was immediately followed by *Walker*, *McLaws*, and *Anderson*. *Longstreet*, with the divisions of *D. R. Jones* and *J. B. Hood*, moved westward across the South Mountains and on reaching Boonsboro was directed to move to Hagerstown to intercept Union troops reported as coming from Chambersburg. *D. H. Hill* followed *Longstreet* but stopped at Boonsboro, ten miles east of Hagerstown, at the foot of the west slope of the South Mountains.

After the withdrawal of the Union army into the defenses of

Washington, President Lincoln directed Halleck to organize an army to take the field. The latter assigned this duty to McClellan; Pope was assigned to duty in the West. In the Antietam campaign the Army of the Potomac had a strength of 97,000 men and 300 guns. There were 49 brigades of infantry and 5 of cavalry.

At the reorganization, the corps received the numbers thereafter retained. McDowell's corps, now assigned to Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, became the I corps; the corps of Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, Porter, and Franklin, became the II, III, IV, V, and VI corps; the corps formed of the troops of North and South Carolina and commanded by Reno became the IX corps; the corps of Sigel and Banks became the XI and XII corps. Banks having been assigned to the command of the Department of Washington, Maj. Gen. Joseph Mansfield was assigned to the XII corps.

At the opening of the Antietam campaign, Burnside commanded the right wing, I and IX corps, and Cox's Kanawha division which was attached to the IX corps; Sumner, the center, the II and XII corps; and Franklin the left wing, VI corps and Couch's division of the IV corps. The V corps became the reserve. Peck's division of the IV corps had been left at Yorktown, Va. (See p. 74.)

As early as the 3d of September the II, IX, and XII corps were moved to the north bank of the Potomac and were soon followed by all the others save the III, V, and XI corps. These were retained on the south bank as the authorities were in doubt as to the exact position of the Confederate army. The V corps was ordered to join McClellan when the Army of the Potomac was at Frederick, Md.

About the 7th of September McClellan took personal command and the army advanced slowly along all the roads running from Washington northwest to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. On the 11th, *Stuart's* cavalry was forced behind the Monocacy River and on the 12th the advance division of the Union army entered Frederick. On the evening of the 13th Cox's Kanawha division and the IX corps were at Middletown, eight miles west of Frederick, and the I, II, and XII corps were at Frederick. The VI corps and Couch's division were at Jefferson south of Middletown.

That day a copy of *Lee's* order for the Harpers Ferry movement was found at Frederick and given to McClellan. As it was evidently a true copy of a real order, Cox's division and the IX corps



followed by the I, II, and XII corps were ordered to march early on the 14th on Boonsboro (plate 15) where *Lee* and *Longstreet* were assumed to be; the left wing was ordered to move towards Harpers Ferry via Crampton Gap.

**South Mountains.**—About ten miles west of Frederick is the South Mountain range rising about 1,000 feet above the Potomac and separating the basins of its tributaries, the Catoctin on the east, and Antietam Creek on the west. The National turnpike between Frederick and Boonsboro passes this range at *Turner Gap*. The old Sharpsburg road crosses at *Fox Gap*, a mile to the south and the old Hagerstown road a mile to the north. To hold the pass it is necessary to hold the ridge two miles long covering these roads.

Five miles further south is *Crampton Gap* through which runs one of the roads from Frederick to Harpers Ferry; the main road passes through the gorge of the Potomac.

*Lee* had not intended to make any defense at the South Mountains as he wanted to draw *McClellan* as far from Washington as possible. On the 13th however he realized that the advance of the Union army must be checked if Harpers Ferry was to be captured and his own army concentrated north of the Potomac. He therefore ordered *D. H. Hill* to move back and help the cavalry hold Turner Gap. On learning that *Hill* would be attacked in force, on the morning of the 14th he directed *Longstreet* to send his trains with one brigade to Sharpsburg and march to *Hill's* assistance with the divisions of *D. R. Jones* and *Hood*. In compliance with these orders, on the afternoon of September 13, *D. H. Hill* sent two of his brigades to Turner Gap and went there in person early on the 14th.

On the morning of September 14 the situation was as follows: the Union brigade which had retired from Winchester to Martinsburg, and the Harpers Ferry garrison were inclosed in the fortified lines of Harpers Ferry in the angle of the Potomac and Shenandoah and were under the fire of guns established by *McLaws* on Maryland Heights north of the Potomac, and by *Walker* on Loudoun Heights east of the Shenandoah; *Jackson's* three divisions were threatening the land front.

*Longstreet*, with the divisions of *D. R. Jones* and *Hood*, was at Hagerstown, ten miles from Boonsboro; *D. H. Hill* with two

brigades was on the South Mountains, one guarding Fox Gap on the old Sharpsburg road, and the other Turner Gap; his other three brigades were at Boonsboro two miles in his rear.

*Fitz Lee's* cavalry brigade was on the right flank of the Union army for information; *Robertson's* cavalry brigade and three of *McLaws's* brigades were defending Crampton Gap; *Stuart* with *Hampton's* brigade was guarding the river road to Harpers Ferry.

Cox's division reached the mountain early in the morning and driving out the Confederate brigade that was there, made a lodgment at Fox Gap. Learning this, *D. H. Hill* ordered up his other brigades.

Cox was not reinforced until noon, by which time all of *Hill's* troops were on the mountain. Burnside decided to concentrate both of his corps before making a serious attack, and therefore the main attack was delayed until 5 p. m., at which time *Longstreet's* brigades were either on the ground or arriving.

The I corps attacked the north half of the ridge and the IX corps the south half. The Confederates were driven back about dark, evacuated the ridge that night, and retired through Boonsboro. In this attack the commander of the IX corps, Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno, was killed.

That same afternoon the VI corps forced Crampton Gap which was not so thoroughly guarded as Turner Gap. When Franklin desired to march southward on Harpers Ferry the next morning, he found six brigades of the divisions of *McLaws* and *Anderson* in his front. Not feeling strong enough to attack this line, he remained stationary that day, September 15. In the course of the day he learned that Harpers Ferry had surrendered, and as the force in front of him disappeared during the night, he awaited orders on the 16th which reached him only at night. He then marched to the Antietam battlefield September 17, leaving Couch's division of the IV corps near Crampton Gap to protect his rear.

The garrison at Harpers Ferry, 12,500 men, surrendered on the morning of September 15, the day following the engagement of South Mountains. About 1,200 cavalry escaped on the night of the 14th by crossing to the north bank of the Potomac and making their way to Sharpsburg and Hagerstown. On the road between those places they discovered *Longstreet's* ammunition train and captured forty-five of his wagons. Franklin's movement as-

sisted the cavalry to escape by withdrawing some of the Confederates from the immediate front of Harpers Ferry.

**Battle of Antietam** (Plate 18).—On the morning of the 15th, *Longstreet* and *D. H. Hill*, covered by *Fitz Lee's* cavalry brigade, fell back from Boonsboro to Sharpsburg where a concentration of the Confederate army was now ordered.

A line was formed along the ridge followed by the Hagerstown road about one mile from Antietam Creek. *D. R. Jones's* division and *Robertson's* cavalry were south of the Boonsboro pike covering the road to the Shepherdstown and Boteler fords three miles in rear. *Fitz Lee's* cavalry, *Hood*, and *D. H. Hill* were north of the pike in the order given from left to right.

The Union army followed and by evening the I, II, V, IX, and XII corps, and *Cox's* division were in the field.

**September 16.**—On the 16th *Jackson* arrived with the divisions of *J. R. Jones* and *Lawton*. *Lee* sent him to the left of *D. H. Hill* to fill a gap between *Hill* and *Hood*. At night *Hood*, who had engaged *Hooker* that afternoon, was withdrawn from the first line and placed in reserve behind *Jackson*. *Walker's* division arrived shortly after *Jackson* and was sent south of Sharpsburg to the right of *D. R. Jones*.

*McClellan* spent the 16th in examining the ground and making his plans. He decided to begin the battle by an attack on *Lee's* left wing early in the morning of September 17. For this purpose, at 2 p. m. on the 16th he sent the I corps across Antietam Creek to take a position on the Hagerstown road beyond the Confederate left flank. In reaching the position a part of *Hooker's* I corps became engaged with *Hood's* division. The XII corps, which was to support the I corps on its left, crossed the creek late the same afternoon and bivouacked a mile in rear.

All of the other corps remained east of the creek; the II corps north of the Sharpsburg-Boonesboro road; the V corps on its left south of that road; and the IX corps and *Cox's* division on the extreme left. There were no Union troops in front of *Stuart's* cavalry between the Hagerstown road and the Potomac.

**September 17.**—*Hooker's* I corps deployed for attack at day-break and by 6 a. m. was driving back *Jackson's* two divisions, when *Hood* and part of *D. H. Hill's* division came to *Jackson's* assistance and about 7 a. m. *Hooker* was compelled to fall back.

Shortly thereafter Mansfield's XII corps came to Hooker's assistance and the two corps fought an indecisive engagement with *Jackson*, *Hood* and some brigades of *D. H. Hill*.

*Stuart's* horse artillery with *Fitz Lee's* brigade materially assisted *Jackson* in his fight with the I and XII corps.

Sumner's II corps crossed Antietam Creek about 8 a. m. and at 9 a. m., one division reinforced the I and XII corps while the other advanced against *D. H. Hill's* troops in the Bloody Lane.

The Confederates were now giving way when *McLaws* and *J. G. Walker* relieved the divisions of *Jackson* and *Hood*, and *Anderson* came to the assistance of *D. H. Hill*.

*McLaws* and *R. H. Anderson* marched through Harpers Ferry and recrossed the Potomac at daybreak. They were resting between Sharpsburg and the Potomac when the battle began.

The fighting now became very severe and by noon the Confederate left wing retired behind the Hagerstown road and the center gave up the Bloody Lane.

The fighting north of the Boonsboro pike was now practically over, and when Franklin's VI corps arrived during the next hour, it simply relieved the Union troops in the front line. Its casualties were mainly in one brigade.

The IX corps and Cox's division were ordered to advance about 10 a. m. but it was 1 p. m. before they began to cross Antietam Creek which was defended at that time by artillery and one Confederate infantry brigade. It was 3 p. m. when the Union troops reached the main Confederate line on the ridge a mile in rear. *D. R. Jones's* division was here alone and was unable to resist their advance. No assistance could be expected from the troops on his left, as *Lee's* center and left had been heavily engaged and were still threatened by greatly superior numbers.

At this critical moment *A. P. Hill* arrived from Harpers Ferry where he had been left by *Jackson* to parole the prisoners and secure the stores. The five brigades he brought with him were sufficient to check the advance of the Union troops, but not sufficient to drive them back across Antietam Creek.

Porter's V corps was held in reserve all day. Pleasonton's cavalry division crossed the Antietam at the Boonsboro pike to support the attack on Bloody Lane. Only the artillery of the V corps and of the cavalry division were seriously engaged.

**September 18.**—Both armies held their lines during the 18th. Although McClellan was reinforced by Couch's division of the IV corps which had been left near Crampton Gap to watch Harpers Ferry, and Humphrey's division of the V corps from Washington, he did not care to renew the battle since he believed that *Lee's* army was larger than his own. *Lee* was too weak to attack.

McClellan states in his report that he had 87,000 men. *Lee* says in his report that he had less than 40,000 effectives.

On the night of September 18, the Confederate army recrossed the Potomac at the fords near Shepherdstown and returned to Virginia.

**October** (Plate 14).—McClellan was urged to take up the pursuit promptly; he reported that his army must be reorganized and reëquipped. He finally threw two bridges across the Potomac at and below Harpers Ferry, and one across the Shenandoah at its mouth, and in the last week of October crossed into the Loudoun Valley of Virginia and advanced towards the Rappahannock.

**Stuart's Chambersburg Raid** (Plate 15).—During the month of October, while the two armies were at rest, *J. E. B. Stuart* made one of his famous raids. Crossing the Potomac twenty miles west of Williamsport at daylight on October 9 with a selected cavalry force of 1,800 men and a horse battery, he reached Chambersburg that night. From Chambersburg he went eastward across the South Mountains and then turned southwards towards Emmitsburg.

He passed through Emmitsburg on the afternoon of the 11th, crossed the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad east of Frederick (plate 14), and recrossed the Potomac on October 12 near the mouth of the Monocacy. His only stop was made at Chambersburg. The movement was made so rapidly that little damage was effected outside of Chambersburg.

**November** (Plate 13).—On the 7th of November, the I, II, V, VI, and IX corps were in the vicinity of Warrenton, Va., and the cavalry along the Rappahannock to the southwest. The XII corps was at Harpers Ferry; Cox's division had been sent back to West Virginia; Couch's division of the IV corps had become the 3d division of the VI corps.

The XI corps and one division of the III corps were also within supporting distance; the former between Warrenton and the

Manassas Gap railroad, and the latter, with Bayard's cavalry brigade, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad between Warrenton Junction and Manassas.

At Warrenton on November 7, McClellan received the order relieving him from the command of the Army of the Potomac.

He was not again assigned to active duty.

After remaining a short time in the vicinity of Shepherdstown, Lee moved his army back to Winchester where it was reorganized, recruited and partially reëquipped with the arms captured at Harpers Ferry. When the Union army crossed the Potomac and began to advance up the Loudoun Valley, *Longstreet* crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains and took station at Culpeper.

When McClellan was relieved, *Longstreet* was at Culpeper, and *Jackson* with the main body of his corps was at Winchester and Strasburg. *D. H. Hill's* division of *Jackson's* corps was near Front Royal, between *Longstreet* and *Jackson*.

McClellan's relief terminated the Antietam Campaign.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN.

*Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments. Cav.	Batter- ies.
I	Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch . . . . .	4	—	4
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. James S. Ricketts . . . . .	3	—	2
Joseph Hooker	Brig. Gen. George G. Meade . . . . .	3	—	4
II	*Maj. Gen. Israel B. Richardson . . . . .	3	—	2
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick . . . . .	3	—	2
Edwin V. Sumner	Brig. Gen. Wm. H. French . . . . .	3	—	—
	Reserve Artillery . . . . .	—	—	3
IV	Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch . . . . .	3	—	4
V	Maj. Gen. George W. Morell . . . . .	3	—	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. George Sykes . . . . .	3	—	3
Fitz-John Porter	Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys . . . . .	2	—	2
	Reserve Artillery . . . . .	—	—	7
VI	Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum . . . . .	3	—	4
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Wm. F. Smith . . . . .	3	—	3
Wm. B. Franklin				
IX	Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox . . . . .	2	—	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis . . . . .	2	—	2
Ambrose Burnside	Brig. Gen. Isaac P. Rodman . . . . .	2	—	1
*Maj. Gen. J. L. Reno.				

\*Killed.

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Kanawha Division attached to IX Corps.	Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox . . . . .	2	-	2
XII	Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams . . . . .	2	-	-
*Maj. Gen. Joseph K. Mansfield	Brig. Gen. George S. Greene . . . . .	3	-	5
	Reserve Artillery . . . . .	-	-	7
	Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton (Cav.) . . . . .	5	13	4
	Total . . . . .	54		
<i>Army of Northern Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee.</i>				
	Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws . . . . .	4	-	5
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson . . . . .	6	-	4
James Longstreet	Brig. Gen. David R. Jones . . . . .	6	-	4
	Brig. Gen. John B. Hood . . . . .	3	-	4
	Brig. Gen. John G. Walker . . . . .	2	-	2
	Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton . . . . .	4	-	7
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill . . . . .	6	-	7
Thomas J. Jackson	Brig. Gen. John R. Jones . . . . .	4	-	6
	Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill . . . . .	5	-	4
Artillery Reserve	Brig. Gen. Wm. N. Pendleton . . . . .	-	-	24
	Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart (Cav.) . . . . .	3	15	3
*Killed.	Total . . . . .	43		

	Union.		Confederate.	
	Men.	Guns.	Men.	Guns.
Strength of armies in the campaign . . . . .	97,000	300	55,000	284
Casualties . . . . .	15,200		13,900	

To the Union casualties must be added the casualties of Harpers Ferry, 12,500, mostly prisoners.

McDowell was relieved from the command of the I corps after the Manassas Campaign and was not again assigned to a field command, although exonerated by a Court of Inquiry of all charges made against him by public rumor.

**Comments.**—Never perhaps has any commander had a more favorable opportunity to win a decisive victory than had McClellan at Antietam. He had a full day to study the situation and rest his army and a full day in which to fight his battle. In front of him in an unfortified position was a force largely inferior to his own.

Of the nine infantry divisions of *Lee's* army, one was far from the field and five others had just reached it after long and exhaust-

ing marches which must have reduced their numerical strength. At *Lee's* back was a wide and barely fordable river.

That McClellan did not win a victory that would have rendered the surrender of Harpers Ferry a trifling incident, was due to the fact that he held nearly one-third of his infantry in reserve and sent his remaining troops into the battle in succession without adequate support. His cavalry, which might have been employed against *Stuart*, was not engaged.

*Lee* on the contrary had no reserves. Every brigade of infantry and cavalry on the field was in the front line. His defense was greatly aided by his artillery which was well posted and well served.

It will always be a marvel to military men that *Lee* was willing to accept battle under such adverse conditions. It is possible that he believed the Union troops were so demoralized by the preceding campaigns that he had a chance of winning a battle north of the Potomac which would bring to his army recruits from Maryland and strengthen the Confederate cause abroad. We know from his previous campaigns that he was not averse to taking rather desperate chances if there was anything to be gained by it.

As Harpers Ferry with its garrison of 12,500 men was surrendered without awaiting an assault, a court was convened to determine the responsibility. The court found its commander incompetent, and his superiors, who had placed him in command, deserving of censure.

Had McClellan advanced more rapidly in the campaign, he might have saved the garrison at Harpers Ferry but he would not have had the same opportunity of winning a decisive battle.

## THE FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

### PLATE 13.

**November.**—When Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside took command of the Army of the Potomac on November 7, 1862, he at once submitted a plan which contemplated the movement of his army to the south side of the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. From that point he proposed to follow the railroad to Richmond. This plan was approved by the authorities at Washington on November 14.

Assuming that the plan would be approved, on November 6, orders were sent to Harpers Ferry to take up the ponton bridges used by McClellan and send them to Falmouth opposite Fred-



ericksburg. The orders were not delivered at Harpers Ferry until the 12th; hence the trains did not reach Falmouth until November 25. They were taken by rail to Washington and thence by water to Acquia Creek.

In organizing his army for this campaign, Burnside formed it into three *grand divisions*. The right grand division was composed of the II and IX corps under Sumner; the center grand division of the III and V corps under Hooker; and the left grand division of the I and IV corps under Franklin. A cavalry division was assigned to the right grand division and a cavalry brigade to each of the others. The XII corps remained near Harpers Ferry. The total strength of the army was 118,000 men and 374 guns. It had fifty-one brigades of infantry and four of cavalry. (For organization see p. 80.)

On November 17, Sumner's grand division reached Falmouth; on the 18th, Franklin's reached Stafford on his left and rear; and on the 19th, Hooker's reached Hartwood, on his right and rear.

Had Burnside so desired he might have taken possession of the heights south of Fredericksburg at once as there was nothing but a weak cavalry force opposed to him; he was unwilling to place the unfordable river behind him before the ponton trains arrived.

The *Army of Northern Virginia* had been greatly reinforced since Antietam. It was organized into two army corps and *Longstreet* and *Jackson* were promoted to the grade of lieutenant general to command them. *Longstreet* had five divisions and *Jackson* four. Each division had a battalion of artillery. *Longstreet's* corps had two battalions of corps artillery, and the entire army had three battalions of reserve artillery. The army had a strength of 78,000 men and 255 guns; it had 41 brigades of infantry and 3 of cavalry. (For organization see p. 81.)

*David R. Jones*, *John B. Hood*, *George R. Pickett* and *John G. Walker* were promoted to the grade of major general. *Pickett* was assigned to the division of *Longstreet's* corps commanded by *Kemper* in the Antietam campaign; *J. G. Walker* was sent to Louisiana and his division fell to the senior officer, Brig. Gen. *Robert Ransom*.

When *Lee* heard of the movement of Burnside's army towards Fredericksburg, he promptly ordered *Longstreet* to that place.

Taking *McLaw's* division, *Longstreet* reached the town on Nov. 20, three days after Sumner, and relieved the cavalry that had

been holding it. This movement was followed by the other divisions of *Longstreet's* corps. On reaching their positions *Longstreet's* troops immediately intrenched themselves.

*Jackson* remained in the valley at Winchester until Nov. 22, when he marched to Culpeper to replace *Longstreet*. At that time *Lee* thought of employing *Jackson* in making another raid on the enemy's communications, but he definitely abandoned the idea when he found that Burnside was making preparations to cross the Rappahannock at Skinker Neck, about twenty miles below Fredericksburg. He then ordered *Jackson* to march to Fredericksburg and guard the river on *Longstreet's* right.

**December.**—*Jackson's* appearance below Fredericksburg caused Burnside to abandon his plan of crossing so far below the town and he concentrated his troops near Falmouth. *Jackson* then moved three of his divisions to Fredericksburg and posted them on *Longstreet's* right. *D. H. Hill's* division was left on the Rappahannock fifteen miles below the town.

The position (plate 19) occupied by the Confederate army on the day of the battle was the irregular edge of a plateau that extends from the Rappahannock, about two miles north of the railroad bridge, to Hamilton Crossing where the highway and railroad intersect, about three and a half miles below the railroad bridge.

Immediately behind the town of Fredericksburg the plateau has its greatest elevation, 100 to 150 feet, and is nearest the river. The edge of the plateau is separated from the river by an open plain three quarters of a mile wide on which the town is built. The Orange Plank Road running to Chancellorsville mounts the plateau near a point called *Maryes Hill*.

This salient part of the plateau, a mile in length, was held by *McLaws's* division with *Ransom's* division in reserve.

*McLaws* had two lines of defense. Near the foot of the plateau was a sunken road running along his line for a distance of a half mile. This was his main infantry line. On the crest of the plateau were his reserves, *Longstreet's* corps artillery, and some of the reserve artillery of the army.

*Anderson's* division was on *McLaws's* left and prolonged the Confederate line to the Rappahannock. His front was protected by a canal which formed a serious obstacle.

On *McLaws'* right for a distance of two miles, between Hazel and Deep runs, the edge of the plateau is a mile and a half from the river. Along this retired curtain were the divisions of *Pickett* and *Hood*.

From Deep Run to Hamilton Crossing the edge of the plateau again forms a salient, a mile from the river. At the time of the battle this was covered with woods. This part of the line was occupied by *Jackson's* corps. As he had recently reached it, the line was not well intrenched. One division was in the front line and two in reserve. *D. H. Hill's* division did not reach the field in time to be engaged.

*Stuart's* cavalry was on *Jackson's* right in the plain between Hamilton Crossing and the Rappahannock.

**Battle of Fredericksburg.**—On December 9, Gen. Burnside decided to attack the Confederate line. To prepare for this attack the Union artillery was posted along the river bluffs on the Falmouth side of the river to sweep the plain on the Confederate side of the river.

Six bridges, each 400 feet long, were thrown across the river on December 11; three opposite the city of Fredericksburg and three about a mile and a half below it.

Sumner's grand division followed by Hooker's was ordered to cross the upper bridges and attack the salient at Maryes Hill. Franklin's grand division was to cross the lower bridge and seize the plateau held by *Jackson*. Franklin was reinforced by the divisions of Sickles and Birney of the III corps, and later by W. W. Burns' division of the IX corps.

The XI and XII corps were ordered to the front to act as a reserve, but did not reach Falmouth in time to take part in the battle.

The six corps crossed the river on the 12th and moved to the attack on the morning of the 13th.

The first and principal assault on *Longstreet's* corps was made on *McLaws* by the divisions of W. H. French and W. S. Hancock of the II corps. These were followed by assaults on the same division by the divisions of Samuel D. Sturgis, Oliver O. Howard, Charles Griffin and Andrew A. Humphreys. Assaults followed each other from noon to evening. All were repulsed at the sunken road by *McLaws* aided by *Ransom* and the artillery with great loss to assaulting troops.

The main attack on *Jackson's* corps was made by the divisions of Gibbon and Meade of the I corps. Birney's division of the III corps also lost heavily in going to their support. The attack penetrated the first line but was repulsed by *Jackson's* reserves.

The Union army remained on the west bank of the river until the 15th and then retired to the east bank. *Jackson* had ordered a counter attack but desisted when he saw the formidable array of Union guns on the south bank of the river covering Franklin's bridges over the Rappahannock.

**Comments.**—Burnside himself had little confidence in the success of his attack, but felt compelled to do something with the army intrusted to him. Had his main attack been made in front of his left wing where the ground was less favorable for the Confederates than in front of his right wing and where the Confederates had not so thoroughly intrenched their position, his chances of success would have been greater.

#### OPPOSING FORCES AT FREDERICKSBURG.

*Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside.*

*Right Grand Division, Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
II	Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock . . .	3	—	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard . . . . .	3	—	2
Darius N. Couch	Brig. Gen. Wm. H. French . . . . .	3	—	2
	Reserve Artillery . . . . .	—	—	2
IX	Brig. Gen. Wm. W. Burns . . . . .	3	—	2
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis . . . . .	2	—	4
Orlando B. Willcox	Brig. Gen. George W. Getty . . . . .	2	—	2
	Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton (Cav.) .	2	6	1
<i>Center Grand Division, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker.</i>				
III	Brig. Gen. David B. Birney . . . . .	3	—	2
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles . . . . .	3	—	4
George Stoneman	Brig. Gen. Amiel W. Whipple . . . . .	2	—	3
V	Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin . . . . .	3	—	4
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. George Sykes . . . . .	3	—	2
Daniel Butterfield	Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys . .	2	—	2
	Brig. Gen. Wm. W. Averell (Cav.) . .	1	4	1
<i>Left Grand Division, Maj. Gen. Wm. B. Franklin.</i>				
I	Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday . . . . .	4	—	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John Gibbon . . . . .	3	—	4
John F. Reynolds	Maj. Gen. George G. Meade . . . . .	3	—	4

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
VI	Brig. Gen. Wm. T. H. Brooks.....	3	-	4
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Albion P. Howe.....	3	-	4
Wm. F. Smith	Brig. Gen. John Newton.....	3	-	3
	*Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard (Cav.)	1	5	1

Reserve artillery of army, Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, 2 batteries siege ar-  
tillery and 9 field batteries.

\*Mortally wounded.

*Army of Northern Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee.*

	Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson....	5	-	4
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws.....	4	-	4
James	Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett.....	5	-	3
Longstreet	Maj. Gen. John B. Hood.....	4	-	3
	Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom.....	2	-	2
	Corps Artillery, 2 battalions.....			10
	Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early.....	4	-	6
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill.....	5	-	5
Thomas J. Jackson	Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill.....	6	-	7
	Brig. Gen. Wm. B. Taliaferro.....	4	-	5
	Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart (Cav.)	3	15	5

Reserve artillery of army, Brig. Gen. Wm. N. Pendleton, 3 battalions 14 bat-  
teries.

	Union.		Confederate.	
	Men.	Guns.	Men.	Guns.
Strength.....	118,000	374	78,000	255
Casualties.....	12,653		5,309	

*Hampton's* cavalry brigade was on detached service at the time of battle.

## OPERATIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA.

### PLATE 2.

**March.**—The State of West Virginia became the Mountain Department on March 11, 1862, when McClellan was relieved as general in chief of the armies, and was assigned to Frémont who took actual command of the department towards the end of the month. He adopted Rosecrans' plan of invading the Shenandoah and upper Tennessee valleys in several columns.

The movements of the brigades of Milroy and Schenck and the division of Blenker were described in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign.

In the vicinity of Gauley and Charleston, on the Kanawha River, Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox had four brigades. One of these

under Brig. Gen. George Crook was to move eastward and advance through Lewisburg; two others under Cox himself were to advance southward from Gauley and strike the Lynchburg-Chattanooga railroad near Newbern, Va.

To oppose Cox, Maj. Gen. *W. W. Loring* had two small brigades under Brig. Gens. *Henry Heth* and *Humphrey Marshall* near Lewisburg and Tazewell, Va.

**April-July.**—During the month of April, Cox moved one brigade to the Flat Top Mountains and the other to Raleigh. *Heth* moved to Pearisburg.

During the month of May, Cox advanced against *Heth* through Princeton on Pearisburg but was compelled to retreat to the Flat Top Mountains when *Marshall* advanced from Tazewell on Princeton. Cox remained at the Flat Top Mountains until August. He came under the orders of Pope, June 26, when Frémont's corps became part of the Army of Virginia.

Crook advanced as far as Lewisburg where he repulsed an attack made by *Heth* in May, after Cox's retreat.

**August.**—In August, Cox was ordered to reinforce Pope in Virginia with two brigades. He therefore left West Virginia and went to Washington with the Kanawha division consisting of his best two brigades. The remaining troops were left on the Kanawha between Gauley and Charleston.

*Lee* learned of this movement from Pope's dispatch book captured by *Stuart* at Catletts Station in August; he therefore directed *Loring* to invade West Virginia. (See p. 58.)

**September.**—In September, while *Lee* was in Maryland, *Loring* advanced into West Virginia and captured Charleston; the Union troops retreated to the mouth of the Kanawha. At the same time Brig. Gen. *Albert G. Jenkins* with a small force of mounted men entered the State through Huttonsville and captured depots of supply at Buckhannon and Weston.

**October.**—West Virginia was now made a district of the Department of the Ohio and Cox was assigned to the command. After the battle of Antietam the Kanawha division under Crook and a division under Milroy were concentrated near Clarksburg on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. In October, the former moved via Sutton on Gauley Bridge and the latter on Beverly. The troops

from the mouth of the Kanawha under Cox himself, reinforced by troops from Kentucky, moved on Charleston at the same time.

The Confederates were then again driven from the State.

**November-December.**—*Loring* was now relieved from duty in the East at his own request and was sent to report to Lieut. Gen. *Pemberton* in Mississippi. The Department of Western Virginia was formed and assigned to Maj. Gen. *Samuel Jones* who had been with Bragg in Tennessee.

**Comments.**—Rosecrans' plan was much too ambitious for the small force that he had under his command. Being the independent commander of a department he naturally wished to make a record as did Frémont after him. The best policy for West Virginia was to station in it a force strong enough to protect it from raids, and let this force guard the few important roads that led across the mountains.

Since *Loring* entered the State with only 5,000 men, his invasion would probably have been checked ere he reached Charleston, had not Cox taken with him his best troops and the only brigade commanders who had served in the regular army.

## OPERATIONS ALONG THE ATLANTIC COAST.

**Department of Southeast Virginia** (Plate 2).—When Norfolk was evacuated by *Huger* in May, the Union troops in this department occupied that place and advanced along the Petersburg railroad as far as Suffolk.

When the Army of the Potomac left the Peninsula in August, Maj. Gen. John J. Peck's division of the IV corps was left at Yorktown. This division with the troops already in the department became the VII corps in September.

About June 1, Maj. Gen. John E. Wool was succeeded in the command of the department by Maj. Gen. John A. Dix.

In December, 12,000 troops were sent from this department to North Carolina to take part in an attack on Wilmington, N. C.

**Monitor and Merrimac.**—In the spring of 1861 the United States navy-yard at Norfolk, Va., was abandoned and most of the vessels awaiting repairs were either burned or sunk. Among them was a recently constructed cruiser, the *Merrimac*. This vessel was raised by the Confederates and its hull was converted into an iron-clad by the construction of a superstructure or citadel

with sloping sides, whose walls were two feet of oak covered with four inches of wrought-iron plate, and extended some distance below the water-line. It was equipped with four rifled guns of 6- and 7-inch caliber and six 9-inch smooth-bores.

While the *Merrimac* or *Virginia* was being constructed at Norfolk, the *Monitor* was being constructed at New York. This was a smaller vessel in which the iron hull was surmounted by a single turret for two 11-inch smooth-bore guns. The turret was made of one inch plates and had an aggregate thickness of eight inches.

**March.**—On March 8, 1862, the *Merrimac* with a number of small wooden gunboats entered Hampton Roads and attacked the Union fleet consisting of three large wooden cruisers, the *Congress*, *Cumberland*, and *Minnesota*, and a number of smaller vessels. The *Cumberland* and *Congress* were destroyed by the *Merrimac*. The *Minnesota* ran aground. After destroying the two cruisers the *Merrimac* ran up to Norfolk for supplies.

That night the *Monitor*, which had also just been completed, arrived at Hampton Roads and took station guarding the *Minnesota* which was aground but uninjured. The *Merrimac* returned to Hampton Roads on the morning of the 9th and there occurred a duel between the opposing ironclads. The *Monitor* had the advantage of having much less draft. The battle was a drawn one but the *Merrimac* was prevented from destroying the cruiser.

After the engagement, the *Merrimac* withdrew to Norfolk for repairs and did not return to Hampton Roads until a month later. The *Monitor* and all the wooden ships retired into Chesapeake Bay and the *Merrimac* took possession of Hampton Roads. The Union authorities were unwilling to risk another engagement unless necessary, and the Confederate authorities were unwilling to expose the *Merrimac* to the guns of *Fort Monroe*.

**May.**—As heretofore stated, the *Merrimac* was destroyed by the Confederates when Norfolk was evacuated by them early in May. Her draft was too great for the James River.

**Department of North Carolina** (Plate 5).—On January 11, a joint land and naval force sailed from *Fort Monroe* and passed through Hatteras inlet into Pamlico Sound, N. C. The land force was a division of 12,000 men under Brig. Gen. Ambrose Burnside.

On February 8, he defeated a Confederate force of 2,000 men



under Brig. Gen. *Henry Wise* on Roanoke Island between Abemarle and Pamlico Sounds and established a garrison there.

On March 14, he captured Newbern, N. C., held by two Confederate brigades and made this his permanent base.

About the end of the same month he took Beaufort on the coast. Expeditions were also sent from Newbern to operate against Washington, Plymouth and Edenton, N. C., and to threaten Norfolk and Suffolk, Va.

To reinforce McClellan, early in July, Burnside returned to Fort Monroe with 7,500 men leaving the same number under Brig. Gen. John G. Foster to hold the department. There were no important operations during the remainder of the year. The troops in this department became the XVIII corps.

The capture of Roanoke Island and Newbern by Burnside caused President *Davis* to send Maj. Gen. *Theophilus H. Holmes* from the *Acquia District* of Virginia to command the *Department of North Carolina*.

When *Huger* moved from Petersburg, Va., in June, to join the *Army of Northern Virginia*, the *Department of North Carolina* was extended northwards to include all of Virginia south of the James River.

In July, *Holmes* was transferred to Arkansas and Maj. Gen. *Gustavus W. Smith* took command of the department.

At the close of the year, *Smith* had 25,000 troops present for duty.

**Department of the South** (Plates 5 and 6).—In March, 1862, Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Sherman was relieved by Maj. Gen. David Hunter and the Department of the South was created.

The most important operation in this department was the siege and capture of *Fort Pulaski* in April.

This was an inclosed masonry fort on Cockspur Island at the mouth of the Savannah River. It had one tier of casemates surmounted by a tier of barbets and mounted about forty guns.

The siege was conducted by Brig. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore, who established his batteries of rifled guns from one to two miles from the fort and reduced it in two days. It was the first combat of rifled guns and masonry forts and led to a revolution in the construction of seacoast defenses.

In July, Hunter was directed to send 5,000 troops to reinforce McClellan and offensive operations were brought to a standstill.

In September, Hunter was relieved by Maj. Gen. Ormsby M. Mitchel from the Army of the Ohio who commanded the department until his death in November. At the close of the year there were but 11,000 troops in the department. They were organized as the X army corps.

The Confederate *Department of South Carolina and Georgia* was commanded in succession by *Lee* until March 17, by Maj. Gen. *John C. Pemberton* until September 24, and then by *Beauregard*. At the close of the year there were 21,000 troops in the department.

**Military Situation at the Close of 1862.**—At the close of 1862, the Union troops in the East were in permanent possession of Yorktown and Norfolk, Va., Beaufort and Newbern, N. C., *Fort Pulaski*, Ga., Saint Augustine, Fernandina and Pensacola, Fla. These were in addition to the seacoast places taken in 1861 on the South Carolina Coast.

The State of West Virginia, west of the Allegheny Mountains, was also in the permanent possession of the National government.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS IN THE WEST IN 1862.

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- January . . . Engagement at Logan Crossroads or Mill Springs, Ky.
- February . . . Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, Tenn.
- March . . . . . Battle of Pea Ridge or Elkhorn Tavern, Ark.
- April . . . . . Battle of Shiloh, Tenn.  
Capture of Island No. 10, Mississippi River.  
Capture of New Orleans, La.  
Occupation of Huntsville, Ala.
- May . . . . . Capture of Corinth, Miss.  
Bombardment of Vicksburg, Miss.
- June . . . . . Capture of Memphis, Tenn.  
Capture of Cumberland Gap, Tenn.  
Bombardment of Vicksburg, Miss.  
Beginning of movement of the Army of the Ohio on Chattanooga.  
Movement of McCown's division to Chattanooga.
- July . . . . . Raids of Morgan and Forrest in Kentucky and Tennessee.  
Movement of Army of the Mississippi to Chattanooga, Tenn.  
Bombardment of Vicksburg, Miss.
- August . . . . Kirby Smith's invasion of Kentucky including engagements at  
Gallatin, Tenn., Big Hill and Richmond, Ky.
- September . . Bragg's invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky including the cap-  
ture of Munfordville, Ky.  
Evacuation of Cumberland Gap by G. W. Morgan.  
Engagement at Iuka, Miss.
- October . . . . Battle of Perryville, Ky., and retreat of Bragg into east Tennessee.  
Morgan's second raid in Kentucky.  
Engagement at Corinth, Miss.
- November . . . Concentration of the Army of the Cumberland at Nashville, Tenn.  
Concentration of the Army of Tennessee at Murfreesboro, Tenn.  
Beginning of Grant's overland campaign against Vicksburg, Miss.
- December . . . Battle of Murfreesboro or Stone River, Tenn.  
Morgan's third raid in Kentucky.  
Forrest's raid in west Tennessee.  
Capture of Holly Springs, Miss., by Van Dorn.  
Sherman's assault on Chickasaw Bluffs near Vicksburg, Miss.

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE WEST  
JANUARY 1, 1862.

PLATES 1 AND 3.

**Confederate**—On December 31, 1861, the strength of the Confederate troops present for duty in the West was approximately as follows:

Department No. 1, Maj. Gen. Mansfield Lovell.....	7,000
“ “ 2, General Albert Sidney Johnston.....	62,000
“ of Western Florida and Southern Alabama, Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg.....	13,000
Department of Texas, Brig. Gen. Paul E. Hébert.....	3,000
“ “ Southern Missouri, Maj. Gen. Sterling Price and Brig. Gen. M. Jeff. Thompson (estimated).....	8,000
Total present for duty.....	93,000
Total present.....	115,500

*Department No. 1* embraced the State of Louisiana; its troops were assigned to the defense of the lower Mississippi River.

*Department No. 2* embraced the States of Tennessee, Arkansas, and adjacent portions of Kentucky and Missouri (plates 3 and 4). Its troops were defending the long line from the mountains of eastern Tennessee to the western boundary of Arkansas and were distributed approximately as follows:

Cumberland Gap.....	1,500
Mill Springs on upper Cumberland River, Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden.....	6,000
Army of Kentucky, Bowling Green, Hopkinsville, Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston.....	25,000
Forts Henry and Donelson on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman.....	5,000
Between the Tennessee and Mississippi rivers, Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk.....	17,000
Arkansas.....	7,500

The troops in the *Department of Western Florida and Southern Alabama* were at Pensacola and Mobile.

The *Department of Texas* embraced that State only.

**Union.**—The strength of the Union troops present for duty in the West at this time was approximately as follows:

Department of the Ohio, Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell.....	72,000
Department of the Missouri, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck.....	91,000
Total present for duty.....	163,000
Total present.....	174,000

The Department of the Ohio comprised the States of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Kentucky east of the Cumberland River.

The troops under Buell were in Kentucky and had been organized into twenty brigades of four regiments each. With the exception of two independent brigades, these brigades formed six divisions under Brig. Gens. George H. Thomas, Alexander McD. McCook, Ormsby M. Mitchel, William Nelson, Thomas L. Crittenden, and Thomas J. Wood.

Thomas' division was at Lebanon, Columbia, and Somerset; Crittenden's on the Green River at Calhoun; the others along the Louisville and Nashville Railroad extending from Louisville to Munfordville. The independent brigades were in eastern Kentucky.

The Department of the Missouri comprised the northern States along both banks of the Mississippi, Arkansas, and Kentucky west of the Cumberland River.

In the Department of Missouri there were 20,000 men under Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant in the District of Cairo, Ill., which included Paducah and Smithland, Ky.

About 15,000 were in the Army of the Southwest under Brig. Gen. Samuel Curtis; this army was being mobilized at Rolla, Mo., for operations in southwestern Missouri against the Confederate forces under *Price* and *McCulloch*.

About 15,000 men were in central Missouri under Brig. Gen. John Pope between the Missouri and Osage rivers to prevent the return of *Price* to the central part of the State.

The remaining forces were in the vicinity of St. Louis and in northern Missouri.

## THE CAMPAIGN OF LOGAN CROSSROADS.

### PLATE 3.

**January.**—The Union inhabitants of eastern Kentucky were much exercised over a threatened invasion by a large Confederate army which rumor said Maj. Gen. *George B. Crittenden* had concentrated at Mill Springs, Ky., on the upper Cumberland. It really consisted of but two brigades.

Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas who commanded the 1st division of the Army of the Ohio and was in the same part of the State was directed to advance against *Crittenden* and drive him out of Kentucky.

Leaving Lebanon with two brigades, Thomas marched through Columbia towards Somerset where there were two other brigades that were to unite with him in the movement.

At *Logan Crossroads*, before his forces were entirely united, Thomas was attacked by *Crittenden* on January 19, 1862. *Crittenden* was decisively defeated and fell back that day to his bridgehead at Mill Springs where he was invested by Thomas.

During the night *Crittenden* ferried his troops across the river and retreated into Tennessee. In the retreat he was compelled to abandon both stores and artillery.

#### OPPOSING TROOPS IN CAMPAIGN OF LOGAN CROSSROADS.

	Divisions.	Brigades.	Batteries.
<i>Union Forces.</i>			
Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas . . . . .		3	3
Casualties, 262.			
<i>Confederate Forces.</i>			
Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden . . . . .		2	1
Casualties, 533.			

*Crittenden* was severely criticised for his defeat and as a result the *Department of East Tennessee* was created and Maj. Gen. *Edward Kirby Smith* was sent from the *Army of Northern Virginia* to command it. Troops were sent him from Georgia and South Carolina.

#### THE HENRY AND DONELSON CAMPAIGN.

##### PLATE 3.

**Fort Henry.**—It was early decided by the Union authorities in the West to turn *A. S. Johnston's* position at Bowling Green by an advance up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. As the State of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River was in the Department of the Missouri, the movement was under the supervision of Halleck.

On December 23, 1861, the District of Cairo was formed of southern Illinois, western Kentucky, and southeastern Missouri. Grant was assigned by Halleck to this command. On January 30, Grant received permission from Halleck to attempt the capture of *Fort Henry* with the aid of a naval force under Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote.

*Fort Henry*, on the east bank of the Tennessee River in the northern part of the State of Tennessee, was a closed fieldwork

mounting seventeen guns. It was constructed near the bank of the river on low ground, and on the day of the attack was partially flooded. Its garrison consisted of one hundred artillery soldiers and was commanded by Brig. Gen. *Lloyd Tilghman* himself.

The fort was the nucleus of an intrenched camp which was located on the high plateau immediately behind it. The fortifications inclosing the camp were however only partially completed, and though garrisoned, it was not yet in condition to resist an attack.

On the west bank of the river another work, *Fort Heiman*, was under process of construction. This fort occupied high ground which commanded the interior of *Fort Henry*.

The force commanded by Grant consisted of the division of Brig. Gen. Charles F. Smith, three brigades, and the division of Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand, two brigades; in all about 15,000 men. The naval force under Flag Officer Foote included four ironclad river gunboats mounting twelve guns, each more powerful than any of those ashore.

**February.**—According to the general plan of the Union commander, the gunboats were to bombard *Fort Henry*, February 6, and under cover of their fire, troops were to land on both banks of the river a few miles below the fort and completely invest it.

After a short bombardment by the gunboats, however, *Tilghman* surrendered *Fort Henry* and its surviving artillery garrison of about eighty men, to Flag Officer Foote. The Confederate infantry, cavalry, and field artillery of the intrenched camp retired eastwards to *Fort Donelson*.

**Fort Donelson** (Plate 20).—Immediately after the surrender, the Union fleet ascended the Tennessee River and destroyed the railroad bridge over that river just above *Fort Henry* and all the Confederate gunboats on the river as far south as the Alabama line. Grant, after securing the stores captured at *Fort Henry*, made preparations to advance on *Fort Donelson*.

*Fort Donelson* consisted of a large inclosed fieldwork constructed on a high bluff overlooking the Cumberland River. An intrenched camp, of which the fort was the citadel, extended a mile along the river and three-fourths of a mile inland. The camp inclosed the town of Dover on the Cumberland.

Except on the down-stream side, where it was limited by an

unfordable stream, the camp was inclosed by an almost continuous line of standing trenches of strong profile with good positions for artillery in and behind the line. The total length of the line to be defended was about 4,000 yards. The river was commanded by an embrasure battery of heavy guns having a command of 30 feet.

There was no bridge over the river; when the land front was fully invested, there was no means of escape for the garrison except by boat.

On February 7, immediately after the fall of *Fort Henry*, *Albert S. Johnston* decided to withdraw the *Army of Kentucky* from Bowling Green to the south bank of the Cumberland River. It was desirable that *Fort Donelson* should be held until this was accomplished to prevent the Union gunboats from interfering with the movement.

The divisions of Brig. Gens. *John E. Floyd* and *Simon B. Buckner* of the *Army of Kentucky* were therefore ordered to reinforce the garrison. *Fort Donelson* was to be evacuated as soon as *A. S. Johnston* with *Hardee's* division was across the Cumberland.

*Buckner* reached *Donelson* on February 11, and *Floyd* on February 13. On the latter day the garrison consisted of *Tilghman's* division of three brigades, now commanded by Brig. Gen. *Gideon J. Pillow*, *Floyd's* small division of four regiments, and *Buckner's* division of two brigades. The total strength was reported by *A. S. Johnston* on March 17 as 17,000 men. (For organization see p. 94.)

The divisions of *C. F. Smith* and *McClermand* began moving on *Fort Donelson* on February 12, and on the 13th the investment began. Since the capture of *Fort Henry* each division had been reinforced by a brigade. A brigade which arrived from *T. L. Crittenden's* division of *Buell's* army at this time, was combined with a number of regiments sent from Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois, and formed a third division under Brig. Gen. *Lew Wallace*. (For organization see p. 94.)

When the Union troops arrived in front of the intrenched camp, *McClermand's* division was assigned to the right of the line and *C. F. Smith's* to the left. *Lew Wallace's* division was afterwards pushed in between them. To enable *McClermand* to rest his flank on the Cumberland, he was reinforced by a brigade from each of the other divisions.



On February 14, Flag Officer Foote attacked the river batteries with four gunboats, intending after their destruction to move up the river and prevent the escape of the garrison by boat. His attack was repulsed and this means of retreat was preserved.

Seeing that his troops were closely invested, *Floyd* called a council of war on the 14th to decide whether the fort should be evacuated. It was decided to break through McClernand's right and retire up the river.

Early on the morning of February 15, the Confederates began a vigorous assault, and by noon had opened the road up the river towards Clarksville. *Pillow*, who commanded his own division and that of *Buckner* in this attack, decided that the Union troops had now been so decisively defeated that there was no longer any necessity of retreating. He therefore ordered *Buckner* to resume his position in front of C. F. Smith's division while he preserved the line of retreat.

*Buckner* found on his return to his trenches that C. F. Smith's troops had advanced and were now occupying a part of the Confederate works. These he was unable to dislodge. Late in the afternoon Grant transferred another brigade of C. F. Smith's division to assist Lew Wallace in regaining the original position. Thus reinforced, Lew Wallace attacked *Pillow*, drove him back into Donelson, and again closed the line of investment.

Being invested by a very superior force and having lost part of their intrenched line, the Confederate commanders felt compelled to surrender. *Floyd* turned over the command to *Pillow* and employed two boats that came to *Fort Donelson* early in the morning of the 16th to take himself and his division up the river to make their escape.

*Pillow*, after authorizing Col. *Nathan B. Forrest* to take his cavalry out of Donelson by a road partially inundated, turned over the troops to *Buckner* and also made his escape by boat.

The remainder of the garrison, probably 13,000 men, surrendered unconditionally on the 15th. Some of these afterwards escaped in the confusion resulting from the surrender.

**Comments.**—The capture of *Fort Donelson* by raw troops was one of the most remarkable events of the war and reflected great credit on Grant to whose energy it was due. His promptness in closing the gap made by *Pillow's* attack sealed the fate of the Confederate garrison.

Had *Pillow* carried out the decision of the council of war, most of the Confederate troops would have escaped. He was therefore personally responsible for their capture.

The Confederate authorities justly condemned *Floyd* and *Pillow* for turning over the command and seeking personal safety; neither was again given an important command.

#### OPPOSING FORCES AT FORT DONELSON.

*Union, Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.*

Divisions.	Brigades.	Regiments. Cav.	Batteries.
Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand .....	3	2	4
Brig. Gen. Charles F. Smith.....	4	—	3
Brig. Gen. Lew Wallace.....	3	—	1

*Confederate, Brig. Gens. John B. Floyd, Gideon J. Pillow, and Simon B. Buckner.*

Brig. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow.....	3	—	1
Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner.....	2	—	3
Col. Gabriel Wharton.....	2	—	3
Garrison.....	—	—	4
Cavalry.....	—	2	—

Strength of investing force at close of siege.....	27,000
Maximum strength of besieged force.....	17,000
Strength of besieged force at surrender—probably.....	13,000

**Union Occupation of Nashville.**—While the attack on *Fort Donelson* was in progress, *A. S. Johnston* withdrew *Hardee's* division from Bowling Green and fell back to Nashville.

Buell's advance division under O. M. Mitchel reached the Great Barren River at Bowling Green on February 14, and found the Confederate rear guard on the opposite shore about to retire.

Nelson's division of Buell's army had been sent by transport to the Cumberland to reinforce Grant, but did not arrive in time for the attack on Donelson. It was now escorted up the river by the gunboats and took possession of Clarksville on February 20; it united with Mitchel's division at Nashville on February 24.

On the 3d of March, Buell was at Nashville with four of his divisions and shortly thereafter his other divisions joined him.

*Johnston* retreated southwards to Murfreesboro, where *G. B. Crittenden* joined him.

**Union Movement up the Tennessee River.**—Halleck proposed to follow the capture of *Fort Donelson* by an expedition up the Tennessee River to Alabama, there to destroy the railroad bridge.

over Great Bear Creek near the Mississippi-Alabama boundary line (plate 40) and to destroy the railroad junctions at Corinth, Miss., and Jackson and Humboldt, Tenn. This would separate the remnants of *A. S. Johnston's Army of Kentucky* from *Polk's* corps at Columbus, Ky., and each could be attacked separately. For this operation Halleck requested the assistance of Buell. Without waiting for the latter, however, on March 3 he ordered the Union troops at *Fort Donelson* up the Tennessee.

**March.**—This expedition was sent under the command of Maj. Gen. Charles F. Smith. On the 5th of March, the first troops landed at Savannah, Tenn., on the east bank of the Tennessee River, which was to be the new base of operations.

On March 11, while Halleck was getting his expedition under way, McClellan was relieved as general in chief of the Armies of the United States and Halleck was made independent commander of the new Department of the Mississippi which comprised all the country east of the Great Plains and west of the meridian through Knoxville, Tenn. Buell thus came under Halleck's command and on March 16 was ordered to march his army as rapidly as possible to Savannah.

After the capture of *Forts Henry* and *Donelson* the District of West Tennessee was established and Grant, now a major general, was assigned to this command. He was directed to remain at *Fort Henry* temporarily and hasten troops and supplies to Savannah. In this work he was assisted by Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman who was in command of the base at Paducah.

The troops in this district were now organized into four divisions; three were commanded by Maj. Gens. Charles F. Smith, John A. McClernand, and Lew Wallace, and one by Brig. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut. To these was shortly added the 5th division organized by Sherman at Paducah and commanded by him.

By the middle of March the transports with the five divisions were at Savannah. As Corinth, Miss., and the railroad running north from that place were the objectives of the expedition, C. F. Smith decided to secure a base on the west bank of the Tennessee River. Lew Wallace's division was therefore debarked at Crump Landing nearly opposite Savannah.

Sherman's division was sent up the river to Eastport, Miss., to destroy the railroad bridge over Great Bear Creek, east of Iuka,

Miss. Finding the Confederates ready to dispute this operation, the division returned and debarked at Pittsburg Landing about seven miles south of Savannah. Being a better camping site than Crump Landing, this then became the main base and to it were sent the divisions of C. F. Smith, McClelland, and Hurlbut.

On March 17, Grant was directed to resume the command of the troops at the front and he established his headquarters at Savannah. He made no change in the disposition of the troops as established by C. F. Smith. As C. F. Smith was ill at Savannah and unable to take an active part in the operations, his division was commanded by Brig. Gen. Wm. H. L. Wallace.

New regiments were constantly arriving and on the 26th of March, the 6th division was formed and sent to Pittsburg Landing. This was commanded by Brig. Gen. Benjamin M. Prentiss. (For organization see p. 102.)

The advance division of Buell's Army of the Ohio reached Columbia, Tenn., on its way to Savannah, March 19; here it was delayed ten days by the floods in Duck River and did not get away again until the 29th. Buell's advance division was on that day about ninety miles from Savannah.

**Army of the Mississippi.**—Immediately after the battle of *Logan Crossroads*, Ky., *Beauregard* was sent from the *Army of Northern Virginia* to the West to assist *A. S. Johnston*; he was with *Johnston* at *Bowling Green* when *Fort Henry* was captured.

*Johnston* knew that *Fort Donelson* must soon be abandoned by the Confederate troops and he assumed that the Union troops would then attack *Polk* in west Tennessee. *Beauregard* was therefore directed to take charge of the defense of the territory west of the Tennessee River.

*Beauregard* established his headquarters at Jackson, Tenn., on the 16th of February, and immediately after the surrender of *Donelson* began the formation of the *Army of the Mississippi*.

On February 8, immediately after the fall of *Fort Henry*, Maj. Gen. *Mansfield Lovell* was ordered by the authorities at Richmond to send 5,000 troops to *Polk* from Louisiana. Considering Columbus untenable and a movement up the Tennessee probable, *Beauregard* sent this division to Corinth, Miss., to watch the upper Tennessee.

After the capture of *Fort Donelson*, the Richmond authorities

directed Maj. Gen. *Bragg* to evacuate Pensacola, Fla., and go to the assistance of *A. S. Johnston* and *Beauregard*.

*Bragg* went to Corinth with three brigades and assumed command of that place. He sent one brigade to Bethel on the railroad north of Corinth and another to Iuka on the railroad east of Corinth to watch the upper Tennessee River. *Bragg's* outposts were on the west bank of the river when the Union troops reached Savannah.

In the first week of March the troops from Louisiana and from the Gulf Coast were united into a corps of six brigades under the command of *Bragg*.

In accordance with his general plan, *Beauregard* directed *Polk* to withdraw from Kentucky and establish his main body at Humboldt, Tenn., with the advanced posts at Union City and Paris. The river defenses at Island No. 10 and New Madrid were to be held by a strong force as long as possible, but as this line could be turned, *Fort Pillow*, a strong work on the bluffs forty miles north of Memphis, was equipped with heavy guns from Columbus, Ky., and from Pensacola, Fla., to form a second line for the defense of the Mississippi.

*Polk* moved to his new position during the last week in February and the first week in March.

When the Union troops began to disembark at Crump and Pittsburg Landings, *Polk* was directed to move his field force of four brigades from Humboldt to Jackson and Bethel to cooperate with *Bragg's* corps.

*A. S. Johnston* in retiring from Nashville first marched to Murfreesboro where he strengthened his army by the addition of *G. B. Crittenden's* troops and new regiments. He then marched southwards through Shelbyville to Huntsville. He had with him three brigades of *Hardee's* division, and three brigades of the divisions of *Buckner*, *Floyd*, and *G. B. Crittenden*. He was at Decatur when the Union troops landed at Shiloh and at once pushed his column westward to unite with *Beauregard*.

*Johnston* reached Corinth on the 24th of March and on the 29th took command of the combined armies. *Beauregard* was assigned as second in command.

The *Army of the Mississippi* as finally formed was composed of four corps: *Polk's* corps of four brigades; *Bragg's* corps of six brigades; *Hardee's* corps of three brigades; and *Breckinridge's* corps of three brigades. (For organization see p. 103.)

## THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.

## PLATES 3 and 40.

**April.**—On April 1, nearly the entire *Army of the Mississippi* was at Corinth, completely organized. On that day five divisions of the Army of the Tennessee were at Shiloh, and one at Crump Landing five miles below. One division of the Army of the Ohio was a day's march from Columbia on the road to Savannah, and the other five were between Columbia and Nashville.

On April 1, Maj. Gen. *Cheatham*, whose division was at Bethel, Tenn., reported that he was about to be attacked; *Beauregard* assumed from this that the Union army was about to advance westwards in two bodies from Crump and Pittsburg Landings, and advised an immediate attack on the latter place while the Union divisions were separated. His plan was approved.

The orders for the Confederate advance were issued on April 2, and the movement was to begin by noon on the 3d.

The armies were only twenty-five miles apart and it was assumed that if the troops started at noon on April 3, they would be able to get in position on the 4th and attack on the 5th. It had been reported to *A. S. Johnston* that Buell was moving on Savannah and it was hoped that the battle would be fought before Buell arrived.

It was however the first campaign of nearly all the Confederate troops engaged and the movements were much slower than anticipated. The attack was therefore made on the morning of the 6th of April instead of the 5th.

The Army of the Tennessee was not expecting a battle near the Tennessee River; both Grant and Sherman believed that the Confederate commanders would await an attack in the vicinity of Corinth.

In the arrangement of the encampment at Pittsburg Landing (plate 22), the divisions of Sherman and Prentiss were on the Corinth front south of the Purdy-Hamburg road. Three of Sherman's brigades were astride of the west Corinth road at Shiloh Church; one was detached and encamped at the junction of Purdy-Hamburg and Hamburg roads. The two brigades of Prentiss' division were astride of the east Corinth road.

McClermand's division was along the west Corinth road north of Sherman. Hurlbut's division was near the junction of the east Corinth and Hamburg roads. Smith's division under Wm. H. L. Wallace, was near Pittsburg Landing.

**April 4.**—On the night of April 4, the *Army of the Mississippi* bivouacked at Mickey crossroads, six miles from Shiloh Church. On this day a Confederate cavalry regiment captured a Union picket on the west Corinth Road and was in turn attacked by Union infantry and cavalry, and had several men captured. Sherman reported this affair on the 5th, and stated that infantry and artillery were in his front. He still did not believe that he would be attacked.

**April 5.**—The *Army of the Mississippi* was to move from Mickey crossroads at 2 a. m. but the movement was delayed until sunrise by a drenching rain. As the roads were bad and the army was moving on a single road, the entire day was spent in moving the troops about three miles and deploying them for the attack.

When deployed, the front line was formed of the three brigades of *Hardee's* corps with one brigade of *Bragg's* corps on their right. These brigades formed a single line of battle astride of the west Corinth and Bark roads, about a mile and a half from Shiloh Church. Cavalry and infantry outposts were in advance of *Hardee*, between the two armies.

Six hundred yards in rear of *Hardee*, *Bragg* had five brigades, each in mass with regimental front, ready to support *Hardee*. His front overlapped *Hardee's*.

*Polk's* four brigades formed a single mass of brigade front, astride the west Corinth road, in rear of *Bragg*. *Breckinridge* was in column in rear of *Polk*.

Although Sherman and Prentiss sent patrols to the front this day, who reported the Confederates rather "saucy," the two generals were unaware of the presence of so large a force. They did however strengthen their outposts.

**Battlefield.**—Pittsburg Landing was merely a landing place for river steamboats. The bluff at this point is 80 feet higher than the highest flood. From Pittsburg Landing roads ran to Hamburg 4 miles above, to Crump Landing 8 miles below, to Purdy, and to Corinth. The best road to Corinth was that via Mickey crossroads.

The battlefield lies between Owl and Snake creeks which empty into the Tennessee River below the landing, and Lick Creek, which empties into the Tennessee above the landing. Owl and Snake creeks were at the time of battle impassable ex-

cept at the bridges. The shortest distance between Owl and Lick creeks is about three miles.

The battlefield is a plateau, intersected by numerous dry ravines. At the time of the battle it was covered with open forest, having thick underbrush in patches. Clearings, surrounded by forest, marked the farms that occupied the field.

**April 6.**—About 3 a. m. April 6, from Prentiss' division a patrol of three companies was ordered out. It proceeded to and along the west Corinth road until it ran into a Confederate regiment on outpost duty about 5 a. m. These troops opened the battle. Prentiss and Sherman both received warning in time to form their brigades close to their encampments.

About 6:30 a. m. the entire Confederate army began to advance and by 9 a. m. its three lines became merged into a single line. *Breckinridge's* corps was not engaged until noon.

The battle developed along two lines of attack. The left of the Confederate army, eventually composed of one or more brigades of the four Confederate corps, attacked Sherman and McClernand who deployed on Sherman's left. The Union commanders fell back from position to position and at the close of the fight occupied a line along the Crump Landing road, extending from Dill Branch northward. One brigade of Hurlbut's division was attached to McClernand's division.

The Confederate center and right attacked Prentiss' division and Sherman's brigade on the east Corinth and Purdy roads.

Hurlbut's division advanced to the Hamburg-Purdy road to support Prentiss, and Wm. H. L. Wallace's division advanced to the junction of the east Corinth and Hamburg roads for the same purpose.

The principal fighting of the Union left wing took place at this junction, "*the hornet's nest*," between 2 and 5 p. m., between six brigades of the divisions of Prentiss, Hurlbut and Wallace and the center and right of the Confederate army. Hurlbut withdrew his brigades at 4:30 as he was about to be surrounded; the others remained some time longer. W. H. L. Wallace was mortally wounded in this engagement and Prentiss with 2,200 men was captured about 5:30 p. m.

During this fight, a line of field and siege guns was established behind Dill Branch in rear of which the remnants of the Union center and left were assembled.



In the attack on the "*hornet's nest*," the Confederate troops became much disorganized and could not be rallied to make a united attack on the Union line behind Dill Branch.

The remnant of two Confederate brigades entered the ravine of Dill Branch to attack this line but finding it swept by the Union gunboats and a strong line in its rear, made but a feeble attack. This closed the battle. One regiment of Buell's army took part in this closing engagement.

*A. S. Johnston* was killed about 2:30 p. m. near the east Corinth road and the command fell to *Beauregard* who ordered the attack to cease about 6 p. m., in order that the troops might be reorganized for the next day's battle. About this time he received a message from scouts in Tennessee saying that Buell was marching on Decatur, Ala., and not on Savannah, Tenn.

Grant was at Pittsburg Landing on April 4, when the Union and Confederate cavalry encountered each other, and was injured by the fall of his horse that night while returning to the Landing.

On the 5th, he remained at Savannah to receive Buell's troops who were arriving.

On the 6th, hearing firing in the direction of Pittsburg Landing, he went there in his boat, stopping en route to caution Lew Wallace to be ready to move.

Grant reached the field at 8 a. m. and found practically all his troops either engaged or on their way to the front. He spent the day in visiting and encouraging his division commanders, in rallying fugitives from the front, and in sending forward ammunition.

As soon as he reached the field he sent for Lew Wallace's division. Wallace however at first took the wrong road and marched down the west side of Snake Creek thinking that he was expected to cross Owl Creek on the Purdy road and come in on Sherman's right. A staff officer sent by Grant pointed out his mistake and led him to the field which he reached about dark.

Buell reached Pittsburg Landing on the afternoon of the 6th in advance of his troops.

Nelson's division of the Army of the Ohio had reached Savannah about noon of the 5th, but was ordered to remain there until it could be taken up to Pittsburg Landing by river. No transports appearing, about 1 p. m. of the 6th, it was started through the swamps on the east bank of the Tennessee. A part of its first

brigade reached the west bank in time to take part in the final operations of the day; the remainder crossed the river that night.

Crittenden's division reached Savannah on the evening of the 6th and was brought up to Pittsburg Landing in transports that night. McCook's division was next transported but only one brigade reached the field at dawn; the others soon followed. Wood's division made a forced march during the night of the 6th, reached Savannah the next morning and was on the field before the battle of the 7th was over. Thomas arrived after the battle.

**April 7th.**—On the morning of the 7th, therefore, Grant had at his disposal the fresh divisions of Lew Wallace, Nelson, and Crittenden, and one brigade of McCook's division; the other brigades of McCook as well as those of Wood were close at hand. *Beauregard* had only his disorganized and exhausted troops to put into his line.

The attack by Grant's army reinforced by the Army of the Ohio began about 7:30 a. m. In his line of battle the Army of the Ohio formed the left wing and the Army of the Tennessee the right. Lew Wallace's division was on the extreme right.

By 2 p. m. the Confederates were driven beyond the Purdy-Hamburg road and *Beauregard* gave the order to retire to Corinth.

No orders were given to pursue the retreating forces. The Army of the Tennessee was exhausted by the battles of the 6th and 7th, and the Army of the Ohio was exhausted by the forced marches, by the night movements on the 6th, and by the battle of the 7th.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.

##### *Union.*

##### *Army of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
1. Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand.....	3	—	4
2. Brig. Gen. Wm. H. L. Wallace*.....	3	—	4
3. Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace.....	3	—	2
4. Brig. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut.....	3	—	3
5. Brig. Gen. Wm. T. Sherman.....	4	—	2
6. Brig. Gen. Benjamin M. Prentiss †.....	3	—	2
Cavalry.....	—	3	—

\*Killed. †Prisoner.

*Army of the Ohio, Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
2. Brig. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook.....	3	-	1
4. Brig. Gen. William Nelson.....	3	-	-
5. Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden.....	2	-	2
6. Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood.....	2	-	-
Cavalry.....	-	3	-

*Confederate.*

*Army of the Mississippi,* { *Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston.\**  
                                  { *Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard.*

Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Alexander P. Stuart....	2	-	2
Leonidas Polk	Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham.	2	-	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles .....	3	-	2
Braxton Bragg	Brig. Gen. Jones M. Withers.....	3	-	3
Maj. Gen.	Wm. J. Hardee.....	3	-	4
Brig. Gen.	John C. Breckinridge.....	3	-	4
	Reserve Artillery.....	-	-	2
	Cavalry.....	-	5	-

\*Killed.

*Strength.*

The strength of the Army of the Tennessee present for duty was....	44,000
Grant assumes its effective strength on the 14th exclusive of Lew Wal- lace's division as.....	33,000
The effective strength of Lew Wallace's division is given by himself as	5,000
The effective strength of the Army of the Ohio is given by Grant as 5,000 per division.	
The effective strength of the Army of the Mississippi is given in the War Records as.....	40,339

*Casualties.*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Union.....	1,754	8,408	2,855	13,047
Confederate.....	1,728	8,012	959	10,699

**Comments.**—The incidents of the campaign of Shiloh led to much controversy between the participants on each side. The facts seem to be as follows:—

From the middle of March four divisions of the Army of the Tennessee were encamped at Pittsburg Landing on the west bank of the Tennessee River in hostile territory. Although behind

them was an unfordable river, no intrenchments were thrown up to strengthen the position. No special precautions were taken to give warning of the approach of an enemy, although the usual outposts were established a short distance to the front.

The headquarters of the army were seven miles away, although after March 26, five of the six divisions of the army were concentrated at Shiloh.

To understand such a situation it must be remembered that at the beginning of 1862 the Confederate forces in Kentucky and Tennessee were in three bodies; the right under Maj. Gen. *G. B. Crittenden* on the upper Cumberland, the center at Bowling Green and *Fort Donelson* under Gen. *A. S. Johnston*, the left in western Kentucky under Maj. Gen. *Polk*.

In January, *Crittenden* was decisively defeated by Thomas. In February one-half of *Johnston's* force was captured at *Fort Donelson* and he himself retreated towards Chattanooga. *Polk's* forces were presumably engaged with those of Maj. Gen. John Pope, who had organized an army in Missouri and early in March had begun an attack on the Confederate river defenses at Island No. 10 and New Madrid.

It is not surprising that both Grant and Sherman believed that the Confederate force at Corinth was an insignificant one probably collected at that place to protect the railroads against Union raiding parties. It reflects great credit on *Beauregard* that he was able to organize and concentrate the *Army of the Mississippi* so close to the camp of his adversary without alarming him. Grant remained at Savannah, because from that point he could best supervise the supply and reinforcement of his army.

Since the Union generals had no fear of their adversaries, the camp at Shiloh was neither intrenched nor specially arranged for defense. For the same reason the Army of the Ohio was not urged to hasten its march nor was Nelson's division of that army on its arrival at Savannah at once sent to Shiloh.

Although on April 6, the Army of the Tennessee was surprised, it made such a stubborn resistance that by 6 p. m. *Beauregard* concluded that it would be impossible to carry the attack to a successful conclusion on that day. He therefore gave the order to cease the attack.

Grant and Sherman were also of the opinion that the Army of

the Tennessee was then in a condition to resist any further attempt of the Confederates to push back its lines.

In view of these facts the contention made by the friends of *A. S. Johnston*, that had he lived, the result of the day's battle would have been a decisive victory for the Confederates seems untenable.

While Lew Wallace's division did not reach the field until the evening of the 6th, the fault was not that of Wallace but was due to a misunderstanding of orders.

Grant maintained that with Lew Wallace's fresh division he was in a position to win a victory on the 7th, without the aid of the Army of the Ohio, although he gave great credit to the work of that army on the second day. Neither Buell nor *Beauregard* agreed with him in that opinion, but maintained that the Army of the Tennessee was saved by the opportune arrival of Buell's army.

The moral effect of the approach of the Army of the Ohio on the 6th both on Grant and on his subordinates must have been very great, although it took no important part in that day's battle.

It is of course not possible to say whether the Army of the Tennessee could have resisted a second day's attack with the reinforcements brought by Lew Wallace alone. It is certain however that the participation of the Army of the Ohio in the battle of the 7th had a great moral effect on the officers and men of the armies both of Grant and of *Beauregard* and changed what was at least a doubtful contest into a decisive victory.

The Army of the Ohio would have been at Pittsburg Landing at least a week earlier had it been provided with a ponton train to cross the Duck River.

## NEW MADRID AND ISLAND No. 10 CAMPAIGN.

### PLATE 4.

The Union movement up the Tennessee River, which was only a preliminary movement looking to the opening of the Mississippi River, was contemporaneous with another movement, also under Gen. Halleck, for the same purpose. This was the attack on New Madrid and Island No. 10.

After the capture of *Fort Henry*, February 6, Grant called for reinforcements to attack *Fort Donelson*. Halleck withdrew Brig.

Gen. John Pope's force from central Missouri to send them to Grant. Finding that all of Pope's troops would not be needed in Tennessee, Halleck directed Pope to mobilize a corps on the Mississippi near Cape Girardeau and attack the Confederates at New Madrid. Pope began organizing his Army of the Mississippi on February 20 and on March 3 was in front of New Madrid, Mo., on the Mississippi River. (See p. 107.)

The peninsula (plate 23), inclosed by the Mississippi River and Reelfoot Lake, runs north and south. It is ten miles long and about three miles wide. At the eastern end of its base is Island No. 10 in the Mississippi River; at the western end of the base is the town of Tiptonville. On the Missouri shore opposite its northern extremity is the town of New Madrid.

The defenses of this position were begun when Brig. Gen. *Gideon J. Pillow* was at New Madrid in August, 1861. They consisted of a redout for two regiments at New Madrid, land batteries and a floating battery at Island No. 10, and land batteries on the Tennessee shore near Island No. 10.

When *Polk* evacuated Columbus, he sent Maj. Gen. *John P. McCown's* division of about 5,000 men to reinforce the garrison of 2,000 men then occupying this position. (See p. 108.)

Under *McCown* a second redout was constructed at New Madrid, and five regiments were detailed to hold the two redouts on the Missouri side of the river. Guns were mounted on the west side of the peninsula to command the river, and additional guns were mounted on Island No. 10 and in its vicinity.

When Pope reached New Madrid there were over thirty heavy guns along the shores of the river above and below Island No. 10, and nearly twenty on the island itself. The new batteries were however without bombproofs of any description, even for the magazines. A fleet of small gunboats formed an auxiliary defense.

**March.**—The two redouts at New Madrid were so well supplied with artillery that Pope decided to take the place by regular siege. Siege guns were sent for and mounted, and on March 13, the preliminary bombardment was commenced; at the same time regular approaches were begun.

While Pope attacked New Madrid, Flag Officer Foote with his armored gunboats and mortar-boats bombarded Island No. 10 and the batteries above New Madrid.

To escape the danger of being isolated on the Missouri side of the river, *McCown* evacuated the redouts of New Madrid on the night of March 13, and withdrew their garrisons across the river to the peninsula. For this movement *McCown* was relieved.

Pope now decided to cross the river south of New Madrid and turn the defenses of Island No. 10. To enable him to get transports to New Madrid to use as ferries, Pope had a channel cut through the swamps of Missouri north of Island No. 10. The channel was completed on April 4. While this work was in progress, batteries were established opposite the west shore of the peninsula to silence the Confederate batteries which might oppose the crossing.

**April.**—On April 4 and 6, two armored gunboats ran the line of Confederate batteries to aid the army in making its crossing.

On April 7, after the Confederate batteries along the west shore of the peninsula had been silenced by the opposing batteries and gunboats, four regiments were ferried across in as many transports and marched to the town of Tiptonville at the base of the peninsula through which ran the Confederate line of retreat.

Finding his retreat cut off, Brig. Gen. *Wm. W. Mackall*, the Confederate commander who had succeeded *McCown*, surrendered his command which then consisted of about 3,500 men, over 1,500 of whom were on sick report. About 500 escaped through the swamps.

The capture of Island No. 10 opened the Mississippi to *Fort Pillow* about forty miles above Memphis. Pope was about to undertake the reduction of that fort when, on April 14, he was directed to bring his army to the upper Tennessee River to unite with Grant and Buell in an advance on Corinth.

#### OPPOSING FORCES AT NEW MADRID AND ISLAND NO. 10.

*Army of the Mississippi, Maj. Gen. John Pope.*

Divisions.	Brigades.	Regiments Cav.	Batteries.
1. Brig. Gen. David S. Stanley . . . . .	2	—	1
2. Brig. Gen. Schuyler Hamilton . . . . .	2	—	1
3. Brig. Gen. John M. Palmer . . . . .	2	—	1
4. Brig. Gen. Eleazer A. Paine . . . . .	2	—	—
5. Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Plummer . . . . .	2	—	1
Brig. Gen. Gordon Granger (Cav.) . . . . .	—	2	—
Artillery reserve . . . . .	—	—	2
Flotilla brigade . . . . .	1	—	—
Naval Fleet, Flag Officer Foote, 6 gunboats and 11 mortar-boats.			

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
<i>Confederates.</i>				
Maj. Gen. John P. McCown.....		4	-	-
Brig. Gen. William W. Mackall .....				
Heavy artillery.....		1	regiment	
Light artillery.....		-	-	3
Cavalry.....		3	companies	
	Union..	Confederate.		
	Exclusive of fleet.	Under McCown	Under Mackall	
Strength.....	19,000	7,000	3,500	
Casualties.....	100		3,000	

After the retreat from New Madrid, five Confederate regiments were withdrawn. At the time of the surrender, three of these were at Shiloh and two at *Fort Pillow*.

**Comment.**—The running of the batteries of Island No. 10 by river gunboats was the most important development of this campaign.

## THE ADVANCE ON CORINTH AND MEMPHIS.

### PLATES 21 and 40.

Shortly after the battle of Shiloh, Halleck took command of the forces at Shiloh in person and began to organize an army for the attack of the Confederates at Corinth. For this purpose he ordered Pope's army to Hamburg on the Tennessee River and ordered Maj. Gen. S. R. Curtis, then in Arkansas, to send a division to reinforce Pope. The division sent by Curtis did not however reach Pope until May 22. When Halleck began the campaign, he had about 90,000 men; at its close he had about 100,000.

Halleck began to move forward from Shiloh and Hamburg about the last of April. Four divisions of the Army of the Tennessee and Thomas' division of the Army of the Ohio constituted his right wing which was commanded by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas. The remainder of the Army of the Ohio under Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell constituted his center. The Army of the Mississippi under Maj. Gen. John Pope constituted his left wing. The divisions of McClernand and Lew Wallace of the Army of the Tennessee under McClernand formed the reserve. Grant was appointed second in command. (See p. 110.)

*Beauregard*, who had been reinforced by Maj. Gen. *Earl Van Dorn's Army of the West* from Arkansas, assigned *Bragg* to the



command of the *Army of the Mississippi*. His armies received additional troops from South Carolina and east Tennessee, and from the Gulf Coast both east and west of the Mississippi. The Confederate government realized that if Corinth fell, it would be necessary to abandon *Fort Pillow* and Memphis. (See p. 110.)

With all his reinforcements, *Beauregard* had about 66,000 men, or two-thirds of the strength of Halleck. To prolong the resistance, *Beauregard* converted Corinth into an intrenched camp.

**May.**—Halleck moved forward cautiously. His commanders had orders to intrench themselves daily. On May 28 he was close to the main line of fortifications about Corinth. His right flank rested on the railroad running north from that city and his left flank on the railroad running east.

As Halleck afforded him no good opportunity for counter-attack, *Beauregard* began to study his own line of retreat. With *Lee's* approval, he decided to retreat southwards towards Meridian to preserve his communications both eastward and westward.

When Halleck's left wing, Pope's army, reached the railroad running eastward from Corinth it was about three miles from *Beauregard's* line of retreat. The latter therefore evacuated Corinth quietly on the night of May 29. Pope was sent in pursuit.

The Union cavalry came in contact with the Confederate rear-guard and had several unimportant encounters; the infantry did not come into contact. In this pursuit Col. Philip H. Sheridan, 2d Michigan Cavalry, was especially active.

**June.**—On June 11, it was known that *Beauregard* had retreated beyond Baldwyn (plate 40), and the pursuit was discontinued. The Union cavalry was then at Baldwyn and the infantry at Booneville. *Beauregard* continued his retreat to Tupelo.

The immediate result of the evacuation of Corinth was the withdrawal of the Confederate forces from *Fort Pillow* and all of the territory between the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers north of the Corinth-Memphis railroad.

The Union fleet of gunboats and rams at once proceeded to Memphis and there destroyed the Confederate fleet on June 5. On the following day a Union regiment was landed and took possession of the city.

The Confederates at Memphis retired along the Memphis-Jackson railroad (plate 7).

The Mississippi was now open to the Union transports from the Ohio River to Vicksburg, Miss. (plate 7), which *Beauregard* had given instructions to fortify when he knew that he must abandon *Fort Pillow* and Memphis.

OPPOSING FORCES IN CORINTH CAMPAIGN.

*Union Forces, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck.*

*Army of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant*

Divisions.	Brigades.	Regiments Cav.	Batteries.
1. Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand.....	3	1	2
2. Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Davies.....	3	1	2
3. Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace.....	3	—	6
4. Brig. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut.....	2	1	3
5. Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman.....	4	1	5
6. Brig. Gen. Thomas J. McKean.....	3	1	5

*Army of the Ohio, Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell.*

1. Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas.....	3	—	3
2. Brig. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook.....	3	—	4
3. Brig. Gen. William Nelson.....	3	—	4
4. Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden.....	2	—	2
5. Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood.....	3	—	3
Cavalry.....	1	4	—

*Army of the Mississippi, Maj. Gen. John Pope.*

Brig. Gen. 1. Brig. Gen. Eleazer A. Paine.....	2	—	2
Wm. S. Rosecrans 2. Brig. Gen. David S. Stanley.....	2	—	3
Brig. Gen. 3. Brig. Gen. Joseph Plummer.....	2	—	2
Schuyler Hamilton 4. Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis.....	2	—	2
Reserve division Brig. Gen. Gordon Granger.....	1	5	3

Special Troops (Engineers) 1 regiment

*Confederate Forces, General Pierre G. T. Beauregard.*

*Army of the Mississippi, Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg.*

Maj. Gen. Brig. Gen. Charles Clark.....	2	—	2
Leonidas Polk Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham.....	3	—	2
Brig. Gen. Brig. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman.....	4	—	3
Daniel Ruggles Brig. Gen. Jones M. Withers.....	4	—	5
Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee.....	4	—	7
Brig. Gen. John C. Breckinridge.....	4	—	4

*Army of the West, Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn.*

1. Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones.....	3	—	3
2. Maj. Gen. Sterling Price.....	3	—	3
3. Maj. Gen. John C. McCown.....	3	—	3
Reserve Brigade.....	1	—	—
Brig. Gen. Wm. N. Beall (Cav.).....	—	10	—

**Comment.**—The campaign of Corinth completed the work undertaken in the campaigns of Shiloh and New Madrid.

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI, JUNE TO  
DECEMBER.

## PLATES 3, 7 and 40.

Halleck decided not to pursue *Beauregard* into central Mississippi but to make sure of Tennessee. For this purpose he deployed his troops along the general line of the Memphis-Chattanooga railroad.

**June.**—Lew Wallace's division of the Army of the Tennessee was sent to Memphis, McClernand's to Jackson, Sherman's and Hurlbut's to Grand Junction. The two remaining divisions of the Army of the Tennessee with Pope's Army of the Mississippi and Thomas' division of the Army of the Ohio were to hold Corinth and guard the railroad as far east as Decatur, Ala.

Buell, with the divisions of Nelson, T. L. Crittenden, McCook and Wood of the Army of the Ohio, was to move east along the railroad to capture Chattanooga and hold the railroad between Decatur, Ala., and Chattanooga, Tenn.

*Beauregard*, who was obliged to take sick leave, was succeeded by *Bragg* who was promoted to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Gen. *Albert Sidney Johnston*. When *Beauregard* returned to duty in September, he was sent to command the *Department of South Carolina and Georgia*.

The Union fleet, with a brigade of infantry, had come up the river from New Orleans and was at this time bombarding Vicksburg. To meet this movement, *Breckinridge's* division of the *Army of the Mississippi* was sent to Vicksburg and *Van Dorn* was placed in command of that part of the State west of the New Orleans-Holly Springs railroad.

To meet a threatened attack on Chattanooga by O. M. Mitchell's division of the Army of the Ohio, which had followed A. S. *Johnston* on his retreat from Nashville to Huntsville, Ala., *McCown's* division of the *Army of the West* was sent to Chattanooga, Tenn.

**July.**—During the first half of July, Lew Wallace's division was sent to occupy Helena, Ark., and was replaced at Memphis by the divisions of Sherman and Hurlbut. The railroad between Corinth and Memphis was abandoned by the Union troops.

About the middle of the month, Halleck went to Washington - to become general in chief and Grant was left in command. Before

leaving, Halleck directed Grant to relieve Thomas' division which was guarding the railroad between Tuscumbia and Decatur, Ala., and send it to Buell.

Thomas was relieved by one of Rosecrans' divisions and crossed the Tennessee River at Decatur in the latter part of July.

The Union fleet left Vicksburg in the latter part of July and returned to New Orleans. The brigade which was acting with it was landed at Baton Rouge.

As the Union troops in Mississippi did not resume the offensive, about the 20th of July *Bragg* began to move his *Army of the Mississippi* to Chattanooga to operate against Buell.

He left *Van Dorn* in west Mississippi with *Breckinridge's* division of the *Army of the Mississippi* and such other troops as were in his part of the State. *Price* was left at Tupelo with two divisions of the *Army of the West* under Brig. Gens. *Henry Little* and *Dabney B. Maury*. Maj. Gen. *Samuel Jones*, who commanded a division of this army at Corinth, was transferred to the *Army of the Mississippi*.

**August.**—Grant was ordered to relieve the divisions of *Paine* and *J. C. Davis* of the *Army of the Mississippi* which were at Tuscumbia and Big Bear Creek, and send them via Florence to Buell who was along the Nashville-Stevenson railroad.

During August, *Breckinridge* was sent by *Van Dorn* to recapture Baton Rouge. After an unsuccessful attack, *Breckinridge* moved his division to Holly Springs.

**September.**—Grant was ordered to send *Granger's* division of the *Army of the Mississippi* to Louisville, Ky., threatened by *Bragg* and to evacuate the railroad east of Corinth.

Of the *Army of the Tennessee*, *Lew Wallace's* division was at Helena, Ark., *Sherman's* at Memphis, those of *McClelland* and *Hurlbut* were at Jackson and Bolivar, and those of *Davies* and *McKean* were at Corinth.

*Rosecrans* with the divisions of *Stanley* and *Plummer* of the *Army of the Mississippi* was also at Corinth.

*Van Dorn* who had moved with his field force consisting of the divisions of *Lovell* and *Breckinridge* to Holly Springs, was ordered to send *Breckinridge* to *Bragg* via Chattanooga.

The middle of September found Grant confined to the defensive

and holding a line about 100 miles long, extending from the Tennessee to the Mississippi River.

On the right, Sherman had about 8,000 men present for duty around Memphis; at the center, Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord\* had 18,000 at Bolivar and Jackson, and on the left Rosecrans had 23,000 of the armies of the Mississippi and Tennessee around Corinth.

Behind this line, in western Kentucky and Tennessee, were 6,000 men in small garrisons.

*Price* was still at Tupelo. Early in September he reported his force to be 13,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 800 artillery, effectives.

*Van Dorn* was at Holly Springs with 7,000 effective troops.

*Price*, who was still under *Bragg* and junior to *Van Dorn*, was directed by the former to prevent Rosecrans from going to the assistance of Buell in middle Tennessee. Should Rosecrans move into middle Tennessee, *Price* was directed to follow him.

*Van Dorn*, who was of the opinion that Grant's force in western Tennessee had been much weakened, requested *Price* to join him in a movement against Grant.

**Iuka** (Plate 40).—Believing *Bragg's* instructions to be the more imperative, *Price* advanced northward from Tupelo and reached *Iuka* on the 13th. Here he found a small Union force guarding some stores that had not yet been removed. This force was driven out and the stores were captured.

*Price* decided to await at *Iuka* for further developments.

Having learned of *Price's* movement, Grant decided to attack him at once before *Van Dorn* could act.

Having ordered a small division from Jackson, Grant directed Ord to advance with three small divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, 8,000 men, along the railroad to *Iuka*, while Rosecrans with his two divisions, 9,000 men, advanced south of the railroad via Jacinto and cut off *Price's* retreat.

Late on the afternoon of September 19, when Rosecrans was within two miles of *Iuka* on the road on which *Price* had reached that town, he was suddenly attacked by two brigades of *Price's* army under Brig. Gen. *Henry Little*, sent by *Price* to keep the road open.

\*McClelland was on detached duty in Illinois.

A fierce fight was kept up for two hours, or until dark, in which two brigades of *Price's* army were engaged with three brigades of Rosecrans' division. In this fight *Little* was killed.

The strength of Rosecrans' force surprised *Price*, and when he learned that there was another Union force near by, he retreated southward that night.

Grant had not intended to attack until the 20th, and as Ord heard nothing of the fight he took no part.

On the 26th of September, Grant moved his headquarters from Corinth to Jackson, Tenn., and Ord resumed command of the troops at Jackson and Bolivar. Rosecrans was left in command of Corinth with two divisions of his own army and two of the Army of the Tennessee.

**Corinth** (Plate 40).—*Price* retreated from Iuka to Baldwyn, then marched northwestward and joined *Van Dorn* at Ripley the last of September. *Van Dorn* had left part of his force at Holly Springs to guard the roads to Vicksburg and with Maj. Gen. *Mansfield Lovell's* division marched to Ripley.

Believing that Rosecrans at Corinth was weaker than Ord at Bolivar, and much weaker than himself, *Van Dorn* decided to march northwards to the Memphis-Corinth railroad, as if marching on Bolivar, and then turn eastward and attack Corinth.

**October.**—On the 1st of October, *Van Dorn* reached the railroad and about 10 a. m. on the 3d drove in Rosecrans' outposts at Corinth. As Rosecrans' force was not wholly concentrated, the attack of October 3 fell on the two divisions of the Army of the Tennessee; these were driven back from the old Confederate lines to the suburbs of the town. Here a new line of works had been constructed by Rosecrans in September.

During the night, all of Rosecrans' forces were deployed along this new line, and on the 4th of October they were subjected to several desperate assaults, all of which were repulsed. Early in the afternoon *Van Dorn* gave up the fight and began to retire westward along the railroad.

Immediately on hearing of *Van Dorn's* movement, Grant sent two brigades from Jackson to follow the Jackson-Corinth railroad to Corinth, and two brigades from Bolivar to move into Corinth from the west.

The first column, under Brig. Gen. James B. McPherson,

reached Corinth on the afternoon of the 4th, as the Confederates were retreating.

The second column under Maj. Gen. Ord reached the bridge over the Hatchie River about 10 miles west of Corinth on the morning of the 5th, as the Confederate forces were crossing.

Ord captured a Confederate battery and nearly 300 prisoners, and compelled *Van Dorn* to countermarch and cross the Hatchie several miles further south. In this engagement Ord was wounded and Hurlbut succeeded to his command.

The divisions under Rosecrans and those of McPherson took up the pursuit on the 5th. A large number of wounded and stragglers were captured, but the main body of the Confederates succeeded in reaching Holly Springs via Ripley.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN THE BATTLE OF CORINTH.

*Union Forces, Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans.*

*Army of the Mississippi.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley . . . . .	2	—	3
Brig. Gen. Charles S. Hamilton . . . . .	1	—	4
Cavalry . . . . .	1	6	—

*Army of the Tennessee.*

Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Davies . . . . .	3	—	4
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. McKean . . . . .	3	—	5

*Confederate Forces, Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn.*

*Army of the West, Maj. Gen. Sterling Price.*

Brig. Gens. Henry Little, Paul E. Hébert . . . . .	4	—	6
Brig. Gen. Dabney B. Maury . . . . .	3	—	4
Cavalry . . . . .	1	2	—

*District of West Mississippi.*

Maj. Gen. Mansfield Lovell . . . . .	3	—	3
Cavalry . . . . .	1	2	—

	Union.	Confederate.
Effective strength at Corinth . . . . .	20,000	20,000
Casualties at Corinth and in retreat . . . . .	2,520	4,832

On October 24, Rosecrans was relieved from duty in western Tennessee and directed to take command of Buell's army in Kentucky. The Army of the Mississippi ceased to have a separate status and its two remaining divisions were attached to the Army of the Tennessee. Maj. Gen. Charles S. Hamilton succeeded to the command of Corinth.

In the latter part of September the *Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana* was created and Lieut. Gen. *John C. Pemberton* was sent from South Carolina to command it. He took command while *Van Dorn* was engaged in the Corinth Campaign.

On October 21, a confidential order was issued by the Secretary of War directing Maj. Gen. McClernand to raise troops in Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa to be sent to Memphis or to such a point as might be designated by Halleck, to the end that when a sufficient force, not required by the operations of Grant's command, were raised, an expedition under McClernand's command might be organized to operate by the Mississippi River against Vicksburg. This order was secured by McClernand, who was on leave, by personal application to President Lincoln. As it promised to deprive Grant both of his troops and his objective, it greatly influenced his operations.

**November.**—At this time Grant was still holding the line Corinth-Bolivar-Memphis. At Corinth were five divisions under Maj. Gen. Charles S. Hamilton; at Bolivar, two divisions under Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson; and at Memphis, three divisions under Maj. Gen. Wm. T. Sherman. Two brigades were at Jackson, Tenn., and one at Columbus, Ky. All of Grant's supplies for Hamilton and McPherson came from Columbus over the railroad through Jackson, Tenn.

Feeling certain that if he did not employ his troops in active service they would be transferred to McClernand, Grant requested permission to advance against *Van Dorn*. This was granted.

*Van Dorn* was at this time at Holly Springs with 20,000 men, and had outposts at Grand Junction which had been evacuated by the Union troops.

At Vicksburg there was a force of about 4,500, under Maj. Gen. *Martin L. Smith*. To prevent the Union troops from coming up the Yazoo River, *M. L. Smith* was ordered to construct fortifications at Snyder Bluff, twelve miles above Vicksburg, where the Yazoo flows at the base of the plateau upon which Vicksburg is built. He was also directed to construct a boom across the river at that point to obstruct navigation.

**Operations along Mississippi Central Railroad.**—Grant organized his field army into three corps. Three of the five divisions at Corinth formed the left wing under Hamilton; the two divisions



at Bolivar formed the center under McPherson; the three divisions at Memphis formed the right wing under Sherman. (Plate 40.)

Hamilton and McPherson were to unite near Grand Junction and advance along the Grand Junction-Grenada railroad and Sherman was to advance along the Memphis-Grenada railroad. If the Confederates made a stand behind the Tallahatchie River, the entire army could be united on that river.

The corps of Hamilton and McPherson moved to Grand Junction early in November and sent cavalry towards Holly Springs. This movement caused *Van Dorn* to retire behind the Tallahatchie River. The Union cavalry occupied Holly Springs.

The further advance was postponed until the end of November as it was reported to Grant that many western regiments were en route to Memphis.

During November, Grant organized his small cavalry force, nine regiments, into a division of three brigades; one was assigned to each corps.

The concentration of the Union forces at Grand Junction, Memphis, and Helena, Ark., alarmed *Pemberton* for the safety of Vicksburg which was garrisoned by 4,500 men and was covered only by *Van Dorn's* army of 20,000 men. He called on the authorities at Richmond for troops from *Bragg's* command in Tennessee and from *Holmes'* command in Arkansas.

**December.**—*Bragg* responded by sending a brigade from Mobile, Dec. 1, and directed *Forrest* to make a raid on Grant's communications in western Tennessee. *Holmes* declined to send troops since he believed Little Rock and Arkansas Post would then be exposed to capture by the Union troops at Helena, Arkansas.

The Confederate government responded by appointing *Joseph E. Johnston* to command the combined forces of Gens. *Bragg*, *E. Kirby Smith* and *Pemberton*.

President *Davis* himself visited Murfreesboro and Vicksburg in December, and on the 18th, ordered *Johnston* to send *Stevenson's* division of four brigades from *Bragg's* army to Vicksburg. President *Davis* and *Johnston* urged *Holmes* to send troops from Arkansas to Vicksburg. The latter replied that his force was too small to admit of his sending troops out of the State.

On the 27th of November, the three Union corps moved forward

from the Memphis-Corinth railroad and at the same time a Union division of 7,000 men crossed the Mississippi River near Helena and moved on Grenada. The entire force making the concentric movement on Grenada was probably 60,000 men.

This concentric movement caused *Pemberton* to withdraw his field army from the Tallahatchie River to Grenada, where he assumed command in person. The Union army advanced to Oxford, which Grant made his headquarters on December 5. Here he proposed to remain until the railroad in his rear was repaired and then advance on Grenada.

About the 1st of December, McClernand finished the work of recruiting his corps, and during Sherman's absence from Memphis the divisions of Brig. Gens. Andrew J. Smith and George W. Morgan raised by McClernand reached Memphis. McClernand now requested orders to join his troops and advance on Vicksburg.

Having the support of President Lincoln, this request could not be refused by Halleck, general in chief. The Helena division was recalled and Grant was directed to resume the defensive and send troops to Memphis to take part in the river expedition. He was advised to evacuate the territory south of the Tallahatchie and confine himself to holding the Memphis-Corinth railroad.

As he had not yet received orders limiting his powers, Grant sent Sherman with one of his three divisions to Memphis and directed him to take as large a force as could be raised at Memphis and Helena and move by water on Vicksburg. Grant decided to remain at Oxford while Sherman moved on Vicksburg. If *Pemberton* weakened his force at Grenada to reinforce Vicksburg, Grant proposed to advance.

In the meantime, Grant decided that he would destroy the Corinth-Tupelo railroad and prevent operations along that line.

On Dec. 18, the Secretary of War directed Grant to organize his troops into the XIII, XV, XVI, and XVII army corps under Maj. Gens. McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut and McPherson. McClernand was to have charge of the river expedition. As Maj. Gen. C. S. Hamilton ranked McPherson, he resigned his commission.

Before this order could be communicated to McClernand and Sherman, Maj. Gen. *Nathan Bedford Forrest* had cut the telegraph lines between Bolivar, Tenn., and Columbus, Ky., and the river expedition went forward under Sherman.

**Holly Springs.**—While a part of Grant's cavalry was destroying the Corinth-Tupelo railroad, *Van Dorn*, who had taken command of his own cavalry for a raid in conjunction with that of *Forrest*, made a sudden descent on Holly Springs where Grant had established his depot of supplies. *Van Dorn* captured Holly Springs December 20, and destroyed \$1,500,000 worth of supplies.

The capture of Holly Springs compelled Grant to retreat from Oxford to Holly Springs, where he lived on the country while his engineers repaired the railroad to Memphis, which he decided to make his future base. In retreating, he destroyed the railroad between Holly Springs and the Yocona River.

**Chickasaw Bluffs** (Plate 26).—On December 23, Sherman steamed down the river, escorted by Admiral Porter's gunboats, with 30,000 men present for duty. On the 26th he landed on the east bank of the Yazoo River above Vicksburg. (See p. 120.)

The Confederate force under *Martin L. Smith*, in line between Vicksburg and Snyder Bluff, was at this time probably 6,000 men. He was reinforced on the 26th by three brigades sent by *Bragg*, numbering 6,000 men. En route to join him were two brigades from *Bragg* and a division from Grenada.

The ground occupied by the Confederate troops at Chickasaw Bluffs, just above Vicksburg, where Sherman made his attack, was a high plateau overlooking low swamps cut up by watercourses over which the Union troops were compelled to advance on a narrow front and without adequate support of artillery.

Sherman's corps assaulted the Confederate lines on the 29th and was repulsed. On January 2, before he could renew his attack, McClernand reached Sherman and informed him that Grant would not be able to assist him. As *Pemberton* was now free to concentrate his whole force against him, Sherman abandoned operations against Vicksburg and took the troops to Milliken Bend twenty miles above Vicksburg where McClernand assumed command.

**Comments.**—Had Grant at this time, had full control of the divisions of A. J. Smith, G. W. Morgan and Steele, he would have operated along the overland line. With these troops added to his own he could have captured Grenada and repaired the railroad from that point to Memphis.

The advance from Grenada to Jackson and Vicksburg would

have been in the uplands where his army could easily maneuver and his supplies could have been drawn from the country and from Memphis.

Had he been allowed to operate along this line, it is probable that the Vicksburg campaign would have been much shortened and the risks involved in the river expedition would have been avoided. Sherman was strongly in favor of this line of operation.

President Lincoln was often called upon to decide, as in this case, whether political or military considerations should govern the policy of the country. McClernand was an influential member of the non-administration party. His support at this time was important to the administration.

The river expedition against Vicksburg was premature. Even had Sherman succeeded in taking the Confederate line at Chickasaw Bluffs, he would have been unable to hold it against the force which *Pemberton* could have concentrated there. Grant's army was too far in rear to be of any assistance to Sherman.

The Army of the Tennessee was very weak in cavalry which made possible the raids of *Forrest* and *Van Dorn*. The destruction of the depot of supplies at Holly Springs was however primarily due to the defective organization of the lines of communication. A competent officer of high rank should have been in charge of the troops along these lines, and it should have been his duty to see that they were properly instructed, posted, and intrenched. The garrison of Holly Springs was of sufficient strength but it was badly posted and under an inexperienced officer.

#### OPPOSING FORCES AT CHICKASAW BLUFFS.

		<i>Union.</i>		
Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
	Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele . . . . .	4	—	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Smith . . . . .	3	—	—
Wm. T. Sherman	Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith* . . . . .	2	—	—
	Brig. Gen. George W. Morgan . . . . .	3	—	8
	Siege . . . . .	—	—	1
*Seriously wounded.				
		<i>Confederate.</i>		
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Stephen D. Lee . . . . .	1	—	5
Martin L. Smith	Separate brigades . . . . .	3	—	—
		Union.	Confederate.	
Strength . . . . .		30,000	11,000	
Casualties . . . . .		1,776	207	

OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EAST  
TENNESSEE.

APRIL TO DECEMBER.

PLATES 3 and 24.

**April-June.**—When Buell with five divisions of the Army of the Ohio joined Grant on the battlefield of Shiloh, he left in his district east of the Tennessee River, two brigades in east Kentucky, three brigades at Nashville, Franklin and Columbia, Tenn., and Brig. Gen. Ormsby M. Mitchel's division at Fayetteville.

The two brigades in Kentucky, which had formerly belonged to the Department of West Virginia, were united into a division under Brig. Gen. George W. Morgan. They advanced to Barbourville, Ky., with the intention of capturing Cumberland Gap at the first favorable opportunity.

Mitchel's division had followed the retreating army of A. S. Johnston from Nashville to Huntsville and reached the latter point April 11. As Mitchel occupied an isolated position he was directed to destroy the railroad bridges at Decatur and Bridgeport to prevent his being attacked by overwhelming numbers.

Both bridges were destroyed about May 1st and Mitchel at first confined himself to holding the country between Decatur and Stevenson. In June, he received some reinforcements and at G. W. Morgan's request threatened Chattanooga. This caused the Confederates to withdraw from Cumberland Gap and concentrate their forces. Morgan now took possession of Cumberland Gap and fortified it.

In June, Buell moved eastward from Corinth, Miss., and on the 1st of July, his divisions were posted as follows:—Nelson, Crittenden, McCook and Wood were at Athens and Decatur, and Mitchel at Huntsville, Ala.

The railroads south of Nashville, which the Confederates had wrecked in their retreat, were being repaired.

When A. S. Johnston in March moved westward from Huntsville, Ala., to join *Beauregard* at Corinth, Miss., Maj. Gen. *E. Kirby Smith* assumed command of the Confederate forces along the line Cumberland Gap-Chattanooga. His entire command consisted of 10,000 men.

His right was threatened by 8,000 men under G. W. Morgan and his left by 8,000 men under Mitchel. When Mitchel threat-

ened Chattanooga he felt compelled to evacuate Cumberland Gap in order to hold Chattanooga. To reinforce Chattanooga, towards the end of June, *Bragg* sent him *McCown's* division of the *Army of the West*.

**July.**—The repairs of the Nashville-Stevenson Railroad being near completion, early in July Buell ordered the divisions of *McCook* and *Crittenden* to Bridgeport which they reached July 14, two days after the railroad was in operation. Here they began the construction of pontoons to replace the bridge destroyed by *Mitchel*.

Just at this time, Buell's operations were thrown into confusion by the raids of *Forrest* and *Morgan*.

**Morgan's First Raid.**—On July 4, Col. *John H. Morgan* with two regiments numbering about 800 men left Knoxville and on the 9th successfully attacked a Union cavalry post of four companies at Tomkinsville, Ky., and captured their supplies and camp equipage. He captured a depot at Glasgow, Ky., on the 10th, and one at Lebanon, Ky., on the 11th. From Lebanon he moved via Harrodsburg, Lawrenceburg, Versailles, and Georgetown to Cynthiana, Ky., where on the 17th he had a sharp fight with the Kentucky militia. He then retired via Paris, Richmond, Crab Orchard, and Somerset to Monticello, Ky., which he reached on the 22d. At Crab Orchard he destroyed one of the depots on G. W. Morgan's line of supply.

The moral effect of this raid was very great, as it took place immediately after *McClellan's* retreat to the James River. The authorities began to lose confidence in Buell and the newspapers criticised the slowness of his movements.

**Forrest's First Raid.**—While Col. *Morgan* was moving through Kentucky, on July 9, Col. *Nathan Bedford Forrest* with a force of 1,500 mounted men crossed the Tennessee River at Chattanooga, and marching through McMinnville surprised and captured two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, 1,000 men, the guard of the important depot of Murfreesboro, Tenn. After destroying the depot and the bridges in the vicinity, he retired to McMinnville.

Starting again from McMinnville on the 19th, *Forrest* marched for Lebanon, Tenn., and followed its retreating garrison to Nashville. South of Nashville he destroyed several important

bridges, and again returned to McMinnville. As a result of this raid the Nashville-Stevenson railroad could not be operated between the 20th and the 27th of July, and it was with difficulty that the divisions of McCook and Crittenden at Bridgeport could be supplied.

To protect the Nashville-Stevenson railroad, Buell ordered Nelson's division to Nashville, and Wood's to Decherd.

While *Morgan* and *Forrest* were on their raids, Halleck was ordered to Washington as general in chief. Realizing the necessity of reinforcing Buell, he directed Grant to relieve Thomas' division on the railroad west of Decatur and send it to Buell to enable the latter to both guard his communications and to resume the offensive against Chattanooga.

Before Thomas could join Buell, *Bragg* had decided to transfer his *Army of the Mississippi* to Chattanooga.

**August.**—On the 1st of August, Buell's army was disposed as follows:—

On the Tennessee River near Bridgeport were the divisions of McCook and T. L. Crittenden; at Decherd and Manchester, on the McMinnville railroad, was Wood's division; on the road between Murfreesboro and McMinnville was Nelson's division; Thomas' division was moving from Huntsville towards Decherd; the division formerly under O. M. Mitchel, now under Brig. Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau, had its headquarters at Stevenson and was guarding the railroads south of Pulaski and Decherd.

All the railroads in the triangle, Nashville-Decatur-Stevenson, were then in operation. Stockades had been or were being constructed at all the bridges; important points like Stevenson, Decherd, Decatur, and Murfreesboro, were fortified with redouts and stockades.

Buell knew at this time that *Bragg* was transporting the *Army of the Mississippi* to Chattanooga and that the Army of the Ohio must for a time continue its defensive rôle. He assumed that if *Bragg* took the offensive he would attack some point of the line, McMinnville-Decherd-Bridgeport, and probably Bridgeport or Decherd. He therefore disposed his troops to meet such a movement.

*Bragg*, having started his army from Tupelo, Miss., July 21, reached Chattanooga in person towards the end of July and had

a conference with *E. Kirby Smith*. It was decided that *Smith* should move all his troops including *McCown's* division from Chattanooga to Knoxville, where he was to be reinforced by two additional brigades from *Bragg's* army.

With six brigades, *Smith* was to cross the mountains west of Cumberland Gap as soon as possible and invest Cumberland Gap from the north. In the meantime his other four brigades under Brig. Gen. *Carter Stevenson* were to invest it from the south. If G. W. Morgan evacuated the gap he was to be vigorously pursued; if he remained, he was to be attacked as soon as possible. After leaving garrisons in the Tennessee Valley it was assumed that *Smith* would have a mobile force of over 20,000 men. (See p. 130.)

*Bragg* was to concentrate his own army on the Tennessee at and above Chattanooga, and eventually move into Tennessee through Sparta, thus turning all the fortified points along the railroad; this would compel Buell to evacuate Tennessee. The further movements were to be decided by circumstance.

Brig. Gen. *Humphrey Marshall* who had a brigade in the Tennessee Valley in western Virginia was to cross the mountains about sixty miles east of Cumberland Gap and move on Lexington through Pikeville and West Liberty, Ky.

*Price* was to cross the Tennessee River at some point west of Decatur to operate on Buell's rear, and *Van Dorn* was to send *Breckinridge's* division to join *Bragg's* army as soon as possible.

It will be seen that *Bragg's* plan contemplated the employment of nearly all the Confederate troops between the Allegheny Mountains and the Mississippi River against Buell.

During the first two weeks of August the commanders on both sides were preparing for the coming campaign. Buell ordered his engineers to fortify Nashville, and induced Halleck to order Grant to send two divisions of the Army of the Mississippi to reinforce him. *Smith* concentrated his brigades at the entrance of the passes north of Knoxville. *Bragg's* forces were daily arriving from Mississippi and were being prepared for the field.

**E. Kirby Smith's Invasion of Kentucky.**—The Confederate movement was begun by *Smith's* cavalry, of which there were two small brigades under Cols. *John H. Morgan* and *John S. Scott*. *Morgan* was at Sparta, Tenn., and *Scott* on the Tennessee River at Kingston near Knoxville.



Col. *Morgan*, having received instructions to interrupt the operation of the Louisville-Nashville railroad, moved from Sparta and by forced marches surprised and captured the garrison of Gallatin, Tenn., on August 12, and burned the wooden lining of an 800-foot railroad tunnel at that place.

Remaining in that neighborhood, on the 22d he was attacked by a force of 640 cavalry under Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson who had started from McMinnville with a mixed brigade to cut off *Morgan's* retreat. Johnson's infantry had been recalled and he was left with a small mounted force selected from four regiments. Gen. Johnson's command was badly defeated and its commander taken prisoner. Col. *Morgan* then marched towards Lexington, Ky., to join *Smith's* army.

Col. *Scott's* brigade left Kingston on August 13, and captured London, Ky., on the 17th. On the 22d he attacked and defeated a regiment of cavalry and a battalion of infantry at *Big Hill* near Richmond, Ky.

The reports sent by G. W. Morgan from Cumberland Gap concerning the concentration of *Smith's Army of Kentucky* caused the Union authorities to strengthen the weak force in Kentucky by calls on the governors of the central States for additional troops. Lew Wallace, then on recruiting duty in Indiana, and Wm. Nelson of the Army of the Ohio were sent to organize the troops.

On August 17, the Department of the Ohio was created. It comprised Kentucky east of the Cumberland, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Michigan. Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright from the Department of the South was assigned to the command of the new department. This did not affect the Army of the Ohio, which was still commanded by Buell.

Troops were assembled at Louisville and Covington and pushed forward to Lexington. From Lexington two brigades were sent by Lew Wallace to *Richmond* to protect the communications of G. W. Morgan's division at Cumberland Gap.

Leaving *McCown* in command at Knoxville, about the middle of August, *Smith* with the divisions of *Henry Heth*, *Patrick R. Cleburne* and *Thomas J. Churchill*, 6 brigades, crossed the mountains west of Cumberland Gap in two columns. His advance reached Barbourville on August 18.

Finding G. W. Morgan's position at Cumberland too strong to attack, on the 24th, *Smith* started northward and on the 30th

decisively defeated the two Union brigades at *Richmond* which were compelled to retreat with a loss of over 5,000 men. Nelson who came up during the retreat was wounded in endeavoring to stop the panic. By sending *Scott's* cavalry around the Union forces to their line of retreat, *Smith* took over 4,000 of the 5,000, prisoners.

**September.**—Having dispersed the only organized forces in his front, *Smith's* army entered Lexington, Ky., on September 1st where he was joined on the 3d by *J. H. Morgan's* cavalry brigade.

After the 1st of September *Smith* divided his forces in order to capture Covington on the Ohio River and to intercept G. W. Morgan who left Cumberland Gap September 17. Neither operation was successful. The fortifications of Covington constructed by Lew Wallace were too strong to warrant an assault and Morgan reached the Ohio River at Greenup in safety.

For his invasion of Kentucky, Maj. Gen. *E. Kirby Smith* was promoted to the grade of lieutenant general.

**Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky.**—*Bragg's* army consisted of the cavalry brigades of Brig. Gens. *Joseph Wheeler* and *N. B. Forrest* and the army corps of *Polk* and *Hardee*. (See p. 130.)

*Samuel Jones's* division had been incorporated in the corps of *Polk* and *Hardee*, and he was left in personal command of Chattanooga with a single brigade.

With *Wheeler's* brigade as flank guard, *Polk* and *Hardee* crossed the Tennessee River above Chattanooga on August 26, and on September 13 reached Glasgow, Ky. Learning that there was a strong Union garrison at Munfordville, Ky., guarding the bridge over the Green River, *Bragg* surrounded the place and induced its garrison of 4,000 men to surrender. Although he was now on Buell's line of communications, *Bragg* was unable to maintain himself there and moved to Bardstown to get nearer the Blue Grass region from which he expected to draw both supplies and recruits. He reached that point on September 23, and there his army remained until the 3d of October. On the 28th of September, *Bragg* turned over the command to *Polk* and went to Harrodsburg in the vicinity of which he established a depot of supplies, then to Lexington to confer with *Smith*, and finally to Frankfort, Ky., where he installed a Confederate governor on

October 4. He ordered all the troops left in the vicinity of Chattanooga and Knoxville to be sent to the front.

*Forrest's* cavalry brigade joined the army at Glasgow, and with *Scott's* brigade of *Smith's* army became the advance-guard and patrolled the roads leading from Louisville to Bardstown and Frankfort.

On leaving Glasgow, *Wheeler's* cavalry brigade became the rear-guard. At Bardstown, *Forrest* was relieved by Col. *John A. Wharton* and went to Murfreesboro to raise a new cavalry brigade.

**Buell's Retreat.**—When Buell was informed that *Bragg's* army was about to cross the Tennessee River, he assumed that *Bragg* was advancing on Decherd or McMinnville to turn the position of Bridgeport; he therefore ordered his divisions to concentrate at Altamont. This being found impracticable, he abandoned the country south of Duck River and ordered a concentration at Murfreesboro on September 5.

At Murfreesboro, Buell was joined by Jefferson C. Davis' division of the Army of the Mississippi. Being informed that *Bragg* was passing through Sparta, Buell retreated to Nashville. At Nashville he was joined by Eleazer A. Paine's division of the Army of the Mississippi.

While Buell was retreating, some Confederate cavalry captured the garrison of Clarksville and interrupted navigation on the Cumberland.

From Nashville, two Union divisions were at once sent to Bowling Green to hold that important depot; they reached it on the 10th of September. Leaving Paine's division with the new 8th division under Brig. Gen. James S. Negley to hold Nashville, with the remainder of his army Buell moved to Bowling Green.

From Bowling Green, Buell went to Munfordville which he reached on September 21, the day after *Bragg* left for Bardstown. From Munfordville, Buell's army marched to Louisville which his advance division reached on the 29th of September. At Louisville he found nearly 50,000 raw troops. With these he reinforced his old divisions by incorporating new regiments into his old brigades. (For organization see p. 129.)

**October.**—On the 1st of October, Buell had six of his own divisions and J. C. Davis' division of the Army of the Mississippi concentrated at Louisville, and in addition four new divisions.

At Bardstown, thirty-five miles away, was *Bragg's* army; four of *Smith's* brigades were returning from Mt. Sterling to Lexington and were seventy miles east of Bardstown; *Cleburne's* division was between Frankfort and Louisville; and *Stevenson's* division, which had just joined, was at Harrodsburg; *Humphrey Marshall's* brigade was with *Cleburne*. (For organization see p. 130.)

**Perryville Campaign.**—On October 1, Buell with about 60,000 men advanced from Louisville in four columns. Two divisions under Brig. Gen. Joshua W. Sill followed the direct road to Frankfort; the main body, consisting of the corps of T. L. Crittenden, Charles C. Gilbert and two divisions of McCook's corps followed roads converging on Bardstown.

*Bragg*, who assumed that Sill's column on the Frankfort road was the main body, on October 2, directed *Polk* to move northward from Bardstown to attack it in flank while *Smith* advanced from Frankfort and attacked it in front. *Polk* who was in immediate touch with his cavalry realized that *Bragg* was mistaken in assuming that the main Union column was marching on Frankfort. Instead of obeying the order, his own corps fell back to Harrodsburg and *Hardee's* to *Perryville*.

In leaving Bardstown, Gilbert's corps moved along the Perryville road, McCook marched on his left, and Crittenden on his right. The difficulty of getting water caused a dispersal of the troops, and on the evening of October 7, Brig. Gen. P. H. Sheridan's division of Gilbert's corps was somewhat in advance of the general line.

This led *Bragg*, who came to Harrodsburg to join his army, to direct *Polk* to return to Perryville with one of his divisions, and in conjunction with *Hardee* to make a vigorous assault on Gilbert's corps. He directed *Polk* to send his other division to *Smith* who was near Frankfort and who begged for assistance.

Buell had at first assumed that the battle would be fought somewhat further to the rear, but on the night of the 7th decided that it would be fought at Perryville and sent word to McCook and Crittenden to concentrate there.

**Battle of Perryville.**—The battle was opened on the morning of October 8, by Sheridan; the real Confederate attack was however not made until the afternoon when McCook's two divisions were on Sheridan's left. The main attack then fell on McCook's

divisions which were forced back until supported by the reserve division of Gilbert's corps.

Although all the Union troops were within a short distance of the battle-field, only nine Union brigades were heavily engaged. Gilbert knew only late in the day that McCook and Sheridan were being attacked in force, and Crittenden, who naturally got his information through Gilbert, was not engaged at all. Buell, who was at his headquarters only two and a half miles away, was not informed until 4 o'clock that a battle was in progress.

After the battle of Perryville, *Bragg* fell back to Harrodsburg where he finally concentrated his two armies.

Buell called up Sill's division of McCook's corps from Frankfort road and advanced to attack *Bragg*. *Bragg* fell back to Crab Orchard, and without offering further resistance retreated across the mountains into the Tennessee Valley.

The pursuit was discontinued at London on the 22d and the Union troops turned towards the Louisville-Nashville railroad.

On October 30, Buell was relieved from command and was succeeded by Rosecrans. Just before the battle of Perryville, Buell had been directed to turn over his command to Thomas, but the latter declined to supersede him on the eve of battle and assisted in the campaign as second in command.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN THE PERRYVILLE CAMPAIGN.

*Army of the Ohio* { *Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell.*  
 { *Maj, Gen. George H. Thomas, second.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
	Brig. Gen. Joshua W. Still.....	3	-	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau.....	3	-	4
Alex. McD. McCook	Brig. Gen. James S. Jackson.....	2†	-	2
	Brig. Gen. Wm. Sooy Smith.....	3	-	5
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Horace P. Van Cleve....	3	-	3
Thomas L. Crittenden	Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood.....	3	-	3
	Brig. Gen. Albin Schoepf.....	3	-	3
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Robert B. Mitchell.....	3*	-	3
Charles C. Gilbert	Brig. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.....	3†	-	2
At Cumberland Gap,	Brig. Gen. George W. Morgan.....	4	-	4
At Nashville,	Brig. Gen. James S. Negley.....	2	-	3
With Gen. Sill,	Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Dumont.....	4†	-	3
At Nashville,	Brig. Gen. John M. Palmer.....	2*	-	2
	Col. John Kennett (cavalry).....	3†	10	-

\*From the Army of the Mississippi.

†Organized at Louisville.

*Strength.*

In the campaign .....	81,000
In the battle .....	25,000

*Casualties at Perryville.*

Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
845	2,851	515	4,212

*Army of the Tennessee, Gen. Braxton Bragg.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
Maj Gen.	Maj. Gen. Benj. F. Cheatham .....	3	3
Leonidas Polk	Brig. Gen. Jones M. Withers .....	4	4
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner .....	3	3
Wm. J. Hardee	Brig. Gen. J. Patton Anderson .....	4	4
	Brig. Gen. Nathan B. Forest (Cavalry) ...	1	
	Brig. Gen. Joseph Wheeler (Cavalry) ....	1	

*Army of Kentucky, Maj. Gen. E. Kirby Smith.*

Brig. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson .....	4	6
Brig. Gen. Henry Heth .....	2	2
Brig. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne .....	2	2
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Churchill .....	2	2

*Detached Forces.*

Brig. Gen. Humphrey Marshall .....	1	
Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Maxey .....	1	
Col. John H. Morgan (Cavalry) .....	1	
Col. John S. Scott (Cavalry) .....	1	

*Strength.*

In the campaign .....	67,000
In the battle .....	16,000

*Casualties at Perryville.*

Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
519	2,635	251	3,296

**Comments.**—The operations in Kentucky and central Tennessee disappointed both the people of the North and those of the South. Buell was criticised for the slowness of his movement on Chattanooga, for allowing *Bragg* to reach Kentucky, for not rescuing the garrison of Munfordville, for not destroying the Confederate army at Perryville, and for not following *Bragg* into the upper Tennessee Valley. *Bragg* was criticised for not concentrating his armies in Kentucky and decisively defeating Buell before the latter reached the Ohio River.

Buell's slowness at the opening of the campaign was due to Halleck's defective plan of operations. Halleck's plan was to hold the line of the Chattanooga-Memphis railroad and thus prevent

the Confederates from reentering Tennessee. Grant and Rosecrans were to hold the part west of Decatur and Buell the part east of Decatur. When Buell had secured possession of Chattanooga and the railroads east of it, it was assumed that G. W. Morgan could advance to Knoxville and hold eastern Tennessee. In this way a barrier would be formed for the protection of Kentucky and Tennessee. This plan reduced the Union troops to the defensive all along the line and transferred the offensive to the Confederates.

Had the railroad east of Corinth been abandoned and Buell's army been sent by water to Nashville, or had it marched overland as rapidly as possible to its real line of operations against Chattanooga, the Nashville-Stevenson railroad, Buell would have made his headquarters at Nashville and been in a proper position to control both his department and his army. Buell recommended the transfer of his army to Nashville, but he was overruled.

Buell made his dispositions on the erroneous hypothesis that *Bragg* would attack somewhere between McMinnville and Bridgeport. He was consequently surprised by *Bragg's* movement through Sparta. *Bragg* having reached Sparta before Buell was aware of his movement, it was impossible for Buell to prevent *Bragg* from reaching Kentucky.

The battle of Perryville was one of those battles in which the lack of a proper staff to keep the commander informed of the operations and to secure the cooperation of the various corps, made itself very apparent. Had Buell, Gilbert, and Crittenden known the true situation, a decisive Union victory might have been secured.

Buell was right in not pursuing *Bragg* into east Tennessee; he would have found it impossible to subsist his troops there. Chattanooga was the real objective, and that city could best be reached from Nashville.

A military commission, which was convened by the Secretary of War to investigate Buell's conduct during the campaign, criticised him only for not being at the front at Perryville and for not concentrating at McMinnville when *Bragg's* army reached Chattanooga. As he was only two and one-half miles from the firing line his failure to be present at the battle was due only to the failure of McCook to notify him that he was being attacked.

While the second criticism is correct from a military point of

view, Buell would probably have been as severely criticised had he changed his offensive attitude to a defensive one, by abandoning all the country south of McMinnville until compelled to do so.

The fact is that the Army of the Ohio was not at that time strong enough to do what was expected of it: to take and hold Chattanooga and at the same time protect Kentucky and its own line of communications.

Both *Bragg* and *Smith* began the campaign in a brilliant manner, but they made a serious error in not uniting their forces near the Louisville-Nashville railroad, and fighting a decisive battle with Buell while their troops were still elated by the victories of *Richmond* and *Murfreesboro*. The lack of definite purpose in the operations of *Bragg* and *Smith* in Kentucky contrasts very unfavorably with the definiteness of the objectives in *Lee's* campaign in Virginia and Maryland during the same month.

One of the distinguishing features of this campaign is the effective use of independent cavalry brigades by the Confederates. While the Union cavalry was probably as strong numerically, it was employed by squadrons and regiments in guarding long lines of railroad and telegraph lines in a hostile country. The Confederate cavalry commanders paroled their prisoners and thus avoided this impediment to rapid movements.

## STONE RIVER OR MURFREESBORO CAMPAIGN.

### PLATES 3 and 24.

**October.**—When *Bragg* planned his invasion of Kentucky, he requested that *John C. Breckinridge* with his Kentucky division be sent from *Van Dorn's* command in Mississippi to join him. *Breckinridge* reached Chattanooga October 3, with two small brigades and found there a brigade of 6,000 men under Brig. Gen. *Samuel B. Maxey*. Assuming command of the combined forces he moved them to Knoxville, and on October 12, started *Maxey* with 5,000 men for the front.

*Bragg* had by that time decided to retreat, and *Breckinridge* was directed to take his own division with *Maxey's* brigade to Murfreesboro, Tenn., and with *Forrest's* new cavalry brigade to hold that place until *Bragg's* army could reach it. *Breckinridge* reached Murfreesboro on October 28.

A new department was created for Rosecrans, October 24, consisting of Tennessee east of the Tennessee River and such



parts of Georgia and Alabama as his army might occupy. It was called the Department of the Cumberland. Kentucky remained in the Department of the Ohio to which West Virginia had been added.

**Morgan's Second Raid.**—Col. *John H. Morgan* accompanied *Smith's* army in its retreat from Lexington, Ky., as far as Crab Orchard. Here he received permission to act independently with his brigade of about 1,800 men. Making a circuit to the eastwards he entered Lexington on October 18, and drove out the Union garrison. Passing through the town he went through Versailles and Lawrenceburg to Bardstown. Crossing the railroad near Elizabethtown he marched through Leitchfield and Morgantown to Hopkinsville, Ky. He then returned via Springfield to Gallatin, Tenn. He captured a number of small posts and destroyed railroad bridges wherever he crossed the railroad lines.

**November.**—The armies of Rosecrans and *Bragg* now began to approach each other along the Louisville-Nashville-Chattanooga railroad.

The Army of the Cumberland reached Bowling Green and Glasgow, Ky., about the 1st of November and was pushed on to Nashville. Working parties had been employed in repairing the damage done to the railroad by the Confederate cavalry, but it was not until November 26 that the Louisville-Nashville railroad was in operation between its terminal points. On the reorganization of the army, McCook took command of the right wing composed of three divisions; Thomas of the center composed of five divisions; and T. L. Crittenden of the left wing composed of three divisions. The cavalry division was composed of three brigades and was under Brig. Gen. David S. Stanley as chief of cavalry.

The Confederate army on assembling at Murfreesboro was reorganized and became the *Army of Tennessee*. *Bragg's* original army was reinforced by the divisions of *Breckinridge*, *McCown*, and *Stevenson*.

In the latter part of September, Lieut. Gen. *Pemberton* was placed in command of all the troops in the State of Mississippi and in Louisiana east of the Mississippi River hitherto under *Van Dorn* and *Price*. This made three independent commanders in the middle west, *Bragg*, *Kirby Smith* and *Pemberton*.

*J. E. Johnston* reported for duty in November and was appointed general in chief over these three commanders.

The Confederate operations in this territory in October having ended in the retreat of *Bragg* and the defeat of *Van Dorn* at Corinth, President *Davis* came in person to Chattanooga and Murfreesboro to examine the military situation.

About the middle of November, he directed *Johnston* to send *Stevenson's* division to Vicksburg, and then with *Johnston* went to Vicksburg in person.

To interrupt the communications of Rosecrans and Grant, *Forrest* and *Morgan* were sent on raids.

**Forrest's Second Raid** (Plate 40).—*Forrest*, who had organized a brigade of four regiments and several smaller detachments, about 2,500 men, was directed by *Bragg* to make a raid into western Tennessee and destroy the railroads between Grant's base, Columbus, Ky., and his army in northern Mississippi.\*

**December.**—Leaving Murfreesboro about December 10, on the 15th *Forrest* crossed the Tennessee at Clifton below Savannah where his men had constructed two small boats. Passing through Lexington, Tenn., where he defeated a cavalry outpost, he struck the railroad between Humboldt and Jackson and followed it northward into Kentucky, destroying the bridges and stations as he went.

From the vicinity of Columbus he retired to Clifton via Dresden and Lexington, Tenn.

At Parker crossroads, just before reaching Lexington, he found a brigade of three regiments of infantry in his front. While engaged with this command, a second brigade of equal strength attacked him in the rear. *Forrest* succeeded in making his escape, but lost most of the artillery, wagons and horses he had captured on the raid. He recrossed the Tennessee River at Clifton before the infantry could reach that point. He finally encamped his command at Columbia.

*Forrest* returned from this raid with a loss of about 500 men, one gun, and a number of caissons, after capturing and paroling many prisoners and thoroughly wrecking the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Although *Forrest* accomplished all that he had been ordered to do, his raid was on the whole advantageous to Grant,

\*See pp. 116, 117 and 118.

since it caused him to change his base from Columbus, Ky., to Memphis, Tenn.

**Morgan's Third Raid.**—Morgan had organized a division of two brigades, about 4,000 men, and on December 21, left his camp south of Carthage, Tenn., to destroy the railroads in the rear of Rosecrans' army. He marched through Glasgow and struck the railroad just north of Munfordville and followed it to the Rolling Fork just north of Elizabethtown. Here he left the road to march to Bardstown and was attacked while crossing the river by a Union infantry brigade sent from Gallatin. He reached Bardstown with some loss and marched to Springfield, Ky., where he learned that a large Union force was at Lebanon. He avoided this by making a night march, and reached Columbia, Tenn., on January 1. He finally encamped his command at McMinnville without having done much damage to the railroad.

**Battle of Murfreesboro** (Plate 24).—Taking advantage of the absence of *Forrest* and *Morgan* who were known to be on raids, on December 26, Rosecrans moved out of Nashville with the corps of McCook and Crittenden and two divisions of Thomas' corps, eight divisions in all, to attack *Bragg* who was known to be in line between Triune and Murfreesboro, Tenn. His general plan was to refuse Crittenden's corps, which marched along the railroad, and attack and turn the Confederate left flank with the corps of McCook and Thomas who marched south in the angle between the two railroads.

When *Hardee*, who was at Triune, learned of the approach of McCook, he fell back to Murfreesboro.

On the 31st (plate 25), the two armies were in contact with each other just west of Stone River near Murfreesboro. *Bragg* was resting his right flank on the river and facing northwestward; on the right was *Breckinridge*, then *Polk* in two lines, then *Hardee* with *McCown* and *Cleburne* in two lines. McCook was on the right of the Union line, Thomas in the center, and Crittenden on the left. (For organization see p. 137.)

Each army commander planned an offensive battle on the 31st, in which he was to pivot on his right flank and attack with his left and center. *Bragg* had the advantage of having no obstacle between his attacking wing and his adversary and was thus able to begin the battle. The resulting battle of *Murfreesboro* or

*Stone River* fought on December 31 was a tactical success for *Bragg*, who compelled the Union line to swing several miles to the rear about its left flank, but he was unable to drive it from the field.

There was no fighting on January 1; the battle was renewed on the 2d by *Breckinridge* attacking one of *Crittenden's* divisions, which was again attempting to turn *Bragg's* right flank by a movement east of *Stone River*. This Confederate attack was repulsed principally by artillery. On the night of January 3, *Bragg* gave up the contest and began retiring on *Shelbyville*. He was not pursued.

### OPPOSING FORCES IN THE BATTLE OF STONE RIVER OR MURFREESBORO

*Army of the Cumberland, Maj. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
	Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis.....	3	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson.....	3	3
Alex. McD. McCook	Brig. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.....	3	3
	Maj. Gen. Lovell H. Rosseau.....	4	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. James S. Negley.....	3	3
George H. Thomas	Brig. Gen. Speed S. Fry.....	3	3
	Brig. Gen. Robert B. Mitchel.....	2	3
	Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds.....	2	—
	Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood.....	3	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John M. Palmer.....	3	3
Thos. L. Crittenden	Brig. Gen. Horatio P. Van Cleve.....	3	3
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. David S. Stanley.....	3	1

Of *Thomas's* corps, *Mitchel's* division was the garrison of *Nashville*; *Reynold's* division was pursuing *J. H. Morgan*; of *Fry's* division, one brigade took part in the battle, one arrived on Jan. 2, and the third was pursuing *J. H. Morgan*.

#### *Strength.*

Present for duty ..... 45,000

#### *Casualties in the Battle.*

Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
1,730	7,802	3,317	12,849

*Army of the Tennessee, Gen. Braxton Bragg.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
Lieut. Gen. Leonidas Polk	Maj. Gen. Benj. F. Cheatham . . . . .	4	4
	Maj. Gen. Jones M. Withers . . . . .	4	4
	Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge . . . . .	5	6
Lieut. Gen. Wm. J. Hardee	Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne . . . . .	4	4
	Maj. Gen. John P. McCown . . . . .	3	3
	Brig. Gen. Joseph Wheeler . . . . .	4	5
	Brig. Gen. John H. Morgan . . . . .	2	2
	Brig. Gen. N. Bedford Forrest . . . . .	1	1

*Strength.*

Present for duty . . . . . 38,000

*Casualties in the Battle.*

Killed.	Wounded.	Missing	Total.
1,294	7,945	824	10,063

**Minor Raids** (Plate 3).—On the same day that Rosecrans advanced from Nashville, a small Union brigade of cavalry under Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Carter and belonging to the Department of the Ohio, left Manchester, Ky., crossed the mountains east of Cumberland Gap and entered the upper Tennessee Valley.

About the last of the month Carter destroyed two important railroad bridges south of Blountville and then returned safely to Manchester.

Though unimportant in its results, it was the first successful Union cavalry operation in the West. Both in organization and relative strength, the Union cavalry in the West was inferior to the other combatant arms. It was still necessary to detach infantry to pursue *Morgan* and *Forrest*.

While the two armies were facing each other on Stone River, Maj. Gen. *Joseph Wheeler* with four regiments of cavalry rode entirely around the Union army capturing small detachments and destroying supplies. He captured the entire wagon train of McCook's corps and almost destroyed it before he was driven off by an infantry brigade which was marching from Nashville to join the Union army.

OPERATIONS IN MISSOURI, ARKANSAS AND  
LOUISIANA IN 1862.

PLATES 4 and 7.

**Missouri and Arkansas.**—In December, 1861, Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis was assigned to the command of the Army of the Southwest which had been operating in Missouri under Gens. Lyon and Frémont.

**February-March.**—The Army of the Southwest was mobilized at Rolla and Lebanon, Mo., and on February 10 began to move on Springfield.

Maj. Gen. *Sterling Price*, who had spent the winter at Springfield, retreated into Arkansas on the Springfield-Bentonville road. At the latter point he united his forces with those of Maj. Gen. *Earl Van Dorn* who had been sent from the *Army of Northern Virginia* in January to organize and command the Confederate troops in the *Trans-Mississippi District of Department No. 2*.

**Pea Ridge.**—Curtis followed *Price* into Arkansas. At Pea Ridge or Elkhorn Tavern, *Van Dorn* so maneuvered as to place himself on the Union line of retreat. This resulted in an obstinately contested battle on March 7 and 8 in which *Van Dorn*, although greatly superior in numbers, was compelled to retire.

OPPOSING FORCES AT PEA RIDGE.

*Army of the Southwest, Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
	1 Brig. Gen. Alexander Asboth.....	1	—	—
Brig. Gen.	2 Col. Peter J. Osterhaus.....	2	—	2
Franz Sigel	Cavalry.....	—	2	—
	3 Col. Jefferson C. Davis.....	2	—	2
	4 Col. Eugene A. Carr.....	2	—	2
	Cavalry.....	—	1½	—
	Unattached.....	—	1½	—

*Army of the West, Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn.*

	1 Mo. Conf. Volunteers	3	(organizations not definitely given)	
Maj. Gen.	2 Mo. State Militia (organizations not definitely given)			
Sterling Price	3 Brig. Gen. Ben. McCulloch.....	2	—	4
	4 Brig. Gen. Albert Pike (Indians)..		—	—

Strength of Union Army.....	11,000	Casualties.....	1,348
Strength of Confederate Army..	17,000	Casualties.....	1,300

The Confederate army retreated southwards to the Arkansas River where *Van Dorn* received orders to leave western Arkansas and assist in the defense of the Mississippi River. He reached Memphis shortly after the battle of Shiloh.

**April-May.**—When Curtis learned that *Van Dorn* was moving eastward, he withdrew across the border into Missouri and marched in the same direction. On reaching West Plains, Mo., about the 1st of May, he was directed to capture Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas.

He advanced southward as far as Jacksonport, Ark., on the White River; here he received an order directing him to send a strong division from his small army to reinforce Pope for the Corinth Campaign.

In the latter part of May, when *Van Dorn* was with *Beauregard* at Corinth and Little Rock was threatened by Curtis, Maj. Gen. *Thomas C. Hindman* was sent from Corinth to organize the defense of Arkansas and to command the *Trans-Mississippi Department*.

**June-July.**—Curtis remained at Jacksonport until the Confederates evacuated Memphis and the Mississippi River was open to the Union gunboats from the Ohio River to Vicksburg. He moved to Helena, Ark., early in July and was there reinforced by Lew Wallace's division of the Army of the Tennessee, under Brig. Gen. Alvin P. Hovey.\*

When the Union troops took possession of Helena, Ark., Maj. Gen. *Theophilus H. Holmes* was sent from North Carolina to command the *Trans-Mississippi Department* and the Missouri State troops in *Van Dorn's Army of the West* were sent to him. Under *Holmes*, *Hindman* commanded the troops in western Arkansas.

**September.**—In the month of September, *Hindman* concentrated troops on the south bank of the Arkansas River near *Fort Smith* for an invasion of western Missouri. His advance troops crossed the border near Pea Ridge where they halted to await the main body.

To meet this threatened invasion, the Department of Missouri

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\*At the request of the Governor of his State, Indiana, Wallace was directed to report to him to assist in recruiting volunteers.

was reestablished September 19, and Curtis, now a major general, was ordered to St. Louis to take command. Brig. Gen. Frederick Steele took command of the troops at Helena, Ark., and Brig. Gen. John M. Schofield, who had been in command of the District of Missouri, took command of the troops in the field.

**October.**—In southwestern Missouri, Schofield formed the Army of the Frontier, 16,000 men, and soon drove the Confederates back into Arkansas where he followed them. The Confederates retreated towards *Fort Smith* on the road following the western boundary of Arkansas.

**November.**—Schofield, now a major general, was directed to leave a division under James G. Blunt in northern Arkansas and send his other two divisions under Francis Herron into Missouri. Shortly after November 20, when Schofield was on sick leave, Blunt advanced his division to Cane Hill, about twenty miles southwest of Fayetteville, Ark.

**December.**—About the 3d of December, *Hindman* crossed the Arkansas River at Van Buren with a force of 11,000 men. His plan was to threaten Blunt in front and turn his left flank by marching towards Fayetteville. En route, he learned that Herron had returned to Arkansas and was at Fayetteville on his way to reinforce Blunt. He therefore decided to attack Herron and leave only a brigade to watch Blunt.

**Prairie Grove.**—*Hindman's* command was a very poorly organized one and he was unable to concentrate it in time. Herron therefore compelled him to fight a defensive battle at *Prairie Grove*, midway between Fayetteville and Cane Hill, on December 7. During its progress Blunt's division reached the field. Not feeling able to fight the combined Union forces, *Hindman* withdrew at night and retreated to the Arkansas River.

#### OPPOSING FORCES AT PRAIRIE GROVE.

*Army of the Frontier, Maj. Gen. James G. Blunt.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments. Cav.	Batter- ies.
Maj. Gen. James G. Blunt . . . . .	3	4	3
Maj. Gen. Francis J. Herron . . . . .	2	6	2
Col. Daniel Huston . . . . .	2	1½	1

The Army of the Frontier was composed of troops of the Department of Kansas commanded by Blunt and troops of the Department of Missouri commanded by Herron.



*Trans-Mississippi Army, Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman.....	5	—	5
Brig. Gen. John S. Marmaduke (cavalry).....	3	7	2
Probable effective strength, Union.....	10,000 Casualties, 1,251		
Probable effective strength, Confederate..	10,000 Casualties, 1,317		

After the battle, the Union forces advanced to the Arkansas River and captured Van Buren and *Fort Smith* in the last days of December.

**Louisiana** (Plate 7).—In September, 1861, Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler received permission from the Secretary of War to organize a brigade of 5,000 men in New England for the purpose of invading the South from some point on the Atlantic or Gulf coasts. In November, the Navy Department decided to undertake the capture of New Orleans, and the War Department consented to employ Butler's command as a supporting force.

**January-March.**—The first brigade organized by Butler was sent to Ship Island, off the coast of Mississippi, in December, 1861. Butler was formally assigned to the command of the expedition February 23, 1862, and his force increased to 15,000 men. This force mobilized at Ship Island during the months of February and March, 1862, for an attack in April.

The naval fleet which was under the command of Admiral David G. Farragut consisted of twenty-four wooden vessels and gunboats carrying about 200 guns, and nineteen mortar-boats each carrying a single 13-inch mortar.

In the *Department of Louisiana and Southern Mississippi*, Maj. Gen. *Mansfield Lovell* had but few volunteer regiments under his command. Nearly all of his volunteers had been sent to *Beauregard* in March and were replaced by militia. His command was broken up into small detachments which garrisoned the numerous forts required to guard the entrances of the waterways in southern Louisiana.

About six miles below the city of New Orleans were the permanent masonry forts, *Jackson* and *St. Philip*, on the opposite banks of the Mississippi and only a thousand yards apart. The river had been closed by a raft in December, 1861, but this was partially destroyed by the floods in February. Each fort had a garrison

of nearly 500 men and an armament of forty-five guns. A fleet of gunboats, fire-ships, etc., assisted in the defense.

According to Farragut's plan of attack, the fleet of mortar-boats was to anchor below the forts and subject them to a prolonged bombardment. This it was thought would destroy their offensive power sufficiently to enable the fleet of cruisers and gunboats to pass them and attack the Confederate gunboats and ironclads above.

**April.**—The attack on the forts was begun by the mortar-boats on April 18. After a week's bombardment which did little injury to the forts, Farragut decided to run the forts and destroy the Confederate river fleet above. This was accomplished with little damage on the morning of April 24, and a few days later Farragut received the surrender of New Orleans.

The only line of retreat of the garrisons of the two forts being along the levees to New Orleans, the troops became demoralized by the surrender of New Orleans, mutinied, and caused the surrender of the forts to the navy. Butler, who was following the fleet in transports, immediately put a regiment in the forts and with the remainder of his force proceeded to New Orleans, which he occupied on May 1.

The territory occupied by the land force became the Department of the Gulf. *Lovell* retired to Jackson, Miss.

**Vicksburg.**—After the occupation of New Orleans, Farragut's fleet proceeded up the river without meeting any serious opposition until it reached Vicksburg. *Beauregard* had ordered this place fortified April 20, when he became convinced that Memphis must be evacuated. When the fleet reached Vicksburg, May 18, it was occupied by a single brigade and its batteries were only partially completed.

**May-July.**—The Confederates having refused to surrender, Admiral Farragut began a bombardment with his cruisers and gunboats which was kept up intermittently until June 14. His mortar-boats reached Vicksburg about the middle of June and bombarded the place from the 20th to the 27th. On the 12th of July, the gunboats and rams from Memphis joined Farragut, and the bombardment was renewed and kept up at intervals until July 26, when the attack ceased.

The loss to the defense was only twenty-two killed and wounded and two guns temporarily disabled.

Under cover of the fire of the fleet, on June 25, an infantry brigade under Brig. Gen. Thomas Williams began the construction of a canal through the peninsula opposite Vicksburg (plate 26) to connect the river above and below. The work was found more difficult than anticipated and was abandoned on July 26. The Union brigade was taken to Baton Rouge, La., where a post had been established, and the fleet returned to New Orleans and the Gulf.

**August-December.**—At Baton Rouge, the Union troops under Brig. Gen. Thomas Williams, consisting of seven regiments with three batteries, were attacked on August 5 by Maj. Gen. *John C. Breckinridge* with four small brigades. The attack was repulsed and the Confederates withdrew.

Baton Rouge was evacuated by the Union troops on August 21, and not again occupied until December 27, when Banks relieved Butler of the command of the Department of the Gulf.

In the meantime *Van Dorn* had ordered an intrenched camp to be constructed at *Port Hudson*, about twenty miles above Baton Rouge.

At the close of the year the Union troops occupied New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Brashear City and the territory inclosed by lines connecting them.

**Comment.**—The operations on the Mississippi River demonstrated the inability of land forts alone to stop the passage of wooden ships, and the inability of a fleet to silence land batteries.

**Military Situation at the Close of 1862.**—In the West, the Union troops had secured the permanent possession of the following strategic points: Nashville and Memphis in Tennessee, Helena in Arkansas, New Orleans and Baton Rouge in Louisiana. The States of Kentucky and Missouri, although subject to raids, were practically under Federal control.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST IN 1863.

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The principal operations in the East in 1863 were:

- February... Movement of a corps of 10,000 men from North Carolina to Port Royal, S. C., for an attack on Charleston.  
Movement of the IX corps from Falmouth to Fort Monroe, Va.  
Movement of two divisions of Longstreet's corps from Fredericksburg to Petersburg, Va.
- March.... Movement of two divisions of the IX corps from Fort Monroe, Va., to Kentucky.
- April..... Beginning of Chancellorsville Campaign, Va.  
Repulse of iron-clads at Charleston, S. C.  
Repulse of attack on Suffolk, Va.  
Confederate cavalry raids in West Virginia.
- May..... Battle of Chancellorsville, Va.
- June..... Beginning of Gettysburg Campaign—Capture of Winchester, Va.  
Operations against Richmond from West Point, Va.
- July..... Battle of Gettysburg and retreat of Army of Northern Virginia into Virginia.  
Advance of the Army of the Potomac to Warrenton, Va.  
Assaults on Fort Wagner, Morris Island, S. C.  
Beginning of siege of Fort Wagner and bombardment of Fort Sumter.
- August.... Movement of a division of the XI corps to South Carolina.  
Movement of 10,000 men from the Army of the Potomac to suppress draft riots in New York City.
- September.. Movement of two divisions of Longstreet's corps from Virginia to Ringgold, Ga.  
Movement of XI and XII corps from Virginia to Chattanooga, Tenn.  
Capture of Fort Wagner, S. C., and boat attack on Fort Sumter.
- October... Advance of Army of Northern Virginia and retreat of the Army of the Potomac from Warrenton to Bull Run, Va.  
Retreat of Army of Northern Virginia to Culpeper and advance of the Army of the Potomac to Warrenton, Va.
- November.. Retreat of Army of Virginia to the Rapidan and advance of the Army of the Potomac to Culpeper, Va.  
Averell's raid in West Virginia.
- December.. Mine Run Campaign in Virginia.

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE EAST  
JANUARY 1, 1863.

PLATES 2, 5 and 6.

**Confederate.**—On December 31, 1862, the strength of the Confederate troops in the East present for duty was approximately as follows:

Department of Northern Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee.....	77,000
“ “ Western Virginia, Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones.....	4,000
“ “ Henrico, Brig. Gen. John H. Winder.....	2,000
“ “ North Carolina and Southern Virginia, Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith.....	34,000
“ “ South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard.....	20,000
Total.....	137,000
Total present.....	164,000

The troops in the *Department of Northern Virginia* constituted the *Army of Northern Virginia*. That army was on the south bank of the Rappahannock River behind Fredericksburg.

The *Department of Western Virginia* had replaced the former *Army of the Northwest*. Its headquarters were at Dublin Depot near Newbern, Va., in the New River Valley. Its troops were guarding the mountain passes between Virginia and West Virginia.

The *Department of Henrico* comprised the territory immediately about the Confederate capital, Richmond.

The *Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia* extended from the James River, Va., to South Carolina. Its headquarters were at Goldsboro, N. C.; the troops were distributed along the railroad from Petersburg, Va., to Wilmington, N. C. The largest bodies were at Goldsboro and Wilmington.

The *Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida* comprised the Atlantic coastal plain from North Carolina to the Gulf of Mexico and the State of Florida east of Pensacola. Its headquarters were at Charleston, S. C.; the troops were distributed along the railroad parallel to the coast. The largest body was at Charleston.

**Union.**—The strength of the Union troops present for duty in the East, December 31, 1862, was as follows:

Department of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside.....	157,000
“ “ Virginia, Maj. Gen. John A. Dix.....	20,000
“ “ Washington, Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman.....	49,000
Middle Department, Maj. Gen. Robert C. Schenck.....	12,000
District of West Virginia, Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox.....	25,000
Department of North Carolina, Maj. Gen. John G. Foster.....	18,000
“ “ the South, Brig. Gen. John M. Brannan.....	11,000
Total.....	292,000
Total present.....	352,000

The Department of Virginia was the tidewater section of Virginia south of the Rappahannock River. Its headquarters were at *Fort Monroe*; the troops occupied Yorktown, Norfolk, and Suffolk.

The Department of Washington was created in 1862 to insure the proper defense of the capital and its limit was the line of forts about the city. Early in 1863 this limit was extended to include the territory about twenty miles from Washington.

The Middle Department was created in 1862. It comprised the State of Maryland outside the Department of Washington. Its headquarters were at Baltimore; the troops were distributed along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Baltimore to Cumberland. In March, 1863, the District of West Virginia was added to this department, but was taken away again in June, 1863.

The District of West Virginia was a part of the Department of the Ohio until March, 1863, when it was made part of the Middle Department. In June, 1863, it became the Department of West Virginia. Its headquarters were at Charleston, W. Va.; the troops were distributed along the Kanawha River and along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

The Department of North Carolina comprised so much of that State as was occupied by Union troops. Its headquarters were at Newbern; the troops were principally at Washington, Newbern, and Beaufort.

The Department of the South comprised so much of the Atlantic coast south of North Carolina as was occupied by Union troops. Its headquarters were at Hilton Head, Port Royal Sound, S. C.; the troops were on the coastal islands between Charleston and the Savannah River, and at Saint Augustine and Fernandina, Fla.

#### OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA.

**January-April.**—In the latter part of January, Burnside began to move his army up the Rappahannock with the intention of

crossing that river at some point above Falmouth. Bad weather however soon compelled him to abandon the movement as the roads became impassable. On January 25, Burnside was, at his own request, relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac.

At the same time Sumner was also relieved at his own request, and Franklin was relieved because he had been unjustly blamed for not carrying out Burnside's orders.

By direction of the President, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker assumed command of the Army of the Potomac January 26, 1863. Burnside's old corps, the IX corps, was detached from the army and sent to Fort Monroe early in February, leaving in the army the I, II, III, V, VI, XI, and XII corps. Hooker's army had a strength of 134,000 men and 404 guns. He had 57 brigades of infantry and 7 of cavalry. (See p. 156.)

Hooker abandoned the organization into grand divisions and reestablished the corps as the largest unit. He consolidated the cavalry into an independent corps of three divisions and a reserve brigade. Maj. Gen. George Stoneman, a cavalry officer of the Regular Army, was placed in command.

The *Army of Northern Virginia* remained in the lines occupied in the battle of Fredericksburg, until the opening of the Chancellorsville campaign.

The transfer of 12,000 Union troops from the Department of Southeast Virginia to the Department of North Carolina in the last days of 1862 compelled Gen. *Lee* to send *Ransom's* division to North Carolina early in January.

When *Lee* was informed that Burnside's corps was debarking at Fort Monroe early in February, he first sent *Pickett's* division, then *Hood's* division, and finally *Longstreet* in person to meet this movement.

There were present for duty with the army, *Jackson's* four divisions, *McLaws'* and *R. H. Anderson's* divisions of *Longstreet's* corps, and the cavalry brigades of *Fitz Lee* and *W. H. F. Lee*. *Lee* had 28 brigades of infantry and 2 of cavalry. (See p. 157.)

*Hampton* was absent recruiting his brigade and *W. E. Jones* was in the Shenandoah Valley in command of the *Valley District*.

The strength of the army was 57,000 men and 228 guns.

Maj. Gen. *D. H. Hill* and Brig. Gen. *Wm. B. Taliaferro* having been ordered to command troops in North Carolina, their divi-

sions were commanded by Maj. Gen. *Robert E. Rodes* and Brig. Gen. *Raleigh E. Colston*.

## CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN.

### PLATES 13, 19 and 27.

About the last of February, the Union authorities, being certain that *Lee* had weakened his army by sending some of *Longstreet's* corps to southern Virginia, urged Hooker to take advantage of this and attack *Lee* as soon as possible. The roads were however impassable during March and the first half of April, and active military operations in this section of Virginia were impossible.

**Hooker's Plan** (Plates 2 and 13).—On the 11th of April Hooker submitted to President Lincoln his plan of campaign.

He proposed to send his cavalry across the Rappahannock at or near the railroad north of Culpeper. It was then to move southward to Gordonsville and follow the railroad eastward to the Fredericksburg-Richmond railroad. Both roads were to be rendered useless by the destruction of bridges and viaducts.

When the cavalry was well in the rear of the Confederate army, Hooker proposed to cross the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers above their junction with his army, and take a position in rear of *Lee's* left flank. This would compel *Lee* to fall back from Fredericksburg. Hooker then proposed to follow and attack the retreating army whose movements would be impeded by the damage done to *Lee's* communications by the Union cavalry.

The plan was at once approved, and April 13 was the day set for the beginning of the movement of the cavalry. The infantry was to move two weeks later. To prevent *Lee* from discovering his plan, the Rappahannock was closely picketed and strict orders were given to prevent intercourse between the opposing picket lines.

On April 13, six brigades of Union cavalry with four batteries of horse artillery, 10,000 men, left Falmouth and marched to Bealeton. As the cavalry corps was not provided with a ponton train, it was to cross the Rappahannock by the fords at and above the railroad, all of which were picketed by small Confederate detachments. The cavalry did not cross on the 14th as planned; that night a severe storm set in and for two weeks the Rappahannock was unfordable. The Union cavalry encamped along the railroad north of the river waiting for the flood to subside.



**April 27-30** (Plate 13). Since the cavalry raid was not an essential part of his program, Gen. Hooker did not postpone the movement of his infantry; on April 27, the V, XI, and XII corps moved out of their winter quarters and started for Kelly Ford on the Rappahannock to which a ponton train had been sent. Here, on the night of the 28th and the following day, the three army corps and the cavalry corps, that had been delayed by the flood, crossed the river.

The six cavalry brigades, under D. McM. Gregg and Averell, turned westwards on their raid, and were not again in touch with the army during the campaign. The infantry corps, preceded by one brigade of cavalry, marched for Chancellorsville; the XII and XI corps by Germanna Ford, the V corps by Ely Ford. On the 30th, the V and XII corps were at Chancellorsville and the XI corps on the Orange road at Dowdall Tavern, three miles in rear.

On the same day, two divisions of the II corps crossed the Rappahannock at U. S. Ford, a mile below the junction of the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers, and joined the V and XII corps near Chancellorsville. The third division of the II corps remained at Falmouth.

None of the above corps met with any serious opposition as the only opposing force was a Confederate cavalry regiment at Kelly Ford.

To divert *Lee's* attention from this turning movement, the I and VI corps, under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, threw bridges across the Rappahannock, one and two miles below Fredericksburg, and on the 29th a division of each corps crossed to the south bank.

The III corps remained as a support to the I and VI corps until the crossing was made, and then marched to the U. S. Ford.

On the night of April 30, Hooker was at Chancellorsville in person and had under his direct command twenty-seven brigades of the II, XI, and XII corps, 52,000 men. The nine brigades of the III corps, 18,000 men, were on their way to join him and would reach him by noon of May 1. Hooker's intention was to advance on the morrow and establish his lines on a range of hills about six miles east of Chancellorsville, where he would be in more open country, on the flank of his adversary, and within touch of his own left wing. He issued no order for this movement that night, evidently thinking it unnecessary to hasten the movement.

On April 29, *Lee* was informed by his cavalry that Union troops in force had crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly Ford. Being uncertain of their numbers and purpose, and knowing that his cavalry was weak, that night he directed Maj. Gen. *R. H. Anderson*, who was guarding the U. S. Ford with two brigades, to take these brigades with his reserve brigade and go out to meet them.

*Anderson* assembled his brigades at Chancellorsville on the morning of the 30th but was soon compelled by the V and XII corps to fall back towards Fredericksburg. At Tabernacle Church (plate 19), five miles from Chancellorsville, he halted and in accordance with *Lee's* orders began to intrench his position.

*Lee* made up his mind to fight a defensive battle at Tabernacle Church and ordered *Anderson* to assemble there his five brigades; he directed *Jackson* to join *Anderson* with three divisions, and *McLaws* to join him with three brigades. He thus ordered the concentration of twenty-three brigades at Tabernacle Church. The remaining four brigades were to watch the I and VI corps.

**May 1** (Plate 27).—From Chancellorsville there are three roads running eastward towards Fredericksburg. The northern one called the *river road* runs towards the Rappahannock and is separated from the others by Mott Run. The middle one is the *turnpike*, which runs almost straight to Salem Church, six miles from Chancellorsville. The southern one is the *plank road* which curves a mile to the south and joins the middle one at Tabernacle Church. The last two roads are separated by thick woods. At the time of the battle an unfinished railroad ran south of and nearly parallel with the plank road.

*Jackson* reached Tabernacle Church with the divisions of *A. P. Hill*, *Rodes*, and *Colston* at 9 a. m. and found *Anderson* and *McLaws* intrenching. He ordered them to cease at once and form their troops for an advance on Chancellorsville. It took *Jackson* two hours to form his troops and it was between 11 and 12 a. m. when the movement began.

Hooker issued his orders for the movement on Fredericksburg at 11 a. m.

About noon, there were marching eastwards from Chancellorsville on the river road five brigades of the V corps, 10,000 men; no Confederates were in their front to oppose the march. On the turnpike, there were marching eastward a division of the V corps

and a small force of cavalry, 7,000 men, and westward five Confederate brigades of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, 10,000 men. On the plank road there was marching eastward the XII corps, 12,000 men, and westward on this road and the railroad *Jackson's* corps and three of *Anderson's* brigades, 34,500 men.

Of the Union supports, two divisions of the II corps, 12,000 men, were at Chancellorsville, the III corps, 18,000 men, was in rear of the II corps, and the XI corps, 12,000 men, was at Dowdall Tavern.

The opposing columns on the turnpike first came in contact, and the division of the V corps called for aid. Four brigades of the II corps, 7,000 men, were sent to its assistance.

This unexpected movement on the part of the Confederates, and the reports he received from his balloon at Falmouth of heavy Confederate columns marching westward, caused Hooker to order his troops to retire and take up a defensive position about Chancellorsville.

The Confederates advanced and took up a position in the woods close to the Union lines.

Believing that the whole Confederate army was in his front, Hooker sent an order to Sedgwick to send the I corps to Chancellorsville via U. S. Ford.

That night *Lee* and *Jackson* had a conference and agreed that the Union position was too strong to warrant a frontal attack. It was therefore decided that *Jackson* should start at once with his three divisions, 30,000 men, to make a flank march and if possible reach the rear of the Union army. Concealed by the thick woods about Chancellorsville, *Lee* was to hold the Confederate line with the divisions of *Anderson* and *McLaws*, 16,000 men. *Wilcox's* brigade of *Anderson's* division was to go to Bank Ford to prevent Sedgwick from crossing the Rappahannock between Falmouth and the U. S. Ford.

**May 2.**—On the morning of May 2, the Union army had taken up its line of defense. Its line began on the Rappahannock and followed the Mineral Spring road to the Ely Ford road; thence along that road to Chancellorsville. From Chancellorsville it followed the Orange road westward to a point on the turnpike a mile west of Dowdall Tavern. The roads were all in rear of the line of intrenchments.

The XII corps was around Chancellorsville with the II corps on its left. The V corps was along the Mineral Spring road. The XI corps was around Dowdall Tavern and one division of the III corps was along the road between the XI and XII corps. Two divisions of the III corps were in reserve near Chancellorsville.

*Jackson* started under a full moon on the night of May 1 to reach the roads running from Dowdall Tavern to Orange Courthouse. His column was ten miles long and part of it was obliged to pass within a mile of the Union line.

His column was discovered on the morning of the 2d by the outposts of the III corps who reported it to their corps commander, Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles. Sickles immediately assumed that the Confederate army was retreating towards Gordonsville and requested Hooker's permission to pursue. Hooker was a little suspicious and gave permission to Sickles to proceed cautiously. He personally rode around his lines to see whether they were properly intrenched.

As the day wore on, Sickles increased the strength of his pursuing column and the whole army accepted his diagnosis of the situation as correct.

This unfortunate movement resulted in removing from the south front of the Union line in the course of the afternoon two divisions of the III corps, the one in the line and one of the two in reserve, one brigade of the XI corps, and one division of the XII corps, in all about 20,000 men. It left the remaining five brigades of the XI corps isolated and gave Hooker and his corps commanders the impression that *Lee* was really retreating.

Sickles delayed the march of two of *Jackson's* brigades somewhat, and compelled *Lee* to send two of *Anderson's* brigades to extricate *Jackson's* trains, but he did not delay the main movement.

*Jackson* reached the Orange turnpike with twelve brigades about 4 p. m., having en route inspected the position of the XI corps from a prominent hill near the plank road. He formed his troops astride the turnpike in three lines on a front of about two miles. One brigade was on the plank road.

From Wilderness Tavern where *Jackson* formed his line, to the right flank of the Union line which was also on the turnpike west of the Tavern, was only a distance of a mile and a half but the two lines were separated by dense woods.

Sometime between 5 and 6 p. m. the Confederate line moved off and it was 6 p. m. when *Jackson* struck the left flank of the Union line three miles west of Chancellorsville.

In a clearing about Dowdall Tavern, separated from the remainder of the army by a mile of woods, were the five brigades of the XI corps, 10,000 men, their general line facing south. The XI corps was taken at a great disadvantage, being surprised, outnumbered, outflanked, and unsupported. After making such resistance as possible, its routed troops fell back through the woods and gave Hooker and the troops about Chancellorsville the first information they had received of *Jackson's* attack.

The remaining division of the III corps was at once formed across the Orange road facing west and was supported by the division of the XII corps which had been sent to Sickles but was fortunately not far from the Orange road. This line was reinforced by some troops from the II corps. It was dark when *Jackson* reached this line, and as his troops were disorganized, he was obliged to stop his advance.

Soon after dark, as *Jackson* was returning to his lines from a reconnaissance made in front, he was fired on by his own men and mortally wounded. *A. P. Hill*, the next in rank, having also been wounded, *J. E. B. Stuart* assumed command.

During the night, Sickles, whose advance brigade was between two and three miles south of the Orange road when the XI corps was attacked, returned to his morning position a half mile south of the Orange road. This was a cleared plateau since known as Hazel Grove.

**May 3.**—The Union lines were adjusted during the night to meet the new conditions. To prevent *Jackson's* corps from reaching the road to U. S. Ford, the I corps, which arrived during the night, and the V corps were deployed along the Ely Ford road facing south. The XI corps took the former position of the V corps. The II corps occupied its lines of the previous day as did the left division of the XII corps. The right division of the XII corps formed a line facing west, parallel to and a mile to the west of the II corps.

Sickles was directed to move his troops into the area between the Union lines facing east and west and act as a reserve. He began his march at daylight.

He thus abandoned the keypoint of the position, Hazel Grove, from which the Confederate artillery afterwards swept the area inclosed by the two Union lines and enfiladed the trenches of the left division of the XII corps. In the hands of Union troops, it would have separated *Stuart* and *Lee*, and taken in flank Confederate troops advancing towards Chancellorsville.

While Sickles was moving to his new position, *Stuart* and *Lee* vigorously attacked the troops in their front. Hooker was wounded by an artillery shot from Hazel Grove, and when he learned that the XII corps was nearly out of ammunition and his west front was about to be broken, he directed the II, III, and XII corps to fall back from Chancellorsville to the Mineral Spring road. This gave the Orange road to *Lee*.

**May 4.**—There were no operations about Chancellorsville on the 4th. The Union army was intrenching its position, and *Lee*, having sent away *McLaws* and *Anderson*, had only *Jackson's* corps at that point. That night Hooker decided to recross the Rappahannock, since his position, though safe, was very contracted and a difficult one from which to assume the offensive.

The army recrossed at U. S. Ford on the 5th and 6th.

**Sedgwick's Operations** (Plate 19).—On the evening of May 2, at the time *Jackson* struck the XI corps, Gen. Sedgwick, whose VI corps was on the south bank of the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, received an order to advance on Bowling Green on the railroad south of Fredericksburg. This order was evidently given under the impression that *Lee* was retreating towards Gordonsville.

Just before midnight Sedgwick received a second order. This directed him to recross to the north bank of the river, march to Falmouth, cross the Rappahannock, and join the army at Chancellorsville, driving away any small force he might meet. He was to be at Chancellorsville about daylight. Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, whose division of the II corps was at Falmouth, was to prepare the way for him by occupying Fredericksburg at once.

When he issued this last order on the night of May 2, Hooker naturally assumed that practically all of *Lee's* army was in his front.

As a matter of fact on the evening of May 2, *Barksdale's* brigade of *McLaws'* division was on Marye Hill on the Chancel-

lorsville road supported by a part of the artillery reserve. Hays' brigade of *Early's* division was on his right and *Wilcox's* brigade of *Anderson's* division was on his left behind a canal nearer the town. On the Chancellorsville road, three miles in rear of *Barksdale*, was Brig. Gen. *Jubal A. Early* with his other three brigades. He was on his way to join *Lee*.

**May 3.**—To save time, Sedgwick marched to Fredericksburg up the south side of the river and drove from the town the Confederates who were opposing the construction of a bridge by Gibbon. As it would take too long to turn the Confederate line on Marye Hill, Sedgwick took it by assault. This was done about noon. When Sedgwick reached the position near Salem Church occupied by *Early*, to which *Barksdale* and *Wilcox* had retired, he was confronted by five brigades which were shortly reinforced to eight by the arrival of the three remaining brigades of *McLaws'* division sent by *Lee*.

Here at Salem Church Sedgwick's assault was repulsed and his advance was stopped. His command had been marching and fighting since midnight of the 2d, and was confronted by a fresh force in a position selected by *Early* that morning.

That night *Lee* sent the remaining brigades of *Anderson's* division to assist in the attack of Sedgwick, and the Confederates made plans to cut him off from the river.

**May 4.**—On the morning of the 4th Sedgwick received word from Hooker that the latter had contracted his line and Sedgwick must look out for himself and save his command. Sedgwick extended his lines to conform to those of the Confederates and to cover his retreat to the river. He sent word to his engineers to throw a ponton bridge over the river at Bank Ford, three miles above Fredericksburg. On the 4th, the Confederates maneuvered all day for position and did not attack until nearly dark. This attack was repulsed and that night the VI corps recrossed the Rappahannock.

Gibbon, who took possession of Fredericksburg on Sedgwick's arrival on the morning of the 3d, also evacuated the south bank and took up his bridge.

**Cavalry Operations** (Plates 2 and 13).—During the Chancellorsville campaign, *J. E. B. Stuart* had but two cavalry brigades at his disposal, those of *Fitz Lee* and *Wm. H. F. Lee*. At the begin-

ning of the campaign, *Stuart* was near Culpeper and had detachments guarding all the fords of the Rappahannock above its junction with the Rapidan.

When the Union army began crossing at Kelly Ford, *Stuart* took most of his command eastward to assist his force at the ford. Finding the Union column too strong to check, he took *Fitz Lee's* brigade and joined *Lee* on April 30, near Chancellorsville. Two of the regiments were posted on the right flank of the Confederate army between the Fredericksburg road and the river, and three, with *Stuart* himself, accompanied *Jackson* on his flank march.

To *Wm. H. F. Lee's* brigade was assigned the defense of the depot at Gordonsville and that territory.

When Gen. Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly Ford, he divided his command into two divisions.

D. McM. Gregg's division, which Stoneman accompanied, crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford, marched for Louisa on the railroad east of Gordonsville and thence to the South Anna River. Here Gregg divided his force into small raiding parties to attack the enemy's communications. One went south and destroyed the bridge over the James River at Columbia. Two regiments went eastward separately, and crossed the Fredericksburg-Richmond railroad; both of these eventually reached Gloucester opposite Yorktown. Others attacked the railroad east of Louisa.

After the raids, Gregg's division, with the exception of the two regiments that went to Gloucester, was reassembled and returned to Kelly Ford over the route it came and reached the Rappahannock on May 8.

The second division under *Wm. W. Averell* went to Culpeper with the intention of attacking Gordonsville. *Averell* did not succeed in forcing a crossing over the Rapidan defended by *Wm. H. F. Lee*, and on May 2, was ordered to march to Ely Ford and guard that point. He reached it on the 3d.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN.

*Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
I	Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth . . . .	4	—	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson . . . . .	3	—	4
John F. Reynolds	Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday . . . . .	2	—	3



Corps	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
II	Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock . . . . .	4	—	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John Gibbon . . . . .	3	—	2
Darius Couch	Maj. Gen. Wm. H. French . . . . .	3	—	2
	Corps Artillery . . . . .			2
III	Brig. Gen. David B. Birney . . . . .	3	—	4
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Hiram G. Berry* . . . . .	3	—	3
Daniel E. Sickles	Maj. Gen. Amiel W. Whipple † . . . . .	3	—	3
V	Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin . . . . .	3	—	4
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. George Sykes . . . . .	3	—	2
George G. Meade	Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys . . . . .	2	—	2
VI	Brig. Gen. Wm. T. H. Brooks . . . . .	3	—	4
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Albion P. Howe . . . . .	2	—	2
John Sedgwick	Maj. Gen. John Newton . . . . .	3	—	3
	Independent Brigade . . . . .	1	—	1
XI	Brig. Gen. Charles Devens . . . . .	2	—	1
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr . . . . .	2	—	1
Oliver O. Howard	Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz . . . . .	2	—	1
	Corps Artillery . . . . .			3
XII	Brig. Gen. Alpheus A. Williams . . . . .	3	—	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John W. Geary . . . . .	3	—	2
Henry W. Slocum	Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasanton . . . . .	2	8	1
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. Wm. W. Averell . . . . .	2	7	1
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg . . . . .	2	7	—
George Stoneman	Reserve Brigade . . . . .	1	5	—
	Corps Artillery . . . . .			4
	Engineer Brigade . . . . .	1	—	—
	Artillery Reserve . . . . .			9
	Siege Artillery . . . . .			2
* Killed. † Mortally wounded.				
<i>Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee.</i>				
	Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws . . . . .	4	—	4
	Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson . . . . .	5	—	4
	Corps Artillery . . . . .			10
	Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill . . . . .	6	—	5
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Robert F. Rodes . . . . .	5	—	4
Thomas J. Jackson	Brig. Gen. Raleigh E. Colston . . . . .	4	—	4
	Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early . . . . .	4	—	4
	Corps Artillery . . . . .			10
Cavalry	Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart . . . . .	2	10	4
	Reserve Artillery . . . . .			6

	Union.		Confederate.	
	Men.	Guns.	Men.	Guns.
Strength . . . . .	134,000	404	57,000	228
Casualties . . . . .	16,804		13,156	

**Comments.**—Hooker's defeat was due primarily to his great confidence in his plan of campaign. He was convinced that he could concentrate his army at Chancellorsville by stratagem, and that *Lee* would retreat as soon as he found Hooker on his flank.

Under these assumptions, Hooker thought his own cavalry would render more valuable service in destroying the railroads and bridges over which *Lee* would retreat than in guarding the flanks of the Union Army.

Had the cavalry corps been on the right flank of the Union army, *Jackson's* flank movement would either have been impossible or its object would have been known in time to defeat it.

Being confident that *Lee* would retreat when he learned that the Union army was across the Rapidan, Hooker made no haste to get his army into position in advance of the woods around Chancellorsville, and was compelled to change from the offensive to the defensive.

Had he been less confident on May 2, he would have been less ready to believe the report that *Lee* was retreating. It was the acceptance of this interpretation of *Jackson's* march that led to Sickles' unfortunate pursuit and to Hooker's failure to properly post and support the XI corps.

Hooker had greatly improved the organization of the Union army during the time he was in command, and deserves great credit for the thorough and systematic manner in which his movement to Chancellorsville was planned and executed. Against any combination of commanders less resolute and daring than *Lee* and *Jackson*, he would have been successful. Against them he needed the cavalry he had sent away so that he could continue the offensive until his army was united at Fredericksburg.

When *Lee* found that he could not prevent Hooker from crossing the Rapidan, he was compelled to decide whether to retreat or modify his dispositions. He gave orders to his commanders to prepare to fall back, but decided not to retreat until compelled to do so. When *Anderson* retreated from Chancellorsville, he found the chief engineer of the Confederate army at Tabernacle Church with instructions from *Lee* to select a good line and intrench it.

*Lee* proposed to await *Hooker's* right wing there behind his fortifications.

When *Jackson* reached *Anderson* on the morning of the 1st, he ordered *Anderson* and *McLaws* to stop digging and get their troops ready to advance. *Lee* had changed his mind during the night, due probably to a conference with *Jackson*.

Having once decided to assume the offensive, *Lee* determined to maintain it even at great risk.

The assault of the Union lines around Chancellorsville, protected as they were by abatis and breastworks, being deemed too hazardous, his only alternative was to attempt to reach the rear of the army by one of *Jackson's* swift flank marches. A full moon made this movement possible.

It was a desperate chance. He based his plan upon the assumption that *Hooker* would neither assume the offensive on the morrow nor correctly interpret the object of *Jackson's* movement. He trusted to the well known marching and fighting qualities of *Jackson's* corps to make the movement a success.

*Jackson* was not so successful as the two generals had hoped, and it still required desperate fighting on the 3d, to unite *Lee's* two wings.

In the operations of the two commanders about Chancellorsville, we recognize the wisdom of Napoleon's observation:—"At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance, is a matter for grave consideration; but once having assumed the offensive it must be sustained to the last extremity."

The Confederate operations against *Sedgwick* were not conducted with the same skill as those about Chancellorsville, probably because of the lack of a directing head. He was therefore enabled to withdraw his command across a defile in open country without serious loss.

## THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.

### PLATES 13, 14 and 15.

**May.**—At the close of the Chancellorsville campaign, both armies returned to the positions recently vacated and began to reorganize for a renewal of hostilities.

*Hooker* found it necessary to remount and reorganize his cavalry and to replace with new troops the two-year infantry regiments,

raised in 1861, whose terms of enlistment were about to expire. To incorporate the new regiments, several of the corps underwent a reorganization.

The headquarters of the cavalry was at Bealeton on the railroad, and the infantry corps were encamped above and below Falmouth. The picket line was along the Rappahannock River. (See p. 174.)

After the death of *Jackson*, *Lee* reorganized his army into three equal corps, commanded by *Longstreet*, *Ewell*, and *A. P. Hill*. *Ewell*, who had lost a leg at the battle of Manassas, had returned to duty and with *A. P. Hill* had been promoted to the grade of lieutenant general. *Lee* strengthened his infantry by sending some of his depleted regiments to the South Atlantic States to be recruited, and drawing from those States some of the strongest regiments. He increased *Stuart's* cavalry by *Robertson's* brigade from North Carolina and recalled the brigades of *Hampton* and *W. E. Jones*. He also attached to the army the two brigades of irregular cavalry which had been operating under Brig. Gens. *John D. Imboden* and *Albert G. Jenkins* in the *Valley District* and in West Virginia. He reorganized and reequipped his artillery so that each infantry division should have sixteen guns and in addition each corps, thirty-two. (See p. 174.)

*Lee* was thus careful in strengthening and reorganizing his army because he had determined to cross the Potomac once more and carry the war into the enemy's country. Since the fate of the Confederacy might depend upon this campaign, he proposed to take with him the strongest and best-equipped army the Confederacy could raise without drawing on the West, where *Bragg* and *Pemberton* were hard pressed by Gens. *Rosecrans*, *Grant*, and *Banks*.

Having studied the military situation, *Lee* determined to avoid a battle in Virginia by marching his army parallel to the Rappahannock through Culpeper and Sperryville (plate 2) and entering the Shenandoah Valley at Front Royal. He could then follow that valley to the Potomac and march either on Frederick, Washington, and Baltimore, or on Harrisburg. He proposed to hold the lines about Fredericksburg with a part of his command to check Hooker's advance should he cross the Rappahannock at that place and the Confederate authorities direct *Lee* to cease his movement and cover Richmond.

**June** (Plate 13).—When the campaign opened, *J. E. B. Stuart* was at Brandy Station midway between Culpeper and the Rappahannock, where he was inspecting and equipping his five regular brigades of cavalry. The infantry divisions that fought at Chancellorsville were on the heights behind Fredericksburg. The divisions of *Hood* and *Pickett*, which had been with *Longstreet* at Suffolk, Va., were near Hanover Junction. The pickets were along the Rappahannock.

On June 2, *Hill* was directed to relieve the pickets of *Ewell* and the latter was ordered to move on Culpeper. *Longstreet* who had only one division at Fredericksburg was ordered to follow *Ewell*.

These movements did not escape the notice of Hooker who directed his cavalry corps, supported by two brigades of infantry, to move along the railroad to Culpeper and ascertain what force was at that place.

This reconnaissance resulted in the cavalry fight of *Fleetwood* or *Brandy Station* June 9, in which the principal forces engaged were five cavalry brigades on each side. *Stuart* was surprised and at first fell back; later however he rallied his forces and compelled the Union cavalry under Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton to fall back on its infantry supports. Pleasonton however secured the information desired, that *Stuart* was in force in front of Culpeper and that infantry occupied that town.

It was now evident to Hooker that *Lee* had concentrated on his left for some movement around the Union right flank; he therefore requested permission to cross the Rappahannock and attack the weakened forces on Fredericksburg heights. If successful, he proposed to move on Richmond and compel *Lee* to return to cover the Confederate capital.

The authorities were unwilling to consent to such a bold plan and directed Hooker to cover Washington and Harpers Ferry and attack *Lee* wherever possible north of the Rappahannock.

*Lee*, knowing that his plan had been revealed to Hooker by the cavalry reconnaissance and fearing the very movement proposed by Hooker, ordered *Ewell* to move as rapidly as possible to Winchester and attack the Union garrison there. By this means he hoped to alarm the Union authorities for the safety of their own territory and thus prevent Hooker from interfering with the invasion of the northern States.

The alarm was unnecessary, since, under orders from Washing-

ton, Hooker began to withdraw towards Manassas on June 11. The retrograde movement of the Union army released *Hill's* corps and he marched at once to Culpeper.

*Ewell* reached the Shenandoah Valley (plate 16) on June 13, and was there joined by *A. G. Jenkins'* cavalry brigade which had been sent from the upper Shenandoah Valley in advance to locate the Union forces. A Union division under Maj. Gen. Robert H. Milroy was at this time guarding the valley. Two brigades were at Winchester and one at Berryville.

*Ewell* therefore directed one of his divisions on Berryville and two on Winchester. On the evening of the 14th, he captured Winchester and took 4,000 prisoners. Milroy with the remainder of his division succeeded in reaching the Potomac but he was compelled to abandon his stores and trains. *Ewell* moved at once to the Potomac, crossed the river, and occupied Hagerstown and Sharpsburg, Md.

When Hooker began to fall back, *Longstreet*, who had concentrated his corps at Culpeper to support *Hill* if necessary, began to move north keeping just east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. He could thus either threaten Harpers Ferry or cross into the Shenandoah Valley by the passes north of the Manassas Gap railroad. Since *Lee* later abandoned his intention of threatening Harpers Ferry, *Longstreet* crossed the mountains to Berryville.

*Hill* moved on Winchester through Culpeper, Sperryville, and Front Royal, and reached it about the 21st of June, when *Longstreet* was at Berryville.

*Stuart* with his five regular cavalry brigades had remained between the two armies during this flank march, and moved northward through Loudoun Valley between the Blue Ridge and Bull Run mountains. Between the 17th and 21st of June he had several encounters with Pleasonton's cavalry which entered the same valley from Aldie. The most important engagement was on June 21, near *Upperville*, at the base of the Blue Ridge, where Pleasonton supported by a brigade of infantry drove *Stuart* out of the valley into the Blue Ridge Mountains.

From the operations in the Loudoun Valley, each army commander learned that the other was not advancing through that valley in force. *Lee*, who was at Berryville, thereupon abandoned all concern for his communications and ordered an advance into Pennsylvania. Hooker also ordered an advance across the Poto-

mac to Frederick, Md. *Lee's* army being less concentrated was able to move faster than the Union army.

One week later, on June 28, *Lee* was in the vicinity of Chambersburg, Pa. (plate 15), with the corps of *Longstreet* and *Hill*. *Ewell* with two divisions was at Carlisle; his third division under *Early* was at York which it reached by moving eastward from Fayetteville through Gettysburg and Berlin. Hooker's headquarters were at Frederick, Md.; his troops were encamped on the roads radiating from that town.

*Lee* was in complete ignorance of the location of the Union army. He was now in a hostile country and his regular cavalry had completely failed him. *Stuart* with three brigades was at Rockville (plate 15) near Washington, and *Robertson* with two brigades was still in the Blue Ridge Mountains east of Berryville, Va.

When *Lee*, at Berryville, gave his final orders for an advance into Pennsylvania, he directed *Stuart* to cross the Potomac as soon as possible and place himself on *Ewell's* right flank. *Stuart* was at this time in the Loudoun Valley which he reentered when Pleasonton retired to Aldie after the fight at Upperville.

*Stuart* had, after studying the situation, formed the plan of riding through or around the Union army and reaching Frederick by a shorter route than that via Sharpsburg and Boonsboro. He submitted this plan to *Lee* who, having great faith in his cavalry commander, approved it, but apparently with some misgivings. By this plan *Stuart* was to leave two brigades under *Robertson* with *Longstreet* to guard the rear of the army and take the other three with him.

*Stuart* found his plan more difficult to execute than he had anticipated; and when, after making a wide detour southward around Manassas, he finally crossed the Potomac on the night of June 27, he found the whole Union army at Frederick. He therefore rode northward for Westminster hoping to be able to reach Emmitsburg, Md., or Gettysburg, Pa., and get in touch with *Ewell*. *Robertson* was apparently left without definite orders and remained south of the Potomac after both armies were well north of it.

**June 28.**—On the night of June 28, a Confederate spy reached Chambersburg from Frederick and reported the Union army at Frederick. *Lee* was apprehensive for his communications and

decided at once to concentrate his army in the direction of Gettysburg and thus force Hooker to move east of the Monocacy River to cover Baltimore. Not knowing how far north the Union army might be by the time his concentration was completed, *Lee* ordered the concentration at Cashtown, just east of the mountains, from which roads ran to Middletown (now Biglerville), to Mummasburg, to Gettysburg, and to Fairfield.

On the same night a staff officer reached Frederick from Washington with an order relieving Hooker from the command of the Army of the Potomac at his own request, and appointing Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, the commander of the V corps, as his successor.

Meade's instructions were to cover Washington and Baltimore, but he was not to remain on the defensive unless so compelled. From telegrams received from Harrisburg, the position of the Confederate army was quite accurately known. It was surmised that *Lee* would concentrate his army at some point on the roads connecting York, Heidlersburg, and Chambersburg, but at that time there had been nothing to indicate the exact point. Meade therefore decided to shift the center of his army to the eastward to cover Baltimore and advance northward to the line Gettysburg-Hanover.

**June 29-30.**—On the 29th, messages went from Chambersburg to all the detached troops of *Lee's* army, and on the 30th the Confederate army began to concentrate.

From Berryville south of the Potomac *Robertson* with his two regular cavalry brigades marched for Fayetteville east of Chambersburg. *Imboden* with his mounted infantry brigade, which had marched down the South Branch of the Potomac, while *Lee* was marching down the Shenandoah, was at this time at Hancock on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad whose bridges he had been destroying. He marched northward for Chambersburg to take charge of the army trains and conduct them to Cashtown.

*Hill*, followed by *Longstreet*, marched eastward on the Chambersburg-Gettysburg pike for Cashtown. *Ewell* sent one of his divisions from Carlisle to Chambersburg to escort his trains and the cattle he had captured; with the other and *Jenkins'* cavalry he started for Heidlersburg, where *Early's* division was to join him.



The night of June 30, found *Ewell* with two divisions near Heidlersburg; his third was near Scotland north of Chambersburg. *Hill* was at Cashtown with two divisions; his third was at Fayetteville. *Longstreet* was at Fayetteville with two divisions; his third was near Chambersburg guarding the trains. *Imboden* had reached McConnellsburg and *Robertson* had reached Martinsburg. *Stuart* who had found the roads to Emmitsburg, Gettysburg and Carlisle, all blocked by Union troops, was this night making a night march from the vicinity of Hanover Junction to Dover on the York-Carlisle road. Having learned that *Ewell* was at Carlisle he was endeavoring to reach that place.

During the 29th and 30th Meade advanced towards his new line. On the night of June 30, the I corps was at Marsh Creek on the road between Emmitsburg and Gettysburg; the XI corps was at Emmitsburg watching the roads to Waynesboro and Hagerstown; the III corps was just east of Emmitsburg. These three corps with Buford's cavalry division, of which one brigade was at Mechanicstown and two at Gettysburg, constituted the left wing of the army and were under the command of Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds of the I corps who was at Marsh Run.

The four corps constituting the right wing of the army were on the general line Taneytown-Manchester. The cavalry divisions of Kilpatrick and Gregg were on the right flank of the army where they had been sent to seek *Stuart*. Kilpatrick was near Hanover at which place he encountered *Stuart* on the 30th and turned him eastward towards Hanover Junction. *Stuart* was encumbered by a large wagon train which he had captured and did not care to fight. Gregg was near Westminster.

Both armies were within a circular area, fifty miles in diameter whose center was Gettysburg.

Being still uncertain of the position of *Lee's* army, Meade directed his engineers to reconnoiter a line along Pipe Creek, which flows past Manchester and Taneytown, to which he might retire should any of his corps unexpectedly encounter the entire Confederate army.

On this same day, June 30, occurred the incident that led to the battle on the following day. *Heth's* division of *Hill's* corps encamped near Cashtown on June 29; the following day he sent *Pettigrew's* brigade into Gettysburg to procure supplies and particularly shoes. As *Pettigrew* drew near the town he saw the dust

made by Buford's cavalry as it moved into Gettysburg about noon on the Emmitsburg road. *Pettigrew* retired across Marsh Creek and reported to *Hill* that Union cavalry was at Gettysburg. Not wishing to lose this important road center, *Hill* decided to move into Gettysburg on the following day with his two divisions, and so notified *Ewell*. He directed *Heth* to take his whole division to Gettysburg in the morning and find out what Union force was there.

Buford, who had received instruction from Pleasonton to hold Gettysburg if possible, sent patrols out on all the roads radiating towards Hagerstown, Chambersburg, Carlisle, and York, and prepared his lines to resist an attack from the direction of Cash-town.

**Battle of July 1.**—A battle on July 1, was not desired by either army commander, since neither army was concentrated. *Lee* himself was at Fayetteville and did not cross the mountains until noon. He remained with *Longstreet* that morning until the rear divisions of *Hill* and *Ewell* had crossed the mountains and *Longstreet* himself began to move. He naturally wished to postpone a decisive engagement until his cavalry arrived. He rode to the field only on hearing the artillery fire at Gettysburg and arrived there towards the close of the battle.

Meade's headquarters were at Taneytown that morning and there he remained until night. He did not contemplate making a rapid advance that day. He expected his left wing to occupy Emmitsburg and Gettysburg that night and the four corps of his right wing to extend the general line through Two Taverns and Hanover to Manchester.

On the morning of July 1, *Heth* started with his four brigades and a battalion of artillery from the vicinity of Cashtown to march to Gettysburg and brush away the cavalry that *Pettigrew* had seen. As he began to cross Marsh Creek his advance-guard was fired on by a Union outpost; when he reached Herr Tavern (plate 28) he deployed a brigade on either side of the road and advanced.

While *A. P. Hill* was advancing from the west, Reynolds was advancing with a division of two brigades of the I corps from Marsh Run to join Buford. As Reynolds was not expecting to encounter the enemy, his other divisions were ordered to start an hour later. While still some distance from Gettysburg, Reynolds

received word from Buford that his cavalry division was about to be attacked. He hastened to Buford's support and sent word to his other divisions and to the XI corps to march to Gettysburg.

*Heth's* deployed brigades moved forward without great opposition until they crossed Willoughby Run a mile west of Gettysburg. Here they were met by Buford's main line of defense consisting of dismounted cavalry and a battery of horse artillery which was just being reinforced by Reynolds' two brigades. In this preliminary engagement *Heth's* two brigades were driven back across the run. Reynolds was killed and was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday in the command of his corps, and by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard in the command of the left wing. Howard ordered up the III corps. By Meade's orders, two of the six brigades of the III corps were left by Sickles at Emmitsburg until further orders.

Having developed more strength in the Union line than he had anticipated, and not knowing what forces lay behind Seminary Ridge which concealed the town of Gettysburg, the contest was not renewed by *Hill* until the afternoon of the 1st. *Pender's* division started from Cashtown an hour or more after *Heth's* and reached the field during the morning engagement.

*Ewell* received word from *Hill* that the latter was moving to Gettysburg when he himself was moving with *Rodes'* division from Heidlersburg towards Cashtown. When he reached the Carlisle-Gettysburg road, *Ewell* turned southward towards Gettysburg and reached its vicinity about noon. *Early*, who started from a point several miles east of Heidlersburg, turned at that town and moved on Gettysburg. He arrived in its vicinity about 2 p. m.

On the afternoon of July 1 (plate 28), the six brigades of the I corps were between Gettysburg and Willoughby Run extending southward from the Mummasburg road almost to the Fairfield road. One of Buford's cavalry brigades was on their left and rear. Four brigades of the XI corps were just north of the town extending from the Mummasburg road to the Heidlersburg road. One brigade of Buford's cavalry was on their right and rear. Two brigades of the XI corps were in reserve on Cemetery Hill, just south of the town.

In this position the ten brigades of the I and XI corps in the front line were attacked by the divisions of *Heth* and *Pender*,

8 brigades, who deployed along Willoughby Run between the Cashtown and Fairfield roads; by *Rodes'* division, 5 brigades, which came from Middletown and formed line astride the Mummasburg and Carlisle roads; and by *Early's* division, 4 brigades, which came from Heidlersburg and formed line astride the Heidlersburg road.

Although outflanked on both wings and attacked by a very superior force, the Union troops held their line until *Early's* division took by assault Barlow Knoll on which rested the right flank of the XI corps. This compelled that corps to fall back and uncovered the right flank of the I corps. Howard sent one of his reserve brigades to cover the retreat of the XI corps.

Both Union corps fell back through the town closely pursued by *Ewell's* two divisions and formed line on the remaining reserve brigade on Cemetery Hill. *Hill's* corps did not join in the pursuit but remained on Seminary Ridge.

The Confederate pursuit stopped at the town.

*Lee* reached the town of Gettysburg when *Ewell's* troops were in it and directed *Ewell* to take Cemetery Hill if he thought it advisable. *Ewell's* troops were much disorganized and he deemed it best to wait for his rear division which was momentarily expected from Cashtown. It did not however arrive in time to attack that day.

Meade first heard of the battle about 1 p. m. when he learned of the death of Reynolds, his most trusted corps commander. He knew that the I and XI corps were on the field, that all but two brigades of the III corps were marching there, and that the XII corps was within five miles of Gettysburg. He was uncertain as to the ultimate result of the battle and therefore could not decide where to order his concentration.

Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock, commanding the II corps, reached Taneytown with his corps about this time, and Meade sent him on to Gettysburg to investigate the situation. Hancock arrived as the Union troops were falling back to Cemetery Hill and assisted in forming a new line there. After this was formed, Hancock was convinced that a further retreat was unnecessary; he then sent a message to Meade advising him to concentrate at Gettysburg.

Meade at once sent word to the VI corps at Manchester, the V corps at Hanover, and the two brigades of the III corps at Em-

mitsburg to march to Gettysburg. The XII corps had already started from Two Taverns.

**Battle of July 2** (Plate 29).—On the night of July 1-2, *Lee* decided to renew the attack in the morning before the Union army was concentrated. He directed *Ewell*, whose three divisions were now on the field, to deploy on the right of *Hill* west of the town, and join *Longstreet*, who would be on the field next day with two divisions, in an attack on the Union left.

*Ewell* however persuaded *Lee* to allow his corps to remain where it was, assuring him that Culp Hill in his front was unoccupied and could be easily taken in the morning.

*Lee* therefore ordered the attack on the Union left to be made by *Longstreet* with the divisions of *McLaws*, *Hood*, and *Anderson*.

On the morning of July 2, *Ewell* informed *Lee* that the movements made by the Union troops during the night would prevent his occupation of Culp Hill. As it was then too late to move him, *Lee* directed him to attack where he was when he heard *Longstreet's* guns.

On the morning of July 2, the V corps was on the Hanover road northeast of Wolf Hill; the XII corps occupied Culp Hill and the ridge to the southeast; the I and XI corps occupied Cemetery Hill; the II corps occupied Cemetery Ridge; the III corps was east of Plum Run north of the Wheatfield Road. Meade's instructions were that the III corps should occupy Little Round Top and connect with the II corps. The VI corps was en route from Manchester by forced march.

During the morning, the V corps moved to the Rock Creek crossing of the Baltimore Pike and D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division took its place on the Hanover Road.

In the afternoon, Sickles without the knowledge of Meade, moved the III corps to the position shown on plate 29.

In the morning of July 2, *Ewell's* three divisions were in the positions shown on plate 29.

During the morning, *Hill's* three divisions shifted to the positions shown.

*Longstreet's* two divisions reached the positions shown on plate 29 sometime between 4 and 5 p. m.

*Longstreet's* attack began between 4 and 5 p. m. and the divisions of *Hood*, *McLaws* and *Anderson* enveloped the III corps and

forced it back behind Plum Run although it was reinforced in its advanced position by four brigades of the V corps and four of the II corps.

The Confederates were however unable to effect a lodgment east of Plum Run where the Union troops were reinforced by the remaining brigades of the V corps, the reserves from the right wing of the II corps, and detachments from the XII and VI corps.

*Ewell*, who was to attack at the same time as *Longstreet*, opened fire from Benner Ridge when he heard *Longstreet's* guns, but his artillery was soon overpowered by the Union guns on Cemetery and Culp hills.

His infantry divisions were separated into three groups by the town and by Rock Creek.

Two brigades of *Early's* division attacked Cemetery Hill about 6 p. m., and succeeded in entering the batteries. They were however soon driven out with great loss.

Three brigades of *Johnson's* division made an attack on the lines of the XII corps about sunset.

Five brigades of the XII corps had left the lines to go to the assistance of the III corps. Only the brigade on Culp Hill was in position to meet the attack. This brigade, later assisted by troops from Cemetery Hill, prevented *Johnson* from capturing Culp Hill but could not prevent the Confederates from occupying the Union trenches between Culp Hill and Rock Creek.

*Rodes'* division which was west of the town did not get in position until *Early's* attack had been repulsed. As an unsupported attack by his own division gave little promise of success, *Rodes* did not attack.

**July 3** (Plate 30).—On the morning of the 3d, *Pickett's* division arrived from Chambersburg where it had been relieved as train guard by *Imboden*. *Lee* decided to renew the battle on the 3d by attacking the Union center with the divisions of *Pickett*, *Heth*, *Pender*, and *Anderson*. *Ewell* was to strengthen *Johnson's* division from his right and center divisions and attack at the same time.

Gen. Meade had on this day all his troops save three brigades of cavalry. At a council of war on the night of July 2-3, it was decided to drive *Ewell's* troops out of the trenches of the XII corps, but otherwise to remain on the defensive. On the afternoon

and evening of the 2d, the Union line had been extended to the left to include two prominent hills three miles south of Gettysburg, Little and Big Round Top, so the flanks of the line were secure. Some of the brigades of the VI corps were distributed along the line as local reserves.

The positions of the opposing armies are shown on plate 30.

The battle began at daylight when the XII corps made an attack on *Johnson's* division, which had been reinforced by two brigades of *Rodes'* division. Before noon the XII corps recovered its lines. During this time the main Confederate assaulting column was assembling along Seminary Ridge to attack the center of the II corps posted just west of the Taneytown road and one mile south of Gettysburg.

At 1 p. m. the Confederate artillery opened on the Union lines with 138 guns; 71 guns replied to this bombardment. At 1:30 p. m. the Confederate infantry, 15,000 men from the division of *Heth, Pender, Pickett, and Anderson*, advanced in long lines which converged on the point of attack. The point of attack was a salient in the line formed by a low stone fence in rear of which was a part of the II corps. In moving to the attack, the Confederate infantry was obliged to advance about a half mile over open ground exposed to artillery fire, and climb the fences along the Emmitsburg road. Only a small body of men reached and carried the stone fence and these were captured or killed in its rear.

The survivors of the charge, leaving 19 regimental colors behind, drifted back to the Confederate line of guns in rear of which they reformed under the personal supervision of *Lee*.

**Cavalry.**—While the troops of *Longstreet* and *Hill* were attacking the Union center, *Stuart* with the brigades of *Hampton, Fitz Lee, Chambliss, and Jenkins* was endeavoring to reach the Union line of supply, the Baltimore Pike.

*Stuart* had reached Carlisle on July 2, and there learned that *Ewell* had gone to Gettysburg. After resting his command, he marched for Gettysburg which he reached on the morning of the 3d. At noon he was on the left flank of the Confederate army east of Rock Creek, between the York railroad and the Hanover road, and 2-1/2 miles east of Rock Creek.

In his front along the Hanover road near the Two Taverns

road was David McM. Gregg with the cavalry brigades of J. I. Gregg, McIntosh, and Custer.

In a very spirited encounter that afternoon in which both sides fought both mounted and on foot, *Stuart's* attack was repulsed and D. McM. Gregg remained in possession of the Hanover road.

While Gregg was protecting the right flank of the Union army, Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick with two brigades, Farnsworth and Merritt, was protecting its left flank. While *Pickett* was making his charge, Kilpatrick ordered Brig. Gen. Elon B. Farnsworth's brigade to attack *Hood's* division. The Confederate infantry being protected by stone walls and thick woods, the charge resulted only in the death of Farnsworth and a number of his men.

**July 4-14.**—On the night of July 3-4, *Ewell's* corps and *Stuart's* cavalry were withdrawn to the west of the Emmitsburg road, and on the following day *Lee* made his preparations to retreat to Hagerstown.

*Imboden* was directed to form a column of the prisoners, ambulances and the general supply train along the Cashtown road and conduct his column to Williamsport on the Potomac. His rear was to be protected by the cavalry brigades of *Fitz Lee* and *Hampton*.

*Stuart* with the brigades of *Chambliss* and *Jenkins* was to move to Emmitsburg and guard the road to Monterey Pass. Finding that Kilpatrick had preceded him, *Stuart* crossed the mountains south of Monterey Gap and went to Hagerstown.

The brigades of *Robertson* and *Jones* which reached Cashtown on the 3d, were to move through Fairfield to Monterey Gap and secure that point.

The three army corps were to retreat via Fairfield and Monterey Gap.

The movement began on the afternoon of July 4, in a severe storm that lasted several days and made the Potomac unfordable.

*Imboden* reached Williamsport on the 6th having lost some wagons near Greenville, where his column was attacked by some of Milroy's cavalry.

*Jones'* brigade encountered a regiment of Merritt's cavalry near Fairfield and was delayed by it so that he was unable to reach Monterey Gap in advance of the corps trains.

Kilpatrick, with the brigades of Custer and Farnsworth, moved



to Emmitsburg in advance of *Stuart* and turned off to Monterey Gap. He was thus enabled to capture 40 wagons of *Ewell's* train. With these he joined Buford at Boonsboro.

Buford's cavalry division marched from Westminster on the 4th, and on the 6th attacked *Imboden* at Williamsport. Reinforced by two infantry regiments that had escorted an ammunition train from Winchester, *Imboden* was able to repulse this attack. Buford retired to Boonsboro.

The VI corps started on the Fairfield road and pursued the Confederate army to Monterey Gap where it gave up the direct pursuit.

With these exceptions the retreat was unmolested and the Confederate army reached Hagerstown July 7, intact. Since *Lee* had no bridge train and as the bridge he had left over the river had been destroyed by a Union cavalry force from Frederick, Md., he was obliged to remain on the north side of the Potomac until a bridge could be constructed or the flood subsided. He therefore strongly intrenched his army along a ridge which is parallel to and west of the Hagerstown-Sharpsburg road and covered Williamsport and Falling Waters.

The other Union corps took up the pursuit on the 6th, as soon as Meade was convinced that *Lee* intended to fall back to the Potomac. They marched to Frederick, Md., and thence westward through the different passes to the Hagerstown-Sharpsburg road, along which they deployed on July 12.

On the night of July 12, Meade requested the opinion of his corps commanders as to the advisability of making an assault on the Confederate line. Remembering the fate of *Pickett's* charge, the majority voted against it.

The 13th was spent in examining *Lee's* lines for a weak spot. That night a bridge was completed by the Confederates at Falling Waters and the river reached its fording stage at Williamsport. *Lee* therefore began to cross the river; *Ewell* and *Stuart* at Williamsport, *Longstreet* and *Hill* at Falling Waters. The bridge broke during the night, and *Hill*, who crossed after *Longstreet* at this point, was not on the south bank until 1 p. m. the following day. *Heth's* division, which formed the rear-guard, lost several hundred men in covering the retreat to the bridge.

## OPPOSING FORCES IN GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.

*Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
I	Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson.....	2	—
John F. Reynolds	Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery, Col. Charles S. Wainwright		5
II	Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell.....	4	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John Gibbon.....	3	—
Winfield S. Hancock	Brig. Gen. Alexander Hayes.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery, Captain John G. Hazard..		5
III	Maj. Gen. David B. Birney.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys.....	3	—
Daniel E. Sickles	Corps Artillery, Capt. G. E. Randolph....		5
V	Brig. Gen. James Barnes.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.....	3	—
George Sykes	Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.....	2	—
	Corps Artillery, Captain A. P. Martin....		5
VI	Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Albion P. Howe.....	2	—
John Sedgwick	Maj. Gen. John Newton.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery, Col. Chas. H. Tompkins..		8
XI	Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow.....	2	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Adolf von Steinwehr.....	2	—
Oliver O. Howard	Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz.....	2	—
	Corps Artillery, Maj. Th. W. Osborn....		5
XII	Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John W. Geary.....	3	—
Henry W. Slocum	Corps Artillery, Lieut. Ew. D. Muhlenberg		4
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. John Buford.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg.....	3	1
Alfred Pleasonton	Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick.....	2	—
	Horse Artillery, Captain John C. Tidball..		5
Artillery Reserve,	Brig. Gen. Robert O. Tyler.....	5	24

*Army of the Northern Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee.*

I	Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws.....	4	4
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett.....	3	4
James Longstreet	Maj. Gen. John B. Hood.....	4	4
	Corps Artillery, Col. J. B. Watson.....	2	10

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
II Lieut. Gen. Richard S. Ewell	Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early . . . . .	4	4
	Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson . . . . .	4	4
	Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes . . . . .	5	4
	Corps Artillery, Col. J. T. Brown . . . . .	2	8
III Lieut. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill	Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson . . . . .	5	3
	Maj. Gen. Henry Heth . . . . .	4	4
	Maj. Gen. William D. Pender . . . . .	4	4
	Corps Artillery, Col. R. L. Walker . . . . .	2	9
Cavalry	Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart . . . . .	6	7
	Independent Cavalry, Brig. Gen. J. D. Im- boden . . . . .	1	1

**Comments.**—Like the campaign of Antietam, that of Gettysburg was a disappointment to the authorities of both the North and South. Meade was criticised for not destroying *Lee's* army at the Potomac and requested to be relieved. He was however induced to withdraw it.

Although he was not criticised by his superiors, *Lee* was so disappointed with the results that he too requested to be relieved.

While the plan of *Lee* involved great risks, the result showed that he was justified in believing he could carry the war into the enemy's country without sacrificing the safety of Richmond.

In his movement northward he erred only in yielding his own judgment as to the proper movement of his cavalry to that of its commander. Had *Stuart* carried out *Lee's* suggestion to cross above Harpers Ferry, he would have reached Frederick before the Union army and the course of the campaign would have been different.

*Hill's* movement to Gettysburg forced the battle on *Lee* before his army was concentrated. While it gave the Confederates a great advantage in the contest of July 1, they derived no benefit from it. The movement therefore proved a disadvantageous one for *Lee*.

The battle of July 1, was badly managed by the Confederate commanders. The Confederates had the advantage both of position and numbers and should have won a decisive victory over the I and XI corps. This would have been a serious blow to the Army of the Potomac.

On the night of July 1, *Lee* erred in not carrying out his original intention of moving *Ewell* to the right of *Hill*, where *Longstreet*

eventually deployed. He would then have been able to attack the left of the Union line with two corps instead of one, or, as *Longstreet* suggested, would have been able to maneuver Meade out of Gettysburg by threatening his communications. This maneuver was perfectly feasible, because the Fairfield and the Emmitsburg roads were both available for Confederate lines of communication and retreat.

*Ewell's* corps however tied *Lee's* army to Gettysburg and practically compelled him to attack on the third day if he desired to prevent Meade from assuming the offensive.

In moving from Frederick, it is apparent that Meade deployed too far to the east. *Lee* was not liable to cut himself entirely from communication with his base by deploying farther east than Gettysburg; it was more probable that he would maneuver towards Emmitsburg to shorten his line of communications. The VI corps at Taneytown would have been in a better position than at Manchester.

Strategically, Gettysburg was not a good point of concentration for the Union army operating against a Confederate army concentrated on the Cashtown and Fairfield roads. The army could be easily maneuvered out of position by a Confederate movement southward. As the valleys in this vicinity run north and south such a movement would not have been difficult. Meade felt the weakness of his position and was apprehensive for his communications.

Tactically, the position occupied by the Union army on the third day was very strong. It had no weak point along the line which could be assailed.

Meade has been criticised for not following up *Pickett's* repulse by a counter-attack. This criticism does not seem warranted. Meade had good reasons for believing that on July 3, *Lee's* army was numerically equal to if not stronger than his own. The I, XI, and III corps had been defeated on the preceding days. His dispositions for July 3 were therefore made with the sole idea of resisting an assault on any part of his line. At no part of the line had he a strong reserve of fresh troops. To organize a counter-attack would have taken time, and to make it without organization would have been hazardous. In this counter-attack his troops would have been obliged to attack a deployed line of 138 guns. We now know that the Confederate artillery was low in ammunition, but this was not known to Meade at the time.

He was also reproached for not attacking the Confederate lines near the Potomac. At *Spottsylvania* and *Cold Harbor*, a year later, such assaults were made and repulsed. It is by no means certain that Meade's army would have been successful had he attacked contrary to the advice of his most experienced corps commanders. Such a repulse would have impaired the moral effect of the victory at Gettysburg.

## BRISTOW AND MINE RUN CAMPAIGNS.

### PLATES 12, 13 and 14.

**July.**—About the 17th of July the Army of the Potomac began to cross the Potomac River at and near Harpers Ferry and moved into the Loudoun Valley of Virginia. Moving south in that valley it crossed the Manassas-Gap railroad between the Bull Run and Blue Ridge mountains and reached the Rappahannock River about the last of July.

The *Army of Northern Virginia* conformed to this movement by marching up the Shenandoah Valley, crossing the Blue Ridge at Front Royal, and moving to Culpeper.

**August.**—During the month of August both armies were stationary. In that month one division of the XI corps of the Army of the Potomac was sent to South Carolina to take part in the attack on Charleston and about 10,000 troops were temporarily detached to suppress the draft riots in New York.

**September.**—Early in September *Lee* detached *Longstreet's* corps. The divisions of *McLaws* and *Hood* were sent under *Longstreet* to reinforce *Bragg* in northern Georgia; *Pickett's* division went to Richmond to recruit and to replace troops sent from that department to South Carolina. *Lee* withdrew the corps of *Ewell* and *Hill* to the south bank of the Rapidan, where he took up a strong position along the river, with *Ewell* above and *Hill* below the railroad.

As soon as it was definitely ascertained that *Longstreet's* corps had been detached, Meade was urged to take the offensive. He crossed the Rappahannock September 16, and advanced to the Rapidan driving back the Confederate outposts north of that river. In the latter part of September the troops sent to New York were returned, but the XI and XII corps were ordered to

Chattanooga, Tennessee, where the Army of the Cumberland was being besieged by *Bragg*.

**October.**—On learning that the XI and XII corps had been detached, *Lee* decided to assume the offensive and accordingly concentrated his army near Madison Courthouse and moved against the right flank of the Union army. To protect his flank, Meade fell back to the Rappahannock. *Lee* then advanced on Warrenton, and Meade, pursued by the Confederate army, fell back behind Bull Run. *Lee* gave up the pursuit at this stream and returned to Culpeper destroying the railroad as he retired. The only infantry engagement during this campaign was a minor one at Bristow station between the Union rear-guard and the advance-guard of the *Army of Northern Virginia*.

**November and December.**—When *Lee* retired, Meade again advanced to Warrenton Junction, to which point the railroad was repaired by the 1st of November. He now proposed to move his army to Fredericksburg; this movement was disapproved by the authorities at Washington and he was advised to move against *Lee's* army. He once more crossed the Rappahannock to Culpeper and *Lee* fell back behind the Rapidan.

Not feeling able to force the crossing of the Rapidan, about the last of November Meade decided to turn *Lee's* right flank by crossing the Rapidan near Germanna Ford. He could then attack *Lee* by moving westward along the roads running to Orange Court House.

He succeeded in crossing the river with his five corps, but as his movement was discovered almost as soon as it was begun, the Confederate army was withdrawn from the Rapidan and marched to meet him. As soon as *Lee* ascertained that Meade was moving westward, and not towards Richmond or Fredericksburg, he took up a strong position behind *Mine Run*, a tributary of the Rapidan, which flows due north and intersects the roads on which Meade was advancing.

The Army of the Potomac deployed in front of this stream and the corps commanders sought for a weak point that could be attacked. Finding none, Meade, without attacking, quietly withdrew his army and returned to Culpeper where it went into winter quarters.

**Comments.**—In these campaigns, the Army of the Potomac numbered about 80,000 present for duty and the *Army of Northern Virginia* about 61,000 before *Longstreet* was detached, and 48,000 thereafter.

In the Bristow Campaign, Meade was outmaneuvered by his more daring and skilful adversary. Although he had a numerical superiority of eight to five, he retreated about forty miles and permitted his adversary to destroy the railroad which it took a month to repair.

In the Mine Run Campaign, Meade's flank movement was successfully executed, but, as it was discovered by the Confederates as soon as begun, it was impossible for him to surprise *Lee*. Since *Lee* had deployed and intrenched his whole army along Mine Run and was hoping that Meade would attack, it was probably wise that he did not do so.

Meade was handicapped throughout these campaigns by the feeling that he was operating along a false line. He wanted to move to the Fredericksburg line, but was forbidden to do so. He could see no advantage in advancing on Gordonsville, which would only prolong his line of communications and weaken his position. He was certain that *Lee* would accept battle only in a position advantageous to himself. Along the Fredericksburg route, his communications would be shorter and he would be nearer Richmond.

## OPERATIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA IN 1863.

### PLATE 2.

At the close of the operations in November, 1862, there were in the District of West Virginia four divisions. Between Clarksburg and Beverly was the division of Brig. Gen. Robert L. Milroy; along the railroad from Harpers Ferry to Grafton, the railroad division of Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Kelley; north of the Kanawha near Gauley, the division of Brig. Gen. George Crook; south of the Kanawha near Fayetteville, the division of Brig. Gen. E. Parker Scammon.

Towards the end of 1862, Maj. Gen. Robert C. Schenck was assigned to the command of the Middle Department and to the protection of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as far west as the Ohio River. This brought Kelley's division under his command.

A reported advance of *Jackson* from Winchester in November, 1862, led to Kelley's being reinforced by the division of Milroy, who was moved eastward to the vicinity of Cumberland, and in January, 1863, to Romney, and later to Winchester, Va.

In January, Crook's division was sent to Louisville, Ky., to join Granger's corps.

As this left but Scammon's division in the district, the District of West Virginia was abolished and in March that State was added to the Middle Department.

**April.**—About the 1st of April, Kelley's division was on the railroad between Cumberland and Harpers Ferry; it consisted of six brigades. Milroy's division was at Winchester. The railroad from Cumberland to the Ohio was guarded by a single brigade which had an advanced post of one regiment and some cavalry at Beverly.

This condition of affairs being known to the Confederates, a raid on the railroad west of Cumberland was made during the months of April and May.

**Jones' and Imboden's Raid** (Plate 2).—From the vicinity of Harrisonburg, Va., Brig. Gen. *Wm. E. Jones*, who commanded a brigade of *Stuart's* cavalry as well as the *Valley District*, started on April 20, to march via Mt. Jackson, Petersburg, and the Northwestern Turnpike to attack the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between Oakland, Md., and Rowlesburg, W. Va.

From the vicinity of Monterey, Va., Brig. Gen. *John D. Imboden* started at the same time with a mixed brigade of 3,500 men, only 700 of whom were mounted, to capture Beverly, W. Va., and unite with *Jones* in the vicinity of Grafton or Clarksburg.

*Jones* carried out his part of the program and destroyed railroad bridges between Rowlesburg and the Alleghany Mountains. He then crossed the railroad and moved northward as far as Morgantown, W. Va., threatening Wheeling, W. Va., and Pittsburg, Pa. Returning along the Monongahela, he destroyed the railroad bridge at Fairmont and united with *Imboden* at Weston. The latter had captured Beverly and Buckhannon, but had been unable to reach the railroad.

**May.**—Kelley having pushed a large force westward to Grafton and Clarksburg, the Confederate commanders were not only unable to attack either of these stations, but were afraid of being



attacked by overwhelming numbers. It was therefore decided that *Jones*, whose command could move rapidly, should attack the railroad between West Union and Parkersburg while *Imboden* moved south to Summerville, collecting supplies en route. The two commands were to unite at Summerville, and if possible attack Gauley Bridge.

The first part of this program was carried out, but from Summerville, *Jones* and *Imboden* returned to the Shenandoah Valley without attacking Gauley.

The entire operations lasted just a month. Besides destroying numerous railroad bridges, and collecting supplies and cattle, the raid greatly alarmed the people of western Pennsylvania and West Virginia.

**June.**—When *Lee's* army crossed the Potomac on its way to Gettysburg the Middle Department was subdivided: Maryland, west of the Allegheny Mountains, and West Virginia became the Department of West Virginia under Kelley, who was also charged with the defense of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad west of Harpers Ferry. He had two divisions on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, one division on the Kanawha, and one division between the railroad and the river.

While *Lee* was north of the Potomac, Kelley was directed to operate against the Confederate communications, but was unable to accomplish anything of importance.

**November.**—On November 1, a mixed brigade under Brig. Gen. Wm. W. Averell started from Beverly, W. Va., and another on the 3d under Brig. Gen. A. N. Duffié from Charleston, W. Va., to unite at Lewisburg and attack the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad.

On the 6th of November, Averell's brigade met and defeated a mixed Confederate brigade under Brig. Gen. *John Echols*, about twenty miles north of Lewisburg. The following day the two Union brigades entered Lewisburg. On account of the condition of the troops, the expedition was here terminated and the two brigades returned to their stations.

While Averell was engaged in this raid, the main body of the Confederate troops in the *Department of Western Virginia* was in the extreme western part of the State engaged in a campaign against Knoxville in east Tennessee.

## OPERATIONS ALONG THE ATLANTIC COAST.

## PLATE 2.

**Department of Virginia.**—At the beginning of the year the Union troops in the Department of Virginia, commanded by Maj. Gen. John A. Dix, were holding Yorktown and Fort Monroe north of the James River, and Suffolk and Norfolk south of it. They numbered about 10,000 present for duty. A division of 12,000 men had been sent to North Carolina in the last days of 1862.

**February and March.**—In February, the IX corps was brought from Fredericksburg to Fort Monroe en route for North Carolina, where Burnside was to assume command. This movement had been observed by Confederate spies, and the divisions of *Hood* and *Pickett* of *Longstreet's* corps were sent to southern Virginia to meet a possible advance on Richmond either from Yorktown or Suffolk. *Longstreet's* arrival at Petersburg led to the reinforcement of the garrison at Suffolk by one division of the IX corps.

At this time President Lincoln decided to send Burnside to Kentucky. Two divisions of the IX corps were therefore sent from *Fort Monroe* to Washington en route for the West. The third division remained at Suffolk.

*Longstreet* with his divisions moved to Zuni on the Blackwater River, and a division of Confederate troops from North Carolina moved to Franklin. *Longstreet* found the town of Suffolk so strongly intrenched that after a preliminary assault he deemed it inadvisable to attack that place. He contented himself with investing it on the west side, while he foraged the region east of the Blackwater for supplies.

## OPPOSING FORCES AT SUFFOLK, VIRGINIA.

		<i>Union.</i>			
Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.	
	Brig. Gen. Michael Corcoran, VII corps. . . . .	3	-	-	
	Brig. Gen. George W. Getty, IX corps. . . . .	3	-	2	
Maj. Gen. John J. Peck	Colonel Wm. Gurney, VII corps. . . . .	3	-	-	
	Unassigned. . . . .	-	1	8	
<i>Confederate.</i>					
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett. . . . .	4	-	3	
James Longstreet	Maj. Gen. John B. Hood. . . . .	4	-	3	
	Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French (N.C.)	2	1	5	

**April.**—During the month of April there were 30,000 Union troops in this department. One division was on the Peninsula and three at Suffolk.

**May.**—After the battle of Chancellorsville, *Longstreet* withdrew from Suffolk and one division of the Union troops was transferred to the Peninsula; one of the divisions on the Peninsula advanced from Yorktown to West Point, but was withdrawn from this advanced position on May 31.

**June.**—On June 14, when *Ewell* reached the Potomac and it was certain that *Lee* was moving into Maryland, Dix was directed to concentrate his troops on the Peninsula, destroy the railroad bridges over the North and South Anna rivers, and if practicable, attack Richmond. Dix concentrated a force of 20,000 men at White House on the Pamunkey. At a council of war it was decided not to attack Richmond but to operate against the railroads.

A division of about 10,000 men under Brig. Gen. George W. Getty was accordingly sent up the north bank of the Pamunkey to destroy the railroad bridges, while a second division of 6,000 men advanced to the Chickahominy to make a diversion in his favor.

The total Confederate force covering Richmond was at this time about 10,000 men; Maj. Gen. *D. H. Hill* who was in command of Virginia and North Carolina had however made provision to bring to its protection if necessary a large force from North Carolina.

The first division found the railroad bridge over the South Anna protected by an intrenched Confederate brigade whose strength was estimated at 8,000 men and did not attack. It destroyed the smaller railroad bridges between the South Anna and the Chickahominy and returned to White House. The second division encountered two brigades under *D. H. Hill* and failed to reach the Chickahominy.

**July.**—As it was evident that nothing important would be accomplished by the troops in this department, about July 9, 20,000 of its troops were ordered to Washington. North of the James River, the remaining troops were withdrawn to Yorktown; south of the James, Suffolk was abandoned and the troops were withdrawn to the vicinity of Norfolk.

The department was then consolidated with that of North Carolina and Maj. Gen. John G. Foster was assigned to the command of both.

**August to December.**—During the remainder of the year nothing important was accomplished. About the end of November there were 27,000 men present for duty in the two departments, of whom 20,000 were in Virginia.

**Department of North Carolina** (Plate 5).—At the close of 1862 about 12,000 troops were ordered from the Department of Virginia to the Department of North Carolina increasing the force in the latter department to about 24,000. Towards the end of January, a force of about 12,000 men was assembled at Beaufort, N. C., to assist in a joint land and naval attack on the defenses of Wilmington, N. C.

Before this expedition was ready to move, the authorities at Washington decided to attack Charleston, S. C., instead of Wilmington, and 10,000 men were sent to Port Royal, S. C. This so reduced the force in North Carolina that it was compelled to remain on the defensive and engaged in unimportant raiding operations. In June the force was still further reduced by the discharge of 5,000 men whose enlistment had expired.

In the latter half of the year the force numbered only about 7,000 men and the department was combined with that of Southeast Virginia as stated above. The line held by the Union troops ran from Plymouth on the Roanoke River, through Washington on the Pamlico River, through Newbern on the Neuse River, to Beaufort on the coast.

At the opening of 1863, the Confederate *Department of North Carolina* had nearly 28,000 present for duty. A strong division was at Wilmington, N. C., a corps in the vicinity of Goldsboro, N. C., and a brigade at Petersburg, Va.

When *Longstreet* with his two divisions reached Petersburg early in March, he took command of this department; the total force, including *Longstreet's* divisions, was 44,000. Of these 20,000 were on the Blackwater in Virginia, 11,000 at Goldsboro, N. C., and the remainder at Richmond and Wilmington.

On June 30, when *Lee* was in Pennsylvania, Gen. *D. H. Hill* was left with 28,000 men in this department to cover Richmond and hold the line through North Carolina. At the close of the

year the department was under Maj. Gen. *George E. Pickett* who had 17,000 men; of these 6,000 were at Wilmington, N. C.

**Department of South Carolina** (Plate 5).—The result of the *Monitor-Merimac* combat in Hampton Roads led to the reinforcement of the Union navy by a number of monitors and an iron-clad battleship. The civil officers of the Navy Department had great faith in these vessels and conceived the idea of destroying *Fort Sumter*, Charleston Harbor, by naval bombardment. Having destroyed *Fort Sumter*, the fleet would move into Charleston Harbor itself and land an army corps, as Farragut had done at New Orleans.

**Operations Against Charleston.**—The operations against Charleston were assigned to Admiral Dupont and Maj. Gen. David Hunter. The latter returned to the Department of the South in January, 1863, and was reinforced by 10,000 men from the Department of North Carolina; this gave him a force of 20,000 men.

The channel entrance to Charleston is a mile wide and is limited on the north by Sullivan Island and on the south by *Fort Sumter*. The city is three and a half miles inside the fort.

At the beginning of 1863 the defenses consisted of *Fort Moultrie* and a number of batteries on Sullivan Island, in all 48 guns; *Fort Sumter*, an inclosed masonry fort with two tiers of casemates and a barbette battery in which were 37 guns; *Battery Gregg*, at the northern end of Morris Island, which had 3 guns. The harbor entrance was thus defended by 88 guns, but all of them were not of high power.

Across the entrance, just in rear of *Fort Sumter*, was a floating obstruction, with a two-hundred foot free entrance near *Fort Sumter*. In rear of this line were a number of old and unimportant works.

**April.**—Dupont's fleet as finally assembled about the 1st of April consisted of eight monitors and one ironclad battleship.

On the afternoon of April 7, the fleet attempted to force the entrance to the harbor, but was unable to pass the line of obstructions. The monitors were unable to silence the guns either on Sullivan Island or at *Fort Sumter*, and were obliged to withdraw from the contest after less than an hour's engagement. At

a council of war that evening, it was decided that under existing conditions it would be impossible to capture the city. Before it could be done, *Fort Sumter* must be silenced and the obstructions must be removed. The land force which was waiting in transports to occupy Charleston returned to Port Royal.

The repulse was a great disappointment to the authorities at Washington who believed that the task of the navy would be an easy one. To their relief, Gillmore, who had reduced *Fort Pulaski* the preceding year, offered to reduce *Fort Sumter* in a similar manner.

**June.**—In the month of June, Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore relieved Hunter of the command of the Department of the South, and about the same time Admiral John A. Dahlgren relieved Dupont. To these new officers was assigned the task of capturing Charleston.

Gillmore's plan was to obtain a footing on the south end of Morris Island, three and a half miles from *Battery Gregg*, and make himself master of that island. By establishing heavy batteries on the island, he expected to reduce *Fort Sumter* to ruins. The principal land defense of Morris Island consisted of an isolated redout, *Fort Wagner*, which extended entirely across a narrow part of the island one mile south of *Battery Gregg*. This work was a mile and a half from *Fort Sumter*. Additional batteries, to protect Morris Island from landing parties from Folly Island just below it on the coast, had been planned but had not been completed when operations began.

**July.**—On July 10, a Union brigade under Brig. Gen. George C. Strong made a descent on Morris Island from Folly Island, a quarter of a mile distant, and drove the Confederate force on the southern part of the island into *Fort Wagner*.

The following morning Strong made a daylight assault on the fort, which was repulsed. In the two and a half Union regiments actually engaged, the casualties were 339 men. The garrison of the fort numbered about 1,200 men; its casualties were only 12 men.

Siege batteries were now installed about three-fourths of a mile from the fort and on July 18, *Fort Wagner* was bombarded by twenty-six rifled siege guns and ten siege mortars. At dusk an assault was made by two brigades. The Union troops succeeded

in entering the works, but receiving no timely support were driven out. The casualties in the ten regiments making the assault were over 1,500 men. The assault was led by a colored regiment, 54th Massachusetts, which lost 25% of its strength. The casualties of the defenders were about 200 men. Strong was mortally wounded in leading this assault.

In all these attacks the land troops were assisted by the fleet which bombarded *Fort Wagner* from the sea.

**August and September.**—Not being able to take *Fort Wagner* by assault, Gillmore resorted to regular siege. On September 6, his approaches had reached the ditch of the work and an assault was ordered for the following day. On the night of the 6th however the Confederates evacuated *Morris Island*.

While the siege was in progress, Gillmore constructed batteries of seacoast guns on *Morris Island* at a distance of two to two and a half miles from *Fort Sumter*. These were armed with nine 100-pounder and four 200-pounder Parrott rifled guns, more powerful than any in the service when the position of *Fort Wagner* was fixed. With these guns Gillmore was able to reach *Fort Sumter* and destroy its exposed walls.

Fire was opened from these batteries on August 17, and kept up for one week. This bombardment destroyed the artillery power of *Fort Sumter*, but *Beauregard* decided to hold it defensively to the last extremity. Since the guns were all disabled, the artillery garrison was withdrawn and replaced by infantry.

On the night of September 8, Dahlgren sent a boat party of about 400 men to capture *Fort Sumter* by surprise. The attacking party, after losing 125 men, was compelled to withdraw. This was the last effort made by the navy.

**October to December.**—*Fort Wagner* and *Battery Gregg* were now equipped by Gillmore with artillery for the further attack of *Fort Sumter*, and the fire on that work was continued irregularly until December 6.

At the close of the year, the Confederate infantry still held *Fort Sumter*; the line of obstructions was unimpaired; and in rear of the fort, on the south shore, there were powerful batteries which were constructed by the Confederate engineers as soon as it was felt that the offensive power of *Fort Sumter* would be destroyed by the Union batteries.

While Gillmore was in command of this department in the last half of the year, the strength of the forces varied from 16,000 when he took command to 27,000 in December.

The defense of Charleston was conducted by *Beauregard*, who was assigned to the command of the *Department of South Carolina and Georgia* September 24, 1862. The entire force in his department varied from 20,000 in June to 27,000 in December. One-fourth to one-third of the troops were in the States of Georgia and Florida.

*Union Force on Morris Island, August 31, 1863.*

*Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry . . . . .	5	11

The Confederate garrisons of Forts Sumter and Wagner were changed every few days.

*Assault on Fort Wagner, June 11.*

*Brig. Gen. George C. Strong.*

	Union.	Confederate.
Strength . . . . .	5 regiments	4 regiments
Casualties . . . . .	339	12

*Assault on Fort Wagner, July 18.*

*Brig. Gen. George C. Strong.*

	Union.	Confederate
Strength . . . . .	10 regiments	3½ regiments 1 battery
Casualties . . . . .	1515	181

**Comments.**—The attack on Charleston Harbor was originally based on the erroneous hypothesis that the monitor fleet could easily reduce *Fort Sumter*. Dupont was by no means so confident of victory as were the civil officials of the Navy Department.

The operations of Gillmore were based on the hypothesis that were the artillery power of *Fort Sumter* destroyed, the navy could easily remove the obstructions and move against the city.

The artillery power of the fort was destroyed by August 25, and two weeks later Morris Island was evacuated by the Confederate troops.

Had a determined effort been now made by a combined land and naval force, the infantry garrison of *Fort Sumter*, consisting of only 300 men, could have been overpowered and the fort taken. From the fort as a base, the obstructions could have been destroyed by night operations sufficiently to allow the monitors to take a position inside of *Fort Sumter*.



Here they would have taken the Confederate line of land defenses on James Island in rear, and the army could have taken possession of that island and the city itself.

The failure to capture *Fort Sumter* saved the city.

The obstruction which protected the city when the fleet made its first attack, consisted of three cables in a vertical plane ratlined together like the shrouds of a ship. They were supported by buoys and held in place by anchors. To the cables were attached long, streaming ropes which were to foul the propellers of attacking ships. At a later period two parallel floating cables with streaming ropes were employed. Submarine mines were also extensively utilized to protect the harbor.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS IN THE WEST IN 1863.

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- The principal operations in the West in 1863 were:
- January . . . Capture of Arkansas Post, Ark.
  - February . . . Van Dorn's movement into Tennessee.
  - March . . . . . Movement of IX corps to Kentucky.  
Engagement at Spring Hill, Tenn.
  - April . . . . . Raids by Van Dorn and Wheeler in Tenn.  
Yazoo Pass expedition in Mississippi and attack on Fort Pemberton, Miss.  
Grierson's raid in Mississippi.
  - May . . . . . Vicksburg Campaign including engagements of Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion Hill and the assault.  
Investment and first assault on Port Hudson, La.
  - June . . . . . Tullahoma Campaign, Tenn.  
Sander's raid in east Tennessee.  
Siege of Vicksburg, Miss., and Port Hudson, La.  
Walker's attack on Youngs Point and Milliken Bend.
  - July . . . . . Morgan's Ohio Raid.  
Capture of Vicksburg and Jackson, Miss., and Port Hudson, La.  
Attack on Helena, Ark.
  - August . . . . . Forward movements of the armies of the Ohio and of the Cumberland.
  - September . . Capture of Knoxville, Tenn.  
Battle of Chickamauga, Ga.  
Investment of Chattanooga, Tenn.  
Capture of Little Rock, Ark.  
Sabine Pass expedition.
  - October . . . . Minor engagements around Knoxville and Chattanooga, Tenn.  
Raids of Wheeler and Roddey in Tennessee.
  - November . . . Assault of Fort Sanders, Knoxville.  
Battle of Chattanooga including Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge.  
Capture of Brownsville, Texas.
  - December . . . Relief of Knoxville, Tenn.

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE WEST  
JANUARY 1, 1863.

PLATES 1, 3, 4 and 8.

**Confederate.**—On December 31, 1862, the strength of the Confederate troops in the West, present for duty, was approximately as follows:

Department of East Tennessee, Lieut. Gen. E. Kirby Smith.....	7,000
Army of Tennessee, Gen. Braxton Bragg.....	51,000
Maj. Gen. N. Bedford Forrest.....	2,500
District of the Gulf, Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner.....	7,500
Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, Lieut. Gen. John C. Pemberton.....	39,000
Trans-Mississippi Department, Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes (estimated).....	29,000
	135,000
Total present.....	150,000

In east Tennessee the troops were occupying Cumberland Gap and Knoxville.

The *Army of Tennessee* was at Murfreesboro, Tenn., where the battle of Murfreesboro was being fought.

*Forrest* was on a raid in west Tennessee destroying the railroads.

The troops of the *District of the Gulf* were at Mobile, Ala.

In the *Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana* the troops were principally at Grenada and Vicksburg, Miss., and at Port Hudson, La.

In the *Trans-Mississippi Department* there were the districts of Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas.

In the *District of Arkansas*, Maj. Gen. *Thomas C. Hindman* was in the western part of the State with 8,000 men, a division of 5,000 men was at the State capital, Little Rock, and a division of 6,500 men under Brig. Gen. *Thomas J. Churchill* was at Arkansas Post near the mouth of the Arkansas River.

In the *District of Louisiana*, there were 3,500 men under Maj. Gen. *Richard Taylor*.

In the *District of Texas*, there were 6,000 men under Maj. Gen. *John B. Magruder*.

**Union.**—The strength of the Union troops present for duty at the same time was approximately as follows:

Department of the Ohio, Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright . . . . .	35,000
Department of the Cumberland, Maj. Gen. Wm. S. Rosecrans . . . . .	65,000
Department of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant . . . . .	76,000
Department of the Missouri, Maj. Gen. Samuel M. Curtis . . . . .	46,000
Department of the Gulf, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks . . . . .	31,000
Total . . . . .	253,000
Total present . . . . .	295,000

The Department of the Ohio comprised the States of West Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Michigan. In the table, the troops in the District of West Virginia are omitted. Of the remaining troops about 30,000 were in Kentucky.

The Department of the Cumberland comprised the State of Tennessee east of the Tennessee River; its troops formed the Army of the Cumberland which was at this time at Murfreesboro and Nashville, Tenn.

The Department of the Tennessee comprised the State of Tennessee west of the Tennessee River and Northern Mississippi. Its troops formed the Army of the Tennessee. At this time Sherman's army, made up of troops from the Departments of the Tennessee and the Missouri, was at Vicksburg, and the remaining troops of the department were in northern Mississippi under Gen. Grant.

The Department of the Missouri comprised the States of Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, and Indian Territory. Its headquarters were at St. Louis. Of the troops in the department, about 10,000 formed the Army of the Frontier then near Van Buren, Ark.; 8,000 were at Helena, Ark., or with Gen. Sherman; and 5,000 formed the Army of Southeast Missouri.

The Department of the Gulf comprised the Gulf Coast from Pensacola to the Rio Grande. The troops were principally in Louisiana occupying New Orleans with its adjacent territory and Baton Rouge.

## OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI.

### PLATES 3, 4 and 7.

**January.**—On January 1, 1863, the situation in the Department of the Tennessee was as follows:

Gen. Grant was in command of about 75,000 men present for duty.

Of these, two corps, the XIII and XV, were at Vicksburg under Maj. Gen. Wm. T. Sherman who had just been repulsed at Chickasaw Bluffs. The XVI corps under Maj. Gen. Stephen

Hurlbut and the XVII under Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson were along the southern border of Tennessee, having just returned from the overland advance on Grenada. Besides these four corps, Grant had strong detachments at various points on the railroads connecting Corinth and Grand Junction with Columbus, Ky.

Having decided to abandon his base at Columbus and draw supplies from Memphis, his engineers were engaged in repairing the Memphis-Corinth railroad.

Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand was en route to Vicksburg where he was about to assume command of the XIII and XV corps.

Grant established his headquarters at Memphis January 10, and on January 12, was authorized to assume command of operations against Vicksburg in person.

Early in January, McClernand took his two corps up the Arkansas River to attack Arkansas Post.\* At the close of these operations he debarked his corps at Napoleon, Ark., at the mouth of the Arkansas River. The XIII and XV corps were now ordered by Grant to encamp on the west bank of the Mississippi as close as possible to Vicksburg.

Sherman with the XV corps encamped at Young Point, across the river from Vicksburg, and his troops resumed work on the canal through the peninsula opposite the town, which had been begun by Williams' brigade in June, 1862. McClernand with the XIII corps encamped at Milliken Bend, twenty miles above (Plate 26).

The authorities at Washington strongly approved the canal project; it was thought that the canal would enable the gunboats and transports to avoid the Vicksburg batteries in navigating the Mississippi River.

Grant visited Sherman's corps at Young Point on January 30, and was at once impressed by the slight probability of making the canal navigable. He therefore began to study other possible routes by which he could reach the land front of Vicksburg, the only front admitting of attack.

## THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

### PLATES 7 and 26.

**February-March.**—On February 1, the Mississippi River was at flood stage and so remained for two months. At this stage the

\*See p. 242.

backwater flooded the roads connecting Milliken Bend above Vicksburg with Carthage below, making them impassable for troops.

The only way Grant could operate by land was to return to Memphis and advance again on Grenada. He feared the moral effect of such a retrograde movement, and determined to utilize if possible the water routes by which he could land his army either on the east bank of the Yazoo above Vicksburg, or on the east bank of the Mississippi River below that town.

**Yazoo Pass.**—Nearly opposite Helena, Ark., there had formerly been a canal called Yazoo Pass which connected the Mississippi with one of the tributaries of the Yazoo. Its outlet was closed by the levee of the Mississippi. By opening the levee and letting the flood waters of the Mississippi through the canal, a water route could be opened to Snyder Bluff, the right flank of the Vicksburg defenses. This route was opened in February and two Union divisions went down in transports as far as the mouth of the Yalabusha River.

This operation took some time and was immediately discovered by the Confederates who closed the Yazoo at the Yalabusha by constructing a strong work, *Fort Pemberton*, on its banks.

Finding it impossible to advance, and fearing this interior route would soon be closed by the falling of the waters in the Mississippi River, the Union troops returned to Helena early in April.

**Steele Bayou.**—To reach the Yazoo below *Fort Pemberton*, an attempt was made to navigate the network of streams between the Mississippi and Yazoo just above their junction. This was the Steele Bayou route. While found navigable for small vessels, this route was too shoal for large steamers and was also abandoned.

**Lake Providence.**—In northeast Louisiana is Lake Providence, which is connected with the Red River by a network of streams and is separated from the Mississippi River by a levee. By cutting the levee and letting the flood waters into Lake Providence, it was thought this route might be made available for transports. The troops under Grant and those under Banks might then be united on the Red River and operate either against Port Hudson or against Vicksburg. Work on this route was begun but not completed.

While none of these routes was found practicable, they served to keep the troops employed during the months of February and March and to restrain the impatience of the country.

While Grant was engaged in testing these various routes with the aid of Admiral David D. Porter's gunboats, the river fleet made a trial of the Vicksburg batteries.

On February 2, Colonel Charles R. Ellet safely ran the batteries with one of his rams in broad daylight. Two weeks later a gunboat ran them safely at night. Both were however captured by the Confederates in the river below before the end of the month.

To hold the river between Port Hudson and Vicksburg, in March, Farragut ran the batteries of Port Hudson with two ships from New Orleans. Two Union rams were sent down from above Vicksburg to join him; one of these reached him in safety.

Both Grant and Porter were now convinced that gunboats and transports could run the Vicksburg batteries without excessive loss. Grant therefore decided to wait for the floods to subside and march his troops overland to New Carthage where the fleet was to join him. He would then cross to Grand Gulf or to some other point below Vicksburg.

**April** (Plate 26).—About the 1st of April the road running southward from Milliken Bend became passable and McClernand started a division for New Carthage. As it was necessary to bridge many wide bayous with improvised material, it was the middle of April before the division was assembled near New Carthage.

On the night of April 16, Porter ran the batteries of Vicksburg with a fleet consisting of seven ironclad gunboats, an ironclad ram, three ordinary steamboats and a number of flatboats.

Grant was now assured of the success of his plan and his troops were hurried forward to New Carthage. From that point they were either marched or transported by water to Hard Times, a few miles above Grand Gulf. As soon as McClernand's troops evacuated Milliken Bend, McPherson's XVII corps was landed at that point and followed McClernand.

On April 22, six additional steamers with barges ran the Vicksburg batteries.

It was first thought that the navy could reduce the two Confederate batteries at Grand Gulf, but on the 29th the fleet was repulsed. The troops then moved by land to a point below Grand Gulf and the fleet ran the batteries.

On April 30, four divisions of the XIII corps and one of the XVII were landed on the east bank of the Mississippi at Bruins-

burg. Sherman's corps remained opposite Vicksburg, and on the 29th one division was transported up the Yazoo to make a demonstration at Chickasaw Bluffs.

**Confederate Operations to May 1.**—During the months of January and February of 1862 the Confederate troops under *Pemberton* underwent a thorough reorganization.

**February.**—Most of the cavalry in Mississippi was organized into a cavalry division of about 6,000 men under *Van Dorn* and on February 16, crossed the Tennessee River at Florence to join *Bragg* in Tennessee.

At Grenada there remained but a single infantry division under Maj. Gen. *Wm. W. Loring*, who had joined the army from southwest Virginia.

The Vicksburg defenses were extended from Snyder Bluff twelve miles above Vicksburg to Warrenton six miles below, and were defended by the divisions of Maj. Gens. *Carter L. Stevenson*, *Martin L. Smith*, and *John H. Forney*.

At Jackson there was a division under Maj. Gen. *John S. Bowen*.

**April.**—When, early in April, the Union expedition down the Yazoo was abandoned, *Loring* left a small garrison in *Fort Pemberton* and a brigade at Grenada, and took his two remaining brigades to Jackson. Two small mixed brigades with headquarters at Panola and Columbus guarded the northern part of Mississippi.

*Bowen's* division was sent from Jackson to Grand Gulf below Vicksburg to construct batteries to defend the river. One of these brigades crossed to the west bank of the river to observe and delay the movement of the Union troops. This brigade recrossed the river when Porter's fleet ran the batteries.

On April 12, *Pemberton* was convinced that Grant had abandoned his advance on Vicksburg and was sending troops to Rosecrans in middle Tennessee. He therefore notified *J. E. Johnston* that he would send 8,000 men from Vicksburg to *Bragg* to replace *Stevenson's* division which *Bragg* had sent him in December.

This movement was actually under way and some of the troops had reached Georgia when the passage of the batteries by Porter's fleet caused *Pemberton* to stop the movement and recall his troops.



**May.**—On the 1st of May, Grant's field army on the Mississippi consisted of ten divisions of 5,000 men each present for duty. Of these, five divisions were on the east bank of the Mississippi below Vicksburg, and two were on the west bank of the river ready to cross. Sherman's three divisions were on the road between Young Point and Milliken Bend; they could not reach Grant before the night of May 6. (For organization see p. 201.)

At this time, *Pemberton*, whose headquarters were at Jackson, Miss., commanded an equal force but it was widely scattered.

In the vicinity of Port Gibson and Grand Gulf were the two brigades of *Bowen*; two additional brigades were marching from Vicksburg to reinforce him. Between Snyder Bluff and Warrenton were seven brigades under *Stevenson*, *M. L. Smith*, and *Forney*. *Loring*, who had been obliged to meet a cavalry raid in eastern Mississippi, had one brigade at Grenada, one at Jackson, and one at Meridian. These fourteen brigades, numbering 30,000 men, could be concentrated in time to meet Grant.

As reserves, there were about 5,000 men at *Fort Pemberton* and in northern Mississippi, and 15,000 at Port Hudson. (For organization see p. 201.)

**Investment of Vicksburg.**—On May 1, the Union troops advanced on Port Gibson and dislodged *Bowen*, who occupied a position west of that town. The Confederates retreated across Bayou Pierre and destroyed the bridges.

On the 2d, the Union troops occupied Port Gibson. On the 3d, they crossed Bayou Pierre and advanced to Hankinson Ferry on the Big Black River, behind which *Bowen* had retreated the preceding day. Here Grant halted *McClermand* and *McPherson* to await the arrival of Sherman.

Two divisions of the latter crossed from Hard Times to Grand Gulf on the night of the 6th and the morning of the 7th. Blair's division of the XV corps and a brigade of the XVII corps, left to guard the road between Milliken Bend and Hard Times, did not cross until the 10th.

While Sherman was moving up to join him, Grant decided upon his plan of operations. Instead of attempting to force the crossings of the Big Black River he determined to move up the east side of that river to the railroad and thus threaten Vicksburg from the rear.

When the Union army landed on the east bank of the Mississippi River, *Pemberton*, who had until then been quite confident that Vicksburg would never be taken, realized the seriousness of the situation. He ordered Maj. Gen. *Franklin Gardner* to send him two brigades from Port Hudson and called on President *Davis* to send him reinforcements from other departments. In the mean time he ordered *Loring's* division to Vicksburg to assist in the defense of the Big Black River.]

**May 9-11.**—On the 9th of May the Union army was again under way. The XIII and XV corps followed the Cayuga-Edward Station road and the XVII corps followed the Utica-Raymond road.

**May 12.**—At *Raymond* on the 12th, McPherson encountered *Gregg's* Confederate brigade which had come from Port Hudson. *Gregg* fell back towards Jackson. This unexpected encounter caused Grant to halt his left wing before reaching Edward Station, and to direct McPherson and Sherman to march on Jackson.

**May 13.**—On the 13th, McPherson marched on Jackson by the Clinton road and Sherman by the direct road from Raymond. To support them, McClernand moved to Raymond.

**May 14.**—On the 14th, McPherson and Sherman encountered *Gregg's* brigade, reinforced by some regiments from South Carolina, just west of Jackson. These were under the command of Gen. *Joseph E. Johnston* who had reached Jackson the night before and had planned to unite with *Pemberton* that day at Clinton. Finding the Union force too strong for him, *Johnston* evacuated Jackson and moved north along the railroad.

While Grant was thus moving eastward, *Pemberton* conformed to his movement. On the 12th he crossed the Big Black River at the railroad, and with the divisions of *Loring*, *Stevenson*, and *Bowen* advanced to Edward Station on the 14th. Here he received *Johnston's* suggestion to advance on Clinton. He at once called a council of war.

As the division commanders were not agreed as to the best movement, he hesitated, and finally sent one division towards Raymond and the others towards Clinton.

**May 15.**—On the 14th, Grant intercepted one of *Johnston's* letters to *Pemberton*, and on the 15th ordered McClernand to

move from Raymond on Bolton, and ordered McPherson and Sherman from Jackson to the same place.

**May 16.**—On the morning of the 16th, *Pemberton* having learned that *Johnston* had retreated from Jackson northwards, ordered his own troops to move in that direction. At *Champion Hill* he was attacked by McClernand's corps, Blair's division of the XV corps, and two divisions of the XVII corps. *Pemberton* was decisively defeated and fell back to the Big Black River where he had a bridgehead. In this retreat *Loring's* division, which was on the Raymond road, was cut off and compelled to retreat southward to Crystal Springs on the railroad.

**May 17.**—Grant's troops pursued so vigorously that on the 17th the bridgehead over the Big Black was carried and *Pemberton* was compelled to seek refuge in his intrenched camp at Vicksburg.

**May 18.**—By the night of the 18th, Grant had a cordon around Vicksburg and had established a new base on the Yazoo at Snyder Bluff.

Having *Pemberton* in his front and *Johnston* in his rear, Grant made a general assault on *Pemberton's* lines on May 22, to capture the former if possible. This assault was repulsed with considerable loss.

**Siege of Vicksburg.**—The intrenched camp of Vicksburg proper extended along the river bank for a distance of nearly five miles and had a land front of over seven miles. Its greatest depth between the land and river fronts was nearly two miles. Both fronts were well supplied with artillery.

Finding that the place could not be taken by assault, Grant began a regular siege. To strengthen the besieging force and cover it from attack in rear, he drew from Memphis three divisions of the XVI corps and called on Halleck for additional reinforcements. Halleck sent him Maj. Gen. Herron's division from Missouri, and the IX corps, under the command of Maj. Gen. John G. Parke, from the Department of the Ohio.

His reinforcements began reaching him May 20, and by the middle of June he had over 70,000 men present for duty on the east bank of the Mississippi River and a small force on the west bank. (For organization see p. 201.)

As soon as his reinforcements arrived, Sherman was given

command of a strong covering force which guarded the crossings of the Big Black River and protected the rear of the besieging force.

**June.**—On the 5th of June an attack was made by Maj. Gen. *John G. Walker's* division of Confederate troops from the Department of Louisiana on the Union posts at Milliken Bend and Young Point, then held by colored troops. The attack was repulsed with the assistance of the navy and the posts were thereafter strengthened.

**July.**—The siege of Vicksburg was prosecuted until July 4, when *Pemberton* surrendered his entire command without awaiting another assault. The garrison was paroled to await exchange.

**Army of the Mississippi.**—When Grant drove *Bowen's* division from Port Gibson on May 1, *Pemberton* ordered up two brigades from *Port Hudson* and called on the authorities at Richmond to send him reinforcements.

In answer to this call, four brigades were sent from South Carolina on May 5, and on May 9, *J. E. Johnston* was ordered to Jackson with *McCown's* division from *Bragg's* army in Tennessee. *Breckinridge's* division of three brigades and *Wm. H. Jackson's* cavalry division of two brigades were sent by *Bragg* a little later.

None of these troops arrived in time to join *Pemberton*. They were formed into a relieving army, the *Army of Mississippi* under *J. E. Johnston*. Including *Loring's* division, four brigades from South Carolina, five from *Bragg's* army, and two from *Port Hudson*, by June 3, *Johnston* had an army of 30,000 men. (For organization see p. 202.)

It was however only towards the end of June that the army was equipped with sufficient transportation to take the field. It was then too late to effect anything and Vicksburg surrendered before this army was engaged.

Immediately after the surrender of Vicksburg, Sherman moved with a strong force against Jackson, Miss., then occupied by *Johnston*. The latter evacuated that place on the 16th of July and retired eastward along the railroad. This terminated the Vicksburg campaign. ]

## OPPOSING FORCES IN VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

*Union, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.**Army of the Tennessee.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
XIII	Brig. Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus.....	2	1-	2
*Maj. Gen. John A. McClelland	Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Smith.....	2	-	2
	Brig. Gen. Alvin P. Hovey.....	2	-	3
Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord	Brig. Gen. Eugene A. Carr.....	2	-	2
XV	Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele.....	3	-	3
Maj. Gen. Wm. T. Sherman	Maj. Gen. Frank P. Blair.....	3	-	4
	Brig. Gen. James M. Tuttle.....	3	-	2
XVII	Maj. Gen. John A. Logan.....	3	-	4
Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson	Brig. Gen. John McArthur.....	3	-	4
	Brig. Gen. Marcellus M. Crocker... Cavalry.....	3 1	- 3	4 -
<i>Reinforcements.</i>				
XVI	Brig. Gen. Wm. Sooy Smith.....	4	-	4
Maj. Gen. Cadwalader C. Washburn	Brig. Gen. Jacob G. Lauman.....	3	-	5
	Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball.....	2	-	-
IX	Brig. Gen. Thomas Walsh.....	2	-	1
Maj. Gen. John G. Parke	Colonel Robert B. Potter.....	3	-	2
Department of Missouri,	Maj. Gen. Francis J. Herron....	2	-	3
On west bank of the Mississippi River.....		3	-	-

\*Relieved from command June 18.

*Confederate, Lieut. Gen. John C. Pemberton.**Vicksburg.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Maj. Gen. William W. Loring.....	3	-	3
Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson.....	4	-	8
Maj. Gen. John H. Forney.....	2	-	4
Maj. Gen. Martin J. Smith.....	3	-	2
Maj. Gen. John S. Bowen.....	2	-	6
Detached.....	1	2	-
River Batteries.....	-	-	8

*At Raymond May 12, and Jackson May 14.*

From Port Hudson.....	1	-	1
From South Carolina.....	2	-	2
Cavalry.....	-	2	-

*Vicksburg at Close of Siege.*

	Union.	Confederate.
Strength, present for duty.....	70,000	24,000
Casualties in campaign.....	9,362	9,000
Surrendered.....		29,491

*Second Attack on Jackson.*

*Union, Maj. Gen. Wm. T. Sherman.*

The IX, XIII and XV army corps and two divisions of the XVI army corps.

*Confederate, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.*

*Army of Mississippi.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge.....	3	—	3
Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French.....	3	—	3
Maj. Gen. William W. Loring.....	3	—	4
Maj. Gen. William H. T. Walker.....	4	—	4
Brig. Gen. William H. Jackson (cavalry).....	2	9	2

Strength.	Union.	Confederate.
Present for duty.....	50,000	30,000

**Comments.**—In its results, the campaign of Vicksburg was one of the most important of the Civil War. It practically ended the Confederate control of any part of the Mississippi Basin and reduced the war in that section to minor engagements between small bodies.

In his conduct of this campaign Grant proved himself to be a general of great ability. He was never dismayed by the difficulties of his position, but held firm to his purpose to land an army on one flank of the Confederate line of defense. Having decided to take the risk of sending the transports to run the gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries, without waiting to see the result of this venture he at once started his army overland for Grenada.

When Grant landed his army on the east bank of the Mississippi, he knew neither the strength nor the disposition of *Pemberton's* forces. With Napoleonic directness and decision he united all his available men and attacked *Bowen* with overwhelming odds.

When Sherman joined him, the position of the Union army was by no means an enviable one. Grant could not base himself on Grand Gulf, since every ration landed at that point was either brought by wagon over the single earth road between Milliken Bend and Carthage, or in boats that ran the long line of batteries at Vicksburg. He was obliged to secure a base on the Yazoo above Vicksburg.

Grant therefore decided to cut loose from Grand Gulf and move around Vicksburg to the Yazoo River. If *Pemberton* moved out to attack him, he would be compelled either to evacuate Vicksburg or to oppose Grant with only a part of his army. Grant proposed to keep his own corps united for the expected battle.

At Raymond, McPherson unexpectedly encountered *Gregg's* brigade which retired on Jackson and led Grant to investigate that place. Here he intercepted a message from *Johnston* to *Pemberton* in which the latter, presumed to be at Edward Station, was requested to advance on Clinton and cooperate with *Johnston*. Grant thereupon determined to attack *Pemberton* at once.

Having followed his victory at Champion Hill by a rapid pursuit, Grant drove *Pemberton* into Vicksburg and secured a base for himself at Snyder Bluff on the Yazoo, above Vicksburg.

Had the Confederate generals grasped the situation as clearly as did Grant, *Pemberton* would have remained west of the Big Black River and *Johnston* would have retreated southwards. If Grant forced a crossing of the Big Black, it would have been north of the railroad and *Johnston* with a strong force could have entered Vicksburg from the south. Grant would probably have secured his base on the Yazoo, but *Johnston* and *Pemberton* would have been in front of Vicksburg to resist his advance southward from that base.

**Grierson's Raid.**—While Grant was moving his army down the west bank of the Mississippi from Milliken Bend, the attention of *Pemberton* was diverted by a daring raid made by Col. Benjamin H. Grierson with a small brigade of cavalry.

Starting from the vicinity of Grand Junction, Tenn., on April 17, with three regiments of cavalry he moved almost due south to Houston, Miss. Here he detached one regiment to circle eastward, destroy the Corinth-Meridian railroad and return to Grand Junction. With the other two regiments he moved due south to the Jackson-Meridian railroad. From this point he moved through Raleigh to Gallatin, near the Jackson-New Orleans railroad, and along that railroad to the Louisiana line. He finally reached Baton Rouge, then occupied by Union troops. As most of the Confederate cavalry had left Mississippi under *Van Dorn*, Grierson reached Baton Rouge May 2, with a loss of only twenty-five men.

The effect of this raid was to divert *Pemberton's* attention from the operations of Grant's army on the west bank of the Mississippi.

Expeditions were sent out at the same time from Memphis and Corinth into northern Mississippi to attract the attention of the Confederates in that part of the State.

**August-December.**—For the Vicksburg campaign Grant was made a major general of the Regular Army; Sherman and later McPherson were made brigadier generals in that army.

After the capture of Vicksburg and Jackson, Grant proposed to move against Mobile. President Lincoln however decided that at this time the two most important operations were the occupation of East Tennessee and the seizure of one or more points in the the State of Texas. Grant was therefore directed to send the IX corps back to Burnside, and to send one corps to report to Banks. He sent to Banks the XIII corps under Ord, replacing one of its divisions by Herron's division from Missouri.

Grant also sent to Helena, Ark., 8,000 men under Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele to replace Herron's division, which Schofield had sent him, and retained only his old Army of the Tennessee less the XIII corps. Sherman and McPherson remained in camp around Vicksburg.

In the latter part of September, Sherman was ordered with his corps to Memphis en route for Chattanooga where Rosecrans was invested by *Bragg*.

In October, Grant was assigned to the command of the new Division of the Mississippi with headquarters at Nashville, Tenn., Sherman was assigned to the command of the Department of the Tennessee, and McPherson to the command of the Army of the Tennessee.

When *Johnston* evacuated Jackson he retired to Morton on the railroad east of Jackson and 36 miles from it. Here he gave up the command of the army to Lieut. Gen. *Wm. J. Hardee* and retained only the general supervision of his three departments.

During the remainder of the year Confederate operations in Mississippi were confined to the cavalry, of which there were several brigades under the command of Maj. Gen. *Stephen D. Lee*. He had been in the Vicksburg garrison and after being exchanged was placed in general command of the cavalry in Mississippi.



As Grant did not pursue the *Army of Mississippi* beyond Jackson, Miss., it was decided by the Confederate authorities to reinforce *Bragg*, who was then in northern Georgia.

In September, therefore *Hardee* sent the divisions of *Breckinridge* and *W. H. T. Walker* to *Bragg* and retained in his *Army of Mississippi* only the infantry divisions of *Loring* and *French* and *W. H. Jackson's* cavalry division.

In October, *Hardee* returned to the *Army of Tennessee* and *Polk* came from that army to command the *Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana* and the *Army of Mississippi*.

## THE SIEGE OF PORT HUDSON.

### PLATE 8.

In November, 1862, the administration decided to strengthen the Union force in Louisiana by sending about 10,000 additional troops to that State. Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks was sent with this force and relieved Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler of the command of the Department of the Gulf. The instructions given Banks were to assist in the opening of the Mississippi River. In compliance with his instructions, he landed his division at Baton Rouge.

**January.**—On January 1, 1863, there were about 10,000 Union troops at Baton Rouge and 20,000 in the vicinity of New Orleans.

The Confederate authorities became alarmed by this display of force and in January sent Lieut. Gen. *E. Kirby Smith* from Tennessee to command the districts of Louisiana and Texas. Maj. Gen. *Richard Taylor* who commanded the former district had less than 5,000 men.

At Port Hudson on the Mississippi River a short distance above Baton Rouge was a Confederate force of 15,000 men under Maj. Gen. *Franklin Gardner*, who belonged to *Pemberton's* department.

Banks was unwilling to attack Port Hudson until he had driven the Confederates well back from the vicinity of the Mississippi River.

**April.**—Leaving a garrison of about 8,000 troops at Baton Rouge, and a similar one at New Orleans, early in April Banks assembled a force of about 15,000 men at Brashear, now Morgan City, and advanced on Alexandria on the Red River, *E. Kirby*

*Smith's* headquarters, via New Iberia and Opelousas. He reached Alexandria on May 7, without much opposition.

**May.**—There had been considerable correspondence between Banks and Grant looking to a combined movement against Vicksburg or Port Hudson. At this time however Grant had already crossed the Mississippi River and was engaged in his movement against Vicksburg.

At Halleck's suggestion, Banks now ceased his advance and moved his troops to the Mississippi River. On the 23d he crossed the Mississippi at Bayou Sara above Port Hudson, and on the 24th invested that place where he was joined by the troops from Baton Rouge. (For organization see below.)

He was just in time to prevent the evacuation of that place, which had been ordered by *Johnston* on the 19th. The Confederate messenger had been delayed and was unable to deliver the order in time.

Port Hudson was an intrenched camp along the east bank of the Mississippi River. The river front was about two miles long. The land front had an almost continuous line of parapet about four miles long. The greatest depth between the two fronts was one mile. Both fronts were well equipped with artillery.

**June.**—Before the arrival of Banks, the Confederate garrison had been reduced by the withdrawal of the brigades of *Gregg* and *Maxey* which joined *Johnston's* army before Vicksburg. This left a garrison of only 6,000 men.

**July.**—The siege lasted until July 8, when *Gardner* surrendered his entire command.

The besieging troops numbered about 20,000 men present for duty; they made two unsuccessful assaults on May 27 and June 14.

#### OPPOSING FORCES AT PORT HUDSON.

*Union, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
XIX	Maj. Gen. Christopher C. Auger . . .	3	2	6
	Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Sherman . . .	2	—	1
	Brig. Gen. Henry E. Paine . . . . .	3	—	3
	Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover . . . . .	3	—	3
	Separate Brigade . . . . .	1	—	—
	Cavalry Brigade . . . . .	1	5	—

*Confederate, Maj. Gen. Franklin Gardner.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Brig. Gen. William N. R. Beall.....	1	-	10
	Union.	Confederate.	
Strength, present for duty.....	20,000	4,000	
Casualties during siege.....	4,363	661	
Surrendered.....		5,500	

**August-December.**—After the capture of *Port Hudson*, Banks was reinforced by the XIII corps from the Army of the Tennessee but was directed to make a lodgment in Texas where a small Union force had taken possession of Galveston in December and had been captured January 1, 1863. The French had by this time taken the City of Mexico, and President Lincoln deemed it wise to occupy Texas with Union troops as soon as practicable.

Banks had at this time the XIX corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Wm. B. Franklin, from the Army of the Potomac, and the XIII corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord.

An expedition was sent under Franklin to make a landing on the Sabine River. This was frustrated by the Confederate land batteries, which the Union naval vessels were unable to silence. The expedition returned and the XIX corps was sent to New Iberia. Before the end of the year, a second expedition was sent out, and at the close of the year troops of the XIII corps now under McClernand occupied Brownsville (Plate 1) and Matagorda Island on the coast (Plate 8). The Confederates held the coast between the Sabine and Brazos rivers, including the important port of Galveston.

## OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY, CENTRAL AND EAST TENNESSEE.

After the battle of *Murfreesboro*, December 31, 1862, the corps of Thomas, McCook and Crittenden remained in the triangle, Nashville-Triune-Murfreesboro, for a period of five months. In January, these corps received the numbers, XIV, XX and XXI.

Rosecrans was unwilling to advance until his army was increased and the troops in the Department of Ohio had advanced to the upper Cumberland so as to prevent a repetition of the Confederate movements of the previous year. Rosecrans also wanted his

cavalry force increased so that it could cope with *Forrest*, *Wheeler* and *Morgan*.

During this period of inactivity, operations were confined mainly to the cavalry.

**February.**—Early in February, the divisions of *Wheeler*, *Forrest* and *Wharton* made an attempt to take Fort Donelson by assault and were repulsed.

Later in the month, when *Van Dorn* reported with *W. H. Jackson's* cavalry division from Mississippi, *Bragg* formed his cavalry, 16,000 men, into two corps. *Van Dorn* commanded the divisions of *Forrest* and *Jackson*, and *Wheeler* commanded those of *Morgan*, *Wharton* and *Martin*. *Van Dorn* was directed to operate on the left flank of the *Army of Tennessee* and *Wheeler* on the right flank.

During this month, Rosecrans received as reinforcements, Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger's corps of three divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry from Louisville, Ky.

Gilbert's division with one brigade of Baird's division was sent to Franklin to oppose *Van Dorn*, and Crook's division was sent to Carthage on the Cumberland to oppose *Wheeler's* operations.

**March.**—Early in March, Gilbert was directed to send a strong reconnoitering force along the railroad towards Columbia. He sent a brigade of infantry with a brigade of cavalry. At Spring Hill (plate 24), this force was surrounded by *Van Dorn* and the infantry with a battery of artillery was obliged to surrender.

After this affair, Granger went to Franklin with the other brigade of Baird's division and took command of the forces at that place.

Later in the month, *Van Dorn* captured a garrison of 750 men at Brentwood between Franklin and Nashville.

As President Lincoln was desirous of securing possession of Knoxville, Tenn., he directed Burnside to go to Kentucky with two divisions of the IX corps and there assume the command of the Department of the Ohio. As soon thereafter as practicable he was to move on Knoxville.

**April.**—Early in April, *Bragg*, whose two army corps were at Shelbyville and Tullahoma, decided to move his right corps to Wartrace. To employ the Union troops during this movement, *Van Dorn* and *Wheeler* were to attack.

*Van Dorn* attacked Franklin and was repulsed; *Wheeler* succeeded in destroying some rolling stock on the railroad near Nashville and in capturing a number of prisoners.

**Streight's Raid.**—Towards the end of the month, a brigade of mounted infantry under Col. A. V. Streight left Tusculum, Alabama (plate 6), and rode through northern Alabama to Rome, Ga., to destroy the railroads in that State. As soon as *Bragg* learned of this movement, *Forrest* was sent in pursuit.

**May.**—Early in May, *Forrest* attacked Streight as he was about to enter Rome, Ga., and compelled him to surrender. When *Forrest* returned from this expedition he was placed in command of *Van Dorn's* corps as the latter had been killed.

About the end of May, Burnside had concentrated the IX and XXIII corps on the upper Cumberland and was ready to move on Knoxville. The XXIII corps was composed of all the troops in Kentucky not belonging to the IX corps.

At this time, Grant was in front of Vicksburg and called for reinforcements. Burnside was therefore directed to suspend his movement and send the IX corps under Parke to Vicksburg.

To meet Burnside's movement on Knoxville, *Buckner* was sent from Mobile, Ala., to command the *Department of East Tennessee* and organize its defence.

**June.**—While Burnside was waiting for the return of the IX corps, he sent a mixed brigade of cavalry and mounted infantry, 1,500 men, under Brig. Gen. William P. Sanders, to make a raid on the railroad near Knoxville.

**Sander's Raid.**—Starting from the vicinity of London, Ky., June 14, Sanders moved straight south for Loudon, Tenn., to destroy the railroad bridge at that point. Finding it too well guarded he followed the railroad to Knoxville where he found another strong garrison. Turning this place, he followed the railroad to the Holston River where he destroyed the railroad bridge, 1,600 feet long, over that river. Here he left the railroad and moved northward across country to Kentucky, which he reached on June 23. Without much loss, he captured and paroled a number of small detachments and destroyed rolling-stock, telegraph line and railroad bridges along the route he followed.

## THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN.

When the authorities in Washington learned that Grant had crossed the Mississippi River below Vicksburg, May 1, they feared that *Bragg* might detach a strong force to unite with *Pemberton* and overwhelm Grant. To prevent such detachment, Rosecrans was urged to assume the offensive. With this request Rosecrans did not at once comply, and it was the middle of June before he had decided on a plan of operations and made preparations to advance.

His plan was to maneuver *Bragg* out of position by turning his right flank and to attack him while he was retreating. To deceive the Confederate commander the operations were to begin by a threatened attack on Shelbyville. (For organization see p. 211.)

**June 24.**—Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger moved to Salem on June 24, with a division of cavalry and a division of infantry. His objective was Shelbyville.

The XX corps moved along the Murfreesboro-Shelbyville road a short distance to deceive *Bragg* and then moved on Fairfield.

The XIV and XXI corps moved on Manchester by the Murfreesboro-Manchester and Reedyville-Manchester roads, respectively. Wilder's mounted infantry preceded the XIV corps and a cavalry brigade, the XXI corps.

**June 25.**—On the 25th the Union forces reached the divide between the Duck and Stone rivers held by the Confederate outposts.

**June 26 and 27.**—On the 26th the XIV corps reached the Fairfield-McMinnville road and on the 27th was at Manchester. The XX and XXI corps were in close supporting distance on the Murfreesboro and Reedyville roads. Granger was a few miles from Shelbyville.

*Bragg* had for some time been expecting Rosecrans to make this movement as his own troops were badly posted to prevent it. He was however compelled to keep one corps at Shelbyville to draw supplies from the rich country that surrounded it. To defeat Rosecran's operations *Bragg* had planned to hold Wartrace with one corps and make a counter-attack with his left wing.

This plan he was unable to execute because he had just sent the infantry divisions of *Breckinridge* and *McCown* and the cavalry division of *W. H. Jackson* to *Johnston* in Mississippi. *J. H.*

*Morgan's* cavalry division was in Kentucky on a raid and *Forrest's* cavalry division was near Franklin. At Shelbyville and Wartrace he had only the corps of *Polk* and *Hardee* and *Wheeler's* cavalry corps. (For organization see p. 212.)

*Bragg* therefore ordered the concentration of his army at Tullahoma.

On the evening of the 27th, Granger entered Shelbyville, and captured some stores that *Polk* had not had time to remove.

**June 28 and 29.**—On June 28, *Bragg* had concentrated at Tullahoma and Rosecrans was concentrating on his flank at Manchester.

To interfere with *Bragg's* retreat, Rosecrans sent Wilder's mounted infantry from Manchester to Decherd to destroy the bridge over Elk River between Decherd and Tullahoma. Wilder reached Decherd safely, but the approach of *Forrest* who had reached Tullahoma prevented him from destroying the bridge.

**June 30.**—On June 30, *Bragg* decided to retreat behind the Tennessee River and at once retired to Decherd and traversed the Cumberland Plateau to the vicinity of Jasper where he crossed the river. The Elk River being in flood and its bridges destroyed, there could be no rapid pursuit. The Confederate army therefore reached the Tennessee River without much loss.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN.

*Union, Army of the Cumberland, Maj. Gen. Wm. S. Rosecrans.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
XIV	Maj. Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau . . . . .	3	—	3
Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas	Maj. Gen. James S. Negley . . . . .	3	—	3
	Brig. Gen. James M. Brannan . . . . .	3	—	3
	Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds . . . . .	3	4*	3
XX	Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis . . . . .	3	—	3
Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook	Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson . . . . .	3	—	3
	Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan . . . . .	3	—	3
XXI	Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood . . . . .	3	—	3
Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden	Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer . . . . .	3	—	4
	Brig. Gen. Horatio P. Van Cleve* . . . . .	3	—	3
Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger	Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird . . . . .	3	—	3

\*Mounted infantry.

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Cavalry				
Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley	Brig. Gen. Robert B. Mitchell . . . . .	2	11	1
	Brig. Gen. John B. Turchin . . . . .	2	11	2
<i>Confederate, Army of Tennessee, Gen. Braxton Bragg.</i>				
Lieut. Gen. Leonidas Polk	Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham . . . . .	4	—	4
	Maj. Gen. Jones M. Withers . . . . .	4	—	4
Lieut. Gen. Wm. J. Hardee	Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart . . . . .	4	—	4
	Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne . . . . .	4	—	4
Cavalry				
Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler	Brig. Gen. John A. Wharton . . . . .	2	9	1
	Brig. Gen. Wm. T. Martin . . . . .	2	6	1
	Brig. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest . . . . .	2	8	2
	Artillery Reserve . . . . .	—	—	6
		Union.	Confederate	
Strength . . . . .		60,000	45,000	
Casualties . . . . .		570	not given	

**Comments.**—The Tullahoma campaign was a skilful maneuver. Had the rains not set in just as the movement was begun its results would probably have been greater.

In delaying his movement for over a month after he was requested to advance, Rosecrans incurred the displeasure both of the authorities at Washington and of Grant. This later resulted in his removal from the command of his army.

The transfer of *Van Dorn's* cavalry from Mississippi to Tennessee was a serious mistake on the part of the Confederate authorities. Without *Van Dorn*, *Bragg* had 10,000 cavalry, which was sufficient to guard his flanks and protect his foragers. The few thousand prisoners made by *Van Dorn* had little effect on the campaign. Had he been left in Mississippi, *Grierson's* raid would have been impossible and *Grant's* turning movement would have been extremely difficult.

It will be observed that the troops sent by *Bragg* to *Pemberton* also served no good purpose, since they reached *Vicksburg* too late to take any active part in relieving *Pemberton*. *Morgan's* cavalry division was also sent away from *Bragg's* army at a very inopportune moment.

**Morgan's Raid North of the Ohio River** (Plate 3).—In the early part of June, Brig. Gen. *John H. Morgan* received permission from Gen. *Bragg* to make a raid with his division of about 2,600



men in the State of Kentucky. He was forbidden to cross the Ohio River as he proposed. Notwithstanding this prohibition he decided to invade the North.

He was detained in Tennessee by Sanders' Knoxville raid (see p. 209), until July 2, when he crossed the Cumberland River near Burkesville. Marching northward and overcoming the small parties in his front, he passed through Columbia, Lebanon, Springfield and Bardstown, and on the 8th crossed the Ohio by captured steamers at Brandenburg below Louisville.

Marching rapidly and frequently changing horses, his command now reduced to about 2,000 men passed through Salem and Vernon, Ind., and entered Ohio just north of Cincinnati. He crossed that State on an east and west line and reached Pomeroy on the 18th and Ravenwood on the 19th. Here he expected to recross the Ohio River at a ford which had been examined before he left Tennessee. Finding the ford protected by a redoubt, he waited until the next morning to make an attack.

On the 20th, however, he was attacked by a strong Union cavalry force, which had been sent in pursuit from Kentucky, and the greater part of his command was captured.

Two companies succeeded in crossing the river and reached the Tennessee River in safety. *Morgan* with a small party escaped northward but was compelled to surrender a week later near the point where the Pennsylvania State line crosses the Ohio River.

Several months later *Morgan* made his escape from the Ohio State penitentiary where he had been confined and reached Tennessee in safety. The Indiana and Ohio raid had however destroyed his prestige.

**July.**—After the Tullahoma campaign, Rosecrans placed the Army of the Cumberland in camps along the railroad. The XIV corps was at Decherd, the XX at Winchester, and the XXI at Manchester and McMinnville.

The cavalry corps was at Salem, and the three divisions of Granger's corps were at Shelbyville, Nashville and Murfreesboro.

Before crossing the Tennessee River, Rosecrans believed it necessary to repair the roads and railroads across the Cumberland Plateau and accumulate a store of supplies.

About the last of July, the railroad was in operation to the

Tennessee River and one division of the XX corps was moved to Stevenson and Bridgeport.

At this time, Rosecrans had 68,000 men in his four corps and a cavalry corps of 11,000 men, present for duty. (For organization see p. 224.)

In Kentucky, Burnside had at this time only the XXIII corps but it numbered 25,000 men present for duty. The IX corps was en route to join him.

When *Bragg* withdrew to Chattanooga, he posted his infantry to command all the crossings of the Tennessee River from Kingston above Chattanooga to Bridgeport below. *Forrest* was in the Tennessee Valley near Kingston and *Wheeler* was guarding the Tennessee River below Bridgeport.

*Hardee* was detached to relieve *J. E. Johnston* of the command of the *Army of the Mississippi* and *D. H. Hill* was sent from North Carolina to command his corps. *Withers* was relieved of his division by *Hindman* from Arkansas.

*Bragg* had about 31,000 men present for duty in his two army corps and nearly 11,000 in his two cavalry corps.

*Buckner's* command in east Tennessee consisted of 15,000 men present for duty of whom about 6,000 were in the cavalry brigades of *John S. Scott* and *John Pegram*.

Rosecrans and Burnside together had 104,000 men, while *Bragg* and *Buckner* had only 57,000 men.

The authorities at Richmond were very anxious to strike a blow in Tennessee, which would partially offset the depression in the South caused by the Tullahoma, Gettysburg, and Vicksburg campaigns.

*Bragg* was requested to consider the advisability of assuming the offensive with the forces in east Tennessee and Mississippi added to his own. After learning the strength of his probable reinforcements, he reported that a repetition of his campaign of 1862 was impracticable against the combined armies of Rosecrans and Burnside. He considered his chances of success greater if he remained on the defensive until Rosecrans crossed the Tennessee River. The authorities acquiesced in his decision but placed *Buckner's* forces in east Tennessee under his orders, so that the two commands could act as a unit and ordered *Longstreet* from Virginia to reinforce *Bragg* with the divisions of *McLaws* and *Hood*.

**August.**—The authorities at Washington were impatient over the slowness of the movements in Kentucky and Tennessee, and on August 7, both Burnside and Rosecrans received peremptory orders to advance. Burnside was to start a column of 12,000 men which was later to be reinforced by the IX corps. Both commanders were informed that the objective of the combined movement was the possession of the upper Tennessee Valley.

The authorities at Washington probably expected Rosecrans to move eastwards and unite with Burnside in the upper Tennessee Valley; this movement Rosecrans considered impracticable. After leaving the railroad he would be obliged to cross a broad belt of barren tableland, only to find himself on a wide unfordable river on which *Bragg* could easily concentrate his entire command. Should *Bragg* prefer, he could even assume the offensive, advance along the railroad from Bridgeport, and compel Rosecrans to protect his line of supply.

Rosecrans therefore decided to make a demonstration above Chattanooga and cross below that town. The character of the country opposite Bridgeport and Stevenson was such that *Bragg* could not employ a large force to oppose this movement. After crossing the river, Rosecrans proposed to maneuver *Bragg* out of Chattanooga by threatening his communications with Atlanta.

**Rosecrans' Advance to the Tennessee** (Plate 24).—On August 15, Rosecrans ordered his first movement. From McMinnville and Manchester the three divisions of Crittenden were to march to Pikeville, Dunlap, and Therman in the Sequatchie Valley. From Dunlap a brigade was to advance to Poe Tavern, and from Therman a brigade was to move towards Chattanooga. Minty's cavalry brigade was to move through Sparta on the left flank of the XXI corps, and Wilder's mounted infantry brigade, of the XIV corps, was to move from Tracy City on its right flank.

Two divisions of the XIV corps were to march from Decherd to the vicinity of Jasper, and two towards Stevenson.

Two divisions of the XX corps were to march to Stevenson.

The cavalry corps was to march from Salem to the railroad between Huntsville and Larkinsville (plate 31).

Granger's corps was to take charge of the railroads in rear and move strong bodies to Fayetteville, Athens, and Decatur (plate 3).

Because of the character of the country over which this movement was made, the various divisions reached their new positions only about the 21st of the month. On that day *Bragg* was made aware of the movement by the bombardment of Chattanooga by a battery attached to Wilder's mounted infantry brigade (4th division XIV corps). Wagner's infantry brigade (1st division XXI corps) crossed Walden Ridge to Chattanooga, and Hazen's infantry brigade (2d division XXI corps) crossed to Poe Tavern.

The troops remained in their new positions until the end of the month, during which time pontoons were brought to the front and rafts were constructed for the passage of the Tennessee River.

**Burnside's Advance into East Tennessee** (Plate 3).—About the 15th of August, Burnside also began his advance on Kingston and Knoxville. One infantry division of the XXIII corps moved from Lebanon, Ky., via Columbia and Albany, and one from the vicinity of Crab Orchard, Ky., via Somerset and Huntsville. Each was accompanied by two cavalry brigades. The two columns were to unite in northern Tennessee and advance on Kingston. The IX corps, returning from Vicksburg, began to arrive at Covington about the middle of August and its brigades were at once sent to Lexington and Crab Orchard.

Burnside's XXIII corps crossed the Cumberland River on August 23, and two days later was in northern Tennessee.

**Bragg's Concentration.**—In the last days of August, therefore, *Bragg* saw both his flanks threatened and demonstrations along his entire front. As he could not reinforce *Buckner* without exposing Chattanooga, he directed the troops in east Tennessee to withdraw across the river at Loudon and destroy the bridge. *Buckner* left one brigade in Cumberland Gap and another on the railroad east of Knoxville; with *Preston's* infantry division and *Pegram's* and *Scott's* cavalry brigades, he retired to Loudon.

*Bragg* could not move to Stevenson or Bridgeport to oppose Rosecrans, since this would expose Chattanooga to a movement in the upper Tennessee Valley and also place his own army in a position from which it would be impossible to fall back without great loss.

*Bragg* therefore decided to concentrate his troops near Chattanooga and await developments. The left wing of *Polk's* corps was drawn back to Lookout Creek, and the cavalry alone was

left to watch the Tennessee River below that point. As he expected to fall back from Chattanooga he sent his heavy trains down the railroad towards Atlanta for safety

About the 1st of September, *Bragg* was reinforced by *Breckinridge's* division of three brigades and by Maj. Gen. *W. H. T. Walker's* division of three brigades from the *Army of Mississippi*.

Learning from *Wheeler* that *Rosecrans* was crossing the Tennessee River, *Bragg* ordered *Buckner* to Chattanooga.

When *Breckinridge*, *Buckner* and *Walker* joined him he found it necessary to reorganize his army. (See p. 224.)

### THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN.

From the reports received from deserters and spies and from the reports of his troops on the north bank of the river opposite Chattanooga, *Rosecrans* assumed that *Bragg* was about to evacuate Chattanooga. As he wanted to hasten *Bragg's* retreat, the two divisions of the XX corps stationed at Stevenson crossed the river on a ponton bridge at that point on the last days of August and started across Sand Mountain for Alpine to threaten *Bragg's* communications. (For organization see p. 224.)

**September.**—On the 2d of September, the 1st division of the XX corps was at Valley Head in Wills Valley, at the source of Lookout Creek; the 2d division and the cavalry corps were following the same route. The 3d division crossed the river at Bridgeport that day to join them via Trenton.

The 1st and 2d divisions of the XIV corps were to cross at Bridgeport and move via Trenton to Stevens Gap, on the road to Lafayette. The 3d and 4th had just crossed by boats and rafts near Jasper and Shellmound and were on their way to Trenton by the mountain road.

The XXI corps, save the cavalry and infantry on the Tennessee and opposite Chattanooga, was to move down the Sequatchie Valley and cross at Jasper and Shellmound and follow the railroad.

Granger's corps was directed to occupy Bridgeport and Stevenson in force.

**September 6.**—By the 6th of September, *Rosecrans's* three army corps were in the valley of Lookout Creek; the most advanced division was at Stevens Gap.

On this day Burnside was in possession of Kingston and Knoxville in the upper Tennessee Valley.

*Wheeler's* cavalry had fallen back before Rosecrans' troops, and had finally concentrated at Lafayette, where it blocked the roads through Pigeon Mountains by felling trees, etc.

On September 6, *Bragg* decided to fall back to Lafayette to meet Rosecrans as he came through the mountains. On the night of the 7th, *Hill* started for Lafayette and on the morning of the 8th, *Polk* followed him; the latter stopped at the Lee and Gordon Mill on West Chickamauga Creek. *Walker* joined *Hill* at Lafayette, while *Buckner* stopped *Hill* at Rock Spring.

**September 9.**—On the morning of the 9th, Rosecrans, who was at Trenton, learned that Chattanooga had been evacuated and that Wagner's brigade of infantry which he had left on the Tennessee River opposite that town, was crossing the river.

Assuming that *Bragg* was retreating on Kingston or Rome, he at once ordered a vigorous pursuit. The XX corps was to move on Alpine, the XIV corps on Lafayette, and the XXI corps through Rossville on Ringgold.

The Army of the Cumberland was thus deployed in three groups on a front of 40 miles. The center group was marching straight on *Bragg's* concentrated army. Granger was to occupy Chattanooga with the nearest troops of the reserve corps.

**September 10.**—In compliance with instructions, Negley's division of the XIV corps marched through Stevens Gap into the upper West Chickamauga Valley, called McLamore Cove, and on the 10th crossed the creek to move to Lafayette through Dug Gap in the Pigeon Range. Finding the gap blocked and being warned that a large force was in his front, Negley halted for orders.

On the 9th, *Bragg* learned that Rosecrans had incautiously exposed a division of the XIV corps at Dug Gap. He ordered *Hindman's* division of *Polk's* corps to move that night through Rock Spring and across the Pigeon Mountains to Chickamauga Creek. On the same night *D. H. Hill* was to send *Cleburne's* division through Dug Gap. In the morning the two divisions were to destroy the exposed Union division.

On the morning of the 10th, *Hindman* was on Chickamauga Creek within striking distance of the left flank of Negley's division

of the XIV corps waiting to hear the signal of attack to be given by *Cleburne*. *Hill* had, however, reported to *Bragg* that *Cleburne's* division would be unable to move that night as it would take twenty-four hours to clear the passes which had been obstructed by *Wheeler*.

When *Bragg* learned this on the morning of the 10th, he directed *Buckner* to report to *Hindman* with his corps to support the attack. Orders were also given to *Hill* to open the gaps in his front so that his troops could unite in the attack. The day was spent in preparing for this new attack.

**September 11.**—Before *Hindman* could get in position to attack, Baird's division of the XIV corps joined Negley in front of Dug Gap. *Bragg* had ordered *Hindman* to cut his way through the enemy and was now afraid that this order might get *Hindman* in trouble.

At 11 a. m. therefore he sent word to *Hindman* to recross the Pigeon Mountain to Lafayette if he thought best. This caused *Hindman* to delay his attack. Baird and Negley had in the meantime learned that the whole Confederate army was probably in their front, and retired that afternoon to Stevens Gap. *Hindman* and *Hill* now united on Chickamauga Creek between Dug and Stevens gaps.

They were then in position to attack Baird and Negley on the morning of the 12th, but *Bragg* withdrew them across Pigeon Mountain that night, as he had learned of McCook's arrival at Alpine.

**September 12.**—Rosecrans was now convinced that *Bragg's* whole army was near Lafayette and began to concentrate his own army. In compliance with orders, Crittenden moved westward this day from Ringgold to the Lee and Gordon Mill.

To support his advance divisions, Thomas sent the divisions of Brannan and Reynolds from Trenton to Stevens Gap.

McCook was at Alpine with two divisions and the cavalry corps. He ordered the cavalry to scout towards Lafayette.

*Bragg* learned from *Forrest* that Union troops were advancing from Ringgold. *Polk* and *Walker* were therefore ordered back to Rock Spring, and *Polk* was ordered to attack Crittenden at daylight on the 13th.

**September 13.**—On this day Brannan and Reynolds of the XIV corps reached Stevens Gap and extended the line to the left beyond Cooper or Frick Gap. The other Union troops remained in position: McCook at Alpine, and Crittenden at the Lee and Gordon Mill. That night McCook, in compliance with orders, fell back to unite with Thomas.

When *Polk* reached Rock Spring on the evening of the 12th, he believed that Crittenden was moving towards that place in superior strength. He therefore gave orders for the taking up of a strong defensive position in the morning. This was done, but as Crittenden had moved to the Lee and Gordon Mill, *Polk* did not engage him on the 13th as ordered.

On the night of the 13th Rosecrans joined Thomas at Cooper Gap. Being somewhat apprehensive for his communications, he directed Crittenden to leave only one division at the Lee and Gordon Mill and with the others hold the gaps through Missionary Ridge.

**September 14.**—Thomas remained in position; McCook moved via Valley Head to join him; Crittenden moved two divisions to Missionary Ridge. Gordon Granger with three brigades reached Rossville that day and with the mounted brigades of Minty and Wilder covered the road from Ringgold.

Being threatened in front by Thomas and on either flank by McCook and Crittenden, *Bragg* concentrated his entire army at Lafayette. Later in the day, finding that the Union army was not advancing, he sent *Polk* and *Walker* back to Rock Spring.

As the Confederates had disappeared from the West Chickamauga Valley, Rosecrans was again of the opinion that *Bragg* was retreating, and ordered McCook to move to the head of McLamore Cove only. McCook did not receive this order until he was too far advanced to comply, without risking separation from Thomas.

**September 15.**—Thomas stood fast; McCook continued his march for Stevens Gap; Crittenden finding no water on Missionary Ridge returned to the Lee and Gordon Mill; Granger with the cavalry moved along the Ringgold road with his three infantry brigades to West Chickamauga Creek.

*Bragg's* army remained in position.



That night, however, *Bragg* issued orders for a movement to attack *Crittenden's* corps in front and rear.

**September 17.**—Thomas moved his corps to the left down West Chickamauga Creek to make room for *McCook*, who came in line on his right that day. The cavalry corps was near the head of *McLamore Cove*. *Crittenden* remained in position at the Lee and Gordon Mill.

Of *Bragg's* army, *Buckner* and *Walker* with *Forrest's* cavalry, moved towards the fords and bridges of Chickamauga Creek west of Ringgold. *Polk's* corps moved to the creek between Thomas and *Crittenden*. *Hill's* corps remained at Lafayette with *Wheeler's* cavalry.

That day *Bragg* learned that Brig. Gen. *Bushrod R. Johnson*, of *Stewart's* division, whose brigade was at Ringgold had been reinforced by two additional brigades sent from Mississippi and that *Hood's* leading brigades were at the same place. He issued his orders for a continuation of his movement.

**September 18.**—*Forrest*, *Buckner*, *W. H. T. Walker* and *Bushrod R. Johnson* were to cross the Chickamauga west of Ringgold and attack *Crittenden* in flank and rear. *Polk* was to cross near the Lee and Gordon Mill and attack him in front. *Hill* was to take *Polk's* place on the left.

Rosecrans had not ordered any movements for the day. In the afternoon, however, learning of the Confederate movements, Thomas was directed to send two divisions of his corps to a point about two miles north of the Lee and Gordon Mill to protect *Crittenden's* left flank and two divisions to protect *Crittenden's* right flank. *McCook* was to follow Thomas as soon as the roads were clear.

The mounted brigades of *Minty* and *Wilder* on lower West Chickamauga Creek with *Granger's* infantry, had offered such effective resistance at the crossings that *B. R. Johnson's* division alone crossed the creek that day. *Crittenden* was not attacked, since *Polk* could not attack until the other Confederate troops were in position.

**Battle of Chickamauga, September 19 and 20.**—On the morning of the 19th, Thomas ordered *Brannan's* division, then posted on the road two miles north of the Lee and Gordon Mill, to make a reconnoissance towards Chickamauga Creek. This force en-

countered and drove back *Forrest's* dismounted cavalry, and the latter called on the nearest Confederate infantry for help.

This started a battle which lasted all day, and in which in succession every division of the XIV, XX and XXI corps took part on one side, and the divisions of *Walker*, *Liddell*, *Cheatham*, *Stewart*, *B. R. Johnson*, *Preston*, and *Cleburne* on the other. *Breckinridge* and *Hindman* were not engaged.

Neither side gained any decided advantage, but the Union troops retained possession of the road between Missionary Ridge and West Chickamauga Creek.

**September 20** (Plate 32).—On the night of September 19, and the morning of the 20th, Rosecrans adjusted his lines. As the divisions of the three corps were interspersed he assigned the right wing to McCook and the left to Thomas.

As Rosecrans understood the situation the right wing was to be composed of the divisions of Sheridan, Davis, and Wood from right to left, and the left wing of those of Reynolds, Palmer, Johnson, and Baird. Thomas was to have Brannan as a reserve for his left flank and Crittenden was to have Negley and Van Cleve as a general reserve. The divisions were not in these positions when the battle began on the 20th, and confusion in movements and orders resulted therefrom. Brannan's division was in the front line on Reynold's right instead of being in reserve; Negley was on Brannan's right in the place assigned to Wood who was in reserve.

As *Bragg's* divisions were also interspersed, *Polk* was directed to command the right wing composed of *Cheatham's* division, *Hill's* corps, and *Walker's* corps; *Longstreet*, who had arrived during the night, was to command the left wing composed of *Hindman's* division, *Buckner's* corps, *Hood's* division, and *B. R. Johnson's* division. *Polk's* wing was to begin the attack at daylight.

The Confederate attack began only at 9 a. m. when *Breckinridge* attacked the extreme left of the Union line. Thomas called for Negley's division and it was discovered that he occupied the place of Wood. These divisions were directed to change places and Negley sent one brigade and later a second to Thomas. Thomas was attacked in succession by all of the divisions of *Polk's* wing during the next two hours and repulsed all assaults.

While the fight of his left wing was in progress, Rosecrans was endeavoring to adjust his right. Not finding it compact enough he directed Wood "to close in and support Reynolds" who was assumed by Rosecrans to be on Wood's left. As stated above, Brannan was in this position and to support Reynolds, Wood, who had replaced Negley in the front line, moved his division back and to the left.

At this time, 11 a. m., *Longstreet* was developing to attack Rosecrans' right wing. Having discovered the break in the line caused by Wood's withdrawal, the divisions of J. C. Davis and Sheridan were moving to the left to close it when they were caught in *Longstreet's* advance which completely surrounded them and compelled them to retreat across Missionary Ridge into the valley of Chattanooga Creek. One of Van Cleve's brigades in reserve behind the right wing was also carried off.

Besides these troops, Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden were carried away, and not being able to rally the troops went to Chattanooga. Shortly thereafter, Negley with his third brigade also left the field under the impression that the army was to retire to another position.

Sheridan and Davis retired only to Rossville Gap where they posted such troops as they could rally.

This left Thomas in command of the field and with him the divisions of Baird, Brannan, Reynolds, Johnson, Wood, and Palmer and of the divisions of Negley and Van Cleve two brigades each. Wood and Brannan now faced to the south to meet *Longstreet*, and when they were about to be outflanked Granger came to their support with two brigades which had been covering the Rossville road. He left one brigade on that road.

This enabled Thomas to hold his position until dark, when by direction of Rosecrans he retired across Missionary Ridge and took up a new position at Rossville Gap.

Here the army remained one day and then fell back to the Confederate defensive line about Chattanooga.

*Bragg* followed and deployed his troops along Missionary Ridge.

## OPPOSING FORCES IN THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

*Army of the Cumberland, Maj. Gen. Wm. S. Rosecrans.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments. Cav.	Batter- ies.
XIV	Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird . . . . .	3	—	3
Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas	Maj. Gen. James S. Negley . . . . .	3	—	3
	Brig. Gen. Joseph M. Brannan . . . . .	3	—	3
	Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds . . . . .	3	5	3
XX	Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis . . . . .	3*	—	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson . . . . .	3	1	3
Alexander McD. McCook	Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan . . . . .	3	—	3
XXI	Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood . . . . .	3*	—	3
Maj Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden	Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer . . . . .	3	—	4
	Brig. Gen. Horatio P. Van Cleve . . . . .	3	—	3
Reserve Corps Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. James B. Steedman . . . . .	2	—	2
	Colonel Daniel McCook . . . . .	1	—	1
Gordon Granger Cavalry Corps Brig. Gen.	Colonel Edward M. McCook . . . . .	3	10	1
	Brig. Gen. George Crook . . . . .	2	8	1
Robert B. Mitchell				

\*Only two brigades present.

*Army of Tennessee, Gen. Braxton Bragg.*

Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham . . . . .	5	—	5
Leonidas Polk	Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman . . . . .	3	—	3
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne . . . . .	3	—	3
Daniel H. Hill	Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge . . . . .	3	—	4
Maj Gen. Simon B. Buckner	Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart . . . . .	3	—	4
	Brig. Gen. Wm. Preston . . . . .	3	1	3
	Reserve Artillery . . . . .	—	—	4
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws . . . . .	4*	—	—
James Longstreet	Maj. Gen. John B. Hood † . . . . .	5	—	6
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. States R. Gist . . . . .	3	—	2
Wm. H. T. Walker	Brig. Gen. St. John R. Liddell . . . . .	2	—	2
Unattached Cavalry Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson . . . . .	3	—	2
	Brig. Gen. John A. Wharton . . . . .	2	9	1
Joseph Wheeler	Brig. Gen. Wm. T. Martin . . . . .	2	6	1
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Frank C. Armstrong . . . . .	2	8	3
Nathan B. Forrest	Brig. Gen. John Pegram . . . . .	2	8	2
	Reserve Artillery, Maj. Felix H. Robertson . . . . .	—	—	5

\*Only five brigades of Longstreet's corps engaged. †Severely wounded.

	Union.	Confederate.
Strength . . . . .	58,000	66,000
Casualties, killed . . . . .	1,656	2,389
wounded . . . . .	9,749	13,412
missing . . . . .	4,774	2,003
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	16,179	17,804

**Comments.**—In the Chickamauga campaign Rosecrans repeated the operation of the Tullahoma campaign of maneuvering his adversary out of position by threatening his communications. He would have been absolutely successful had he moved his columns via Lookout Valley to Chattanooga as soon as he learned that the town had been evacuated by *Bragg*. The Union cavalry might have been left in its threatening position at Valley Head and Negley's division at Stevens Gap until the success of the movement was assured.

With a united army he could have held Chattanooga until he received sufficient reinforcements to warrant a further advance. By separating his corps as he did in advancing simultaneously on Alpine, Lafayette and Ringgold, he exposed himself to the danger of being attacked in detail.

When *Bragg* evacuated Chattanooga, Rosecrans was so elated by the success of his maneuver that he gave his orders for the pursuit on the impulse of the moment, based only on reports that *Bragg* was retreating on Rome.

He knew, however, that *Bragg* had been reinforced from *Hardee's Army of Mississippi*, and that there was no good reason why all of *Hardee's* forces should not be sent to *Bragg*. He had also been hearing for days that *Longstreet* was on his way West, though this report had not been verified by Halleck. When his rashness in this maneuver is compared with his hesitation in attacking *Bragg* in the spring of the year, the contrast is very great.

He was slow to recover from his delusion and was inclined to believe Negley had exaggerated the opposition at Dug Gap. When he did realize his perilous position he did all that could be done to unite his army and was fortunately successful.

Having accomplished his concentration, he again became over sanguine and did not give the attention to arranging his lines for the battle of the 20th that the seriousness of the situation demanded.

In leaving the field before the close of the battle, Rosecrans

injured himself in the estimation of the authorities, and he would probably have been relieved from command had they not remembered that it was the inspiration of his courage and bravery that turned Murfreesboro, where his right wing was also broken, from defeat into victory. It was recognized that his failure to return to the battlefield was only an error of judgment.

*Bragg* showed in this campaign the same characteristics as in his invasion of Kentucky. Starting out with a good plan, he failed to push its execution.

His failure to attack Negley in time to destroy him before he could be supported was not his fault, but his complete inaction from the 13th to the 17th while McCook was struggling over mountain roads to reach Thomas, was inexcusable.

Had he employed this time in driving Crittenden back across the Tennessee River, Rosecrans would have been compelled to fall back to that river. The Confederate line of communications was in no danger, since *B. R. Johnson* and *Longstreet* were ready to defend it and Rosecrans would never have dared to venture into the Chickamauga Valley with only two corps.

Having disposed of Rosecrans, *Bragg* might have detached a sufficient force to regain east Tennessee before the Army of the Cumberland was again concentrated.

Like the Perryville campaign, the result of the Chickamauga campaign was disappointing to both the North and the South.

Rosecrans' army had secured the possession of Chattanooga, but the North thought only of the lost battle with its heavy losses. It was afraid, too, that the army and its commander were demoralized and might at any time evacuate that important point.

In the South it had been hoped that with all the troops sent him, *Bragg* would win a victory so decisive that the losses of Vicksburg and Gettysburg would be forgotten. The authorities still hoped that Chattanooga would be again in *Bragg's* possession, but as each day went by they became less hopeful.

In the campaign of Chickamauga is again seen the disadvantage of separate armies. While Rosecrans was engaged in this campaign, two army corps, the XV and XVII, were in Mississippi practically idle. Had Grant been placed in supreme command in the West after Vicksburg, the campaign of Chickamauga would have been made with a force large enough to insure victory.

After the battle of Chickamauga, the Army of the Cumberland fell back to the works of the Confederates about Chattanooga, which it at once began to strengthen. The line thus occupied had both flanks resting on the river, and was three miles long. *Bragg* took up a parallel line with flanks on Missionary Ridge and Look-out Mountain.

On the 29th of September, the President relieved *McCook* and *T. L. Crittenden* and directed that the three corps be consolidated into two, the IV and XIV corps. He assigned *Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger* to the command of the IV corps.\*

As he was completely invested on the south bank of the river, *Rosecrans* received his supplies from *Stevenson* by the wagon road which ran from *Stevenson* up the *Sequatchie Valley* to *Therman* or *Dunlap*, and thence across *Walden Ridge* to the north bank of the river opposite the city. Empty trains were sent by a rough road which skirted the river for a short distance and ran to *Jasper*.

*Rosecrans* was now convinced that he could hold *Chattanooga* indefinitely, if his communications were protected. He therefore asked for reinforcements.

As soon as the result of the battle of *Chickamauga* was known in *Washington*, *Grant* and *Burnside* were directed to send all their available forces to his relief.

At *Halleck's* suggestion, *Grant* directed *Sherman* to transport his corps by water from *Vicksburg* to *Memphis*, and by rail to *Corinth*. From this point he was to advance along and rebuild the railroad as *Buell* had been directed to do the preceding year. *Halleck* ordered the movement over this route to protect western *Tennessee* from invasion. *Burnside* reported his troops as widely scattered and it would be several days before he could move. They were not concentrated until *October 1*.

As no immediate reinforcement would reach *Rosecrans* either from *Grant* or from *Burnside*, the XI and XII corps of the Army of the *Potomac* were ordered to *Tennessee* by rail. *Hooker* was assigned to the command of the two corps.

*Rosecrans* requested that *Hooker* be directed to send his infantry in advance to guard the *Nashville-Chattanooga* railroad.

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\*In *February*, 1864, a court of inquiry passed on the conduct of *McCook*, *Crittenden*, and *Negley*, who had left the field at *Chickamauga*, and acquitted them of any misconduct.

His artillery and trains could follow. At the end of the month the XI corps was at Bridgeport and the XII corps was distributed along the railroad between Stevenson and Nashville.

As he found difficulty in supplying his own troops in Chattanooga, Rosecrans requested that Burnside be left in east Tennessee with his main body so concentrated that he could cooperate with Rosecrans if required. He wished Burnside's cavalry to connect with his own, which was north of the Tennessee River.

Shortly after the battle of Chickamauga, *Bragg* relieved from their commands *Polk*, *D. H. Hill*,\* and *Hindman*.\* *Hardee* returned to *Bragg's* army and *Polk* took command of the *Army of Mississippi*.

*Bragg* was confident that Rosecrans would abandon Chattanooga, and therefore undertook no active operations, other than bombarding the Union lines from Lookout Mountain.

**October.**—On the 1st of October *Bragg* at last became satisfied that Rosecrans did not intend to retreat. He then ordered *Wheeler* to make a raid on the Union communications, and *Longstreet*, whose corps was on the left, to occupy Raccoon Mountain and prevent the use of the river as a Union line of supply.

About the 1st of October, *Wheeler* crossed the Tennessee River near the mouth of the Hiwassee and entered the Sequatchie Valley. Between Dunlap and Jasper he captured a large wagon train and destroyed between three and four hundred wagons. He next captured McMinnville, threatened Murfreesboro, and destroyed the railroad bridges from Murfreesboro to Wartrace. On the south bank of the Duck River, between Shelbyville and Columbia, he was overtaken by the Union cavalry and was defeated. He retreated rapidly for the Tennessee River and crossed it near Tuscumbia about the 9th of October.

On the 7th of October, Brig. Gen. *P. D. Roddey*, who had been on the Tennessee River near Tuscumbia during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns with a Confederate brigade of cavalry, crossed the Tennessee west of Stevenson and attempted to destroy the railroad tunnel and bridge near Decherd. He succeeded in capturing and injuring the former but was unable to capture the bridge. Hearing that *Wheeler* had been defeated, he also retired across the Tennessee River.

*Johnston* sent Maj. Gen. *Stephen D. Lee* with a division of

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\**D. H. Hill* returned to North Carolina. *Hindman* returned to the Army of Tennessee when *Bragg* was relieved in December.



cavalry to Tusculumbia to unite with *Wheeler* and *Roddey* in another raid. This did not take place. Towards the end of the month, *Wheeler* was ordered into the Tennessee Valley above Chattanooga, and *S. D. Lee* returned to northern Mississippi to check Sherman's march from Memphis to Corinth.

The effect of the Confederate cavalry raids was to detain the artillery of Hooker's troops at Nashville, to place the Army of the Cumberland on short rations, and to increase the size of its train guards.

In order to place the three Union armies in the West under a single commander, on October 16, the Department of the Ohio, the Department of the Cumberland, and the Department of the Tennessee east of the Mississippi River, were combined into the Division of the Mississippi.

Grant was placed in command. He was given his choice of two orders assigning him to this command: one with Rosecrans and the other with Thomas in command of the Department of the Cumberland. He chose the latter and on the 18th Rosecrans was relieved. Sherman became the commander of the Department of the Tennessee, and Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer of the XIV army corps Army of the Cumberland.

It had been Rosecrans' intention to open his communications along the river to Bridgeport as soon as Hooker arrived from the East. *Wheeler's* raid, however, prevented Hooker's cooperation before the middle of the month, and then there was another delay because the trains of the XI and XII corps were not sent after them.

The rainy weather that set in about the middle of the month made the mountain roads almost impassable, and again called attention to the necessity of opening a shorter route, Maj. Gen. Wm. F. Smith, chief engineer of his army, submitted a plan of operations to this end to Rosecrans just before the latter was relieved. The change of commanders caused some delay and it was resubmitted to Grant who reached Chattanooga October 22. It was promptly approved.

The plan was simply to force the Confederates to evacuate Raccoon Mountain by landing a force on the south bank of the Tennessee River at Brown Ferry just below the mouth of Look-out Creek, to cooperate with an advance movement by Hooker along the railroad from Bridgeport. Cruft's division of the IV

corps was sent down the north bank to Shellmound to reinforce Hooker. This division remained with Hooker throughout the campaign.

On October 26, the XI corps, followed by one division of the XII corps, moved from Bridgeport. That night, 1,500 men in boats moved down the river, while a force of 4,000 men moved down the north bank to the selected crossing. On the morning of the 27th these troops landed and constructed a bridge. Hooker advanced along the railroad that day and *Law's* brigade evacuated Raccoon Mountain. On the 28th, Hooker reached Brown Ferry.

On the moonlight night of the 28th, Brig. Gen. *Micah Jenkins*, who commanded *Hood's* division, made an attack on Geary's division of the XII corps, which was encamped some distance in rear of the XI corps. The attack was repulsed.

The following day a steamboat, which had been constructed at Bridgeport by the quartermaster's department, reached Kelly Ferry with a large supply of commissary stores, and the Army of the Cumberland received full rations.

There was nothing now to do but await the arrival of Sherman who had been directed by Grant to abandon the railroad, cross the Tennessee River at Florence as Buell had done, and hasten forward to Bridgeport. At the end of October Sherman was crossing the Tennessee River at Florence.

From the top of Lookout Mountain on October 28, *Bragg* saw Hooker advance along the railroad from Bridgeport. He then realized that he had failed in his attempt to retake Chattanooga and he turned his attention to Burnside in east Tennessee who was engaged with Maj. Gen. *Samuel Jones'* troops of western Virginia.

**November.**—On the 4th of November *Longstreet* with the divisions of *Hood* and *McLaws* was detached from the army and ordered to Loudon by rail. *Wheeler*, who had moved from the Tennessee River in Alabama to Cleveland, Tenn., was ordered to cooperate with him in a movement against Burnside.

As soon as Grant learned of this movement he directed Thomas to attack *Bragg* and make a diversion in favor of Burnside. Thomas reported that his artillery was not in condition to move and the attack was postponed until the arrival of Sherman.

Sherman, who was advancing with five divisions, left one at

Athens to repair the railroad and on November 14, reached Bridgeport with his advance division.

**Battle of Chattanooga** (Plate 33).—On November 18, Grant decided on his plan of battle, which he hoped would take place on the 20th or 21st. (For organization see p. 236.)

Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Bridgeport and move his first division to Trenton to impress *Bragg* with the idea that he intended to attack the Confederate left. His four divisions were then to quickly cross to the north bank of the Tennessee at Brown Ferry just west of Chattanooga and concealed by a range of hills, move up the river to a point opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga River. Here he would find Davis' division of the XIV corps with sufficient pontoons in a small tributary of the Tennessee to form a bridge.

He was to cross the Tennessee just below the Chickamauga by surprise, and turn the right flank of the Confederate line by advancing along Missionary Ridge to the hill over the tunnel of the Cleveland-Chattanooga railroad.

When Sherman arrived at that point, Thomas was to cooperate with three divisions of the Army of the Cumberland.

The right wing under Hooker, composed of one division of the XII corps and one of the IV corps was to threaten the Confederate left.

The XI corps was to be on the north bank at Chattanooga as a general reserve.

The division trains of Sherman's corps followed their divisions from Bridgeport which lengthened the columns; rainy weather made the roads difficult; and the bridge at the mouth of Lookout Creek broke after three divisions of Sherman's corps had crossed.

These circumstances altered the plan of battle.

**November 23.**—On the 22d of November, Grant learned that *Bragg* was weakening his lines on Missionary Ridge and he assumed that he was preparing to retreat. Grant therefore ordered Thomas to feel the enemy on the 23d and ascertain the truth.

As a matter of fact, *Bragg* had ordered the divisions of *Buckner* and *Cleburne* to take the train for Loudon to reinforce *Longstreet*.

Thomas placed the divisions of Wood and Sheridan in the front line and supported his right by Baird and his left by the XI corps which had not crossed the river. In the afternoon he advanced

from his line of fortifications and captured the Confederate picket line on Orchard Knob, a low ridge a mile to his front.

This attack and Sherman's movement caused *Bragg* to suspend the movement of *Buckner* and *Cleburne* to Loudon after two brigades of *Buckner's* corps under Brig. Gen. *Bushrod R. Johnson*, had gone, and to order the divisions of *Jackson*, *Stevenson* and *Gist* from his line west of Lookout Creek to the extreme right on Missionary Ridge. (For organization see p. 236.)

**November 24.**—On the night of the 23d, Sherman ferried two of his divisions across the Tennessee above Chattanooga and in the early morning his engineers constructed a bridge for the remaining troops. Grant expected to fight his main battle this day. As Hooker had three divisions, Geary's of the XII corps, Cruft's of the IV corps, and Osterhaus' of the XV corps, Grant modified his original plan and ordered him also to attack this day.

Thomas with the XI corps and four divisions of the IV and XIV corps was to form the center and cooperate with Sherman.

It took some time to get Sherman's troops across the river and form them for attack. He did not get away from the river until noon, and it was 3 p. m. before he reached the hill on Chickamauga River which is in prolongation of Missionary Ridge.

*Cleburne* had returned from the railroad that morning and was placed in reserve. Somewhat later he was sent to occupy the hill towards which Sherman was moving. He reached the position at 2:30 p. m. and sent a brigade northward from the railroad. This encountered Sherman's advance guard.

As it was late in the afternoon both commanders halted their troops for the night. Sherman occupied the hill on Chickamauga River and *Cleburne* a hill further south.

**Lookout Mountain.**—On the Confederate left that morning there were two Confederate brigades of *Stevenson's* division on the summit of Lookout Mountain where they had been sent to observe the roads to Trenton. One brigade of *James K. Jackson's* division was on the west slope of the mountain overlooking Lookout Creek, and one in reserve on the slope running from the crest to the river. One brigade of each division was on the line in the valley between Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Creek.

The 24th was a misty day and clouds covered the mountain nearly all day.

At 8 a. m. Geary's division reinforced by one of Cruft's brigades, crossed Lookout Creek above Wauhatchie and moved northward along the slope of the mountain. Cruft and Osterhaus joined in this movement as Geary moved northward. By noon the Confederate brigade on the west slope was driven to the north end of the mountain where it was reinforced by parts of two other brigades. A sharp fight occurred at this point after which the Confederates retreated a short distance and remained in position until after midnight.

After midnight, the divisions of *Stevenson* and *Jackson* retired across Chattanoga Creek, broke the bridges, and took up a new position on the extreme right of the Confederate line.

Hooker's fight of this day is called the *Battle of Lookout Mountain*.

**November 25.**—Sherman was now in position and the battle as originally planned was to be executed with some little modification. Hooker was to advance and turn *Bragg's* left flank at Rossville Gap.

Grant was on Orchard Knob with Thomas whose troops were to advance only when Hooker reached Missionary Ridge.

On the extreme right of the Confederate line, *Hardee's* wing was posted along two natural bastion fronts, one facing north and one west. North of the Cleveland-Chattanooga railroad were three isolated hills, two forming the bastions and one the curtain; on each of these *Cleburne* had posted a brigade. His fourth brigade was guarding the bridge on his right.

The west front was formed of one of *Cleburne's* bastions, Tunnel Hill, and Missionary Ridge. On this front were the divisions of *Gist*, *Stevenson*, and *J. K. Jackson*, all brought from the lines west of Chattanooga Creek either on the night of the 23d or that of the 24th. As a reserve, there was a brigade of *Breckinridge's* division. A brigade also came from the railroad that morning to reinforce *Cleburne's* brigade on the east side of the Chickamauga River.

*Hardee* had therefore during the battle fourteen brigades, of which two were across Chickamauga River. His front, opposed to Sherman, was only a mile long and had its flanks well protected. Tunnel Hill, which was his salient, was occupied by a battery of four guns, and on its flanks was a brigade well intrenched.

In Thomas' front, on a line two and a half miles long, were nine brigades of the divisions of *Breckinridge*, *Bate*, *Stewart*, and *J. P. Anderson*, and one brigade of *Buckner's* division, all under *Breckinridge*. These forces were nearly equally divided between a trench at the base of Missionary Ridge and an unprotected line on the summit. The troops at the base were to fire a volley at a range of two hundred yards and then retire to the summit.

*Breckinridge* had one brigade beyond his line covering Rossville Gap.

The battle began on the Confederate right and Sherman made desperate efforts to take, and *Hardee* to hold, Tunnel Hill. Several times the Union forces reached its crest only to be swept off its top by the Confederate reinforcements. Sherman was unable to dislodge *Cleburne*, who remained in possession of his line until night.

On the left Hooker was delayed at Chattanooga Creek by broken bridges and did not reach Missionary Ridge until evening.

In the center, on Orchard Knob, Grant and Thomas awaited the development of the plan. As Sherman made no headway, Grant sent the XI corps to his support. Baird's division took its place on Wood's left and Johnson's division moved up on Sheridan's right.

In the afternoon, Grant finally gave the order to Thomas to attack the line in his front to relieve the pressure on Sherman. There was a little delay in getting Baird and Johnson in position, but at 3 o'clock Thomas' four divisions moved forward in two lines and after carrying the Confederate outpost line at the base of Missionary Ridge followed the retreating forces and carried the summit.

Baird's division on reaching the summit was attacked in flank by *Hardee's* forces and compelled to stop. Of the other three divisions Sheridan alone kept his division in hand and followed the retreating Confederates towards Chickamauga River. *Bragg* was able however to withdraw most of *Breckinridge's* wing across that river.

*Hardee* held his lines until dark and then retreated across the Chickamauga.

Having destroyed all the bridges over the Chickamauga, *Bragg* retreated towards Dalton.

Hooker came up at the close of the battle and took possession of Rossville Gap, guarded only by part of a Confederate brigade.

On the following day the Confederate army was pursued beyond Ringgold to the range of hills just west of Dalton where the pursuit ceased.

**December.**—Early in December *Bragg* was relieved at his own request. *Hardee* having declined the appointment, about the last of the month Gen. *J. E. Johnston* was directed to assume command of the *Army of Tennessee*.

The battle of the 25th is known as the *Battle of Missionary Ridge*.

**Comments.**—Rosecrans held Chattanooga long enough to show that the Army of the Cumberland was fairly entitled to that place. Had he been left in command a few days longer he would have driven *Law* from Raccoon Mountain and opened river navigation.

In his campaign of Chattanooga, Grant formed a simple plan which in its essential details he carried out to the end. He was undoubtedly right in his original design of making no attack with his right. The attack on Lookout Mountain only drove the Confederate troops from *Bragg's* left to his right, where they opposed Sherman the next day.

Had Sherman, early on the morning of the 24th, pushed forward the two divisions that crossed the Tennessee at night, he would have reached Tunnel Hill before *Cleburne*, and the entire battle would have been fought as Grant first planned it. The victory would probably have been won on the 24th, as *Bragg* would have been compelled to concentrate behind Chickamauga Creek.

*Bragg* lost by his delays the advantage he secured at Chickamauga. Had he detached a strong force against Burnside as soon as he ascertained that Chattanooga was too strong to assault, he might at least have cleared the upper Tennessee Valley and returned with his whole force to meet Grant. Had *Longstreet* been in reserve behind the center on November 25, the result of the battle would probably have been different.

The tactical deployment of *Bragg's* left wing in two widely separated lines without reserves was very defective. The troops at the top of Missionary Ridge saw those at the bottom driven out of their trenches and pursued up the slope, and were demoralized before the Union troops reached the main Confederate line. Had

the other Union commanders pursued with Sheridan, *Bragg's* losses would have been heavy ere he crossed Chickamauga Creek.

### OPPOSING FORCES IN THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA.

*Union, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.*

*Army of the Cumberland, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.		
IV	Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft . . . . .	2	—		
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan . . . . .	3	6		
Gordon Granger	Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood . . . . .	3	4		
XIV	Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson . . . . .	3	3		
Maj. Gen. John	Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis . . . . .	3	3		
M. Palmer	Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird . . . . .	3	3		
Engineer Division	Brig. Gen. Wm. F. Smith . . . . .	2	—		
Artillery Reserve	Colonel James Barnett . . . . .	2	8		
Brig. Gen. John	. . . . .	2	10		
M. Brannan					
Cavalry	Colonel Eli Long . . . . .	1	—		
Post of Chattanooga,	Colonel John G. Parkhurst . . . . .	1	—		
	<i>Army of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. Wm. T. Sherman.</i>				
XV	Brig. Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus . . . . .	2	3		
	Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith . . . . .	2	3		
	Brig. Gen. Hugh Ewing . . . . .	3	3		
	Brig. Gen. John E. Smith . . . . .	3	3		
	<i>Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker.</i>				
XI	Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr . . . . .	2	—		
Maj. Gen. Oliver	Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz . . . . .	3	5		
O. Howard					
XII	Brig. Gen. John W. Geary . . . . .	3	2		
	<i>Confederate, Gen. Braxton Bragg.</i>				
	<i>Army of Tennessee.</i>				
	Brig. Gen. James K. Jackson . . . . .	4	4		
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson . . . . .	4	4		
Wm. J. Hardee	Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne . . . . .	4	3		
	Brig. Gen. States R. Gist . . . . .	3	3		
	Brig. Gen. J. Patton Anderson . . . . .	4	4		
Maj. Gen. John C.	Brig. Gen. Wm. B. Bate . . . . .	3	3		
Breckinridge	Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart . . . . .	4	3		
	Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner . . . . .	1	4		
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. John A. Wharton . . . . .	2	—		
	Reserve Artillery . . . . .	—	7		
	Union.	Confederate.	Union.	Confederate.	
Strength . . . .	60,000	45,000	Casualties . . . .	5,815	6,687



## THE KNOXVILLE CAMPAIGN.

## PLATE 3.

**September.**—When Maj. Gen. *Simon B. Buckner* retreated from Knoxville to Loudon the end of August, he left a brigade of infantry at Cumberland Gap and another on the railroad east of Knoxville. The brigade at the gap was ordered to evacuate that place when Burnside reached Kingston, but this order was afterwards revoked as it was thought that the brigade would be supported by the troops from western Virginia.

Burnside, with the XXIII corps, reached Knoxville September 2, and at once sent a column to invest Cumberland Gap from the south. The advance brigade of the IX corps in Kentucky was directed to invest it from the north. On September 9, the Confederate brigade of over 2,000 men surrendered without offering resistance.

During the month of September, while *Bragg* was engaged in the Chickamauga campaign, the XXIII corps was moved eastwards to meet Maj. Gen. *Samuel Jones* who had assembled a Confederate infantry division and a cavalry brigade at Abingdon, Va. A Union cavalry brigade was pushed southward as far as the Hiwassee River.

After the battle of Chickamauga, Burnside moved the main body of the XXIII corps to Loudon and called up the IX corps from Kentucky. The latter reached Knoxville via Cumberland Gap about the end of the month.

**October.**—The Confederate force in western Virginia invaded Tennessee early in October and the IX corps was sent eastwards to meet it. Near Greenville, Tenn., the Confederates were defeated on the 10th and returned to Virginia.

The IX corps returned to Knoxville and towards the end of the month took station on the railroad near Loudon, at the junction of the Tennessee and Little Tennessee rivers. The river between Loudon and Kingston was guarded by the XXIII corps, and the Little Tennessee, between the railroad and the mountains, by the cavalry division of the XXIII corps.

To check the Confederates in western Virginia, a division of new troops attached to the IX corps and under the command of Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox was stationed at Jonesboro, Tenn., with two small cavalry brigades covering the Rogersville road.

**November.**—On November 6, Brig. Gen. *Wm. E. Jones*, of the Department of Western Virginia, formerly of *Stuart's* cavalry, attacked and destroyed a brigade of two Union regiments of cavalry at Rogersville, east of Knoxville. Willcox fell back to Morristown.

On November 4, *Longstreet*, with the divisions of *McLaws* and *Micah Jenkins* (*Hood*), was detached from the *Army of Tennessee* and ordered to Loudon by rail. *Wheeler*, who had moved from the Tennessee River in Alabama to Cleveland, Tenn., was directed to cooperate with *Longstreet* in an attack on Burnside at Knoxville.

*Longstreet* entrained his infantry near Cleveland and reached the vicinity of Loudon, November 12.

Leaving two brigades along the railroad near Athens, on the 13th, *Wheeler* with four brigades of cavalry crossed the Little Tennessee and drove a Union cavalry brigade out of Maryville. The next day he approached Knoxville from the south with the intention of capturing the heights on the south bank of the Holston River overlooking the town. Being foiled in this by Sander's cavalry division and the fortifications on the south bank of the river, he crossed to the north bank of the Tennessee River and joined *Longstreet's* infantry.

On the 14th, *Longstreet* threw a bridge over the Tennessee west of Loudon, and with the infantry divisions of *McLaws* and *Jenkins* and two battalions of artillery, 10,000 men, crossed to the north bank.

*Jenkins* moved against Burnside's troops on the railroad while *McLaws*, to intercept Burnside's retreat, took a road further north. Burnside retreated to Knoxville with the entire force west of that place as soon as he learned that *Longstreet* was across the Tennessee. He reached the town in safety on the 16th, and posted his troops in the fortified line about the city. As the fortifications were not in a satisfactory condition, Sanders with his division of cavalry, dismounted, took up a hastily-fortified line west of the city to delay *Longstreet's* advance.

Here Sanders behind a barricade of fence rails held the Confederates for a day and a half, when he himself was killed and the line gave way.

*Longstreet* now invested the intrenched camp of Knoxville, and as a regular siege was out of the question, determined to take the place by assault after an artillery bombardment. After a prelimi-

nary reconnaissance, he selected *Fort Sanders* at the west end of the fortified line as the point of attack.

The Confederate troops were in position by the 20th, and allowing one or two days to prepare the batteries, the assault might have been made on the 21st or 22d had *Longstreet* been more confident of its success. Hearing that *Bushrod R. Johnson* was coming to his assistance with two brigades, he awaited his arrival. With *B. R. Johnson* came *Bragg's* chief engineer, and the assault was postponed until he could pass upon the plan. The assault was thus delayed until the 29th. In the meantime the Union troops had been at work daily strengthening their line.

The point finally assaulted November 29 was a small work—*Fort Sanders*—which had a garrison of 260 men and an artillery armament of four barbette guns. It formed a sharp salient at the extreme west end of the Union line and could be approached under cover to within 200 yards. Its ditch had an average width of twelve feet and an average depth of eight feet. The top of the parapet, which was fifteen feet above the bottom of the ditch, was connected with it by a continuous slope. On the day of the attack the ground was frozen and this slope was covered with sleet.

There were two assaulting columns: one composed of five and the other of four regiments, each in column of regiments. A third column moved on one flank.

The plan finally adopted was to make the attack at daybreak after a short preliminary bombardment.

The assaulting columns formed in the dark and moved forward at dawn. They were thrown into some confusion by wire entanglements but reached the ditch without much loss. Here however they were stopped; the steep, icy slope of the parapet formed an obstacle for which no provision had been made in the way of scaling ladders. Being under severe fire and not able to advance, the troops on the foreground fell back in disorder. Those in the ditch were compelled to surrender. Besides the wounded, over 200 uninjured men surrendered in the ditch.

It was reported to *Longstreet* that the repulse was caused by impenetrable wire entanglements for the removal of which tools should be provided. He at once ordered the supporting columns to halt and cease the attack. Shortly thereafter he received an order from *Bragg* to return to Chattanooga. Before he was ready

to move, he learned that a Union relieving force was on its way from Chattanooga. He then made preparations to retire towards Virginia.

Willcox had orders to withdraw the Union troops from Morristown to Cumberland Gap as soon as communication with Knoxville was interrupted. *Wheeler* interrupted communication on November 16, and on the next day Willcox started for Cumberland Gap which he reached without difficulty. This opened the road from Virginia to Knoxville, and Brig. Gen. *Wm. E. Jones* with two brigades of cavalry joined *Longstreet* just before the assault.

### THE OPPOSING FORCES AT KNOXVILLE.

*Union, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
IX	Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero.....	3	2
Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter	Colonel John F. Hartranft.....	2	—
	Unattached Artillery.....	—	1
XXIII	Brig. Gen. Julius White.....	1	1
Brig. Gen. Mahlon D. Manson	Brig. Gen. Milo S. Hascall.....	2	2
	Reserve Artillery.....	—	2
	Provisional Brigade.....	1	—
Brig. Gen. James M. Shackelford	Brig. Gen. Wm. P. Sanders* (cavalry)....	3	2
	Colonel Israel Garrard (cavalry).....	1	—

\*Killed.

*Confederate, Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet.*

	Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws.....	4	—
	Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins.....	6	—
	Artillery.....	—	9
	Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson.....	2	—
Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler	Maj. Gen. Wm. T. Martin (cavalry)....	2	—
	Brig. Gen. Frank C. Armstrong (cavalry)..	2	1
Dep't Western Virginia	Brig. Gen. Wm. E. Jones (cavalry).....	2	1

	Union.	Confederate.
Strength.....	12,000	20,000

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Casualties in assault	—	26	—	26
on Fort Sanders:	Confederate.....129	458	226	813

**December.**—On December 4, when the relieving force was distant a day's march, *Longstreet* started for Rodgersville. On his way he met Maj. Gen. *Robert Ransom's* infantry division from

western Virginia coming to his support. He returned to Morristown and finally went into winter quarters at Greenville, Tenn.

After the battle of Chattanooga, Grant sent Sherman with the troops under his command and the IV corps of the Army of the Cumberland to Burnside's relief. Sherman reached Maryville on December 5, having sent his cavalry ahead to make a forced march to Knoxville. As *Longstreet* had retreated, and Burnside wanted only two divisions, Sherman sent Granger with the divisions of Sheridan and Wood to Knoxville and returned with the remainder of his force to Chattanooga.

Grant expected Burnside to drive *Longstreet* out of Tennessee but the latter did not take up the pursuit. This compelled Grant to keep a large force in this territory until the following April. At his own request Burnside was relieved December 9 and was succeeded by Maj. Gen. John G. Foster.

**Comments.**—The entire movement of *Longstreet's* corps to the West was badly managed. He had requested to be sent west through the Tennessee Valley before that valley was closed by Burnside's occupation of Knoxville. The movement was, however, not ordered until this route was closed. His corps was therefore transported via South Carolina and did not reach Georgia in time for the battle of Chickamauga. Only one brigade participated in the first day's battle, and only five in the second day's battle. The remaining four brigades, with his artillery, arrived only in time to take part in the investment of Chattanooga. *Longstreet* himself arrived in time to take part in the second day's battle but had no time to make a preliminary study of the ground.

*Longstreet* proposed a movement on Burnside with a strong force immediately after Chickamauga, but *Bragg* would not consent to it.

The expedition was sent only after Rosecrans had been relieved, and *Bragg* was unwilling to detach more than *Longstreet's* two divisions. *Bragg* expected *Longstreet* to return before Sherman arrived; this was made impossible by his lack of efficient transportation. It would have been better for the Confederate army had *Longstreet* remained at Chattanooga.

It is not probable that the Confederate assault at Knoxville would have been successful even had it been made on an earlier day, but the chances of success would have been greater. The

Confederates were deceived as to the depth of the ditch of *Fort Sanders*. They had seen a Union soldier crossing it at its shallowest point, and assumed this to be its general depth.

The Knoxville campaign was a demoralizing one to *Longstreet's* corps. At its close *Longstreet* preferred charges against *McLaws* and two of his brigade commanders. The authorities however did not approve of bringing these officers to trial and simply transferred them to other commands.

The fortifications at Knoxville were designed by Captain O. M. Poe, chief engineer of Burnside's army, who modified the works constructed by the Confederates. The line was very strong in itself, and was further strengthened by interior lines and inundations.

## OPERATIONS IN ARKANSAS IN 1863.

### PLATE 4.

**Arkansas Post.**—Arkansas Post was a fortified place on the Arkansas River a short distance above the mouth of the White River. A square bastion field-work of strong profile with casemated guns, *Fort Hindman*, commanded the river. Field intrenchments about it formed a small intrenched camp. Its garrison consisted of three brigades of infantry with artillery and had a strength of about 5,000 men. Brig. Gen. *Thomas J. Churchill* was in command.

Maj. Gen. McClernand assumed command of Gen. Sherman's troops after their repulse at Chickasaw Bluffs above Vicksburg in the latter part of December, 1862. At Gen. Sherman's suggestion, he decided to employ the troops in an attack on *Arkansas Post*.

**January.**—Preceded by three armored gunboats under Admiral Porter, McClernand's transports proceeded up the Arkansas River and on January 10, he landed his force three miles below the fort.

On the 11th, his troops attacked the intrenched camp, while the navy engaged *Fort Hindman*. When the Union troops were about to assault, white flags were displayed along the Confederate lines and *Churchill* surrendered his entire command.

## OPPOSING FORCES AT ARKANSAS POST.

*Union, Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand.*

*Army of the Mississippi.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
XV	Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele . . . . .	3	3
Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman	Brig. Gen. David Stuart . . . . .	2	3
XIII	Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Smith . . . . .	2	2
Brig. Gen. G. W. Morgan	Brig. Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus . . . . .	3	2
<i>Confederate, Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Churchill.</i>		3	3
	Union.	Confederate.	
Strength . . . . .	30,000	5,000	
Casualties . . . . .	1,061	5,000 including prisoners.	

**Comments.**—On the night of January 10–11, *Churchill* received orders from the department commander, Maj. Gen. *T. H. Holmes*, to hold the place until help arrived or until all his men were dead. This order, given in utter ignorance of the strength of the force which was attacking *Churchill*, compelled the latter to sacrifice his troops.

**July.**—In June, most of the Union troops were withdrawn from Helena, Ark., to take part in the Vicksburg Campaign. Maj. Gen. *Benj. M. Prentiss* was left at that place with 4,000 men.

*Holmes*, who commanded the *District of Arkansas*, had been directed to send reinforcements to *Pemberton* but had failed to comply. He now saw an opportunity of making a diversion in *Pemberton's* favor.

With Maj. Gen. *Sterling Price's* division of infantry and Brig. Gen. *John Marmaduke's* division of cavalry, 6,500 men, he assaulted the intrenchments of Helena, July 4th, the day *Pemberton* surrendered.

The tactical management of his troops was very defective and he was repulsed with a casualty list of 1,600 while *Prentiss* had a list of only 200.

**August.**—After the fall of Vicksburg, Maj. Gen. *Frederick Steele* was sent to Helena with his divisions to operate against *Holmes*.

**September.**—On September 10, *Steele* took possession of the State capital, Little Rock, and *Holmes* retired to Arkadelphia.

About the same time, Union troops from Missouri and Kansas occupied *Fort Smith*.

The Union line was thus advanced from the southern boundary of Missouri to the Arkansas River.

**Results of Campaigns in West in 1863.**—The campaigns of the Union armies in the West in 1863, resulted in the permanent possession of the important strategic points, Knoxville and Chattanooga, Tenn., Vicksburg, Miss., Port Hudson, La., and in the opening of the Mississippi and Arkansas rivers.



## CHAPTER VI.

### THE PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST IN 1864.

The principal operations in the East in 1864 were:

- |                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| February . . .  | Kilpatrick's Richmond, Va., Raid.<br>Attack on Newbern, N. C.<br>Engagement at Olustee, Fla.  |
| April . . . . . | Capture of Plymouth, N. C.  |
| May . . . . .   | Engagement at New Market, Va.<br>Engagement at Drewry Bluff, Va.<br>Battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania, Va.<br>Sheridan's Richmond Raid and engagement at Yellow Tavern, Va.   |
| June . . . . .  | Engagement at Piedmont, Va.<br>Battle of Cold Harbor, Va.<br>Attack on Lynchburg, Va.<br>Sheridan's Trevilian Raid, Va.<br>Gillmore's attack on Petersburg, Va.<br>W. F. Smith's attack on Petersburg, Va.<br>Wilson's raid in southern Virginia. |
| July . . . . .  | Petersburg mine and assault.<br>Engagement on the Monocacy, Md.<br>Engagement at Kernstown, Va.<br>McCausland's Chambersburg raid.  |
| September . .   | Engagements at Globe Tavern and Reams Station, Va.<br>Battles of Winchester and Fisher's Hill, Va.  |
| October . . .   | Engagement at Hatcher Run, Va.<br>Battle of Cedar Creek, Va.  |
| November . .    | Rosser's raid in West Virginia.   |

### MILITARY SITUATION IN THE EAST JANUARY 1, 1864.

(PLATES 2, 5 and 6).

**Confederate.**—On December 31, 1863, the strength of the Confederate troops in the East present for duty was approximately as follows:

Army of Northern Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee . . . . .	46,000
Department of Richmond, Maj. Gen. Arnold Elzey . . . . .	6,000
Department of North Carolina, Maj. Gen. Geo. E. Pickett . . . . .	18,000
Department of South Carolina, Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard . . . . .	28,000
Department of Western Virginia, Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones . . . . .	11,000
Valley District, Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden . . . . .	2,500
Total . . . . .	111,500
Total present . . . . .	125,000

The *Army of Northern Virginia*, then consisting of the corps of *Ewell* and *Hill* and *Stuart's* cavalry, was along the south bank of the Rapidan River with headquarters at Orange Court House. *Longstreet*, with the divisions of *McLaws* and *Hood*, was in eastern Tennessee near the Virginia State line. The brigades of *Pickett's* division were in the *Department of Richmond* and the *Department of North Carolina* where they were being recruited.

Of the troops in the *Department of North Carolina*, about 6,000 were in the defenses of Wilmington and the remainder along the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad.

In South Carolina, *Beauregard* was defending Charleston against the attacks of Gillmore.

**Union.**—On December 31, 1863, the strength of the Union troops in the East present for duty was as follows:

Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.....	81,000
Dep't of Virginia and North Carolina, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler	29,000
Department of the South, Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore.....	26,000
Department of Washington, Maj. Gen. Christopher C. Augur.....	24,000
Department of West Virginia, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Kelley.....	23,000
Middle Department, Brig. Gen. Henry H. Lockwood.....	7,000
	<hr/>
Total.....	190,000
Total present..	232,000

The Army of the Potomac was on the north bank of the Rapidan with headquarters at Culpeper, Virginia. The troops in the various eastern departments were distributed as at the close of the preceding year.

**Preparations.**—The first months of 1864 were spent by both belligerents in preparing for the coming campaign.

Both armies were about to lose the volunteers of 1861, who had enlisted for three years. To encourage the reenlistment of Union troops, furloughs were granted to entire regiments to go to their homes to reorganize and recruit, and the bounty of \$400.00 was paid for each reenlistment; to encourage reenlistment in the Confederate army, furloughs were granted and the organizations that reenlisted received the thanks of the Confederate Congress.

**Kilpatrick's Richmond Raid** (Plates 2, 13 and 14).—During the month of February there took place one of the sensational expeditions of the war, the purposes of which were to scatter amnesty proclamations within the enemy's lines, and if possible, to free

the Union prisoners who were within the intrenched camp at Richmond. The plan of the expedition was drawn up by Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick and the Secretary of War. Meade ordered its execution without giving any definite instructions.

On the night of February 28, Kilpatrick with a force of about 3,600 picked Union cavalymen crossed the Rapidan at Ely Ford. The following day, at Spottsylvania, his column separated. The main body under Kilpatrick rode straight for Richmond, while 500 men under Maj. Ulric Dahlgren rode for Goochland near the James River about 30 miles above Richmond where they were to cross the river and attack Richmond from the south.

Kilpatrick reached the fortifications of Richmond on March 2. Finding it impossible to enter the lines by surprise, he abandoned his plan of freeing the prisoners, turned eastwards and recrossed the Chickahominy River at Mechanicsville. He remained in the vicinity of Cold Harbor during the following day skirmishing with the Confederates and waiting for Dahlgren.

On the 4th he joined Maj. Gen. Butler's forces at New Kent Court House. Kilpatrick had expected Butler's troops to reinforce him in front of Richmond, but they were unable to reach the rendezvous.

Dahlgren reached the James River but was unable to cross; he therefore moved down the north bank to join Kilpatrick. In the vicinity of Richmond his command was attacked and became separated; the larger part of it reached Kilpatrick in safety on March 3. Dahlgren with a hundred men passed to the north of White House and crossed the Pamunkey and Mattaponi rivers. Shortly after crossing the latter river his command was ambushed; Dahlgren was killed and his troops were captured.

This expedition caused considerable excitement because of papers found on Dahlgren indicating his intention to burn the city of Richmond and kill President *Davis* and his cabinet. In reply to a letter from *Lee*, Meade assured him that no such instructions had been given Dahlgren by his civil or military superiors.

Strengthened by a large force of infantry and cavalry, Kilpatrick raided the country near the scene of Dahlgren's death and then went to Yorktown. From that place his command was transported by water to the Army of the Potomac.

In his operations Kilpatrick lost 340 men and 583 horses.

**Plans.**—The almost uniform success that had attended the operations of Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, had caused the United States Congress to authorize his promotion to the grade of lieutenant general. Early in March he was assigned as general in chief and Maj. Gen. Halleck became the chief of staff of the War Department.

Grant's plan for the operations of the eastern armies was to concentrate in Virginia and West Virginia all his available mobile forces and to make a simultaneous advance in three columns.

His right wing was to advance against the Confederates in western Virginia and approach Richmond via Lynchburg.

His center was to operate against the *Army of Northern Virginia* which was guarding the Rapidan south of Culpeper.

His left wing was to operate against the Confederate forces guarding the Confederate capital via the south bank of the James River.

If all went well, the three columns would unite at Richmond.

Since the Confederate forces in Virginia were too weak to assume the offensive, *Lee* made no definite plan for operations in Virginia, but awaited the development of the plan of his adversary. In the meantime he ordered offensive operations in North Carolina from which some of the Union troops had been withdrawn.

**April** (Plate 2).—During the month of April, the three Union columns were concentrated on the proposed lines of operation.

Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, who commanded the Department of West Virginia, assembled a force of 10,000 men at Charleston, W. Va., under Brig. Gen. George Crook. At Strasburg, he assembled a force of 7,000 men of which he was to take personal command (see p. 251).

While Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, Crook was to cross the Flat Top Mountains and the two columns would unite at Salem for an advance on Lynchburg.

The Army of the Potomac, which was south of Culpeper, had been reorganized by Gen Meade and its five army corps had been consolidated into the II, V and VI Corps commanded respectively by Maj. Gens. Winfield S. Hancock, Gouverneur K. Warren and John Sedgwick. Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan had been assigned to command the cavalry corps. The strength of the army was about 105,000 men present for duty. (See p. 262).

To cooperate with the Army of the Potomac, the IX corps had been assembled at Annapolis, Md., and there reorganized. It was moved from Annapolis to Bealeton, Va., in rear of the Army of the Potomac. It was commanded by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside and had a strength of about 19,000 men. (See p. 263).

Grant took personal direction of the operations of the Army of the Potomac and the IX corps.

Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, who now commanded the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, organized the Army of the James on the shores of the York River near Yorktown. It consisted of the X and XVIII corps commanded respectively by Maj. Gens. Quincy A. Gillmore and William F. Smith and a cavalry division under Brig. Gen. August V. Kautz. Its strength was about 37,000 men. (See p. 253.)

To meet the offensive operations of the Union forces whose strength and location became known to the Confederate authorities through spies, newspapers, etc., the following distribution of troops was ordered.

Maj. Gen. *John C. Breckinridge* was charged with the defense of western Virginia. He had under his orders about 9,000 men who were distributed in small brigades at the important points along the railroad from Abingdon to Salem, and at Warm Springs and Harrisonburg. His headquarters were near Newbern. (See p. 251.)

Of the *Army of Northern Virginia*, *Ewell's* corps was guarding the Rapidan River between the railroad and Mine Run (plate 13). *A. P. Hill's* corps was on the left of *Ewell's* with headquarters at Orange C. H. *Longstreet's* corps had been recalled from east Tennessee and was in the vicinity of Gordonsville.

Of *Early's* divisions of *Ewell's* corps, *Hoke's* brigade was in North Carolina; of *Rodes'* division of the same corps, *R. D. Johnston's* brigade was at Hanover Junction where it had been sent in February.

Of *Longstreet's* corps, two brigades of *Pickett's* division were in North Carolina and two in Richmond.

Of *Stuart's* cavalry, four brigades were on the left flank of the army with headquarters near Orange C. H., and two were picketing the Rapidan east of Germanna Ford and the lower Rappahannock with headquarters on the railroad near Guiney Station (plate 13).

The cavalry was being reorganized into a corps of three divisions

under Maj. Gens. *Wade Hampton*, *Fitz Lee* and *Wm. H. F. Lee*. Each division had two brigades. *Hampton's* division was to have a third brigade but this brigade was in South Carolina and could not join before May 20.

Deducting the detached troops, *Lee* had about 62,000 men to meet the combined forces of Meade and Burnside. (See p. 263.)

To meet any movement that might be made south of the James River, on the 20th of April, *Beauregard* relieved *Pickett* of the command of the *Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia* as *Lee* wanted *Pickett* with his division and *Hoke's* brigade, now under Col. *Lewis*, to rejoin their commands.

In addition to the detached forces of the *Army of Virginia*, *Beauregard* had four brigades of infantry and a small brigade of cavalry in Virginia, seven brigades of infantry in North Carolina, and three in South Carolina and Georgia which had been ordered northward.

If Butler would give him time to concentrate his brigades, *Beauregard* would have about 20,000 men to oppose Butler's 37,000.

## THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN FROM MAY 1 TO MAY 20.

**Operations of the Union Right Wing** (Plate 2).—About the 1st of May, Gen. Crook moved southward from the Kanawha Valley with 8,000 infantry to march on Newbern via Raleigh and Princeton. In the vicinity of Newbern, on May 9, he defeated the infantry and cavalry brigades left by *Breckinridge* to dispute his way and then destroyed the New River railroad bridge. Here he was informed that *Breckinridge* was in his front with a formidable force. He therefore moved northward to Lewisburg, to unite with Sigel before advancing on Lynchburg. He reached Lewisburg May 19.

Brig. Gen. Wm. W. Averell, with the cavalry division of Crook's column, moved southward from Charleston, W. Va., via Logan towards Abingdon, Va., to destroy the Confederate salt works at Saltville and that vicinity and found them well guarded. Not wishing to engage a force of unknown strength, Averell turned eastward, had a skirmish near Wytheville, and eventually joined Crook near Lewisburg.

Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley from Strasburg and reached New Market. Here on the 15th of May he was attacked by *Breckinridge*. The Confederate forces consisted of *Imboden's* cavalry brigade, two brigades of *Breckinridge's* department and the cadet battalion of the *Virginia Military Institute*. Sigel was defeated and fell back to Strasburg.

Sigel's defeat temporarily checked the advance of the Union right wing.

OPPOSING FORCES IN WESTERN VIRGINIA MAY, 1864.

*Union.*

*Department of West Virginia, Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel.*

*Right Column, Brig. Gen. George Crook.*

Divisions.	Brigades.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Brig. Gen. George Crook	Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes.....	1	-	-
	Colonel Carr B. White.....	1	-	-
	Colonel Horatio B. Sickel.....	1	-	-
	Captain James R. McMullin.....	-	-	2
Brig. Gen. William W. Averell	Colonel James M. Schoonmaker (cavalry)...	1	2	-
	Colonel John H. Oley (cavalry).....	1	3	-
	Brig. Gen. Alfred N. Duffié (cavalry).....	1	3	-

*Left Column, Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel.*

Brig. Gen. Jeremiah C. Sullivan	Colonel August Moor.....	1	-	-
	Colonel Joseph Thoburn.....	1	-	-
	Artillery.....	-	-	4
Maj. Gen. Julius Stahel	Colonel William B. Tibbits (cavalry).....	1	5	-
	Colonel John E. Wynkoop (cavalry).....	1	2	-
	Captain Chatham T. Ewing.....	-	-	1

*Confederate.*

*Department of Southwest Virginia, Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge.*

Infantry	Brig. Gen. John Echols.....	1	-	-
	Brig. Gen. Gabriel C. Wharton.....	1	-	-
	Colonel John McCausland.....	1	-	-
	Brig. Gen. John C. Vaughn (dism. cav.).....	-	-	-
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. William E. Jones.....	1	5	-
	*Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins.....	1	3	-
	Colonel William E. Jackson.....	1	3	-
Artillery	.....	-	-	7

*Valley District, Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden.*

Cavalry	Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden.....	1	3	1
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\*Mortally wounded at Newbern.

**Operations of the Union Left Wing** (Plates 10 and 34).—On the 4th of May the X and XVIII corps were embarked at Yorktown and on the 5th proceeded up the James River. The division of colored troops of the XVIII corps took possession of City Point on the south bank of the James River below the mouth of the Appomattox River, and the main body was landed at Bermuda Hundred on the south bank of the James River above the mouth of the Appomattox.

After landing, Butler secured his position by constructing a line of intrenchments across the peninsula between the James and Appomattox rivers. This line was three miles long and was only two miles east of the Richmond-Petersburg railroad.

From this position Butler could advance either on Richmond or on Petersburg.

When the Union troops landed at Bermuda Hundred the Confederate garrison of Richmond consisted of four brigades of infantry and the local artillery troops. At Petersburg there was but a single regiment.

The first of the brigades from the Carolinas reached Petersburg only on May 6.

**May 7.**—On May 7, Butler sent four brigades to reconnoiter towards Petersburg. These were encountered and checked at the Richmond-Petersburg railroad by two Confederate brigades, one sent from South Carolina and the other from Richmond. The Union troops returned to their intrenched line.

**May 9.**—On the 9th, Butler's army advanced in force on Petersburg, but was checked by the same two brigades in an intrenched position along Swift Creek, a branch of the Appomattox, three miles north of Petersburg. The Union troops again withdrew into their intrenched line on the 11th, and allowed *Beauregard*, with seven Confederate brigades, which had just arrived from the Carolinas, to march from Petersburg to Richmond.

**May 12.**—On the 12th, Butler's troops advanced in force on Richmond and during the next three days drove the Confederates into their intrenched lines at Drewry Bluff, seven miles below Richmond.

**May 16.**—On the 16th, however, the day after Sigel's defeat at New Market, *Beauregard* took the offensive with ten brigades



to attack the Army of the James in front, and ordered two brigades under Maj. Gen. *Wm. H. Whiting* to move from Petersburg and to attack it in rear.

This attack was not so decisive as *Beauregard* had hoped, due to the failure of the Petersburg troops to cooperate. However, it compelled Butler to retire within his intrenched line and enabled *Beauregard* to confine him there by constructing an opposing line in his front between Trent Reach and Port Walthall.

Having thus "bottled up" Butler's army, *Beauregard* sent to *Lee*, *Pickett's* division and *Lewis'* brigade of *Ewell's* corps which reduced his own force to 14,500 men.

His infantry he organized into two divisions of four brigades each under Maj. Gens. *Robert F. Hoke* and *Bushrod R. Johnson*. One brigade was left in the defenses of Richmond.

**Kautz' Raids** (Plate 2).— In connection with the movement of the Army of the James, Butler's cavalry division, 3,000 men, under Brig. Gen. August V. Kautz moved out from Norfolk via Suffolk, Va., May 5, and on the 8th destroyed the Petersburg-Weldon railroad bridge over the Nottoway River and the stations in its vicinity. He then moved to City Point and joined Butler's army.

Moving out with that army on the 12th, Kautz crossed the Petersburg-Richmond railroad and went westward as far as the Richmond-Danville railroad, where he destroyed part of that road. Turning southward he marched around Petersburg destroying sections of the Petersburg-Lynchburg and Petersburg-Weldon roads. He then returned to City Point.

Theoretically the operations of Kautz' division on the Nottoway River should have delayed *Beauregard's* movement into Virginia; practically it seems to have had no effect.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN SOUTHERN VIRGINIA IN MAY, 1864.

*Union, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
X.	Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry.....	4	—	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John W. Turner.....	2	—	3
Quincy A.	Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames.....	2	—	3
Gillmore	Engineers, Col. Edward W. Serrell.....		1 regiment	

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
XVIII.	Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks . . . . .	3	—	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel . . . . .	2	—	4
William F. Smith	Brig. Gen. Edward W. Hinks . . . . .	2	colored	3
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. August V. Kautz . . . . .	2	4	2
Siege Artillery	Colonel Henry L. Abbot . . . . .		1 regiment	
<i>Confederate, Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard.</i>				
<i>Lieut. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, volunteer aid.</i>				
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Archibald Gracie, Jr. . . . .	1	—	—
Robert Ransom	Brig. Gen. Seth M. Barton . . . . .	4	—	—
Jr.	Colonel William R. Terry . . . . .	1	—	—
	Lieut. Col. William G. Lewis . . . . .	1	—	—
	Artillery . . . . .	—	—	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Montgomery D. Corse . . . . .	1	—	—
Robert F. Hoke	Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson . . . . .	1	—	—
	Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Clingman . . . . .	1	—	—
	Brig. Gen. Johnson Hagood . . . . .	1	—	—
	Artillery . . . . .	—	—	3
Brig. Gen.	Colonel John T. Lofton (Colquitt) . . . . .	1	—	—
Alfred H.	Brig. Gen. Matthew W. Ransom . . . . .	1	—	—
Colquitt	Artillery . . . . .	—	—	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise . . . . .	1	—	—
William H. C.	Brig. Gen. James G. Martin . . . . .	1	—	—
Whiting	Brig. Gen. James Darling (cavalry) . . . . .	1	4	—
	Artillery . . . . .	—	—	4

The above gives the temporary organization of *Beauregard's* force in the engagement at *Drewry Bluff*.

The brigades of *Gracie* and *B. R. Johnson* were the two brigades of *Buckner's* corps that operated with *Longstreet* in east Tennessee and accompanied him to Virginia.

The brigades of *Barton*, *Terry* and *Corse* were three of *Pickett's* brigades; the fourth, *Hunton's*, was in Richmond itself.

*Lewis'* brigade belonged to *Early's* division of *Ewell's* corps.

After *Pickett* and *Lewis* left him, *Beauregard* sent *Gracie's* brigade to Richmond and organized his remaining brigades as follows:

Division.	Brigade.	Division.	Brigades
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Hagood	Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Ransom, M. W.
R. F. Hoke	Brig. Gen. Clingman	B. R. Johnson	Brig. Gen. Wise
	Brig. Gen. Colquitt		Brig. Gen. Elliott, S. E.
	Brig. Gen. Martin		Col. Page, E. R.

Maj. Gen. *Robert Ransom* was sent to Lynchburg to defend that town.

**Operations of the Union Centre** (Plate 13). **Battle of the Wilderness.**—At the opening of the Richmond campaign, Grant had in the Army of the Potomac and the IX corps 96,000 infantry and 14,000 cavalry present for duty. In the infantry is included a brigade of heavy artillery, Kitching's brigade, intended as a guard for the reserve artillery but which fought with the V corps in the battle of the Wilderness and later became a brigade of that corps. In his artillery, Grant had 354 guns, or about 3 guns per 1,000 men. His engineer brigade numbered about 2,300 men. (See p. 262.)

In *Lee's Army of Northern Virginia* there were 50,000 infantry and 8,500 cavalry present for duty. His artillery had about 193 guns, or 3.3 guns per 1,000 men. (See p. 263.)

No material reinforcements were received by either army until the battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania had been fought.

In the Union army there were fifteen infantry divisions of an average strength of 6,400 men, or forty-one infantry brigades of an average strength of 2,300 men. In the Confederate army there were eight infantry divisions of an average strength of 6,200 men, or thirty-five brigades of an average strength of 1,400 men.

After carefully considering the military situation, Grant decided to turn his adversary's right flank, which rested on Mine Run, by crossing the Rapidan east of that stream at Germanna and Ely fords. The crossing was to be effected by a rapid night march and, since *Longstreet* was far distant, it was hoped that the Union army would reach the open country some distance south of the Rapidan before *Lee* could concentrate to dispute the movement.

The orders for the Army of the Potomac were issued on May 2, and on the following day Gregg's cavalry division was moved to the vicinity of Ely Ford and Wilson's cavalry division to the vicinity of Germanna Ford.

**May 4** (Plate 35).—About midnight on the 3d, Wilson's cavalry division, after protecting the construction of two bridges at Germanna Ford, crossed the Rapidan and in the morning moved to Parker Store on the Orange Plank Road three miles west of the Brock Road. Wilson threw out from that place patrols on all roads running towards the Confederate army.

The V corps followed Wilson's cavalry and stopped at Wilderness Tavern. The VI corps followed the V corps and crossed the Rapidan on the afternoon of the 4th. The IX corps, which was still north of the Rappahannock River, crossed that river and moved towards Germanna Ford.

Gregg's cavalry division protected the construction of two bridges at Ely Ford, and on the morning of the 4th moved through Chancellorsville to Aldrich, the junction of Orange Plank and Catharpin roads (plate 27). The II corps followed Gregg's cavalry and moved to Chancellorsville.

The trains crossed at Ely Ford and at Culpeper Ford on May 4 and 5, and followed the II corps.

Torbert's cavalry division guarded the rear and right flank of the army and remained on the north bank of the Rapidan until the following day.

Early in the afternoon of May 4, all the Union troops reached their selected bivouacs.

**Confederate.**—On May 2, *Lee* was aware that some movement was contemplated by his adversary, but he gave no orders until the morning of the 4th.

*Ewell*, with his three divisions, was then ordered to concentrate at Verdiersville (plate 13) and move eastwards on the Orange pike towards Wilderness Tavern. He encamped the night of the 4th five miles from the junction of the Brock and Germanna roads.

*A. P. Hill*, who was on *Ewell's* left, was ordered to move with the divisions of *Heth* and *Wilcox* on the Plank Road. *Heth* encamped the night of the 4th at Mine Run crossing. *Anderson's* division remained in position on the Rapidan.

*Longstreet* was ordered to move to *Ewell's* right. He started to make a night march from the vicinity of Gordonsville at 4 p. m. on the 4th. He was expected to reach the field by the Catharpin Road on the morning of the 6th.

One regiment of *Stuart's* cavalry moved to the left flank of *Ewell's* corps; the remainder of the cavalry corps was ordered to assemble on the Catharpin Road near Craig on the right flank of the Confederate army (plate 38).

**Union.**—Since no Confederate troops were encountered on the 4th, that night Meade issued his orders for the following day. Wilson's cavalry was to leave a regiment at Parker Store and

move to Craig on the Catharpin Road; Gregg and Torbert were to move eastward to reconnoiter and protect the rear of the army from Stuart's cavalry, thought to be south of Fredericksburg; the II corps was to move to the Po River via Todd Tavern; the V corps to Parker Store; the VI corps to Wilderness Tavern; the trains to Todd Tavern.

Burnside, who was still north of the Rapidan, was ordered to cross at Germanna Ford.

**Confederate.**—*Lee* issued no orders for the 5th, as he had cautioned his corps commanders not to bring on a general engagement until *Longstreet* arrived.

**May 5.—Orange Turnpike** (Plate 35).—The opposing troops on the Orange Turnpike were too near each other to prevent contact, and early in the morning *Ewell's* advance brigade became engaged with the flank guard of the V corps. Warren was ordered to halt his corps and ascertain the strength of the Confederate force. At this time the head of the V corps was on the road connecting Wilderness Tavern with Parker Store and a mile from the store.

Warren advanced against *Ewell* about noon through the thick undergrowth just south of the Orange Turnpike and about a mile and a half west of Wilderness Tavern. The divisions of Griffin and Wadsworth, supported by that of Robinson, were in the attack; Crawford's division of the V corps was too far on the road to Parker Store to take part. The attack was repulsed, Crawford was recalled, and the V corps fell back and intrenched itself in the southwest angle of the Orange Turnpike and Brock roads, about a mile west of the Brock Road.

Wright's division of the VI corps had been directed to assist the V corps by making a simultaneous attack along the Orange Grove Road; Wright however found it impossible to get through the thick undergrowth in time to take part in the attack. His division was not in position until 3 p. m. and then repulsed an attack made on it by two brigades of *Edward Johnson's* division. Rickett's division of the VI corps, which had been left to guard Germanna Ford until the arrival of Burnside's corps, took its position on Wright's right late in the afternoon. The VI corps was in the northwest angle of the cross-roads.

**Orange Plank Road** (Plate 35).—During the morning of the 5th, the Union cavalry regiment left at Parker Store by Wilson reported Confederates advancing on the Plank Road. Getty's division of the VI corps was therefore sent to the junction of the Brock and Orange Plank roads to protect the left flank of the V corps. Here it threw up a line of breastworks along the Brock Road.

*Heth's* division of *Hill's* corps reached Parker Store about noon and advanced towards the Brock Road, but made no attack on Getty. *Wilcox's* division followed *Heth* and deployed on his left to connect with *Ewell's* corps.

Hancock's corps followed the route prescribed for it via the Furnace Road (plate 27), and at 9 a. m. its leading division was just beyond Todd Tavern and its rear division was at the Cathar-pin Furnace. Here the corps was halted and later the leading divisions were counter-marched and deployed on Getty's left along the Brock Road. The head of the II corps reached Getty about 2 p. m., and shortly after 4 p. m., Getty was ordered to attack *Hill's* corps and Hancock was ordered to support him.

The attack (plate 35) was made between 4 and 5 p. m. by the divisions of Getty, Birnie and Mott, supported by Gibbon; it was resisted by the divisions of *Heth* and *Wilcox*. The Union troops were repulsed. Wadsworth's division of the V corps, which had been ordered to move down on *Hill's* left flank and take part in this attack, was unable to get through the undergrowth in time. Barlow's division was left at Trigg, two miles from the Plank Road, to protect Hancock's left flank.

**Cavalry** (Plate 13).—One brigade of Wilson's cavalry division advanced to Craig on the morning of the 5th, where it was attacked by *Rosser's* cavalry brigade which was advancing on the Cathar-pin Road at the head of *Stuart's* cavalry. Wilson, finding his position too far advanced for safety, fell back to Todd Tavern where Gregg's division joined him. Together they drove the pursuing Confederate cavalry back across the Po.

Gen. Sheridan sent a reconnoitering force from Gregg's division at Aldrich in the direction of Fredericksburg where two of *Hamp-ton's* brigades had been in camp, and the remainder of the division towards Todd Tavern to guard Hancock's flank. Torbert's

division was ordered to Chancellorsville to guard the trains. That night Sheridan's cavalry bivouacked near Aldrich.

**Night May 5-6.**—On the night of May 5, Grant's entire army, save one division of the IX corps, was across the Rapidan River; Ferrero's division of colored troops was still on the north bank. On the following morning this division marched to Chancellorsville and relieved the cavalry as train guard. It remained with the trains until the Union army was south of the James River.

Of *Lee's* army, *Longstreet's* two divisions bivouacked at Craig on the Catharpin Road; *Anderson's* division of *Hill's* corps bivouacked on the Plank Road several miles in rear of the army; *Ewell* also had a brigade which was coming up from Hanover Junction. On the morning of the 6th, *Lee* expected a reinforcement of fifteen brigades. *Stuart's* cavalry was ordered to concentrate at Craig.

**Plans.**—Since no prisoners of *Longstreet's* corps or of *Anderson's* division were taken on the 5th, Grant gave orders to renew the attack on the turnpike and on the plank road at 4:30 a. m. before these troops could come up. The time was later changed to 5 a. m.

Warren and Sedgwick, with fourteen brigades, were to attack *Ewell*.

Hancock, reinforced by the divisions of Wadsworth and Getty giving him eighteen brigades, was to attack *Hill's* corps. Burnside was to connect Warren and Hancock with two of his divisions and station one division as a reserve at Wilderness Tavern.

**May 6** (Plate 35).—**The Orange Turnpike.**—Promptly at 5 a. m. Warren attacked *Ewell's* right while Sedgwick attacked his center and left. *Ewell* had carefully intrenched his position and both assaults were repulsed. A second assault was made in the course of the morning which suffered the same fate. The attacks then ceased.

During the course of the day Brig. Gen. *John B. Gordon*, who commanded the left brigade of *Ewell's* corps, discovered that he out-flanked the VI corps and suggested that an attack be made on the right flank of that corps. Late in the afternoon he was reinforced by *R. D. Johnston's* brigade which had just reported from Hanover Junction and was directed to attack. His assault was successful and he captured a large number of prisoners including two

brigade commanders. It was too late in the day to make much use of the advantage gained. Before the morning of the 7th the line of the VI corps was adjusted as in plate 35, and its right flank was well protected by artillery.

**The Orange Plank Road** (Plate 35).—Since *Longstreet* would probably advance on the Catharpin Road from Gordonsville, which would bring him to Todd Tavern or to Trigg, Hancock posted the divisions of Barlow and Gibbon under Gibbon in the vicinity of Trigg to check *Longstreet's* advance. This left Hancock only eleven of his eighteen brigades with which to make the attack on *Hill's* corps.

At 5 a. m. Hancock assaulted the line in his front and after a desperate struggle forced back the Confederate divisions of *Heth* and *Wilcox*. Just as the Confederate line was broken, *Longstreet*, who had taken the road from Craig to Parker Store, arrived on the field. The divisions of *Kershaw* and *Field* were deployed to support *Hill* and at 6:30 a. m. checked the Union attack. *Ander-son's* division of *Hill's* corps arrived immediately thereafter.

Hancock now directed Gibbon to send Barlow's division against *Longstreet's* right flank. When this order reached Gibbon, some troops were seen advancing up the Brock Road from the direction of Todd Tavern where heavy firing was heard. Believing this to be a part of *Longstreet's* column, Gibbon sent but two brigades to Hancock. The troops seen approaching from Todd Tavern proved to be Union convalescents returning to the army via Chancellorsville. The firing was that of a cavalry engagement which was taking place at the junction of the Furnace and the Brock roads, a mile north of Todd Tavern.

At 9 a. m. Hancock renewed the attack having been reinforced by two brigades from his left wing and the reserve division of the IX corps. He was informed that Burnside would attack on his right. Hancock's attack was soon brought to a standstill as Burnside was not in position.

About 10 a. m. *Lee* sent four of his brigades under his chief engineer to find a position from which a flank attack could be made on Hancock. These brigades formed line along the partially constructed railroad parallel to and south of the Orange Plank Road and advanced northwards taking Hancock in flank and rear. This attack forced Hancock back to the Brock Road where



his troops took refuge behind the log breastworks thrown up the day before.

*Longstreet* was preparing to move his whole line forward when he was wounded by his own men and was compelled to retire from the field. This accident checked the Confederate movement. The Confederate troops halted in front of the Union breastworks and their attack was not renewed until 4:30 p. m. when the Union line was unsuccessfully assaulted.

**Cavalry.**—As on the preceding day the Union cavalry covered the left flank of the II corps.

Two brigades of Torbert's cavalry division under Brig. Gen. George Custer followed the II corps along the Furnace Road (plate 13) parallel to and north of the Catharpin Road, and in the afternoon repulsed an attack made by the Confederate cavalry near the junction of the Brock and Furnace roads. That night Torbert's three brigades bivouacked at the Catharpin Furnace. At this time Torbert went on sick leave and Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt assumed command of the division.

Gregg's division skirmished with the Confederate cavalry at Todd Tavern and bivouacked that night at Piney Branch Church (plate 36). Wilson's division was posted at Aldrich and Piney Branch Church during the day and bivouacked near Chancellorsville that night.

*Stuart's* cavalry bivouacked near Todd Tavern.

The battle of the Wilderness closed on May 6. Early on the following day Grant decided to make no more attacks on *Lee's* position, but to move the Union army by the left flank and compel *Lee* to evacuate his intrenched lines. For this purpose the bridges over the Rapidan were taken up and a new base was established at Belle Plain (plate 13) on the Potomac, northeast of Fredericksburg.

**Comments.**—This battle was fought in a dense tangle of undergrowth, which made maneuvering almost impossible. The general officers could neither ascertain the exact position of the opposing troops nor follow the movements of their own. It was impossible for troops to keep either alignment or direction. Again and again attacking troops found that they were advancing in such a direction as to expose a flank to the concealed enemy. It was even difficult to distinguish friend from foe, as was shown

by the wounding of *Longstreet* and the killing of Brig. Gen. *Micah Jenkins*, who was with him, by *Longstreet's* own men.

As the troops fought at short range the losses were very heavy. The casualties of the Union army were 2,246 killed, 12,037 wounded, 3,383 missing, or 17,666 in all. It is probable that the percentage in the Confederate army was fully as great. Of the general officers, Brig. Gens. James W. Wadsworth and Alexander Hays of the Union army, and Brig. Gen. *John M. Jones*, *Micah Jenkins*, and *Leroy A. Stafford* of the Confederate army, were either killed or mortally wounded. Brig. Gens. Truman Seymour and Alexander Shaler of the Union army were captured.

Neither commander could claim a tactical success, but Gen. Grant could claim a strategic success, for his army was now safely established on the south bank of the Rapidan.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN BATTLES OF WILDERNESS AND SPOTTSYLVANIA.

*Union, Lieut. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.*

*Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
II.	Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow . . . . .	4	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John Gibbon . . . . .	3	—
Winfield S.	Maj. Gen. David B. Birney . . . . .	2	—
Hancock	Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott . . . . .	2	—
	Artillery, Colonel John C. Tidball . . . . .	—	10
V.	Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin . . . . .	3	—
Maj. Gen.	† Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson . . . . .	3	0
Gouverneur	Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford . . . . .	2	1
K. Warren	* Brig. Gen. James W. Wadsworth . . . . .	3	—
	Artillery, Colonel Charles S. Wainwright . . . . .	—	9
VI.	Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright . . . . .	4	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. George W. Getty . . . . .	4	—
*John Sedgwick	Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts . . . . .	2	—
	Artillery, Colonel Charles H. Tompkins . . . . .	—	—
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. Alfred T. A. Torbett . . . . .	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg . . . . .	2	—
Philip H.	Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson . . . . .	2	—
Sheridan	Artillery, Captain James M. Robinson (horse artillery) . . . . .	6	—
Reserve artillery,	Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt . . . . .	1	18
Provost Guard,	Brig. Gen. Marsena Patrick . . . . .	1	—
Engineers,	Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benham . . . . .	2	regim'ts

† Severely wounded.

\* Killed.

*Burnside's Command.*

		Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
IX.	*Brig. Gen. Thomas G. Stevenson	.....	2	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter	.....	2	2
Ambrose E.	Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox	.....	2	2
Burnside	Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero	.....	2	2
Provisional Brigade,	Colonel Elisha G. Marshall	.....	1	—
Cavalry Brigade,	Colonel Andrew J. Morrison	.....	1	—
Reserve Artillery,	Captain John Edwards, jr.	.....	—	6

\*Killed.

*Confederate, General Robert E. Lee.**Army of Northern Virginia.*

## I.

Lieut. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw	.....	4	—
†James Longstreet	Maj. Gen. Charles W. Field	.....	5	—
	Artillery, Brig. Gen. E. Porter Alexander (3 battalions)			14

## II.

Lieut. Gen.	‡Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson	.....	4	—
Richard S. Ewell	Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes	.....	5	—
	Artillery, Brig. Gen. Armistead L. Long (5 battalions)			18

## III.

Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson	.....	5	—
Ambrose P. Hill	Maj. Gen. Henry Heth	.....	5	—
	Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox	.....	4	—
	Artillery, Colonel R. Lindsey Walker (5 battalions)			20
Cavalry	Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton	.....	2	—
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee	.....	2	—
*James E. B. Stuart	Maj. Gen. William H. F. Lee	.....	2	—
	Artillery, Major R. Preston Chew (horse artillery)			5

† Severely wounded. ‡ Captured. \* Mortally wounded.

**Battle of Spottsylvania** (Plates 13 and 36).—At 6:30 a. m. on May 7, Grant directed Meade to prepare orders for the movement of the Army of the Potomac southward.

The V corps was to march that night along the Brock Road to Spottsylvania Court House. The II corps was to remain in place until the V corps had passed and then move to Todd Tavern. The VI corps was to move back to Chancellorsville and thence by Piney Branch Church to a point on the Brock Road between the II and V corps. The IX corps was to follow the VI corps as far as Piney Branch Church.

**May 7.**—The morning of the 7th was devoted by Gen. Meade to reconnoitering the position of the enemy and ascertaining if possible *Lee's* intentions. The II, V, and VI corps all felt the enemy in their front. A brigade of Wilson's cavalry division was sent to Germanna Ford to ascertain whether *Lee* was following up *Gordon's* movement of the night before. It was apparent from these investigations that *Lee* was not advancing but was awaiting the movement of his adversary.

That morning, the 1st and 2d cavalry divisions of Sheridan's corps advanced to Todd Tavern, where they engaged most of *Stuart's* cavalry. At the close of the fighting, *Hampton's* division with one of *W. H. F. Lee's* brigades retired on the Catharpin Road towards the Po River, and *Fitz Lee's* division retired on the Brock Road towards Spottsylvania.

Sheridan's cavalry corps went into bivouac that night with Gregg's division at Todd Tavern, Merritt's division on the Brock Road a little farther south, and Wilson's division near Piney Branch Church. These three divisions had orders from Sheridan to move at daylight on the 8th and seize the bridges over the Po River, south and west of Spottsylvania. Gregg and Merritt were to go via the Catharpin Road across the Po River; Wilson was to move eastward to the Fredericksburg Road and follow that to Spottsylvania.

At 5 p. m. Gen. Meade issued the orders for the movement of the army corps, which was to begin at 8:30 p. m. To clear the roads, the wagon trains were directed to move at once via Chancellorsville to Piney Branch Church. The cavalry was to protect the movement of the V corps by watching the roads that came in from the right or west.

The order seems to have been based on the assumption that the Brock Road was unobstructed and was covered by the Union cavalry. This road was covered by the Union cavalry only from the left flank of the II corps to a short distance beyond Todd Tavern. From that point to Spottsylvania it was occupied by *Fitz Lee's* cavalry division.

When Meade reached Todd Tavern at midnight on the 7th, in advance of the V corps, he found the cavalry encamped there. He directed Gregg to proceed at once to Corbin Bridge, the crossing of the Catharpin Road over the Po, and Merritt to move

along the Brock Road to Spottsylvania to clear that road for the V corps.

**Confederate.**—Being informed that the ponton bridges at Germanna Ford had been removed, *Lee* came to the conclusion that Grant would move either towards Fredericksburg or towards Spottsylvania. He therefore warned *Stuart* of the possible movement and directed *Anderson*, who had been placed in command of *Longstreet's* corps, to move at dawn on the 8th by his right flank to Spottsylvania.\*

**May 8** (Plate 36).—When Merritt began to advance through the dense forest south of Todd Tavern he found that *Fitz Lee's* cavalry division had slashed the trees across his road to obstruct his movement and that it proposed to dispute his advance. When the V corps passed Todd Tavern it found Merritt's cavalry in its front and was obliged to halt for several hours. Eventually the infantry replaced the cavalry at the head of the column and reached the junction of the Brock Road with the Old Court House Road about 8:30 a. m.

*Hampton's* cavalry was intrenched between Gregg and Corbin Bridge, and Gregg was still skirmishing with him in the vicinity of the Tavern when Hancock reached that point at 9 a. m. the following morning.

Wilson's cavalry division had an unobstructed march to Spottsylvania Court House, and was there early in the morning of May 8. It was ordered to withdraw when it was learned that *Anderson* and *Fitz Lee* were between it and the Union army.

**Confederate.**—The Wilderness woods being on fire, the divisions of *Kershaw* and *Field* of *Anderson's* corps did not wait for dawn but started for Spottsylvania before midnight, May 7-8. *Anderson* followed a wood road which entered the Catharpin Road north of Corbin Bridge. At that bridge he crossed to the south bank of the Po and followed the road eastward to Block House Bridge over the Po. Here he rested his command and then went to *Fitz Lee's* assistance. He arrived at the junction of the Brock and Old Court House roads in advance of the V corps. Here he took up a position across the Brock Road facing northwest, with his left flank resting on the Po River. His troops strengthened the intrenchments begun by the cavalry.

\*Gen. Longstreet did not return to duty until the following October.

The position of the cavalry divisions of *Hampton* and *Fitz Lee* and the early movement of *Anderson's* troops enabled *Lee* to secure the strategic position of Spottsylvania.

**Engagements.**—The V corps came in contact with *Anderson* at 8:30 a. m. and as the successive divisions deployed into line they at once attacked. Finding *Anderson's* position too strong to be carried, Warren called on the VI corps, which was at Piney Branch Church, for assistance. It was late in the afternoon however before a combined attack could be made. The head of *Ewell's* corps was then on the field and *Rodes'* division was deployed on *Anderson's* right. The attack was repulsed. *Ewell* had followed the road through Parker Store and Craig.

Hancock halted his corps at Todd Tavern, near which he found Gregg's cavalry. Between this place and Corbin Bridge part of the II corps had an engagement with *Hill's* corps, now commanded by *Early*, which was following the wood road passed over by *Anderson*. *Early* bivouacked that night near Corbin Bridge.\*

The IX corps passed through Chancellorsville and the head of the column halted that night on the Plank Road in the vicinity of Aldrich. In the afternoon it received orders to move the next day towards Spottsylvania via the Mine and the Fredericksburg roads.

Being irritated at his failure to reach Spottsylvania before *Lee*, Meade criticised Sheridan for allowing his cavalry to block the way. Sheridan retorted by saying that his cavalry would have been in Spottsylvania before *Lee*, had not Meade changed Sheridan's orders. He added that if allowed freedom he would dispose of *Stuart*. At Grant's suggestion the cavalry corps was detached from the army on the afternoon of the 8th and was assembled by Sheridan near Tabernacle Church (plate 27). It was absent from the 9th to the 24th.

Five regiments of cavalry, all but one belonging to the IX corps, remained with the Union army.

**May 9.**—On the morning of the 9th, *Ewell's* lines were fully intrenched. *Rodes'* division was next to *Kershaw's* division of *Anderson's* corps and *Johnson's* division was on the right of *Rodes*.

In front of the lines formed by the divisions of *Field*, *Kershaw*, and *Rodes* were the V and VI corps. The V corps was on the

\*Gen. Hill was on sick report until the close of the battle of Spottsylvania.

right, with its flank resting on the Po. Sedgwick was killed on his lines this day by a Confederate sharpshooter, and Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright was assigned to the command of the VI corps.

*Early's* corps moved to Spottsylvania that morning to support the cavalry which was covering that place. *Wilcox* was posted on *Johnson's* right but faced eastward, while *Johnson* faced towards the northwest. *Heth* and *Mahone* were on *Wilcox's* right.

When *Early* left Corbin Bridge, Hancock moved down to the Po and was posted along it on the right of the V corps.

After crossing the Rapidan, Grant had established a new base on the Potomac at Belle Plain (plate 13) south of Acquia Creek. It was to cover his communications with this point that the IX corps was ordered to the Fredericksburg-Spottsylvania road. One of its divisions reached the vicinity of Spottsylvania this day, where it had an encounter with the Confederate cavalry.

The somewhat exaggerated reports of a division commander led Burnside to report to Grant that *Lee* was moving to Fredericksburg. Grant therefore ordered Hancock to send one of his divisions to the left of the VI corps to connect with the IX corps, and with the other three to cross the Po and attack *Lee's* left flank via Block House Bridge. If *Lee* moved on Fredericksburg, Grant proposed to cut him off from Richmond.

Hancock complied with the order and crossed the Po with three divisions, but was unable to reach the bridge before dark.

**May 10.**—During the night of May 9-10, *Lee*, who had no intention of moving on Fredericksburg, directed *Early* to send one division to Block House Bridge to protect it and another to cross at Old Court House Bridge, and come up on Hancock's flank. *Early* sent *Mahone's* division to Block House Bridge and with *Heth's* division crossed the Po at the Old Court House Bridge.

Hancock reported in the early morning that there was little probability of his being able to force the Po near the Block House Bridge, and he was therefore ordered to recross with two of his divisions leaving one south of the Po.

Later in the day, as this division was threatened by *Heth* and could effect nothing on the south bank, it too was ordered to the north bank. In its retreat it was attacked by *Heth* who was joined by *Mahone*.

Thinking that the Confederate line in front of the V and VI

corps had been weakened by the troops sent to meet Hancock, Grant ordered the Confederate line to be vigorously assaulted. Towards evening assaults were made by the V and VI corps assisted by part of the II corps on the divisions of *Field*, *Kershaw*, and *Rodes*.

None of these assaults were successful, though Upton's brigade of the VI corps succeeded in forcing its way through *Rodes'* division. Not being supported, Upton was compelled to withdraw.

On this day the 1st division of the IX corps joined the 3d on the Fredericksburg Road a mile from Spottsylvania and the 2d was moved along the same road to the Ny River.

**May 11.**—On the morning of May 11, Hancock sent a brigade to reconnoiter the roads running to Todd Tavern and Corbin Bridge to see if there were any of the enemy's troops in his rear. Its commander found only cavalry patrols.

This movement was reported to *Lee* in the afternoon, probably in exaggerated form, and led him to think that Grant was contemplating a movement around the left of the Confederate army. He therefore ordered *Early* to send a division and a half towards Craig, and ordered all the guns in the front lines of the corps of *Longstreet* and *Ewell* to be withdrawn at sunset through the woods in their rear so that a night march might be made. During the night it was learned that the report had been exaggerated, and the infantry was recalled. The artillery was ordered to return at daylight.

During the afternoon of this day, Grant decided to make his next assault at dawn on the 12th and to send the whole of the II corps against *Johnson's* division, whose right flank rested on a knoll and formed a salient. At the same time the VI corps was to attack *Rodes'* division, the V corps was to assault *Anderson's* corps, and the IX corps was to attack *Wilcox's* division, which was now posted on *Ewell's* right. Hancock was to move into position that night and form for attack about twelve hundred yards from the enemy's line.

**May 12.**—At 4:30 a. m. on May 12, just as the fog was rising, 20,000 men in almost a solid square assailed the front of *Johnson's* division from which all the guns had been removed. They swept over the parapet and captured Maj. Gen. *Edward Johnson* and



two-thirds of his men. They also seized twenty pieces of artillery that were returning to the front.

The Confederate lines on this day formed a redan, of which the salient was in the form of a bastion a half mile in depth and the same in width. *Rodes'* division held the left flank and left shoulder angle; *Johnson* held the faces and the salient angle; *Gordon's* division was in the bastion in reserve.

As soon as *Hancock's* men swept over the parapet they became a confused mass in the interior and were attacked by *Gordon* and several brigades sent by *Rodes* and *Early*. To relieve the pressure on *Hancock's* men, the VI corps made an assault on *Rodes'* division at the left shoulder angle or "bloody angle" of the bastion; the V corps attacked *Anderson*, and the IX corps attacked *Wilcox*.

The fighting at the "angle" was desperate and lasted until both sides were exhausted. At its close *Hancock* occupied the trenches he had captured and the Confederates retired to a new line, constructed across the gorge of the bastion. Neither the V nor the IX corps secured any success.

**May 13-20.**—On the 13th, orders were issued to the V and VI corps to move to the left of the IX corps and attack the Confederate right at Spottsylvania. Rain set in and the troops were not in position until the 14th, by which time the movement was known to *Lee*. *Anderson's* corps was moved to *Early's* right before an attack could be made.

On the 15th, *Hancock* was moved to the left of the VI corps and during the 15th, 16th, and 17th, the new Union positions were well intrenched.

On the night of the 17th, the II and VI corps were moved back to their original positions to make a daylight attack on *Ewell's* corps. They were in position in time but the movement was abandoned after a short attack because of the strength of the Confederate works. The two corps returned to the Union left.

On the night of the 18th, the IX corps was moved to the left of the VI corps and the II corps was withdrawn from the front line. The V corps now held the right of the line across the Fredericksburg Road, which was the line of supply of the army. To replace the losses in the V corps, *Kitching's* brigade of heavy artillery, 2,000 men, had been detached from the Reserve Artillery

and attached to the V corps. It was posted on the Fredericksburg Road near Gate just north of the Ny River.

At this time reinforcements for the Army of the Potomac began to arrive from Washington. The Irish Legion (brigade), 2,000 men, and a division of heavy artillery, 7,500 men equipped as infantry, were assigned to the II corps. On the evening of the 18th the heavy artillery under Brig. Gen. Robert O. Tyler was encamped near Kitching's brigade.

On the 19th, *Ewell* was directed to ascertain whether the Union army was moving. Marching northward with his depleted corps through wood roads and lanes impassable for artillery, late in the afternoon he reached the position occupied by Tyler and Kitching on the Fredericksburg Road. Although the Union forces were mostly raw troops they resisted his attack until reinforced by troops from the II and V corps. After dark *Ewell* returned to his original position.

This closed the battle of Spottsylvania, in which the Union losses were 2,725 killed, 13,416 wounded, and 2,258 missing, or a total of 18,399. The losses of the Confederate army are unknown.

Of the Union generals, Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick and Brig. Gen. Thomas G. Stevenson were killed; of the Confederate generals, Brig. Gens. *Abner Perrin* and *Junius Daniel* were killed, and Maj. Gen. *Edward Johnson* and Brig. Gen. *George H. Stuart* were captured.

The total casualties of the Union army since crossing the Rapidan were 4,971 killed, 25,433 wounded, and 5,641 missing, or a total of 36,065.

That this represents approximately the reduction of the fighting strength of the army is shown by the reports of the Medical Director and of Hancock.

The former, on May 24, reported that from the Army of the Potomac 15,184 wounded had been sent to Washington, 5,830 were at Fredericksburg waiting transportation and about 600 were still in the Wilderness. In addition, about 3,500 wounded of the IX corps were at Fredericksburg. This makes a total of over 25,000 wounded sent to the base.

Gen. Hancock, whose casualties in these two battles are given as 11,734, reports on May 20 his loss in numerical strength due to battle as 12,143.

The casualties in the Confederate army in these two battles are not known, but they must also have been great. Brig. Gen. Abercrombie, who commanded the depot at Belle Plain, reported that between 7,000 and 8,000 prisoners were sent back from that point.

**Comment.**—In the Wilderness campaign and in the opening days of this campaign, Meade deprived himself of the best use of his cavalry by assigning it to guard his trains. This was because he believed the main Confederate cavalry force was near Fredericksburg.

By May 6, Sheridan knew that *Stuart* was on the right flank of the Confederate army, and had he been directed that night to employ his entire force on the 7th to drive *Stuart* southwest of the Po River and secure the bridges over the Po south and west of Spottsylvania, he would probably have been able to do so and the march to Spottsylvania would have been unimpeded. Although Grant and Sheridan both claim that the latter's orders on the 7th for the movements of his command on the 8th would have secured Spottsylvania in advance of *Lee*, it is evident from the description above given that both were mistaken. The contemplated movement of Gregg and Merritt via Corbin Bridge was made impossible by the position of *Hampton's* cavalry and *Anderson's* corps.

In making his repeated assaults on *Lee's* lines at Spottsylvania, Grant was no doubt influenced by the knowledge of his own numerical superiority and the desire to keep *Lee* on the defensive. His tactical success in capturing the greater part of *Johnson's* division probably compensated for his losses in these assaults. He gained a decided strategic victory when he placed his army east of Spottsylvania, from which it could move on Richmond and draw *Lee* still farther south.

In ordering his army to Spottsylvania, *Lee* was probably under the impression that Grant was moving to Fredericksburg to advance along the railroad; he wanted to place himself on the flank of Grant's line of operations. His success in reaching Spottsylvania before Grant was due to the able use of cavalry made by *Stuart*, and to the burning woods which caused *Anderson* to move before the hour appointed for his march.

Had not *Lee* made the mistake of ordering *Ewell's* artillery out

of the front line on the evening of May 11, his defense of the position of Spottsylvania would have been flawless. He was compelled, however, to remain on the defensive, as his adversary gave him no good opportunity to attack and he was thus unable to prevent Grant from moving around him.

It will be noted that on May 15-16, while the battle of Spottsylvania was still in progress, Sigel was defeated at New Market by *Breckinridge*, and Butler was defeated at Drewry Bluff by *Beauregard*. This permitted *Lee* to draw reinforcements both from *Beauregard* and from *Breckinridge*, to offset the reinforcements that were being sent to Grant.

### CAVALRY OPERATIONS DURING SPOTTSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN.

**Richmond Raid.**—As previously stated, on the afternoon of May 8, Sheridan assembled his three divisions of cavalry in the vicinity of Tabernacle Church (plate 27) on the Fredericksburg-Chancellorsville road.

On the 9th, in a single column thirteen miles long, Sheridan moved to the Telegraph Road (plate 34) and down that road towards Richmond. On the 10th he crossed the North Anna River south of Chilesburg, and on the 11th the South Anna at Ground Squirrel Bridge. Between the two rivers, Merritt's division, which was in advance, captured a large Confederate depot of supplies at Beaver Dam Station on the Virginia Central Railroad.

From Ground Squirrel Bridge, Sheridan marched for Richmond, sending one brigade to Ashland Station, where a small Confederate force was dislodged and the station destroyed.

*Wickham's* brigade of *Fitz Lee's* division, which was on the right of the Confederate army, pursued the Union cavalry and began attacking the rear guard as soon as it crossed the Po River. *Stuart*, with the brigades of *Lomax* and *Gordon*, joined in the pursuit and the three brigades united at Beaver Dam Station shortly after the Union cavalry left that place.

The authorities in Richmond were much exercised over this attack from the north, as there were but six brigades in Richmond, and Butler's army was threatening it from the south. *Stuart* was therefore urged to come to its relief.

To interpose between Sheridan and Richmond, *Stuart* left *Gordon* to continue the pursuit, and with the division of *Fitz Lee*, he rode rapidly through Hanover Junction towards Richmond, and on the morning of May 11 reached Yellow Tavern, six miles from Richmond, at the junction of the roads running to Ground Squirrel Bridge and Hanover Court House.

Here he made a stand with his two brigades and was attacked by the divisions of Merritt and Wilson. In this engagement the Confederates were defeated and *Stuart* was mortally wounded. He was taken to Richmond, where he died on the 12th.

While this engagement was going on in front, Gregg's division was engaged with *Gordon* at the rear of the column.

After the battle, Sheridan advanced through the outer line of the Richmond defenses and encamped that night between Richmond and the Chickahominy.

On the 12th, he forced the crossing of the Chickahominy, held by the Confederate cavalry which had retreated eastwards, and at the same time repulsed an attack made on his rear from Richmond. That night he encamped near Gaines Mill.

He then marched for Haxall Landing on the James River opposite Bermuda Hundred, where he turned over his wounded to Butler and received supplies. His cavalry was at that point when Butler's forces were defeated at Drewry Bluff on the 16th of May and retired to their intrenchments.

On the 17th, Sheridan started northward and marching through White House joined the army near Hanover Junction on May 24.

The casualties of the cavalry corps in this expedition were 64 killed, 337 wounded, 224 missing; or a total of 625 men. The casualties in the Confederate cavalry are not known. Its principal loss was the death of its famous commander, Maj. Gen. *James E. B. Stuart*. Brig. Gen. *James B. Gordon*, a brigade commander in the Confederate cavalry, was mortally wounded while defending the crossing of the Chickahominy.

**Comment.**—Sheridan's raid was well timed. The authorities in Richmond were so alarmed for its safety that *Stuart* felt compelled to go to its relief without calling in his other brigades which were on the left flank of the Confederate army.

With his small force it would have been wiser for *Stuart* to have

taken refuge within the defenses and temporarily dismount his men to man the intrenchments. His almost uniform success had made him over-confident.

## VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN FROM SPOTTSYLVANIA TO THE CROSSING OF THE JAMES RIVER.

**Hanover Junction** (Plate 34).—In order to draw *Lee* out of his intrenchments at Spottsylvania, Grant decided to send Hancock's corps, which had just been heavily reinforced, along the north bank of the Ny River as far east as the Fredericksburg-Richmond railroad and south along that railroad through Bowling Green to the south bank of the Mattapony. It was thought that *Lee* would be tempted to move out and attack this corps, in which case the other corps were to move to its support. (See p. 279.)

Grant shifted his base to Port Royal on the Rappahannock, northeast of Bowling Green.

**May 21.**—At midnight, May 20, the II corps, preceded by the cavalry brigade of the IX corps, moved away from the rear of the army and on the evening of the 21st was on the south bank of the Mattapony at the railroad crossing. At Guiney Station, north of Bowling Green, the cavalry encountered some Confederate cavalry, and at Milford Station south of Bowling Green, it found one of *Pickett's* brigades.

Early in the morning of May 21, the V, VI, and IX corps pressed forward on the enemy's works at Spottsylvania to ascertain whether the Confederate army had changed its position. It was learned that *Ewell's* corps was moving.

*Ewell* moved southward across the Po River and eastward along the south bank to Stannard Mill where the Telegraph Road crosses that river.

Finding *Lee* in motion, about noon of the 21st, the V corps followed the II corps to Guiney Station, crossed the Mattapony west of the railroad, and moved southward parallel to the railroad. The IX corps followed the V corps and the VI corps alone remained in front of Spottsylvania.

To ascertain what Union force was still at Spottsylvania, *Wilcox* attacked the VI corps towards evening and was repulsed. The VI corps then followed the IX corps.

Finding that the Union army was moving southward along the railroad, *Lee* decided to concentrate his own army near Hanover Junction, to block the road to Richmond.

**May 22.**—Both Hancock and Warren halted this day to reconnoiter and allow the other corps to come up. Warren's patrols learned that *Ewell* and *Anderson* had passed down the Telegraph Road for Chilesburg on the afternoon and evening of the 21st.

*Ewell* reached Hanover Junction on the morning of the 22d and *Anderson* at noon. They immediately began to intrench.

**May 23** (Plate 37).—On the morning of May 23, *Hill's* corps again commanded by himself, which had followed a road farther west than *Ewell* and *Anderson*, also reached Hanover Junction. At this place *Pickett's* division of *Anderson's* corps and *Hoke's* brigade of *Ewell's* corps joined their corps, and *Breckinridge* joined *Lee* with two infantry brigades from western Virginia.

*Lee's* intrenched line was again in the form of a redan, but its salient rested on an unassailable knoll on the south bank of the North Anna River. The west face of the redan was about two miles long and extended from the North Anna to Little River. It was occupied by *Hill* and *Breckinridge*. The east face was about three miles long and extended from the salient to Hanover Junction, which is two miles south of the North Anna River. This face was held by *Ewell* and *Anderson*.

Both the II and V corps reached the North Anna on the 23d. The V corps crossed the river at Jericho Mills, a few miles above *Lee's* intrenched position, and repulsed an attack made on it by *Hill's* corps.

**May 24.**—The Union army deployed in front of the Confederate redan and intrenched. The V and VI corps were in front of *Breckinridge* and *Hill*; the II and part of the IX corps were in front of *Anderson* and *Ewell*. Both wings of the Union army were well intrenched. With parts of the V and IX corps Grant endeavored to take the Confederate salient and unite his wings but was unsuccessful. On this day the IX corps was assigned to the Army of the Potomac and reported to Meade.

Sheridan rejoined the army on May 24 with his three cavalry divisions, and Torbert, who had returned to duty, resumed command of his division. Wilson's division was ordered to the right

flank of the Union army to threaten the enemy's communications, while Torbert and Gregg remained on the left flank.

**May 25-26.**—These days were spent by Grant in intrenching and in seeking a point of attack. On the 26th, Grant decided to withdraw his army and seek a crossing farther down the Pamunkey River. The Union troops recrossed to the north bank of the North Anna that night.

**Totopotomy and Cold Harbor** (Plate 34).—On the afternoon of the 26th, Sheridan' with the cavalry divisions of Torbert and Gregg, moved down the north bank of the North Anna followed by a division of the VI corps to secure a crossing over the Pamunkey River. A demonstration was made opposite Hanover Court House, ten miles below Hanover Junction, and at night the column moved on to Hanover town, ten miles farther down, where two bridges were constructed on the morning of the 27th.

**May 27.**—The two cavalry divisions and the VI corps crossed the Pamunkey and advanced westward. The only Confederate force in their front was a brigade of cavalry which fell back towards Hanover Court House. The Army of the Potomac marched towards Hanover town and the *Army of Northern Virginia* towards Atlee Station, on the railroad ten miles north of Richmond.

**May 28-31.**—The Army of the Potomac crossed the Pamunkey at Hanover town and vicinity. The cavalry divisions of Torbert and Gregg preceded the army and moved to Hawe Corners where they encountered and dislodged the cavalry division of *Fitz Lee* reinforced by Brig. Gen. *M. C. Butler's* brigade which had recently joined from South Carolina.

After this engagement, Sheridan with his two divisions moved southward towards Tunstall Station to hold the roads running westward from White House which was to be the new base and where the XVIII corps, 16,000 men, landed on May 30.

Sheridan drove the Confederate cavalry back to the Chickahominy and captured Cold Harbor on the 31st.

When the infantry crossed the Pamunkey, the VI corps moved towards Atlee Station and the V corps towards Bethesda Church. On the night of the 31st, the four Union corps formed a line



facing westwards along the upper Totopotomy extending from Bethesda Church to a point east of Atlee Station.

Wilson's cavalry division, which had formed the rear guard in this movement, crossed the Pamunkey after the infantry and moved up the river towards Hanover Court House.

**Confederate.**—*Ewell's*\* corps, now under Lieut. Gen. *Jubal A. Early*, was the first Confederate corps to leave Hanover Junction.

On the 27th, *Early* marched southward and on the 28th passed through Atlee Station and by Shady Grove Church to Hundley Corners three miles east of Shady Grove Church.

On the night of the 28th, *Anderson* was on the left of *Early*, *Breckinridge* on the left of *Anderson*, and *Hill* in reserve.

On the 31st, the Confederates were in line parallel to the Union line.

The cavalry divisions of *Hampton* and *W. H. F. Lee* were on the left of the line.

*Fitz Lee's* cavalry division was facing *Sheridan* at Cold Harbor.

On the evening of the 31st, *Fitz Lee* was reinforced by *Hoke's* infantry division from *Beauregard's* force south of the James River.

**June 1** (Plate 38).—On the night of June 1, both *Lee* and *Grant* started troops to secure the position of Cold Harbor. *Lee* sent *Anderson's* corps; *Grant* sent the VI corps. Before the VI corps arrived, *Sheridan's* dismounted troops were attacked by two brigades of *Kershaw's* division of *Anderson's* corps which were repulsed.

During the course of the day the VI and XVIII corps reached Cold Harbor and found in their front the divisions of *Kershaw*, *Pickett*, *Field* and *Hoke*. *Sheridan* moved towards the Chickahominy River.

At 6 p. m. the VI and XVIII corps assaulted the Confederates in their front. While they gained some ground, which they at once intrenched, they were unable to accomplish much.

On this day Wilson's cavalry division had a severe engagement with brigades of the divisions of *Hampton* and *W. H. F. Lee*

\*On account of physical disability *Ewell* did not again assume command of his corps.

near Hanover Court House where Wilson was engaged in destroying the railroad.

On the night of June 1, Hancock's corps on the one side, and the divisions of *Breckinridge*, *Mahone* and *Wilcox* on the other, were moved southward to close the gap between Cold Harbor and the Chickahominy River. Sheridan's cavalry moved down the Chickahominy, and *Fitz Lee's* cavalry division crossed to the south side of that stream.

**June 2.**—On *Lee's* left, *Early's* corps reinforced by *Heth's* division made an attack on the IX and V corps near Bethesda Church to turn the right flank of the Union army. The Union corps were closing in towards their left at the time and *Early* gained some success in capturing prisoners.

**Cold Harbor** (Plate 38).—On the morning of June 3, both armies were in position and well intrenched.

On the Union right was Wilson's cavalry division reinforced by some infantry; next were the IX and V corps confronting *Early's* corps and *Heth's* division; in the center were the II, VI and XVIII corps confronting the corps of *Hill* and *Anderson* and the divisions of *Breckinridge* and *Hoke*; on the left and rear along the Chickahominy River were the cavalry divisions of *Torbert* and *Gregg* facing *Fitz Lee*.

As *Lee* blocked his road to Richmond and there was nothing to be gained by simply crossing the Chickahominy, Grant decided to assault *Lee's* lines. The main attack was to be made by the II, VI, and XVIII corps. The V and IX corps were to attack *Early*, and Wilson's command was to turn the left flank of the Confederate line.

The assault was made at 4:30 a. m., June 3, and was repulsed with heavy loss. No advance could be made at any point of the line. Grant ordered a renewal of the assault a few hours later, but on the representation of the corps commanders this order was rescinded.

**June 5 to 17.**—On the 5th, the V corps was moved to Cold Harbor and the IX corps closed in on the center.

On the 6th and 7th, *Early* made futile attempts to turn the right flank of the Union line.

This closed the battle of *Cold Harbor*. The armies remained in position some days longer but no further assaults were made.

## OPPOSING FORCES AT COLD HARBOR.

*Union, Lieut. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.**Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
II.	Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow . . . . .	4	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John Gibbon . . . . .	4	—
Winfield S. Hancock	Maj. Gen. David B. Birney . . . . .	4	—
	Artillery, Colonel John C. Tidball . . . . .		12
V.	Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin . . . . .	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Henry H. Lockwood . . . . .	3	—
Gouverneur K.	Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford . . . . .	2	—
Warren	Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler . . . . .	3	—
	Artillery, Colonel Charles S. Wainwright . . . . .	1	12
VI.	Brig. Gen. David A. Russell . . . . .	4	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Neill . . . . .	4	—
Horatio G. Wright	Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts . . . . .	2	—
	Artillery, Colonel Charles H. Tompkins . . . . .	1	13
IX.	Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden . . . . .	3	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Robert B. Porter . . . . .	2	2
Ambrose E. Burnside	Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox . . . . .	2	2
	Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero . . . . .	2	2
Reserve Artillery	Captain John Edwards, Jr. . . . .	—	4
XVIII.	Brig. Gen. William T. H. Brooks . . . . .	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. James H. Martindale . . . . .	2	—
William F. Smith	Brig. Gen. Charles Devens, Jr. . . . .	3	—
	Artillery, Captain Samuel S. Elder . . . . .	—	3
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. A. T. A. Torbert . . . . .	3	12
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg . . . . .	2	11
Philip H. Sheridan	Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson . . . . .	2	9
	Artillery, Captain James M. Robertson (horse)		6
Provost Guard	Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick . . . . .	1	—
Engineers	Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benham . . . . .	1	—
Reserve Artillery	Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt (horse) . . . . .	—	7
<i>Confederate, General Robert E. Lee.</i>			
I.	Maj. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw . . . . .	4	—
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Charles W. Field . . . . .	5	—
Richard H. Anderson	Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett . . . . .	4	—
	Art'y, Brig. Gen. E. Porter Alexander (3 bat's)		14
II.	Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon . . . . .	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur . . . . .	4	—
Jubal A. Early	Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes . . . . .	5	—
	Art'y, Brig. Gen. Armistead L. Long (4 bat's)		13

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
III.	Maj. Gen. William Mahone.....	5	—
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Henry Heth .....	5	—
Ambrose P. Hill	Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox .....	4	—
	Art'y, Colonel R. Lindsey Walker (5 bat's)..	—	20
	Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton.....	2	—
Cavalry.	Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee.....	2	—
	Maj. Gen. William H. F. Lee.....	2	—
	Major R. Preston Chew (horse).....	—	5
Dept. N. Car.	Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke.....	4	4
Dept. W. Va.	Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge.....	2	9

**Casualties.**—The casualties of the Union army about Hanover Junction are given as 223 killed, 1,460 wounded and 290 missing; a total of 1,973.

Between the crossing of the Pamunkey River at Hanover town and the crossing of the James River at Windmill Point the casualties in Grant's army were 2,213 killed, 10,351 wounded and 2,187 missing; a total of 14,751.

Exclusive of the losses in the cavalry, the total casualties in the Union army between the Rapidan and James rivers were 7,369 killed, 37,048 wounded, 8,007 missing; making a grand total of 52,424. According to the Medical Director's report, about 2,000 of the wounded died in the field and depot hospitals; 33,416 were sent to the North from Fredericksburg, Port Royal and White House; 818 cavalry were sent to the North from other points during May and June. In addition to the casualties above given, 8,624 sick were sent to the North during the same time. The total loss of the Army of the Potomac, including the IX and XVIII corps, in its numerical strength was about 61,000 men.

On June 30, the corps of *Anderson* and *Hill* of the *Army of Northern Virginia* had 29,940 infantry present for duty. *Early* gave the strength of the infantry of the *Second* corps as a little over 8,000. In all, the infantry numbered about 38,000 men. Deducting *Pickett's* division, given as 4,917, and *Lewis'* brigade 1,400, there remain about 31,600 men as the aggregate strength of the brigades which entered the campaign of the Wilderness with a strength of 50,000 men. This makes Gen. *Lee's* loss in infantry from all causes, from the Rapidan to the James, about 18,400 exclusive of losses sustained between the North Anna and

James rivers, by *Pickett's* division, *Hoke's* division, *Breckinridge's* division, and *Lewis'* brigade.

**Comments.**—Immediately after the battle of the Wilderness, Halleck at Washington began to push forward reinforcements from Washington and elsewhere to replace the losses in the Union army.

The reinforcements were made up principally of the regiments of heavy artillery, each from 1,500 to 1,800 strong, which had been organized for the defenses of Washington and were now equipped as infantry and incorporated in the old brigades.

According to the returns for May 31, there were at that time in the infantry of the Army of the Potomac, exclusive of the XVIII corps, about 74,000 men.

Gen. W. F. Smith reports that he brought with him from the Army of the James 16,000 infantry and 16 guns. One brigade, 2,000 men, was left at White House to protect his base.

The infantry of the Union army was therefore nearly as strong numerically at Cold Harbor as in the Wilderness.

During the campaigns of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania, Grant decided that he had too much artillery, and directed Meade to send back to the base the reserve artillery of the army. At the suggestion of the chief of artillery, Gen. Henry J. Hunt, the artillery was diminished by reducing the number of guns in a battery from six to four. After this change, twelve batteries were assigned to the II, V, and VI corps each, and eight to the cavalry corps. The IX corps had eleven batteries, one of which was a six-gun battery. The remaining artillery was sent to Washington.

The old organizations of the *Army of Northern Virginia* had received practically no reinforcements since the opening of the Wilderness campaign. *Lee's* reinforcements consisted of *Pickett's* division of four brigades, *Hoke's* division of four brigades, *Breckinridge's* division of two brigades and *Lewis'* brigade. These eleven brigades of veteran troops made *Lee* relatively stronger at Cold Harbor than he was in the Wilderness.

Had Grant been aware of this, the assault at Cold Harbor would probably not have been made.

In the operations after Spottsylvania, *Lee* was as fortunate in anticipating his adversary's movements as he had been before

that battle. In the latter period he was more fortunate in his tactical dispositions. Again, however, he was compelled to remain on the defensive.

**Crossing the James River.**—Having decided to again move to his left and cross the James River, Grant sent Sheridan with the divisions of Torbert and Gregg to destroy the Virginia Central railroad, and thus prevent *Lee* from maintaining himself in northern Virginia should he decide to move northward. Wilson's cavalry replaced Torbert and Gregg on the Chickahominy.

On June 11, Wilson was ordered to cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge (plate 10) and move towards Richmond as far as White Oak swamp, to cover the movement of the Union army to the James. The V corps was to support him.

At dark on June 12, the II, VI, IX and XVIII corps withdrew from their lines. The XVIII corps marched to White House where it was embarked for Bermuda Hundred. The IX corps took the road for Forge or Jones Bridge on the Chickahominy. The II and VI corps retired to a new line in their rear, which they were to hold until the IX and XVIII corps were well on their way. The II corps was then to march to Long Bridge on the Chickahominy and the VI corps to Forge Bridge.

The movements were executed as planned, and on the evening of the 13th, the Army of the Potomac began to arrive on the north bank of the James River opposite Windmill Point.

Here a ponton bridge had been thrown across the river and a fleet of ferries was assembled. By these means the army was transferred to the south bank of the river. Two divisions of the VI corps, which was the last to cross, were taken to Bermuda Hundred.

By the morning of the 17th, the movement was completed and the Army of the Potomac, save the cavalry divisions of Torbert and Gregg, was on the south side of the James River.

**Confederate.**—The cavalry divisions of *Hampton* and *Fitz Lee* went in pursuit of Sheridan on June 8.

On June 10, *Breckinridge's* division started for Lynchburg which was threatened by Maj. Gen. David Hunter who had relieved Sigel and had defeated the troops left by *Breckinridge* to defend the Valley.

The corps of *Anderson*, *Early* and *Hill* remained in position until June 13.

On June 13, *Early's* corps marched for Lynchburg to assist *Breckinridge* while the corps of *Anderson* and *Hill*, with *W. H. F. Lee's* cavalry division, crossed the Chickahominy; the first went to Malvern Hill and the latter two to Glendale. *Hoke's* division marched to the ponton bridge over the James near Drewry Bluff.

*Anderson's* corps crossed the James River near Drewry Bluff June 16 and 17, and *Hill's* corps June 18.

**Trevilian Raid.**—On the 6th of June, when Grant decided to move from Cold Harbor and cross the James River, Sheridan with the divisions of *Torbert* and *Gregg* was directed to march to Charlottesville, there unite with Maj. Gen. David Hunter, and with him destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from Charlottesville to Hanover Junction. He was then to rejoin the Union army.

Sheridan crossed the Pamunkey above White House (plate 25) and marched up the north side of the North Anna River. On the 10th he crossed to the south side of the North Anna and encamped on the road which crosses the Virginia Central Railroad at Trevilian Station, three miles west of Louisa.

When *Lee* learned that Sheridan had crossed the Pamunkey, he sent the divisions of *Hampton* and *Fitz Lee*, five brigades, to operate against him. The Confederate commanders, assuming that Sheridan was aiming for Gordonsville and Charlottesville, decided to bar his route. On the morning of June 11, *Hampton* was just west of Trevilian Station and *Fitz Lee* was at Louisa. They had learned the preceding night that Sheridan had crossed the North Anna near by and they planned to move out and attack him.

Before the Confederate divisions had time to unite, *Hampton* was attacked by *Torbert's* division of the cavalry corps while *Gregg's* division moved on Louisa. While *Torbert* with two brigades was attacking *Hampton* in front, *Custer's* brigade got in his rear by moving between the two Confederate divisions and captured part of *Hampton's* train. *Custer* was in turn attacked by *Hampton* in front and driven on *Fitz Lee's* division which recaptured his spoils and several hundred of his men.

To cover Gordonsville, *Hampton* withdrew to the west of Trevilian Station and directed *Fitz Lee* to join him there. Sheridan's troops then took possession of the field and destroyed the railroad in the vicinity of the station.

From prisoners, Sheridan learned that Hunter was moving on Lynchburg instead of Charlottesville, and that *Breckinridge's* division had gone westward to Gordonsville. Not being confident of reaching Hunter or of being able to complete the destruction of the railroad, he decided to recross the North Anna and return to the army.

There was some skirmishing during the 12th. That night Sheridan recrossed the North Anna and on the 20th was at White House. *Hampton* and *Fitz Lee* moved on parallel roads keeping between Sheridan and Richmond.

In the Trevilian Raid the Union casualties are reported as 1,000 of which 840 were in the 1st division which was engaged with *Hampton's* division. In *Hampton's* three brigades the casualties were 612; *Fitz Lee's* are not reported.

**Comments.**—The timely arrival of *Hampton* with his two divisions at Louisa was probably due to information received from inhabitants of the country.

**Cavalry Crosses the James River** (Plate 9).—When Sheridan reached White House he was directed to break up the depot there and escort such trains as were left to the ponton bridge at Bermuda Hundred.

Under the escort of Torbert's division the trains left White House on June 22, for Forge Bridge on the Chickahominy. Gregg's division moved out on the Long Bridge Road to act as a flank guard. On the 23d it was learned that *Hampton* and *Fitz Lee* were in the vicinity, and the trains were sent towards Charles City. Gregg was ordered to occupy a position near Glendale to cover the movement.

Gregg's division was fiercely attacked on the afternoon of June 24, by the divisions of *Hampton* and *Fitz Lee*, and though eventually driven back toward Charles City, he succeeded in covering the trains and escaped with a loss of 357 men.

The trains reached the river in safety and were ferried over on June 25; the Union cavalry followed and by the 28th it was on the south bank of the James River. On the 26th, *Hampton* and



*Fitz Lee* moved to the Confederate ponton bridge near Drewry Bluff.

The casualties in Sheridan's cavalry corps from the Rapidan to the James were 214 killed, 1,075 wounded and 848 missing; making a total of 2,137.

**Cavalry Organization.**—The cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac received no reinforcements until Sheridan rejoined the army at Hanover Junction. He then received the regiments that had belonged to the IX corps and the new cavalry regiments sent from the North. On May 31, he had about 14,000 mounted men present for duty.

About the beginning of the Wilderness campaign, *Wm. H. F. Lee*, who had been severely wounded in the battle of *Brandy Station*, returned to duty and *Stuart's* cavalry corps was organized into three divisions of two brigades each. These were commanded by *Wade Hampton*, *Fitz Lee* and *W. H. F. Lee*. As the brigades were scattered, they were not actually formed into the prescribed divisions until after *Stuart's* death. About the end of May, *Stuart's* cavalry corps was reinforced by *M. C. Butler's* brigade from South Carolina, which was assigned to *Hampton's* division.

After the death of *Stuart* no successor was appointed until August 11, when Maj. Gen. *Wade Hampton* was assigned to the command of the cavalry of the *Army of Northern Virginia*.

## OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE JAMES RIVER IN JUNE AND JULY.

When, on May 28, the XVIII corps left Bermuda Hundred for West Point to join the Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. *B. F. Butler's* force was reduced to the 1st division of the X corps, the colored division of the XVIII corps, and *Kautz's* cavalry division. The division of the X corps held the Bermuda Hundred line, and the colored division of the XVIII corps held City Point. A bridge was thrown across the Appomattox near its mouth, connecting the two forces. (For organization see p. 253.)

On May 30, at *Lee's* request, *Beauregard* sent *Hoke's* division to reinforce the *Army of Northern Virginia* north of the James, and on June 4, he sent *Ransom's* brigade of *B. R. Johnson's*

division to guard the ponton bridge at Drewry Bluff. This left him only three brigades of infantry and one of cavalry with which to hold the Bermuda Hundred line, six miles long, between the James and Appomattox rivers, and the intrenched line, ten miles long, surrounding the city of Petersburg south of the Appomattox River. (For organization see p. 254.)

**Attack and Defense of Petersburg, June 9.**—Through spies and deserters, Butler ascertained that Petersburg was occupied by a weak garrison composed largely of local militia. He determined therefore to send a body of troops to surprise this force and destroy the railroad and highway bridges over the Appomattox within the town limits. Not wishing to weaken his own lines too much, he detailed for this purpose two infantry brigades, one from the X corps and the other from the XVIII corps, and three regiments of cavalry. Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore commanded the infantry, 3,200 men, and Brig. Gen. Kautz the cavalry, 1,300 men. A battery of four guns accompanied the infantry and a platoon of two guns was attached to the cavalry.

The defenses of Petersburg were begun in 1862 and completed in 1863. The line was ten miles long and consisted of fifty-five intrenched batteries connected by infantry curtains. It formed practically a continuous line of fortification and was designed for 352 guns. The works were of strong profile, with high parapet and deep ditch. The plans called for the slashing of the timber in front of the line for a distance of one-half mile. The work was done under the supervision of the Confederate engineers by slave labor.

Brig. Gen. *Henry A. Wise* was in command of the territorial district containing Petersburg and had his headquarters in that city. To defend the city he had a few regiments of infantry, some battalions of convalescents and militia, a little cavalry, two batteries of field artillery, and an unknown number of fortress guns. His entire force did not exceed 2,500 men. As his garrison was not sufficient to man the entire line of defense, he had no troops in the fortifications west of the Weldon railroad. His main force was on the line, four miles long, between the Appomattox River and the Norfolk railroad. Between the Norfolk and Weldon railroads his line was held by local militia and convalescents.

The Union troops, under Gillmore and Kautz, left the Appomattox ponton bridge at Broadway Landing, only five miles from the Petersburg fortifications in an air line, on the morning of June 9. The column moved by country roads nearly due south to the City Point Road. At this point the brigade of the X corps turned west but the colored brigade of the XVIII corps continued its march to the Jordan Plank Road where it also turned west. The cavalry continued on to Prince George Court House to reach the Jerusalem Plank Road.

At 10 a. m. the Union infantry approached the Petersburg line, and Gillmore found his two columns separated by the Jordan Salient, a group of four strongly intrenched batteries designed for 25 guns, and probably containing half this number. It thoroughly commanded the ground in all direction to the limit of its field of fire.

Since he could not advance without taking this group, and the works appeared too formidable to be taken by assault, Gillmore withdrew without making an attack and in the afternoon returned to Bermuda Hundred.

Having reached the Jerusalem Plank Road, Kautz advanced towards Petersburg and encountered that part of the Confederate line held by the local militia. Dismounting his troops and attacking this line he drove the militia to the plateau upon which the city is built, a mile in rear of the fortifications. Kautz then mounted his troops and found himself in a broad valley between the town and the eastern defenses. Hearing nothing from Gillmore and not desiring to attack the city alone, he retired by the roads he came, and returned to Bermuda Hundred.

**Comment.**—This raid was premature and served only to warn the Confederate commanders. Had Gillmore assaulted the Jordan Salient, he would probably have carried it and might possibly have reached the bridges. With his small force he could not have held the captured works, and even had he destroyed the bridges, the damage would have been only temporary. The Appomattox is fordable above the railroad bridge.

**Attack and Defense of Petersburg June 15-18.**—In withdrawing from the Peninsula, the XVIII corps embarked at White House on the Pamunkey River on June 12, and its troops began to debark at Bermuda Hundred on June 13. On June 14, Grant

visited Butler at Bermuda Hundred, and it was agreed between them that the XVIII corps, the remainder of which were to land that day, was at once to be reinforced by its colored division and Kautz's cavalry. The whole command, under Maj. Gen. Wm. F. Smith, was then to move at dawn on the 15th to capture Petersburg.

The task seemed an easy one since it was known that no important reinforcements had been received by *Wise* since Gillmore's expedition. With Petersburg in Grant's possession, *Lee* would find it difficult to hold Richmond.

To enable Smith to hold the town, Grant promised the assistance of Hancock's II corps, which was to cross the James River that day and could start for Petersburg, sixteen miles in an air line, early in the morning. As Hancock's corps was believed to be nearly out of rations, Butler was to send rations at once to Windmill Point.

From the Confederate point of view there seemed little hope of successfully defending Petersburg. As early as June 7, *Beauregard* had warned *Braxton Bragg*, who was now chief of staff of the *War Department*, that Grant would probably cross the James. He requested that *Hoke's* division and *Ransom's* brigade be returned to him as soon as possible. On June 13, he notified *Bragg* that transports were moving up the James River and troops were landing at Bermuda Hundred. He stated that if attacked, he would probably have to abandon either his Bermuda Hundred line or the town of Petersburg, and requested instructions.

The only answer made to his requests was an order to *Hoke's* division to move from Cold Harbor to the ponton bridge over the James near Drewry Bluff where it relieved *Ransom's* brigade and could cross to the south bank if required. *Lee* had just weakened his army to send troops to Lynchburg, and he was unwilling to return those of *Beauregard* until he ascertained definitely Grant's intentions.

**June 15.**—On the morning of June 15, Smith's column 12,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, started for Petersburg from Broadway Landing on the roads followed by Gillmore. The cavalry was at the head and was followed by the colored troops. Marching along the City Point Road, Kautz's cavalry discovered some

dismounted Confederate cavalry of *Dearing's* brigade with field guns in position a mile from the Confederate line.

Kautz moved off via Prince George C. H. to the Norfolk Road and the colored troops were deployed for attack. The Confederate cavalry was dislodged and the Union troops reformed for the march.

About 11 a. m. the Union infantry reached the front of the Confederate main line and began to deploy. One division was on the River Road, one on the City Point Road, and one on the Jordan Plank Road; two brigades were in reserve.

At 2 p. m. Smith was ready to attack, but hesitated to do so because of the formidable appearance of the Jordan Salient and because the II corps which was to support him had not arrived. It was 7 p. m. before he finally gave the order. There was little opposition to the assault and before 9 p. m. his infantry had captured the Jordan Salient and a mile of works adjacent on the south, and had taken 230 prisoners and 16 guns.

On the morning of June 15, Hancock waited at Windmill Point for rations. He eventually marched without them at 10:30 a. m. By some oversight he was not informed of Smith's movement and did not know that the II corps was expected to support Smith. Hancock was simply informed that he was to march to Petersburg and take position along Harrison Creek, a small tributary of the Appomattox between the Jordan Salient and the city.

He had some difficulty in finding his way because of defective maps, and was near the crossroads south of the old court-house between 5 and 6 p. m., when he learned both from Grant and from Smith that he was expected to support the latter. He turned his column westward and reached the Confederate line just as Smith had completed his assault.

As it was a moonlight night, Hancock, who was senior, reported two of his divisions at Smith's service should the latter desire to take Petersburg. Smith however failed to realize the importance of following up his success and simply requested Hancock to occupy the Confederate works and allow the withdrawal of the XVIII corps. This was done by 11 p. m. About midnight Hancock's third division, which had gone astray, joined the other two.

**Confederate.**—When, on the morning of June 15, *Beauregard* was informed of Smith's movement on Petersburg, he at once sent

to *Wise* such troops as he could spare, and about noon ordered *Hoke* to move to that place as rapidly as possible with his entire division.

*Beauregard* himself reached Petersburg in the evening just after *Smith's* assault, and was promptly followed by *Hagood's* brigade of *Hoke's* division which had been sent by rail. With these troops a new line was taken up on a ridge behind Harrison Creek, a half mile in rear of the first. The other three brigades of *Hoke's* division arrived during the night and were placed on the same line.

That night, June 15-16, *Beauregard* made up his mind that Petersburg must be held at all hazards. Before midnight therefore he ordered *B. R. Johnson* to abandon the Bermuda Hundred line and bring his four brigades to Petersburg. *Gracie's* brigade, sent to *Beauregard* by *Bragg* from Richmond, was ordered to Swift Creek to cover Petersburg on the north. He notified both *Bragg* and *Lee* of the steps taken.

**June 16, South of the Appomattox.**—About midnight, June 15-16, Hancock received an order from Grant to the effect that if Petersburg was not captured before morning, he was to take up a defensive position and hold it until all the Union troops had joined him. He was directed to assume command of the II and XVIII corps.

In taking up its position as ordered, the rear division of the II corps captured a few batteries on the left of those taken by the XVIII corps.

At 10 a. m. June 16, the IX corps arrived from Windmill Point and deployed on Hancock's left.

**Confederate.**—About 10 a. m. June 16, *Bushrod R. Johnson's* division of four brigades reported to *Beauregard* from the Bermuda Hundred line, and was placed on *Hoke's* right.

Grant and Meade reached the field in the morning and an assault was ordered for 6 p. m., in which the II corps was to be supported by troops from the IX and XVIII corps. Some additional batteries of the original Confederate line both north and south of the line already taken were then captured.

When Hancock made his assault at 6 p. m. the divisions of *Hoke* and *B. R. Johnson*, eight brigades, were in his front.

**June 16, North of the Appomattox.**—Early in the morning of June 16, Butler was informed that the Confederates had disappeared from his front. He at once requested additional troops to occupy their works and Grant ordered two divisions of the VI corps, which was still at the ponton bridge over the James, to be sent to him by water. In the meantime Butler decided that it was more important to tear up the Petersburg and Richmond railroad than to occupy and remodel the enemy's works.

**Confederate.**—It was at 2:30 a. m. June 16, when a messenger reached *Lee* at Bottom Bridge with the startling intelligence that *Beauregard* had abandoned the Bermuda Hundred line. *Anderson's* corps was then at Malvern Hill and *Hill's* corps at Glendale.

*Lee* rode at once to the ponton bridge near Drewry Bluff, and directed *Anderson* to send a division to report to him there.

Between 3 and 4 a. m. *Pickett's* division crossed the bridge and began to reoccupy the abandoned Confederate works. *Field's* division joined him at 5 a. m., and by midnight these two divisions had practically retaken *Beauregard's* line which Butler had failed to occupy.

**June 17, South of the Appomattox.**—On the night of the 16th-17th the V corps reached Prince George Court House, and on the 17th deployed on the left of the IX corps.

Early in the morning of the 17th, the IX corps captured part of the original Confederate line in its front and the Confederates occupying that part of the line also fell back behind Harrison Creek. Several assaults were made that day on the Harrison Creek line by the II, IX, and XVIII corps, but without success until nightfall when a few works at the south end of the line were held for a short time by the IX corps.

**Confederate.**—Since *Pickett* and *Field* now occupied his Bermuda Hundred line, *Beauregard* withdrew *Gracie's* brigade from Swift Creek this day, and it reached the right of his line east of Petersburg just in time to make a successful counter attack and recover the works captured by the IX corps at nightfall.

**June 17, North of the Appomattox.**—When *Wright* with his two divisions of the VI corps reached Bermuda Hundred on the

morning of June 17, he found that the Confederates had reoccupied their line and an assault would be useless.

**Confederate.**—*Anderson* with *Kershaw's* division joined *Pickett* and *Field* behind the Bermuda Hundred line this day.

*Hill's* corps with *W. H. F. Lee's* cavalry division remained near Glendale.

*Lee* was in the vicinity of Drewry Bluff between his two corps; he had not yet learned that *Grant's* army had crossed the James River. Early in the afternoon an officer sent by *Beauregard* reached him with a report of the situation at Petersburg. He could not credit the report sent him since it was not confirmed by reports from his own front. He, however, sent word to *W. H. F. Lee* to push to his front and ascertain the position of *Grant's* army, and to *Hill* he sent word that if *Beauregard's* information proved to be correct, *Hill* was to march at once to Drewry Bluff.

It is probable that at midnight, June 17-18, no word had been received from either *W. H. F. Lee* or *Hill*, since at that hour *Lee* did not credit the report brought from *Beauregard* by a second officer. At 3 a. m., however, a third officer sent by *Beauregard* was able to convince *Lee* that Petersburg was in danger and he directed *Anderson* to send reinforcements to that place.

*Beauregard's* staff officer had stopped at *Anderson's* headquarters on his way to *Lee* and made known the nature of his errand; on his return therefore *Kershaw's* division was ready to accompany him to Petersburg.

**June 18.**—During the night of June 17, *Beauregard* quietly withdrew the divisions of *Hoke* and *B. R. Johnson* to a new line of works that had been laid out and constructed on the 17th by his chief engineer, Col. *D. B. Harris*, behind another creek, a half mile in rear of the Harrison Creek line. The line was shorter and more commanding than the old line. Here *Kershaw's* division reported to him at 7:30 a. m. and *Field's* division two hours later.

Late at night on the 17th, Meade issued orders that at 4 a. m. on the 18th, the II, V, and IX corps were to make a vigorous assault on the Confederate line. This attack was to be supported by one division of the XVIII corps and the division of the VI corps that had marched by land from Windmill Point. The remaining divisions of the XVIII corps had been sent back to Butler.



When the assault was ordered, it was believed that the divisions of *Hoke* and *B. R. Johnson* were still along Harrison Creek. When the Union troops moved out in the morning of the 18th it was soon ascertained that *Beauregard* had fallen back to a new line. The corps commanders were directed to push their attacks on this new line which it was known could be only weakly intrenched.

Because of the difficulties of the foreground, it was found impossible to make assaults simultaneously all along the Confederate line; the assaults were therefore made more or less in detail. Assaults were made throughout the day but without success.

At 11:30 a. m. *Lee* reached Petersburg in person and in the afternoon *Hill's* corps began to arrive.

That night Grant decided to abandon assaults and resort to investment.

The casualties to the Union army in front of Petersburg from the 15th to the 18th of June are given as 1,298 killed; 7,474 wounded and 1,814 missing.

An assault on the Confederate Bermuda Hundred line by *Butler's* troops reinforced by two divisions of the VI corps was ordered for the evening of June 18. This was later countermanded and the two divisions of the VI corps were ordered to Petersburg. They started that evening.

**Comment.**—In holding the Union armies in check south of the James with his two small divisions, June 15, 16 and 17, *Beauregard* performed one of the most brilliant feats of the year. As early as June 7, he began to consider the proper dispositions he would make to meet Grant should the latter suddenly appear south of the James River. In his determination to hold Petersburg at all hazards, he had the moral support of *D. H. Hill*, who had assisted him in his operations south of the James as a volunteer aid until he, *Hill*, was sent to assist *Breckinridge* at Lynchburg.

In abandoning the Bermuda Hundred line to concentrate at Petersburg, *Beauregard* knowingly assumed a grave responsibility for which the *War Department* later demanded an explanation.

In the operations covering the crossing of the James, *Lee's* cavalry failed him and almost the entire Army of the Potomac was in front of Petersburg before he was aware that Grant had crossed the James River. The Confederate patrols were unable to penetrate the veil made by the V corps and *Wilson's* cavalry division.

The crossing of the James River by the Army of the Potomac without the knowledge of *Lee* was a remarkable feat, and should have led to greater results.

W. F. Smith failed to act with more vigor in his attack on Petersburg probably because he distrusted the information he had received from Butler as to its garrison, and because Cold Harbor had made him doubt the wisdom of assaults.

The failure of the II corps to reach Petersburg in time to cooperate with the XVIII corps in its attack on June 15 was due to two causes:

1. Grant received the erroneous impression from some one, not Hancock, that the II corps was out of rations. As a matter of fact that corps was rationed until the night of June 16. There was therefore no reason why it should not have marched at daylight on the 15th.

2. In returning from his conference with Butler, Grant directed Meade to issue orders to Hancock to march in the morning to Petersburg and take position behind Harrison Creek. He also informed him that he had ordered Butler to send rations to Hancock which he was to issue before marching. Grant failed to inform Meade that he wanted Hancock to cooperate with Smith. The order that reached Hancock was therefore simply that as soon as he issued the rations sent him by Butler, he was to march on the most direct road to Petersburg and take position where the City Point railroad crosses Harrison Creek. Had Hancock received the proper instructions, it is probable that Petersburg would have been taken on the 15th.

**Operations from June 19 to June 22.**—Immediately after June 18, the Union army began to thoroughly intrench a line west of Harrison Creek. Strong redouts connected by deep trenches were begun along this line, which ran from the Appomattox River to the Jerusalem Plank Road, parallel to and less than a half mile from the Confederate line. Seven redouts with intermediate batteries were eventually constructed on this line, four miles long.

The Union line was held, from right to left, by the XVIII, IX, and V corps, thus releasing the II and VI corps to extend the line southwestward.

**Turning Movements of June 22.**—On the 22d of June, the II corps, which was on the left of the V corps, was directed to wheel

to the right and extend the Union line in a westerly direction beyond the Weldon railroad. The VI corps was ordered to move on the left flank of the II corps and extend the line to the Lynchburg Road. In making this movement, because of the wooded character of the country, it was impossible for the VI corps, to keep in touch with the II corps. Each was therefore directed to guard its own flanks.

To oppose such extension of the Union line, *A. P. Hill* with three divisions of infantry moved down the Weldon road and finding a gap between the II and VI corps moved into it. He detached one division to hold the VI corps in check and attacked the II corps in flank with the other two.

The II corps, temporarily commanded by Maj. Gen. Birney, was unable to resist this flank attack and its divisions fell back in succession from left to right.

The Confederates then formed a line covering the Weldon railroad and the II and VI corps intrenched on a line parallel to that railroad and a mile and a half east of it.

**Wilson's Raid** (Plate 25).—Gen. Wilson's cavalry division crossed the James to Windmill Point on June 17 and remained in the vicinity of City Point until the 22d.

On the 21st, Gen. Wilson received orders to cooperate in the movement of the II and VI corps. He was to move his own and Kautz's divisions, 5,000 men, around the rear of the Union army, cross the Weldon railroad and strike the Lynchburg railroad as close to Petersburg as possible. He was to follow that road to Burkesville and thence move southward along the Danville railroad to the Roanoke River, thoroughly destroying both railroads. He was informed that Sheridan with his two divisions was at White House north of the James River confronted by the cavalry divisions of *Hampton* and *Fitz Lee* whom he would keep employed, and that he need fear only *W. H. F. Lee's* cavalry division. He was also informed that when he returned he would find the left flank of the Union army west of the Weldon railroad.

Wilson started at dawn on the 22d and marched through Dinwiddie Court House for the Lynchburg railroad (plate 2). While his own division was in rear tearing up this railroad, Kautz was sent ahead to Burkesville.

*W. H. F. Lee's* division followed Wilson's command, attacking

his rear. By following the high road, while Wilson followed the railroad, *W. H. F. Lee* reached Nottoway Station in advance of Wilson and was between the two Union divisions.

To prevent *W. H. F. Lee* from attacking Kautz, Wilson attacked *Lee* at Nottoway Station and an indecisive engagement occurred.

Kautz, having finished his work at Burkesville, moved southward and both Union divisions united on the Danville railroad on June 24. They moved along that road towards Danville destroying the track. Kautz was again sent ahead to destroy the railroad bridge over the Staunton River, while Wilson kept *W. H. F. Lee* in check.

Kautz failed to capture this bridge as it was protected by field works and covered by the fire of six guns. Being unable to proceed further south, Wilson now decided to return.

He moved due eastward, crossed the Nottoway River just west of the Weldon railroad, and started for the Union army which he believed was stretched across the Weldon railroad near Globe Tavern.

As previously stated, Sheridan began crossing the James River near Windmill Point on June 25, and *Hampton* began crossing at Drewry Bluff on the 26th.

*Hampton* was at once ordered to go in pursuit of Wilson without unduly wearing out his horses and reached Stony Creek Station, ten miles south of Reams Station, on the 28th.

When Wilson reached Stony Creek Station where he intended to cross the railroad he found a strong Confederate cavalry force in his front. It was *Hampton* with four brigades.

Finding it impossible to force his way through these troops, he directed Kautz to move northward west of the railroad to Reams Station, which he believed to be in the possession of the Union infantry. He was to withdraw his own division and follow as soon as practicable.

Instead of Union infantry, a brigade of Confederate infantry and *Fitz Lee's* cavalry division were at Reams Station.

Wilson succeeded in withdrawing from the front of *Hampton* who attacked him vigorously on the 29th, and joined Kautz. *Hampton* moved northward to join *Fitz Lee*.

Wilson did not at this time know that the flank movement of

the II and VI corps had failed and that the railroad was in the possession of the Confederate troops.

Kautz reached the railroad near Reams Station June 29, and found a Confederate infantry division in his front. Here he was joined by Wilson on the 30th who discovered that *W. H. F. Lee* was on his left, a Confederate infantry division and *Fitz Lee's* cavalry division in his front, and *Hampton* on his right and rear.

Knowing that his only escape lay in rapid movement, Wilson immediately directed his trains to be burned and ordered his command to retreat southward to the Nottoway River. Before this movement was under way, the Confederates separated Wilson and Kautz. The latter with a large part of his command escaped across the Weldon railroad and reached the Union infantry in safety.

Wilson with the remainder of his command retreated to the Nottoway River followed by *Fitz Lee*. He recrossed that river near the railroad June 30, marched due east, crossed the Nottoway again and marched for the James. When his route was finally ascertained, *Hampton's* division moved down the Jerusalem Plank Road to cut him off before he reached the Blackwater River. By rapid marches Wilson reached and crossed the Blackwater July 1, before the Confederate cavalry arrived.

In this raid Gen. Wilson's casualties were 1,500 men. He was obliged to destroy his trains and abandon his artillery, 12 guns. He had however succeeded in wrecking the Richmond and Danville railroad upon which *Lee* relied mainly for his supplies so that it was out of commission for several weeks.

Had Sheridan moved as rapidly as *Hampton*, he would have diverted *Hampton*, and Wilson would not have been placed in such a perilous situation.

**July.**—Early in July, the entire VI corps was withdrawn and sent to Washington to protect that city which was threatened by *Early* who had driven Hunter into West Virginia and had then crossed the Potomac.

As Meade was now too weak to complete the investment of Petersburg, on July 9, he began a regular siege directed against the Confederate works in front of the IX and V corps. A siege train had been organized in May and June for the siege of Richmod

and its heavy guns and mortars were now installed in the redouts and batteries of the Union line at Petersburg.

Among the regiments of the IX corps there was one formed of coal miners whose colonel proposed that a Confederate redan in his front, occupied by *Pegram's* battery, be mined for assault. This proposition was approved and the gallery was begun June 25. By the end of July the mine was completed and its charge of 8,000 pounds of powder was placed in position.

On the 23d of July, when the excavation for the mine had been successfully completed, Grant decided to send the II corps with two divisions of Sheridan's cavalry, reinforced by Kautz's division, to the north bank of the James River. After crossing the James, Sheridan was either to make a dash on Richmond or to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad. The II corps was to support the cavalry and cover its retreat if necessary. Even should the cavalry fail in its raid, this movement would draw troops away from the Petersburg front and thus facilitate the assault which was to follow the firing of the mine.

On the 27th, the Union troops crossed the James just below Deep Run and found the divisions of *Kershaw* and *Wilcox* along that stream; these were joined that day by *Heth's* division. On the following day, *W. H. F. Lee's* cavalry division arrived and on the 29th *Field's* infantry and *Fitz Lee's* cavalry division crossed to the north bank of the James.

The concentration of this strong Confederate force in his front made it impossible for Sheridan to carry out his contemplated raid, but it greatly weakened the Confederate force in Petersburg where Grant was about to make his principal attack.

**Petersburg Mine.**—The explosion of the mine in front of the IX corps was set for 3:15 a. m. on the morning of July 30, and on the 29th the order for the assault was issued. The main attack was to be made by the IX corps supported by the XVIII corps. So much of the V corps as could be safely withdrawn from the front line was to be assembled on the left flank of the IX corps to advance with it.

On the night of the 28th and 29th, the II corps, unobserved by the Confederates, returned to Petersburg to occupy the trenches of the XVIII corps and to support the assault.

*Beauregard* had suspected that his line was being mined and

began some countermines; he also constructed a second line in rear of the threatened redan.

The fuse was lighted at the proper time, but due to defects, the mine was not actually exploded until 5:45 a. m. The crater formed by the mine was 200 feet long, 50 feet wide and 25 feet deep. The Confederate troops were so startled that they temporarily abandoned 500 yards of their line of intrenchments.

The assault however proved a failure. Burnside had failed to clear his front of obstructions, as ordered, so that his troops could advance on a broad front, and his division commanders proved incompetent. During the assault two of them remained in bomb-proofs in the Union lines.

The Union troops took possession of the crater and were not driven out until noon. They were however unable to advance from it.

As the IX corps failed to clear the fronts of the corps on either side as proposed, the V and XVIII corps were unable to advance.

The casualties in this assault were about 3,500 men, principally in the IX corps.

## OPERATIONS AROUND RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG FROM AUGUST TO DECEMBER.

**August** (Plate 23).—Early in August Sheridan with the divisions of Torbert and Wilson was sent to Washington to assist the VI corps in its operations against *Early*, and the Army of the Potomac was reduced to the II, V, and IX corps and Gregg's cavalry division, 29,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry present for duty equipped. The IX corps was now commanded by Maj. Gen. John G. Parke.\* The Army of the James was composed of the X corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. David B. Birney,† the XVIII corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord,‡ and Kautz's cavalry division 17,000 infantry and 2,300 cavalry present for duty equipped.

\*Gen. Burnside went on leave in August and did not again command his corps during the war.

†Gen. Gillmore was relieved June 17 for his failure to capture Petersburg; Birney was assigned to the command, July 21.

‡Gen W. F. Smith was relieved for his failure to capture Petersburg by Gen. Ord, July 21.

Grant's plan was now to make his intrenched line from the James River to the Jerusalem Plank Road so strong that it could be held by a very small force, and to operate with his remaining troops from his flanks.

At the beginning of August, the bridgehead on the James River below Deep Bottom and the Bermuda Hundred line were held by the X corps, and the intrenched line from the Appomattox River to the Jerusalem Plank Road by the XVIII, IX, and V corps. The II corps was in reserve.

*Lee's* plan was a similar one. His intrenched line from the Chickahominy River to the Weldon railroad was also made as strong as possible, and in rear of it was assembled a strong mobile reserve. Since Grant gave him no opportunity to assume the offensive, *Lee* reinforced *Early* in the Shenandoah Valley trusting that the latter might carry on a successful offensive campaign.

At the beginning of August, the divisions of *Field* and *Kershaw* of *Anderson's* corps and *Wilcox's* division of *Hill's* corps were north of the James; *Pickett's* division of *Anderson's* corps held the Bermuda Hundred line (plate 22); the divisions of *Hoke* and *B. R. Johnson* of *Beauregard's* corps held the Petersburg line; the divisions of *Heth* and *Mahone* of *Hill's* corps were in reserve south of the Appomattox.

On August 7, *Lee* sent Lieut. Gen. *R. H. Anderson* with *Kershaw's* division and *Fitz Lee's* cavalry division to join *Early* in the Shenandoah Valley.

The report reached Grant that *Anderson* had taken three divisions with him and that only a small Confederate force was now north of the James River. He therefore decided to have *Hancock* make another attempt to reach Richmond and destroy the railroads in its vicinity.

**August. Operations on the Union Right Flank (Plate 25).—**The infantry of the II corps marched to City Point and was taken by transports on the night of August 13-14 to the ponton bridges over the James below Deep Run, where it was joined by its artillery and *Gregg's* cavalry.

The II corps was to advance on the Newmarket and Darbytown roads while *Gregg* moved on the Charles City Road. If Richmond could not be surprised, *Gregg* was at least to destroy the railroads in its vicinity.



Instead of finding a weak force north of the James, Hancock found *Field's* division intrenched along Deep Run and *Wilcox's* division close in rear. *Mahone's* infantry division and *W. H. F. Lee's* cavalry were at once ordered to the north side of the James to support them. *M. C. Butler's* (*Hampton's*) cavalry division which was north of Richmond on its way to *Early* was also recalled.

Hancock was unable to force the Deep Run line but remained in a threatening position north of the James until the night of August 20.

Gregg advanced along the Charles City Road towards Richmond and encountered the Confederate cavalry. In the engagement which followed Brig. Gen. *John R. Chambliss, jr.*, of the Confederate cavalry, was killed. Gregg then withdrew and later recrossed the James with Hancock.

**August. Operations on the Union Left Flank** (Plate 32).—On August 14 and 15, while Hancock was drawing *Lee's* attention to the north side of the James, the V corps was relieved from its trenches by the IX corps and was assembled in rear of the Union left flank.

At 4 a. m., on August 18, the V corps with a brigade of cavalry from *Kautz's* division moved southward on the Jerusalem Plank Road and westward to Globe Tavern on the Weldon railroad. *Dearing's* cavalry brigade of *Beauregard's* force was all that opposed its march. Warren took up a position about the Tavern facing north and west and was unsuccessfully attacked that afternoon by two brigades under *Heth*.

As Warren's new position was important and isolated, one division of the II corps was withdrawn from the north bank of the James River that night and ordered to relieve the white divisions of the IX corps which were in the trenches before Petersburg. These divisions were ordered to fill the gap between Warren and the left flank of the Union line near the Jerusalem Plank Road.

On the 19th, *A. P. Hill* with five brigades of infantry drawn from the Petersburg line and *W. H. F. Lee's* cavalry division made an unsuccessful attempt to drive Warren from his position by enveloping his flanks.

On the night of the 20th-21st and the following day, *Lee* withdrew most of his troops from the north side of the James to rein-

force *Hill*, and on the 21st the latter made a last attempt to dislodge Warren. In this attack he employed his entire corps and *Hoke's* division. Warren was now supported by the IX corps and *Hill's* attack failed.

Hancock with three divisions of the II corps and Gregg's cavalry division reached Warren on the 22d, and on the following day, with Gregg's cavalry and two of his own divisions, Hancock proceeded southward to destroy the Weldon railroad.

On the 24th, while Hancock was near Reams Station and Gregg was guarding the roads to his west, Confederate troops were seen marching southward from Petersburg. Hancock and Warren were both warned. These troops proved to be eight infantry brigades and the cavalry divisions of *M. C. Butler* (*Hampton's*) and *W. H. F. Lee* which were marching to attack Hancock.

At 2 p. m. on August 25, Gregg's cavalry was driven back on Hancock's infantry, but it was 5 p. m. before *A. P. Hill* was in position to make a serious attack.

Hancock's slight line of intrenchments was carried by the Confederate infantry and his troops fell back towards the Jerusalem Plank Road along which they were expecting reinforcements.

Reams Station remained in the hands of the Confederates, who left cavalry pickets along Hatcher Run between the railroad and the Boydton Plank Road to protect the supplies that came from the south. These were now unloaded near the Nottoway Bridge, twenty-five miles south of Petersburg, and hauled through Dinwiddie Court House.

**September.**—The month of September was largely spent by both commanders in extending and strengthening their lines.

The Union line of redouts and trenches was extended from the Jerusalem Plank Road to a large redout built just west of the Weldon railroad and a short distance north of Globe Tavern. A second redout was constructed close to the railroad three-quarters of a mile farther south and was connected by trenches with the first. A line of circumvallation parallel to the front line ran from this second redout to the Norfolk railroad to protect the troops from attacks from the south.

To cover the Boydton Plank Road, which was one of their lines of supply, the Confederates ran a line of intrenchments from Petersburg to Hatcher Run. This line was from a half-mile to a

mile east of the plank road. A short line also ran parallel to and a mile west of the Weldon railroad and the Vaughn Road. It terminated in a redout about two miles northwest of Globe Tavern.

*Beauregard* was detached during the month and *A. P. Hill* assumed command south of the James.

**September. Operations on the Union Right Flank** (Plate 25).—Towards the end of September Grant made another attack north of the James. Its object was to prevent *Lee* from sending reinforcements to *Early* in the Shenandoah Valley.

The outer line of Confederate works between the James and Chickahominy rivers began at a point on the James two miles below Drewry Bluff and ran through the junction of the Newmarket and Varina roads to New Bridge on the Chickahominy. Along the Varina Road were two strong redouts *Forts Harrison* and *Gilmer* three-quarters of a mile apart and a mile and a half from the river. From *Fort Gilmer* the inner line of works ran northward parallel to the James River. *Forts Harrison* and *Gilmer*, with their connecting trench and the trenches which ran from them to the James River, formed the bridgehead of the important Confederate ponton bridge over the James below Drewry Bluff.

At this time the Confederates had abandoned the Deep Run line, and there were four Confederate brigades under *Field*, and local militia, in the forts and along the line of works between the James and Chickahominy. *Ewell* was in command of the local troops.

On the night of September 28-29, Ord, with 4,000 men of the XVIII corps, Birney with 10,000 men of the X and XVIII corps, and Kautz's cavalry division crossed the James near Varina Landing.

On the morning of the 29th, Ord advanced along the Varina road until he reached *Fort Harrison*. The fort was promptly taken by assault and the Confederates were driven from the adjacent trenches.

While this attack was going on, three Confederate brigades moved into *Fort Gilmer* and the adjacent lines.

The capture of *Fort Harrison* was followed later in the morning by an unsuccessful assault on *Fort Gilmer* by the XVIII corps.

In the meantime Birney's column advanced on the Newmarket Road which intersected the Confederate fortifications just north

of *Fort Gilmer*. Kautz's cavalry, supported by a division of the X corps, moved on the Darbytown Road.

Grant reached *Fort Harrison* shortly after it was captured and informed Birney of its capture. About 3 p. m. Birney made an assault on *Fort Gilmer* and its adjacent lines, now defended by four brigades under *Field* himself, and was repulsed.

During the night of September 29-30, the Union troops made *Fort Harrison* defensible and intrenched their entire position. *Lee* brought troops from the south side of the James to retake *Fort Harrison* by assault.

On the 30th, *Lee* had ten brigades under *R. H. Anderson* north of *Fort Gilmer*. At 3 p. m. *Anderson* made a desperate attempt to retake *Fort Harrison* but without success.

In the attack on *Fort Harrison*, *Ord* was severely wounded and was succeeded in the command of the XVIII corps by Brig. Gen. *Godfrey Weitzel*.

#### **September. Operations on the Union Left Flank** (Plate 32).—

On the morning of September 29, the Army of the Potomac was under arms ready to take advantage of any movement that *Lee* might make when he discovered the Union movement north of the James.

No movement was made that day, but on the following morning, September 30, *Warren* with two divisions of the V corps supported by *Parke* with two divisions of the IX corps advanced against the Confederate redout and adjacent trenches two miles northwest of *Globe Tavern*.

The V corps captured the redout and trenches, and the IX corps was moving past its left flank to the *Boydton Plank Road* when it encountered the Confederate divisions of *Heth* and *Wilcox* moving to the support of the redout. The IX corps fell back and took a position covering the left flank of the V corps which remained in possession of the redout.

#### **October. Operations on the Union Right Flank** (Plate 25).—

During the month of October the Union troops north of the James thoroughly intrenched their position by connecting *Fort Harrison* with the James River by a strong line of works and by running a line of works from *Fort Harrison* to the *Newmarket Road* and thence eastward to the intersection of *Deep Run* and the *Darby-*

town Road. The right of the line was held by Kautz's cavalry division.

On October 7, Kautz was attacked by the divisions of *Field* and *Hoke* and driven back to the Newmarket Road. The pursuit was here checked by the X corps and the Confederates returned to Richmond.

A reconnaissance in force was made along the Darbytown Road by a Union brigade a week later, This brigade was repulsed at the Confederate breastworks.

Towards the end of October, Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler was directed to make a demonstration north of the James.

According to Butler's plan, a part of the XVIII corps under Brig. Gen. Weitzel was to advance on Richmond by the Williamsburg Road and a part of the X corps under Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry was to advance by the Charles City Road.

These movements were made on October 27. The Union troops were however unable to pierce the Confederate line and returned to their intrenchments. There was no pursuit.

*Longstreet* resumed the command of his corps on October 17, and at this time had under his command north of the James, the divisions of *Field* and *Hoke* and a cavalry brigade.

**October. Operations on the Union Left Flank** (Plate 32).—South of the Appomattox the position held by the V and IX corps was fortified by the construction of five redouts and connecting trenches enclosing a large area. This position was connected with the works near Globe Tavern and with Hatcher Run.

Towards the end of the month, the Union line from the Appomattox to the Jerusalem Plank Road was held by a single division of the II corps and a division of that corps was in the line of circumvallation in the rear. West of the railroad were two divisions of the II corps, three of the V corps, two of the IX corps, and Gregg's cavalry division.

*B. R. Johnson's* division held the line from the Appomattox to the Jerusalem Plank Road; on his right were the divisions of *Heth* and *Wilcox* with *Mahone* in reserve. The cavalry divisions of *Hampton* and *W. H. F. Lee* with *Dearing's* brigade were on the extreme right.

Towards the end of October, Grant ordered a movement which contemplated the seizure of the Boydton Plank Road and the Petersburg-Lynchburg or Southside Railroad (plate 25).

Hancock with two divisions of the IV corps was to cross to the south side of Hatcher Run on the Vaughn Road and take the first cross-road to the Boydton Plank Road. Parke was to concentrate 11,000 men of the IX corps north of Hatcher Run and attack the Confederate intrenchments which it was believed he could carry. Warren with 11,000 men of the V corps was to support the IX corps and advance with it if the Confederate line was carried. If the Confederate works were not carried by the IX corps, Warren was to cross Hatcher Run and assist the IX corps by making a flank attack on the Confederate line in its front.

The movement began at 7:30 a. m. October 27, a dark, rainy morning, and by noon Hancock was on the Boydton Road just south of Hatcher Run. Gregg's cavalry moved over a parallel road to his left.

The IX corps supported by the V corps was unable to carry the Confederate line held by *Wilcox's* division. A part of the V corps was therefore sent across the run to take the Confederate line in flank. The country was so covered with thick undergrowth that this movement could be only slowly executed. By 4 p. m. it was evident that *Wilcox* could not be dislodged that day and the entire movement was abandoned.

At 1 p. m. Hancock was directed to halt at the Boydton Plank Road to await the arrival of the V and IX corps; late in the afternoon he was informed that the movement had been abandoned and he was directed to return to the Union intrenchments on the following morning. Late that afternoon he and Gregg were attacked by the infantry divisions of *Heth* and *Mahone* and *Hampton's* two cavalry divisions.

Hancock held his position until dark and withdrew during the night.

**November and December.**—There were no active operations about Richmond and Petersburg during the months of November and December. In the latter month the VI corps and one division of infantry from the Department of West Virginia joined the Army of the Potomac at Petersburg, and *Early's* corps, now commanded by Maj. Gen. *John B. Gordon*, returned to the *Army of Northern Virginia*.

A partial list of the casualties in the Union Army during this period is given as follows:

Casualties in Hancock's command north of the James.....	2,786
Casualties at Globe Tavern in V corps.....	3,137
Casualties at Reams Station.....	2,372
Casualties in Butler's army north of the James.....	2,272
Casualties in V and IX corps September 30.....	2,009
Casualties in Hancock's command, Boydton Plank Road.....	1,482

## OPERATIONS IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY MAY TO DECEMBER, 1864.

### HUNTER'S LYNCHBURG CAMPAIGN.

#### PLATES 2 AND 12

**May.**—When Sigel retired to Strasburg after the battle of Newmarket he was relieved from the command of the Department of Western Virginia by Maj. Gen. David Hunter, and took personal charge of the reserve division of the Department of Western Virginia, which was posted along the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.

When Hunter took command of his department, the military situation was as follows:

Hunter's field forces numbered about 11,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. At Strasburg were the 1st infantry and 1st cavalry divisions under Hunter himself, and at Lewisburg, the 2d infantry and 2d cavalry divisions under Crook (for organization see p. 251).

Brig. Gen. *Wm. E. Jones*, formerly of *Stuart's* cavalry, commanded the *Department of Western Virginia* during the absence of *Breckinridge* who had joined *Lee* at Hanover Junction May 20. *Jones* had about 3,500 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.

About the 26th of May, Hunter moved forward from Strasburg and at the end of the month was at Harrisonburg. On May 31, Crook and Averell began to move on Staunton through Covington and Warm Springs.

As it was the evident intention of the Union commander to unite his two columns at Staunton, *W. E. Jones* moved his entire force towards that point. He detached two brigades of cavalry westward to delay Crook, and took his remaining force northward to meet Hunter.

**June.**—At Harrisonburg, Hunter took the road to Port Republic and thus avoided the fortified position on the Staunton Road

which *Jones* had prepared for defense. An engagement took place on June 5 between Hunter and *Jones* at Piedmont, midway between Port Republic and the railroad. *Jones* was killed and his force decisively defeated; about 1,000 Confederates were either killed or captured. This engagement took place while Grant and *Lee* were confronting each other at Cold Harbor.

Brig. Gen. *John C. Vaughn*, who succeeded *W. E. Jones*, withdrew to Rockfish Gap in the Blue Ridge Mountains west of Charlottesville, and Hunter took possession of Staunton June 6. Here he was joined by Crook and Averell on the 8th.

On June 6, Grant wrote Hunter that Sheridan was on his way to Charlottesville and suggested that he move to that point directly or by way of Lynchburg. The letter was probably not delivered in time to alter Hunter's previous orders to attack Lynchburg.

Sending the 1st cavalry division to destroy the railroad between Charlottesville and Lynchburg, Hunter moved with his main body on Lexington which he entered on June 11. Being harassed by the Confederate cavalry, Hunter ordered the 1st cavalry division which had reached the Charlottesville-Lynchburg railroad at Arrington Station to rejoin the main body at Lexington. He thus allowed *Vaughn* to move his troops by rail from Charlottesville to Lynchburg.

From Lexington, Hunter moved on Lynchburg via Buchanan and reached the suburbs of Lynchburg June 18. The Confederate cavalry delayed his march as much as possible.

On June 6, immediately after the assault on *Cold Harbor*, *Lee* heard of the defeat and death of Brig. Gen. *Wm. E. Jones* and sent *Breckinridge* with his two brigades to the Rockfish Gap west of Charlottesville to reinforce *Vaughn* and reassume command of the *Department of Western Virginia*.

On June 12, when the Army of the Potomac began to withdraw from Cold Harbor to march to the James River, *Breckinridge* reported to *Lee* that the Confederate troops in his department were too weak and disorganized to resist Hunter. *Lee* at once started *Early* with his corps for Lynchburg to reinforce *Breckinridge*.

*Early* left Richmond June 13, and marched to Charlottesville where his corps was entrained. His advance troops reached Lynchburg about noon on June 18.



**June 18.**—On June 18, Hunter attacked the defenses of *Lynchburg* which were manned by *Breckinridge's* troops and a part of *Early's* corps. Hunter was repulsed; and being informed of *Early's* arrival, began his retreat that night on Lewisburg via Salem. He reached Salem on the 21st, Lewisburg on the 25th, and Charleston, West Va., on the 30th. From Charleston his troops were transferred by river and rail to Martinsburg, Va. The water in the rivers being at a low stage, the movement from Charleston to Parkersburg was very slow.

The Confederate cavalry pursued him as far as the Alleghany Mountains, but being hampered by broken bridges did him little damage.

**Comment.**—When Hunter defeated *W. E. Jones* at Piedmont and united his two columns at Staunton, he had done about all that could be expected from his small detached force. He had counteracted the defeat of Sigel and had compelled *Lee* to send *Breckinridge* back to the Valley.

The movement on Lynchburg, which was ordered by Grant, was based on the hypothesis that Grant's operations would be so aggressive that *Lee* would not dare to detach any force to go to the Valley. Had such been the case, Hunter could have taken Lynchburg and destroyed its important factories and supply depots, as well as the railroads and canal in its vicinity, in accordance with Grant's instructions.

When *Lee* detached *Early's* corps, the military situation was entirely changed and Hunter was fortunate in making his escape without material loss.

This campaign is simply another illustration of the difficulty of executing combined operations by two widely separated forces against a central one.

### EARLY'S MARCH TO WASHINGTON.

Ever since the Union army crossed the Rapidan, *Lee* had been considering the advisability of sending a force down the Shenandoah Valley to make a counter demonstration. He proposed such a movement to *Breckinridge* after the latter's successful battle at New Market, but *Breckinridge* did not feel strong enough to make it.

When *Early* left for Lynchburg, such a movement was suggested to him by *Lee*.

**June 27.**—In accordance with this suggestion, *Early* followed Hunter with his infantry only as far as Buchanan, and then turned northward. On June 27, he was at Staunton where the cavalry joined him, and he prepared his army for an invasion of the North.

His infantry was divided into two corps of two divisions each. The first corps was commanded by *Rodes* and was composed of the divisions of *Rodes* and *Ramseur* of *Early's* corps; the second was commanded by *Breckinridge* and was composed of *Gordon's* division of *Early's* corps and *Echol's* division of *Breckinridge's* troops. (For organization see p. 311.)

The four cavalry brigades which had been opposing Hunter were formed into a cavalry division under Maj. Gen. *Robert Ransom*.

**July.**—On July 2, *Early* reached Winchester, having sent *Imboden* down the valley of the South Fork of the Potomac, as *Lee* had done in 1863, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. At Winchester, *Early* encountered some Union cavalry which gave warning to Sigel at Martinsburg.

July 3-4, were employed by *Early* in making attacks on the various posts of Sigel's division between Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry. Sigel evacuated all his posts south of the Potomac and concentrated his forces in an intrenched camp constructed on Maryland Heights opposite Harpers Ferry after the Antietam campaign.

Finding that position too strong to attack, *Early* crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown and started eastward for Frederick, Md. He crossed the South Mountains June 8, and on the 9th was at Frederick.

The report that *Early's* corps was marching down the Valley with a strong force was credited neither by Grant nor by Halleck until July 5; *Early* was then crossing the Potomac. On that day Grant ordered Meade to send one strong division of infantry and his dismounted cavalry to Baltimore. Rickett's division of the VI corps, 5,000 men, and 3,000 dismounted cavalymen were sent from City Point on July 6. This force was deemed ample to meet the emergency, since Grant assumed that Hunter would soon be

at Harpers Ferry with the troops that retreated down the Kanawha Valley.

The troops from the Army of the Potomac reached Baltimore on July 7. Rickett's division was at once sent to the Monocacy River near Frederick, Md., to reinforce Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace, the commander of the Middle Department, who had a brigade of infantry and one of cavalry at that point; the dismounted cavalry was sent to Washington.

**Battle of the Monocacy.—July 9.** (Plate 14)—On July 9, *Early* attacked Wallace with the divisions of *Ramseur* and *Rodes* and turned his left flank with a cavalry brigade and *Gordon's* division. After a prolonged struggle Wallace was decisively defeated and fell back towards Baltimore.

OPPOSING FORCES ON THE MONOCACY NEAR FREDERICK, MD.

*Union, Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
VIII		1	1	1
VI	Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts . . . . .	3		

*Confederate Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early.*

Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge	Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon . . . . .	3		
	Brig. Gen. John Echolls . . . . .	3		
Maj. Gen. Robert Rodes	Maj. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur . . . . .	3		
	Brig. Gen. Cullen A. Battle . . . . .	4		
Cavalry	Maj. Gen. Robert Ransom . . . . .	4	12	
Artillery	Lt. Col. J. Floyd King . . . . .	3 battalions		9

	Strength.	Casualties.
Union	6,000	1,880
Confederate	15,000	700

Sending a cavalry brigade to threaten Baltimore and cut the railroads to its north, *Early* moved his main force towards Washington. He left some cavalry on the Monocacy to protect his rear from the Union force at Harpers Ferry.

On July 9, Grant learned that Hunter's force had been delayed by low water in the Ohio River; he therefore ordered the other two divisions of the VI corps, under Gen. Wright himself, to Washington. They left City Point at 10 a. m. of the 10th. The 1st division of the XIX corps from New Orleans was beginning to

arrive at Fort Monroe at this time and it also was sent to Washington.

**July 11.**—*Early* reached the Washington line of fortifications with his advance cavalry about noon on the 11th, and found the works weakly defended. Before he could deploy his leading division of infantry, he saw a strong force of Union troops enter the intrenchments. The force he saw was composed of 1,500 of the dismounted cavalry sent from the Army of the Potomac. *Early* decided that it was impracticable to take the works by assault that day as his troops were much exhausted. He spent the remainder of the day in reconnoitering.

That night at a council of war it was decided to make a daylight assault; this was postponed when some time in the night *Early* was informed that Grant had sent two corps to Washington.

Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright, with the first troops of the VI corps, reached Washington at noon on the 11th and during the night entered the fortifications in *Early's* front.

*Early* made another reconnoissance on the morning of the 12th and decided to abandon the assault. That night he began his retreat to the Potomac and crossed that river at Leesburg on the morning of the 14th.

Here he rested until July 16, when, on the approach of the Union forces, he retired to Berryville, Va., and posted his troops to cover the roads running from Berryville to Leesburg and to Harpers Ferry. His infantry guarded the crossings of the Shenandoah River.

Grant had hoped that Hunter would be able to concentrate a large force at Harpers Ferry and move down on *Early's* rear before he recrossed the Potomac and with the Washington garrison drive *Early* northward into Maryland. When *Early* recrossed the Potomac, one of Hunter's divisions only had reached Harpers Ferry; and the other was still on the Ohio River.

Wright took up the pursuit on July 13th and on the 14th reached Poolesville, Md., opposite Leesburg, with his two divisions. Here he waited for Rickett's division, which was to reach him from Baltimore, and for the division of the XIX corps from Washington.

On the 16th, Wright, having been reinforced by Rickett's division and the division of the XIX corps, continued the pursuit

and on the 17th united in the Loudoun Valley with Crook who had been assigned to the command of Hunter's field troops and had crossed the Potomac into the Loudoun Valley near Harpers Ferry. From this point Wright moved to the Shenandoah River where he found *Early* in force July 19.

On the morning of July 20, Wright ascertained that *Early* without awaiting attack had retreated towards Strasburg. As Grant had telegraphed that he wanted the VI and XIX corps at Petersburg, Va., before *Early* could rejoin *Lee*, that night Wright ordered the troops of the VI and XIX corps to return to Washington en route for Petersburg and on the 21st notified Halleck from Poolesville of his movement.

Grant believed that *Early* would probably soon return to *Lee* and even if he did remain in the Valley, he thought that Hunter's force was strong enough to prevent him from again invading Maryland.

*Early's* retreat from Berryville was caused by the advance of a strong mixed brigade under Brig. Gen. Wm. W. Averell from Martinsburg which threatened his trains. This brigade defeated *Ramseur's* division, which had been sent to meet it, near Winchester on the 20th.

The following day Averell entered Winchester where he was joined by Crook on July 22.

Halleck, who had less confidence in the ability of Hunter's force alone to protect Washington and Maryland than had Grant, telegraphed his doubts to Grant and received permission to retain Wright as long as he deemed it necessary. This authority unfortunately came only after Wright had returned to Maryland en route for Washington. That night, July 21, Halleck again telegraphed his doubts and Grant suggested that Wright unite with Hunter and drive *Early* southward and destroy the railroad from Charlottesville to Gordonsville. This was received by Halleck on the 23d, the day Wright's command reached Washington.

That same night Grant directed that Wright's corps be returned to City Point if it had reached Washington, but that the XIX corps be retained.

The uneasiness of the authorities at Washington concerning the situation is shown by a telegram from the President to Hunter

asking him if he felt strong enough to withstand *Early* should he return. Hunter replied that he did not feel so.

**Battle of Kernstown.—July 24.**—Having learned that the main Union force had returned to Maryland, on July 24, *Early* moved out from Strasburg and found Crook with Hunter's old force at Kernstown, south of Winchester. This force he decisively defeated, but Crook succeeded in reaching the Potomac at Williamsport with a loss of but 1,100 men and 20 wagons.

OPPOSING FORCES.

AT KERNSTOWN, VA.

*Union, Bvt. Maj. Gen. George Crook.*

Divisions.	Brigades.	Bri- gades.	Regi- ments Cav.	Batter- ies.
Colonel Joseph Thoburn	Colonel George D. Wells . . . . .	1	—	—
	Colonel William G. Ely . . . . .	1	—	—
Colonel Isaac H. Duval	Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes . . . . .	1	—	—
	Colonel Daniel D. Johnson . . . . .	1	—	—
Colonel James A. Mulligan	Colonel Thomas M. Harris . . . . .	1	—	—
	Lieut. Col. John P. Linton . . . . .	1	—	—
	Artillery . . . . .	—	—	3
Brig. Gen. Alfred N. Duffié	Colonel William B. Tibbits (cavalry)	1	4	—
Artillery	Colonel Jacob Higgins (cavalry) . . . . .	1	4	—
	. . . . .	—	—	1
Brig. Gen. William W. Averell	Colonel James M. Schoonmaker (cav.)	1	2	—
	Colonel William H. Powell (cavalry)	1	3	—
	Artillery . . . . .	—	—	1
<i>Confederate, Lieut. Gen. Jubal A. Early.</i>				
Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge	Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon . . . . .	3	—	—
	Brig. Gen. John Echols . . . . .	3	—	—
Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes	Brig. Gen. Cullen A. Battle . . . . .	4	—	—
	Maj. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur . . . . .	3	—	—
Artillery	3 battalions . . . . .	—	—	9
Cavalry	Maj. Gen. Robert Ransom . . . . .	3	11	—

*Early* advanced to Martinsburg where he destroyed the railroad and shops. Having decided to make reprisals for the destruction of private property by Hunter in Virginia, he selected the town of Chambersburg, Pa. (plate 15). To this point he sent the cavalry brigades of *McCausland* and *Bradley T. Johnson* with orders to

levy an assessment of \$100,000 in gold; if this was not paid they were to burn the town. To cover this movement he made demonstrations along the Potomac.

**Chambersburg.—July 30.**—As the assessment was not paid, *McCausland* burned the town of Chambersburg July 30, then rode westward to seize the towns of Hancock and Cumberland, Md. (plate 2). He captured Hancock but finding Cumberland too well guarded he returned to Virginia and encamped at Moorefield, W. Va. At that place he was surprised by Wm. W. Averell August 7, and lost a battery and several hundred prisoners.

As early as June 18, Grant realized that it would be impossible for him to personally direct operations against *Early* from southern Virginia, and as Halleck was unwilling to assume the responsibility, he recommended that the four territorial departments—Washington, the Middle Department, the Department of the Susquehanna, and the Department of West Virginia—be united into the Middle Division and that Maj. Gen. Wm. B. Franklin of the XIX corps be placed in command. Gen. Franklin's name was not acceptable to the administration and on the 25th he suggested Meade. No action was taken on this matter until *Early* attacked Crook; then Halleck was directed by President Lincoln to assume control of the troops in these departments.

**Comment.**—As a diversion in favor of the Confederate troops guarding Richmond, *Early's* operations had thus far been eminently successful. He had relieved Lynchburg; had driven Hunter and all his troops out of the Shenandoah Valley; had wrecked the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; and had drawn to the Potomac River the VI army corps and a division of the XIX army corps. He was now again on the Potomac River threatening another invasion and Grant found it necessary to still further deplete the armies south of the James. *Early's* only reverse was the surprise and defeat of the two brigades of cavalry by Averell at Moorefield.

It was not *Lee's* desire that *Early* should make a serious attempt to capture Washington, as it was known that the Union capital was surrounded by a line of forts of strong profile thoroughly equipped with artillery and probably well garrisoned. In view of what he had just seen at Spottsylvania and Cold Harbor, *Early* was justified in declining to assume the responsibility of an assault which seemed to him to have little chance of success.

Throughout these operations Grant constantly under-estimated the strength of *Early's* command as he could not believe that *Lee* would dare detach a large force from his own army. He did not at that time appreciate the boldness of either *Lee* or *Early*. He assumed that *Lee* would recall *Early* at the earliest possible opportunity and was more concerned about the recall of his own detached troops than about *Early's* operations. The destruction of Chambersburg opened his eyes to the serious moral effect of *Early's* campaign.

Although Grant was promptly informed of the defeat of Crook at *Kernstown* on July 24, and of his retreat to the Potomac, he was not greatly concerned, as he considered the troops under Hunter, reinforced by the VI corps and the division of the XIX corps under Wright, sufficient to meet the emergency. However, he ordered the remaining troops of the XIX corps to Washington. At this time Grant's attention was absorbed by the preparations for the firing of the Petersburg mine and the assault which was to take place on July 29.

Halleck sent Wright from Washington along the north bank of the Potomac to report to Hunter on the Monocacy River. Wright reached the Monocacy on July 27, and a few days later was sent on to Harpers Ferry to unite with Crook.

On the night of July 29, Grant learned that the dispositions made by Halleck had not been sufficient to prevent an invasion of Pennsylvania by the Confederate cavalry (Chambersburg Raid) and that *Early* was threatening to cross the Potomac with his entire command.

**August.**—To meet this new condition of affairs he ordered Meade to forward one of Sheridan's cavalry divisions to Washington and to send Sheridan himself to take command of the troops in the field. On the 4th of August, Grant himself went via Washington to confer with Hunter whose headquarters were near Frederick, Maryland.

Here he carried out the plan which he had proposed to the War Department on July 18, of forming a territorial division of the Departments of Washington, the Susquehanna, West Virginia, and the Middle Department. At his suggestion, on August 7, Sheridan, who was then at Harpers Ferry, was placed in command of this division. Crook succeeded Hunter in the command of the Department of West Virginia.



## SHERIDAN'S SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN.

## PLATES 11 and 14.

**August 7.**—When Sheridan assumed command, the military situation was as follows (plate 12):

The VI corps, the first division of the XIX corps, and the two infantry divisions of Crook's corps, were at Harpers Ferry; Crook's cavalry was at Moorefield, West Virginia; Torbert's division of Sheridan's cavalry corps which had come from the Army of the Potomac was on the road between Washington and Harpers Ferry; Wilson's division of the same corps, which on August 4 was ordered to follow Torbert, was en route to Washington.

*Early's* four infantry divisions and all his cavalry, save the brigades of *McCausland* and *Bradley T. Johnson*, were near Bunker Hill where he had concentrated as soon as he learned of the arrival of the VI corps at Harpers Ferry. The detached brigades of cavalry were at Moorefield, where they were surprised and defeated by Averell, who commanded Crook's cavalry. (See p. 315.)

The substance of the instructions which Hunter had received from Grant and had transmitted to Sheridan was, "If the enemy is south of the Potomac attack and follow him as long as it is safe to do so. In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. Buildings should be protected and not destroyed."

About the 9th of August, Torbert joined Sheridan with his cavalry division and was placed in command of all the cavalry. Merritt took command of the division. On the 10th, Sheridan moved from the vicinity of Harpers Ferry towards Berryville.

According to the returns of July 31, Sheridan had 28,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry present for duty at Harpers Ferry.

The returns of September 10 indicate that *Early's* command present for duty at this time did not exceed 12,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry. The Union authorities, however, assumed the strength of his army to be over 20,000.

*Early*, being aware of his numerical weakness and having little confidence in his cavalry whose morale was injured by the defeat of *McCausland* and *Bradley T. Johnson* at Moorefield, decided

to fall back on Strasburg and await the reinforcements which had been promised him by *Lee*.

On August 7, President *Davis* and *Lee* decided to reinforce *Early* temporarily from the *Army of Northern Virginia*. Lieut. Gen. *R. H. Anderson* was sent with *Kershaw's* division of his corps, 4,500 men, by rail to Culpeper and was there joined by *Fitz Lee's* cavalry division, 2,000 men. From Culpeper, *Anderson* marched to Front Royal, which he reached on the afternoon of August 14.

**August 12.**—As *Early* had decided to retreat to Strasburg, he offered little resistance to *Sheridan* as the latter advanced from Berryville to Cedar Creek, north of Strasburg.

*Early* was at Fishers Hill, just south of Strasburg, where he was reorganizing his cavalry. *Vaughn's* dismounted troops received their horses and Maj. Gen. *Lunsford L. Lomax* reported from the *Army of Northern Virginia* to relieve *Ransom* of the command of the cavalry division.

**August 14.**—On the 14th, *Sheridan* received from *Grant* a message to the effect that two divisions had left the *Army of Northern Virginia* to reinforce *Early*. *Sheridan* was advised to act defensively until these troops were recalled as *Early* might now have 40,000 men.

In accordance with these instructions, *Sheridan* at once began to fall back, and finding no other good position for defence, did not stop until his army was again assembled in front of Harpers Ferry. In retreating he carried out his instructions and destroyed the military resources of the country.

At Winchester, *Sheridan* was reinforced by *Wilson's* cavalry division and at Harpers Ferry by the 2d division of the XIX corps.

*Anderson* and *Early* followed the retreating Union army, united at Winchester August 18, and advanced to Charlestown. While *Anderson* with *Kershaw's* division and one of *Lomax's* cavalry brigades remained in observation at Charlestown, *Fitz Lee* moved to Williamsport, and *Early* with the rest of his command advanced to Shepherdstown, to threaten an invasion of Maryland.

**August 26.**—*Early* was afraid to cross the Potomac with his weak force, and as it was dangerous to leave *Sheridan* long on his flank and rear, so on August 26, he fell back to Bunker Hill.

At the same time *Anderson* fell back along the railroad to the west side of Opequon Creek.

Sheridan, who now had an army consisting of 32,000 infantry and 6,500 cavalry near Harpers Ferry, moved out at once on the roads running towards Winchester and Berryville. Averell's cavalry division, 2,000 men, moved southward from Williamsport where it had assembled after the Moorefield engagement.

**September.**—About September 1, *Early* received a message from *Lee* requesting the return of *Anderson's* force if it could be spared, and suggested that *Anderson* cross the Blue Ridge Mountains through Snickers Gap and return through Culpeper.

As Sheridan did not seem aggressive and his main body was believed to be near Charlestown, *Anderson* started on the morning of September 3 to move eastward through Berryville. In the vicinity of that place he encountered Crook's corps and was forced to halt. *Early* went to his assistance with three of his divisions and developed the strength and position of Sheridan's army. The Confederate generals thereupon decided to fall back behind the Opequon.

**September 14.**—As Sheridan made no attempt to cross the Opequon and his operations were confined to cavalry reconnaissances, on September 14 *Anderson* started for Front Royal with *Kershaw's* division; *Fitz Lee* remained with *Early*. This left *Early* with 12,000 infantry and 6,500 cavalry.

The apparent timidity of Sheridan deceived *Early* and he made no attempt to concentrate or to withdraw although he knew that Sheridan had a much larger force than his own. Three of *Early's* divisions were at Stevenson Station on the railroad four miles from Winchester covering the roads leading to Martinsburg and Charlestown, while only one was between Berryville and Winchester. His cavalry was well distributed along his front and flanks. On the 17th, *Early* moved two divisions to Bunker Hill; one of these advanced to Martinsburg on the 18th but returned to Bunker Hill that night.

In strict compliance with his instructions, Sheridan had waited for *Lee* to recall *Anderson*. His infantry remained in camp along the road running north from Berryville to the railroad, six miles east of Opequon Creek. As soon as he learned through a spy that *Kershaw* had gone to Front Royal, he made his preparations to

attack. His plan was submitted to Grant, who visited him at this time, and received the latter's approval.

In this plan Sheridan proposed to threaten *Early* from Charlestown while he moved his main force via Berryville to Newtown and cut off *Early's* retreat. Being informed by Averell that *Early* had sent two of his four divisions to Martinsburg, he modified his plan and made his turning movement on the Berryville-Winchester road. After the movement was begun he learned that *Early's* movement on Martinsburg was only a reconnaissance and that these troops had returned.

**Battle of Winchester.—September 19.**—In order to surprise his adversary, Sheridan ordered his troops to move at 2 a. m. About that hour Wilson's cavalry started from Berryville for Winchester and the VI and XIX corps, 25,000 men, started across country for the bridge across the Opequon on the Berryville-Winchester road. Crook's corps, 7,000 men, was to move to Berryville to turn the right flank of *Early's* line at the proper time.

Averell's cavalry division was to move up from Martinsburg, and unite with Merritt on the Charlestown-Winchester road to attack *Early's* left flank.

Had the distances covered by the VI and XIX corps been less and the country more favorable for movement, Sheridan would have won a decisive victory, for *Early* had but *Ramseur's* division, 3,000 infantry, and a small cavalry force guarding the Berryville Road. It was nearly noon however before the Union infantry was deployed and began its attack. This delay gave *Early* time to bring two divisions from Stevenson Station to reinforce *Ramseur*.

By assuming the offensive, *Early* was able to penetrate the interval between the VI and XIX corps, check the attack, and compel Sheridan to reinforce the right of his infantry line with Crook's corps.

*Early* realized that he could not long hold his position, so he called in his fourth division and sent his trains towards Newtown. When Crook attacked at about 4 p. m., the Union cavalry were getting around his flanks, so *Early* ordered a retreat which he covered by temporarily holding the old intrenchments about Winchester. He retired to Newtown and at night continued his retreat to Fishers Hill beyond Strasburg.

## OPPOSING FORCES AT WINCHESTER, VA.

*Union, Army of the Shenandoah.**Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
VI *	Brig. Gen. David A. Russell* . . . . .	3	—
Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright	Brig. Gen. George W. Getty . . . . .	3	—
	Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts . . . . .	2	—
	Artillery . . . . .	1	6
XIX	Brig. Gen. William Dwight . . . . .	3	1
Maj. Gen. William H. Emory	Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover . . . . .	4	1
	Artillery . . . . .	—	2
West Va. Corps	Col. Joseph Thoburn . . . . .	3	—
Brig. Gen. George Crook	Col. Isaac H. Duval . . . . .	2	—
	Artillery . . . . .	—	3
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt . . . . .	3	—
Brig. Gen. Alfred T. H. Torbert	Brig. Gen. William W. Averell . . . . .	2	—
	Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson . . . . .	2	—
	Artillery . . . . .	—	7

*Confederate, Lieut. Gen. Jubal A. Early.*

	Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon . . . . .	4	—
	Maj. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur . . . . .	4	—
	Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes* . . . . .	5	—
	Brig. Gen. Gabriel C. Wharton . . . . .	3	—
	Artillery . . . . .	—	9
Cavalry	Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee . . . . .	2	—
	Maj. Gen. Lunsford L. Lomax . . . . .	5	—
	Union.	Confederate.	
Strength . . . . .	41,000	18,000	
Casualties . . . . .	5,018	3,921	

\*Killed.

After the battle, Brig. Gen. Emory Upton succeeded Gen. Russell and Brig. Gen. John Pegram succeeded Gen. Rodes.

**Comment.**—Although *Lee* had urged *Early* to attack Sheridan if possible, *Lee* was not in a position to appreciate the strength of Sheridan's army. *Early*, on the other hand, had retired before Sheridan in August because of the numerical weakness of the Confederate army, and now defied him in an untenable position with a force relatively much weaker than in the preceding month. *Early* was not justified in fighting the battle of Winchester, but deserves credit for extricating himself with so little loss.

Sheridan's plan was a well conceived one and would have been more successful had the Union troops been able to march and maneuver as rapidly as *Early's* more experienced veterans. The battle was an important one to Sheridan, however, as it won him the confidence of the President and the Secretary of War, and gave the army confidence in itself and in its commander.

On September 20, Sheridan took up the pursuit, and on that day discovered *Early* in position on Fisher Hill, a ridge extending across the valley of the north fork of the Shenandoah a few miles above Strasburg. The Confederate infantry not being numerically sufficient to man the entire line, *Lomax's* cavalry was dismounted and placed on the left of the infantry.

**Battle of Fisher Hill.—September 22.**—In the battle of Fisher Hill, Sheridan's plan was to threaten *Early's* front with the VI and XIX corps, while Crook's corps made a long detour in rear of the Union army and secured a position across the Confederate line beyond the left flank of *Lomax's* cavalry. When Crook was in position the whole Union line was to attack.

The flank march occupied nearly the entire day of the 22d and it was late in the afternoon before Crook was in place. The engagement did not last long; *Early* was glad to retire under cover of the night, leaving behind him about 1,000 men and 18 guns. He was pursued as far as Mount Jackson.

Sheridan had sent most of his cavalry under Torbert after *Fitz Lee's* division, which had retired up the Luray Valley. He expected Torbert to reach Newmarket in *Early's* rear. This movement was frustrated by *Wickham* who then commanded the Confederate division; he intrenched himself so strongly at a gorge of Luray Valley that Torbert retired without an attack.

*Early* continued his retreat through Port Republic to Brown Gap in the Blue Ridge Mountains where *Kershaw* was ordered to join him again. *Early* was directed by *Lee* to avoid an engagement until reinforced.

Sheridan followed with his infantry as far as Harrisonburg, and from that point sent his cavalry to capture or destroy all the live stock and forage in the valley from Harrisonburg to Staunton.

Shortly after the battle of Fisher Hill, Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson was detached from Sheridan's army and ordered to report to Sherman to command the cavalry of the Division of the

Mississippi, and Brig. Gen. Wm. W. Averell was relieved. Brig. Gen. George A. Custer and Col. William Powell became the new division commanders.

It was Grant's desire that Sheridan should now move through the Blue Ridge Mountains to Charlottesville and thoroughly destroy the Virginia Central Railroad as far as Richmond. To supply Sheridan's troops, Grant directed Halleck to have the railroad from Manassas to Culpeper placed in running order.

Sheridan reported that to move against the railroad would require the division of his command into three parts; one to guard the Shenandoah Valley, one to guard the Alexandria-Gordonsville Railroad and one to operate against the Virginia Central Railroad. This would expose the Shenandoah Valley and give him too small an operating force. He thought it wiser to retire to some point near Winchester and to send his surplus troops to Grant.

This plan was approved, and Grant ordered Halleck to transfer the working parties to the Manassas Gap railroad to give Sheridan a line of supply. This was repeating the error made by McClellan in 1862. Sheridan, who appreciated the situation better, requested that the working parties be placed on the Winchester-Harpers Ferry Railroad, as the Manassas Gap road was a difficult one to protect.

**October.**—On October 6, Sheridan began to withdraw towards Winchester. One of his cavalry brigades crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains and destroyed the railroad bridge over the Rapidan between Gordonsville and Culpeper.

*Early* followed Sheridan's army down the valley. He had been reinforced by Brig. Gen. *Thomas L. Rosser's* brigade of cavalry from the *Army of Northern Virginia* which he assigned to *Fitz Lee's* division. *Rosser* took command of the division.

The cavalry divisions of *Rosser* and *Lomax*, being in advance of *Early's* army, so annoyed the rear of Sheridan's column that Sheridan halted his army near Strasburg and directed *Torbert* with the divisions of *Merritt* and *Custer* to attack the Confederate cavalry and either defeat it or be defeated.

On October 9, *Torbert* turned on the Confederate cavalry and having thoroughly defeated it, drove it back in great disorder on the Confederate infantry which was in the vicinity of New Market. In this engagement the Union cavalry captured many prisoners and 11 guns.

Thinking that he had now disposed of *Early's* army, Sheridan retired to Middletown and directed the VI corps to march to Alexandria to report to Grant. This corps had already reached Front Royal when *Early* appeared at Strasburg and Sheridan recalled it to Middletown.

Grant was still desirous that Sheridan should operate on Culpeper and Gordonsville and to get the latter's views on the matter, President Lincoln requested him to come to Washington.

Sheridan, with Merritt's cavalry division, followed the Manassas Gap railroad through the Blue Ridge Mountains on October 16. It was Sheridan's intention to send Merritt to Grant. When one day out, a Confederate message was intercepted that indicated that *Longstreet* was coming to unite with *Early* to attack Sheridan. Merritt's division was therefore sent back to the valley to report to Maj. Gen. H. G. Wright who was now in command of the Army of the Shenandoah.\*

*Early* had followed the retiring Union army as far as Fisher Hill which he reached on October 13. Although his army was much weaker than that of his adversary he still had confidence in his ability to defeat him.

**Battle of Cedar Creek.—October 19** (Plate 12).—At Strasburg, Va., the North Fork of the Shenandoah River turns abruptly eastward and maintains this direction for about six miles. About three miles east of Strasburg is a north and south line of military obstacles formed of Cedar Creek and the Massanutten Mountains.

Cedar Creek breaks through the Little North Mountains about eight miles from the North Fork of the Shenandoah River and flows a little east of south into that river. The Massanutten Mountains run north and south between the two branches of the Shenandoah River. The western range, called the Three-Top Mountain, terminates on the south bank of the North Fork of the Shenandoah River, almost opposite the mouth of Cedar Creek. Between the mountain and the Shenandoah is a narrow bench, followed by the road and railroad connecting Strasburg and Front Royal.

The Union line was along the east side of Cedar Creek, with its left resting on the North Branch of the Shenandoah and its right

\*Gen. Longstreet returned to duty at this time and it was probably *Lee's* original intention to send him to relieve *Early*.



on the North Mountains. Custer's cavalry division was on the right, at the base of the mountain; Merritt's division was next; the VI corps in reserve on Merritt's left; the XIX corps along Cedar Creek to the west of the turnpike connecting Strasburg and Middletown and a little south of the VI corps; Crook's corps on Cedar Creek east of turnpike; Powell at Front Royal. The pickets were along Cedar Creek and the Shenandoah.

*Early's* position on Fisher Hill was on the west side of the North Fork of the Shenandoah, six miles above Cedar Creek.

From the top of Three-Top Mountain, then a Confederate signal station, it was possible with a good glass to see the entire Union line.

On October 17, Maj. Gen. *John B. Gordon* and Maj. *Hotchkiss*, *Early's* chief engineer, carefully examined the Union position and *Gordon* formed a plan of attack which was later approved by *Early*.

*Gordon* proposed to construct a foot bridge across the Shenandoah at Fisher Hill, over which the three divisions of *Early's* corps would cross and then by night move along a trail on the south bank of the river to a ford on the Shenandoah, a mile below Cedar Creek. *Wharton's* division was to move on the Valley Pike, which crossed Cedar Creek two miles above its mouth, and *Kershaw's* division, by a road that crossed Cedar Creek by a ford a half mile above its mouth. *Rosser's* cavalry was to make a diversion by attacking Custer's division, and *Lomax* was to move up the Front Royal road and get in the Union rear. (For organization see p. 328.)

*Gordon's* plan was a very promising one since the Union commanders believed their left flank unassailable. Furthermore, a brigade sent by Crook on a reconnaissance on the 18th, reported that the Confederate army had retired up the Valley. As a matter of fact it had only evacuated an advanced position which it held on the 17th.

Wright credited the report made to him by Crook, since it was probable that *Early* could not long maintain himself at Fisher Hill, as the Union army had destroyed the food supplies and forage of the Valley.

The Confederate movement was made with great skill and caution on the night of October 18-19, and long before day-break the three divisions of *Early's* corps were along the

south bank of the Shenandoah in Crook's rear, waiting only for the dawn to surprise his troops in camp. With them was a small cavalry force detailed to capture Sheridan, whose absence was not known.

*Kershaw's* division was near the west bank of Cedar Creek ready to cross and attack Crook's flank. *Wharton's* division was on the turnpike which ran from Strasburg to Middletown, which separated Crook's corps from the XIX corps, ready to unite in the attack. *Lomax's* cavalry was on the Front Royal-Newtown road.

As soon as it was light enough to see their landmarks, *Kershaw's* division crossed Cedar Creek, and the divisions of *Ramseur*, *Pegram* and *Gordon* crossed the Shenandoah River, and began the attack.

Crook's corps, attacked in flank and rear, was completely surprised and left the field in disorder before it could be reinforced. All the field east of the turnpike was thus evacuated and the five Confederate divisions were united along the pike.

Wright endeavored to form the VI and XIX corps in line along the pike but was unable to do so, as the line was turned on both flanks. The VI corps made a short stand and then retired to a position in the fields west of Middletown. The XIX corps was compelled to retire in more or less disorder and rally behind the VI corps.

Although attacked in front and flank, the VI corps held its second position for about an hour, until finally compelled by the Confederate artillery to retire. In maintaining its position the VI corps was aided by the XIX corps on its right and by the cavalry on its left.

When the VI corps again fell back, its divisions became separated and the second division, under Brig. Gen. Getty, retired to a ridge a mile north of Middletown and immediately west of the turnpike. On the same ridge to the east of the pike was the Union cavalry. The other divisions of the VI corps and XIX corps fell back to a position a mile farther north.

*Early* did not at once pursue the VI corps when it fell back the second time and Getty was left undisturbed in his new position.

At this time Sheridan reached the field and took command. He had spent the night at Winchester on his way back to the army,

and had left that town between eight and nine o'clock in the morning.

Shortly after leaving Winchester he began to encounter disorganized Union troops moving to the rear. He hastened to the front and found that the Confederate attack had temporarily ceased.

He immediately determined to form his troops on the ridge occupied by Getty and so notified Wright, who resumed command of the VI corps.

On the new line, Custer's cavalry division was posted on the right, the XIX and VI corps formed the center, and Merritt's cavalry division was on the left. Crook's corps was in reserve.

It was not until the early afternoon, after the new Union line was well established, that *Early* renewed his attack. He was then too late and his attack was repulsed.

There was another lull for about two hours, during which the Union army was strengthened by the return of fugitives. During this time Sheridan ascertained from prisoners that *Early* had not been reinforced by *Longstreet* as had been feared. Between 3 and 4 p. m., Sheridan ordered a counter-attack and the Confederates were in turn routed and driven across Cedar Creek to Fisher Hill, from which place their infantry retired to New Market early the following morning.

In the morning of October 19, the Confederates took about 1,500 prisoners and 24 guns. The prisoners were sent to the rear and were not recaptured. In the afternoon the Union troops captured about the same number of Confederate prisoners, retook the captured Union guns and 24 additional ones. In this battle Maj. Gen. *Stephen D. Ramseur* of the Confederate army was mortally wounded.

This battle closed the important military operations in the Shenandoah Valley for 1864.

## OPPOSING FORCES AT CEDAR CREEK.

*Union—Army of the Shenandoah.**Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Regiments. Inf.	Cav.	Batter- ies.
VI	Brig. Gen. Frank Wheaton . . . . .	2	7	—	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. George W. Getty . . . . .	3	10	—	—
Horatio G. Wright	Col. J. Warren Keifer . . . . .	2	12	—	—
Artillery	Col. Charles H. Tompkins . . . . .	—	—	—	5
XIX	Brig. Gen. James W. McMillan . . . . .	2	10	—	1
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover . . . . .	4	20	—	1
William H. Emory	Maj. Albert W. Bradbury . . . . .	—	—	—	2
Reserve Artillery					
West Va. Corps	Col. Joseph Thoburn . . . . .	2	—	—	—
Brig. Gen.	Col. Rutherford B. Hayes . . . . .	2	7	—	—
George Crook					
Artillery Brigade	Capt. Henry A. DuPont . . . . .	—	—	—	3
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt . . . . .	3	—	12	—
Brig. Gen.	Col. William H. Powell . . . . .	2	—	7	—
Alfred T. A. Torbert	Brig. Gen. George A. Custer . . . . .	2	—	11	—
Artillery	Capt. D. R. Ransom . . . . .	—	—	—	horse 5
	Strength . . . . .	40,000			

*Confederate, Lieut. Gen. Jubal A. Early.*

Second	Maj. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur . . . . .	4	19	—	—
	Brig. Gen. John Pegram . . . . .	3	14	—	—
	Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon . . . . .	4	20	—	—
First	Maj. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw . . . . .	4	21	—	—
	Brig. Gen. Gabriel C. Wharton . . . . .	3	11	—	—
Cavalry	Maj. Gen. Lunsford L. Lomax . . . . .	4	—	18	—
	Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser . . . . .	3	—	11	—
Artillery	Col. Thomas H. Carter . . . . .	4	battalions	—	12
				horse	7
	Strength . . . . .	20,000			

*Casualties in Union Army.*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Winchester . . . . .	697	3983	338	5018
Fisher Hill . . . . .	52	457	19	528
Cedar Creek . . . . .	644	3430	1591	5665

*Casualties in Confederate Army.*

Winchester (infantry and artillery) . . . . .	226	1567	1818	3611
Fisher Hill (infantry and artillery) . . . . .	30	221	995	1246
Cavalry, Sept. 1 to Oct. 1 . . . . .	60	288	348	696
Cedar Creek . . . . .	—	—	—	3000

The casualties in Confederate army are as given in reports of Gen. Early.

**Comment.**—Taken as a whole, Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley was one of the most brilliant operations of the war. It wholly neutralized the effects of the unsuccessful operations of his predecessors as well as the invasion of the northern States by *Early*.

Until the battle of Winchester, Sheridan's operations were characterized by great caution because he was hampered by instructions which forbade his running any risks. There had been some opposition to his appointment to this important command, because of his inexperience; Grant therefore felt personally responsible for his operations and being far from the field of operations was somewhat apprehensive.

When Grant visited Sheridan, just before the battle of Winchester, and heard the latter's plan of operations, any doubt he may have had as to Sheridan's ability to cope with *Early* was dissipated and he gave Sheridan full power to act. The battles of Winchester and Fisher Hill immediately followed.

In opposing Grant's plan of operating against the Virginia Central railroad, Sheridan displayed great strategic sense. He felt confident that if the VI corps reached the front of Petersburg, *Early* would be compelled to reinforce *Lee* and then he could destroy the railroad with the Union cavalry. Had he executed Grant's plan, the strength of the infantry of the Army of the Shenandoah would probably have been dissipated in useless marches and operations.

Had *Early* known the record of his adversary in the West, he might have been less confident and more cautious. As long as he was threatening a descent on Maryland and Pennsylvania and keeping in the Shenandoah Valley a Union force much larger than his own, he was doing all that could have been expected of him when operating against Sheridan.

He should have pursued the tactics of *Jackson* and avoided battle with a stronger force. He could have retired up the valley to Brown Gap as *Jackson* had done in 1862, without impairing

the reputation he had made and without destroying the morale of his troops. Here he could have waited for an opportunity to strike. In this position he would have guarded the passes in the Blue Ridge Mountains and threatened Sheridan's communications had the latter attempted to move on Staunton. At the same time he would have been in close touch with *Lee's* army while Sheridan would have been far from Grant.

That the Confederate force was too weak to cope with Sheridan's army on the battle-field was shown in the battle of Cedar Creek; in this battle the VI corps, almost alone, held the entire Confederate infantry in check long enough to destroy the impetus of its attack. Furthermore, the Union army, after being driven from the field, returned with diminished strength and in a very short time won a decisive victory.

**Minor Operations** (Plate 2).—In November, *Rosser* made a raid in West Virginia and captured a fortified post on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad west of Cumberland; and Merritt moved into the Loudoun Valley to destroy the resources of that valley. *Kershaw's* division returned to *Lee*.

In December, Torbert with two of his cavalry divisions crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains to capture Gordonsville. This movement was frustrated by *Lomax's* cavalry, assisted by infantry sent from Richmond. At the same time Custer's cavalry division moved up the Shenandoah Valley; it was surprised by *Rosser* and compelled to retire.

In December, the VI corps and part of Crook's corps were sent to Grant, and about the same time *Early's* corps under the command of Maj. Gen. *John B. Gordon*, was sent to *Lee*.

Sheridan remained near Winchester with his cavalry, the XIX corps, and part of Crook's corps; *Early* remained near Staunton with his cavalry and *Wharton's* infantry division.

The Manassas Gap railroad was never completed; after the battle of Cedar Creek the working parties were transferred to the Harpers Ferry-Winchester railroad.

## OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.

At the beginning of the year, the District of North Carolina was commanded by Maj. Gen. *John J. Peck* who had about 9,000 troops present for duty distributed in many garrisons.

The *Department of North Carolina* was commanded by Maj. Gen. *George E. Pickett*.

Towards the end of January, *Lee* directed *Pickett* to make an attempt to capture the Union headquarters at Newberne, N. C. The attempt was made early in February with seven brigades of infantry and a force of cavalry. Although Newberne had a small garrison, it was well fortified and the Confederate force was withdrawn without making a serious attack. In April, an attack was made by a large force under Maj. Gen. *Robert F. Hoke* in connection with the ironclad *Albemarle* on the land and naval garrison of Plymouth, N. C. Having destroyed the Union fleet, the defenses were taken by assault after a prolonged attack in which the garrison of 3,000 men was captured.

The fall of Plymouth caused Grant to issue orders for the concentration of all the forces at Newberne.

Towards the end of April, Brig. Gen. Innes N. Palmer succeeded Peck in the command of the District of North Carolina, and *Beauregard* relieved *Pickett* of the command of the *Department of North Carolina*.

Early in May, *Hoke* made a second attempt to take Newberne but was called to southern Virginia to meet Butler's army before any serious attack could be made.

The only important incident that occurred in this department between May and December was the destruction of Confederate iron-clad *Albemarle* at Plymouth October 28th. The vessel was destroyed by a spar torpedo operated by Lieut. W. B. Cushing, U. S. Navy, from a launch in a night attack.

Early in November, *Bragg* was assigned to the command of all the troops in North Carolina in addition to his duties as chief of staff. At this time Sherman was advancing through Georgia and most of the troops were sent to Georgia and South Carolina.

**First Attack on Fort Fisher.**—After active operations ceased in front of Petersburg and Richmond, Grant directed Butler to organize an expedition to operate with the navy in the capture of *Fort Fisher* at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. This was the only important coast fort still in the possession of the Confederate authorities and protected the blockade runners which brought supplies to Wilmington, N. C. Grant directed Butler to place Maj. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel in charge of the land troops.

Butler detailed two divisions, 6,500 men with two batteries, to this expedition and decided to take personal command. The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe December 13 with a naval convoy of 50 vessels. Through mismanagement and storms it was not until the 24th that the attack was begun. In the meantime, the Confederate authorities had been warned and *Hoke's* division was sent from the *Army of Northern Virginia* to the relief.

The naval bombardment began on December 24 and on the following day one of the divisions was landed. Before night however, it became apparent that the land front had been but little damaged by the navy and that an assault would be hazardous. It was also learned that the advance brigade of *Hoke's* division was within five miles of the fort in the rear of the landing party. The troops were therefore reembarked and the expedition returned to Hampton Roads.

One of the features of Butler's plan for capturing *Fort Fisher* was the explosion of a ship containing 215 tons of powder on the shore near the fort. It was thought by him that it would destroy the defenders of the fort if not the fort itself. As a matter of fact it produced no noticeable effect.

## OPERATIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA AND FLORIDA.

### PLATES 5-6.

The Union Department of the South was commanded by Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore until May 1. Maj. Gen. John G. Foster assumed command May 26.

In April, about 10,000 troops were withdrawn to reinforce Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler and for the remainder of the year the department had from 12,000 to 16,000 present for duty.

*Beauregard* left the *Department of South Carolina, etc.*, in April, and was succeeded by Maj. Gen. *Samuel Jones*. In September the latter was relieved by Lieut. Gen. *William J. Hardee*, and took command of the *District of South Carolina*.

Half the troops were withdrawn from this department in April and May, leaving about 10,000 to 12,000 present for duty.

**Operations.**—In South Carolina, the Union troops held the islands along the coast south of Charleston and made several



unsuccessful attempts to capture the land defenses of that city. *Fort Sumter* and the city were bombarded at intervals throughout the year.

Early in February, a Union division was landed at Jacksonville, Florida, to hold it as a base of operations. On February 20, a force of 5,500 Union troops was repulsed with great loss in an attack made on a Confederate division of nearly equal size entrenched at Olustee, Florida, twenty-five miles west of Baldwin. The Union troops fell back to Jacksonville where they were reinforced and the Confederates advanced to Baldwin. Active operations, however, soon ceased as troops from both divisions were sent to Virginia.

In the latter part of November, Foster sent a force of 5,000 men under Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch to attack the railroad near the head of Port Royal Sound or Broad River to threaten the communications of the Confederate forces at Savannah to which point Sherman was marching from Atlanta. This force entrenched itself within striking distance of the railroad and remained there until Savannah was evacuated.

Historically one of the most interesting events of the year was the destruction of the U. S. frigate *Housatonic* by a Confederate submarine boat February 17, at Charleston, S. C.

Several U. S. transports were destroyed during the year by submarine mines in the rivers of the Department of the South.

**Results of Campaigns of 1864.**—In the East, the Army of Virginia was closely invested in its lines about Richmond and Petersburg but still controlled the railroads running to Lynchburg and Danville. Its strength was reduced not only by the losses of the year but also by the loss of morale due to *Early's* unfortunate operations towards the close of the year. *Lee* could hope for no reinforcements since Sherman was now in Georgia threatening to invade the Carolinas and part of Thomas' army was released for reinforcing the coastal troops in those States.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE WEST IN 1864.

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The principal operations in the West in 1864 were:

- February . . . Meridian Campaign in Mississippi.  
March . . . . . Red River Campaign in Louisiana.  
April . . . . . Red River Campaign in Louisiana and Arkansas, including battles  
of Sabine Crossroads, La., Prairie D'Ann and Jenkins' Ferry,  
Ark.  
Capture of Fort Pillow, Tenn., by Forrest.  
May . . . . . Atlanta Campaign in Georgia, Dalton to New Hope Church.  
Red River Campaign in Louisiana and Arkansas.  
June . . . . . Atlanta Campaign in Georgia, New Hope Church to Kenesaw  
Mountain.  
Operations against Forrest in northern Mississippi, including the  
engagement of Guntown or Brice Crossroads.  
July . . . . . Atlanta Campaign in Georgia, Kenesaw Mountain to Ezra Church.  
Operations against Forrest in northern Mississippi, including the  
engagement at Tupelo.  
August . . . . Atlanta Campaign in Georgia, Ezra Church to Jonesboro.  
Forrest's raid into Memphis.  
Capture of Forts Morgan and Gaines at entrance of Mobile Bay,  
Alabama.  
Wheeler's raid in eastern and central Tennessee.  
September . . Occupation of Atlanta by Sherman.  
Forrest's raid in central Tennessee.  
Price's raid in Missouri.  
October . . . . Hood's movement from Palmetto, Ga., to Tuscumbia, Ala., in-  
cluding attack on Allatoona.  
Forrest's raid in west Tennessee.  
Price's raid in Missouri.  
November . . Beginning of Sherman's "March to the Sea".  
Hood's advance on Nashville, Tenn., Tuscumbia, Ala., to Franklin,  
Tenn.  
December . . Stoneman's raid in western Virginia.  
Battle of Nashville, Tenn.  
Siege and occupation of Savannah by Sherman.

On December 31, 1863, the strength of the Confederate forces in the West, present for duty, was approximately as follows (Plate 1):

Troops in east Tennessee, Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet.....	17,000
Army of Tennessee, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.....	48,000
Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana.—Lieut. Gen. Leonidas Polk.....	25,000
Trans-Mississippi Department.—Lieut. Gen. E. Kirby Smith.....	34,000
	<hr/>
Total.....	124,000
Total present..	149,000

*Longstreet's* command consisted of the divisions formerly commanded by *McLaws* and *Hood* of his own corps, the brigades of *Bushrod R. Johnson* and *Archibald Gracie* of *Buckner's* division, several small brigades of infantry and cavalry from the *Department of Western Virginia*, and four brigades of *Wheeler's* cavalry from the *Army of Tennessee*. *Longstreet's* troops were in the vicinity of *Rogersville* and *Greenville, Tenn.*

The *Army of Tennessee* was composed of the troops engaged in the battle of *Chattanooga*. The infantry was near *Dalton, Ga.*, where it was being reorganized by Gen. *Johnston* for the coming campaign. Brigades of *Wheeler's* cavalry were both in northern Georgia watching the enemy at *Chattanooga*, and in northern Alabama along the *Tennessee River* between *Bridgeport* and *Decatur*.

The *Department of Alabama, etc.*, included the *Army of Mississippi* and the *District of the Gulf*. The *Army of Mississippi* was in central *Mississippi* under the personal command of Lieut. Gen. *Polk*; the *District of the Gulf* or the *Mobile District* was under the command of Maj. Gen. *Dabney H. Maury*.

The *Trans-Mississippi Department* was divided into three districts: *Arkansas*, under Lieut. Gen. *Theophilus Holmes*; *Louisiana*, under Maj. Gen. *Richard Taylor*; and *Texas*, under Maj. Gen. *John B. Magruder*. Each district had about 10,000 men.

**Union.**—On December 31, 1863, the strength of the Union forces, present for duty, in the West was approximately as follows:

Division of the Mississippi—Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant:	
Department of the Ohio, Maj. Gen. John G. Foster.....	36,000
Department of the Cumberland, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas.....	84,000
Department of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. Wm. T. Sherman.....	81,000
<hr/>	
Total, Division of the Mississippi..	201,000
Department of the Missouri, Maj., Gen. John M. Schofield.....	40,000
Department of the Gulf, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks.....	44,000
<hr/>	
Grand total.....	285,000
Grand total present....	342,000

Of the troops in the Department of the Ohio, two divisions of the IX corps, two divisions of the XXIII corps, and two divisions of cavalry were in the vicinity of Knoxville and Cumberland Gap, Tenn.

Of the troops in the Department of the Cumberland, two divisions of the IV corps were near Knoxville, Tenn., under the orders of Foster; one division of the IV corps and the XIV corps were in the vicinity of Chattanooga; the XI and XII corps were guarding the railroad from Bridgeport to Nashville. One division of cavalry was at Chattanooga and the other at Pulaski, Tenn.

Of the troops belonging to the Department of the Tennessee, the XV corps was along the railroad in northern Alabama between Stevenson and Decatur. The XVI corps had one division north of the Tennessee River at Athens, Ala.; one at Corinth, Miss.; one at Memphis, Tenn.; and one near Columbus, Ky. The XVII corps was still at Vicksburg, Miss.

In the Department of Missouri, about 10,000 troops were under Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele at Little Rock, Ark., and other points on the Arkansas River. The others were in Missouri.

In the Department of the Gulf, the XIII and XIX corps were holding the banks of the Mississippi from Baton Rouge to New Orleans, the territory between the Mississippi and Bayou Teche, and the coastal islands of southwest Texas.

## OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE AND NORTH GEORGIA.

For various reasons there were no important operations in either east Tennessee or in northern Georgia after the relief of Knoxville in December, 1863, until May, 1864.

The railroad from Bridgeport to Knoxville, on which the troops in eastern Tennessee relied for supplies, had been wrecked by *Bragg* and was not in working order until April. This prevented Grant from concentrating a large force at Knoxville and driving *Longstreet* out of that State. So long as *Longstreet* remained in east Tennessee, an advance on *Johnston's* army at Dalton, Ga., was inadvisable.

The regiments that had enlisted for three years in 1861 were to be discharged in 1864. It was desirable therefore that these regiments be given the opportunity of reenlisting before active operations began. To encourage reenlistment as well as to recruit their numbers, the veteran regiments that reenlisted were sent to their homes on a month's furlough. As all the regiments could not be withdrawn from the front at the same time this operation took several months.

**February.**—In February, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, who had been relieved of the Department of the Missouri by Rosecrans, took command of the Department of the Ohio.

**March.**—In March, Sherman succeeded Grant as commander of the territorial Division of the Mississippi. McPherson took command of the Department of the Tennessee and established his headquarters at Huntsville, Ala., where he began organizing the Army of the Tennessee for the Atlanta campaign.

**April.**—In April, Grant ordered the IX corps to Annapolis, Md., to reorganize for operations in Virginia. As soon as *Lee* learned of this movement, *Longstreet* was recalled to Virginia and the troops of the *Department of Western Virginia* were recalled to meet Sigel and Crook (see p. 248). A small brigade of cavalry, under Brig. Gen. *John H. Morgan*, alone remained in east Tennessee. *Longstreet*, having left his front, Schofield began at once to move the greater part of the XXIII corps in the direction of Chattanooga to take part in the operations against the *Army of Tennessee*.

## THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

Organization, strength, and disposition of the Union armies at the beginning of the campaign (plate 3).

## Organization.—

*Commander in Chief, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman.*  
*Army of the Cumberland, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
IV	Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley . . . . .	3	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John Newton . . . . .	3	2
Oliver O. Howard	Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood . . . . .	3	2
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	7
XIV	Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson . . . . .	3	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis . . . . .	3	2
John M. Palmer	Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird . . . . .	3	2
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	7
XX	Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams . . . . .	3	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John W. Geary . . . . .	3	2
Joseph Hooker	Maj. Gen. Daniel Butterfield . . . . .	3	2
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	7
	Reserve brigade . . . . .	1	—
Cavalry Corps	Brig. Gen. Edward M. McCook . . . . .	3	1
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard . . . . .	3	1
Washington L. Elliott	Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick . . . . .	3	1
<i>Army of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson.</i>			
XV	Brig. Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus . . . . .	3	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith . . . . .	2	3
John A. Logan	Brig. Gen. John E. Smith . . . . .	3	2
	Brig. Gen. William Harrow . . . . .	3	2
XVI			
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Sweeny . . . . .	3	3
Grenville M. Dodge	Brig. Gen. James C. Veatch . . . . .	3	3
XVII			
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Mortimer D. Leggett . . . . .	2	3
Frank P. Blair	Brig. Gen. Walter Q. Gresham . . . . .	3	5
<i>Army of the Ohio, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield.</i>			
XXIII	Brig. Gen. Alvin P. Hovey . . . . .	2	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Henry M. Judah . . . . .	2	2
John M. Schofield	Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox . . . . .	2	2
Cavalry	Maj. Gen. George Stoneman . . . . .	3	1

**Strength.**—The strength of Sherman's combatant field force is given in his report approximately as follows:

	Infantry	Cavalry	Guns
Army of the Ohio . . . . .	11,000	1,700	28
Army of the Cumberland . . . . .	55,000	3,800	130
Army of the Tennessee . . . . .	22,000	600	96
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	88,000	6,100	254
One of Stoneman's brigades . . . . .		1,300 joined May 13	
Garrard's cavalry division (2 brigades) . .		4,500 joined May 10	
		<hr/>	
		11,900	

The following units, given in the table, are not included in the strength as they were left on the line of communications.

One brigade of each of the three cavalry divisions of the Army of the Cumberland. J. E. Smith's division of the XV corps and the entire XVII corps of the Army of the Tennessee.

The XVII corps with Garrard's third cavalry brigade joined Sherman when he was south of the Etowah River. Kilpatrick's third brigade joined at Atlanta.

**Distribution.**—On May 1, Schofield was at Charleston on the Hiwassee River with the XXIII corps (plate 24).

The Army of the Cumberland extended from Cleveland, Tenn., to Bridgeport, Ala. The IV corps, under Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, was at Cleveland; the XIV corps, under Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer, was between Ringgold and Chattanooga (plate 31), and the XX corps, formed by the consolidation of the XI and XII corps, under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, was between Chattanooga and Bridgeport, Ala.

Of the Army of the Tennessee, four divisions of the XV corps, under Maj. Gen. John A. Logan, were along the railroad between Stevenson and Decatur, Ala. (plate 3). Two divisions of the XVI corps, under Brig. Gen. Grenville M. Dodge, were near Athens, Ala.

Of the Union cavalry only two divisions were actually at the front. Brig. Gen. Edward M. McCook's division was at Cleveland, Tenn., and Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick's division was at Ringgold, Ga.

Maj. Gen. George Stoneman's cavalry division was on its way from Kentucky to join Schofield. Two brigades of Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard's cavalry division were on their way to the front from Columbia, Tenn., on the Duck River.

Organization, strength and distribution of the Confederate armies at the beginning of the Atlanta Campaign (plate 6).

**Organization.**—*Army of Tennessee, General Joseph E. Johnston.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
	Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham.....	4	—
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne.....	4	—
William J. Hardee	Maj. Gen. William H. T. Walker.....	4	—
	Maj. Gen. William B. Bate.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	12
	Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman.....	4	—
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson.....	4	—
John B. Hood	Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart.....	4	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	9
Cavalry Corps	Maj. Gen. William T. Martin.....	2	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John H. Kelly.....	2	—
Joseph Wheeler	Brig. Gen. William Y. C. Humes.....	2	—
	Independent.....	2	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	4
	Reserve Artillery.....	—	9

*Army of Mississippi, Lieut. Gen. Leonidas Polk.*

	Maj. Gen. William W. Loring.....	3	3
	Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French.....	3	3
	Brig. Gen. James Cantey.....	3	3
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. William H. Jackson.....	3	3

**Strength.**—According to the returns of April 30, the strength of the *Army of Tennessee* was approximately:

	Infantry	Cavalry	Guns
Hardee's corps.....	21,000	—	48
Hood's corps.....	20,000	—	36
Wheeler's cavalry corps.....	—	7,800	18
Reserve Artillery.....	—	—	36
	<hr/> 41,000	<hr/> 7,800	<hr/> 138

The strength of the *Army of Mississippi* was approximately:

Loring's division.....	5,100	—	12
French's division.....	4,100	—	12
Cantey's division.....	4,900	—	12
Jackson's cavalry division.....	—	4,900	14
Total.....	<hr/> 14,100	<hr/> 4,900	<hr/> 50
Grand total... ..	55,100	12,700	188



**Distribution.**—At the beginning of the campaign, the entire *Army of Tennessee* was in the vicinity of Dalton, Ga., or along the railroad to the south of that town (plate 42).

Of the *Army of Mississippi*, *Loring's* division was at Montevallo, Ala.; *French's* division was at Tuscaloosa, Ala.; one brigade of *Cantey's* division was at Rome, Ga., and the other two brigades of this division were at Mobile, Ala. *Jackson's* cavalry division was in northern Alabama (plate 6).

**Johnston's Position** (Plate 42).—The railroad from Chattanooga to Dalton follows Chickamauga Creek and its eastern tributary to Tunnel Hill, where it traverses the divide, 150 to 200 feet high, separating the Tennessee and Coosa river basins.

After crossing the divide, the railroad runs southward about two and a half miles along a tributary of Mill Creek, at the foot of Rocky Face or Chattoogata Mountain.

The railroad then penetrates Chattoogata or Rocky Face Mountain through Mill Creek or Buzzard Roost Gap and runs southward between the mountains and the Conasauga River to Resaca. Dalton is midway between Ringgold and Resaca and 15 miles from each.

The Chattoogata Range forms an almost continuous north and south barrier 500 to 700 feet high for a distance of four miles north of Mill Creek Gap and for a distance of fourteen miles south of the gap.

It is traversed by a mountain road at Dug Gap, five miles south of Mill Creek Gap, and its southern end is turned by the road through Snake Creek Gap from Villanow to Resaca.

Mill Creek drains the western slope of the Chattoogata Range, as well as the eastern slope of the lower range, Tunnel Hill, which forms the divide between the Tennessee and Coosa basins.

*Johnston's* infantry occupied Chattoogata Range from a point four miles north of Mill Creek Gap to a point a short distance south of the gap. From the northern end of the Chattoogata Range his line ran eastward to the Cleveland-Dalton railroad.

Tunnel Hill divide was held by the Confederate cavalry, which had outposts also to the north. A cavalry division of two brigades was at Resaca.

**Sherman's Plan.**—As the campaign was originally planned, three corps of the *Army of the Tennessee*, instead of two, were to

take part in the opening of this campaign. This army was to cross the Tennessee River at Decatur and points east of that place, and march on Rome, Ga. (plate 6), thus threatening *Johnston's* communications at Kingston, 25 miles south of Resaca, while the Army of the Cumberland advanced along the railroad from Ringgold and the Army of the Ohio along the railroad from Cleveland.

This plan was modified, because the XVII corps was not ready to take the field when the campaign began.

Sherman therefore directed McPherson to bring the XV and XVI corps to Chattanooga and march via Rock Creek Church, Villanow and Snake Creek Gap on Resaca.

**Ringgold to the Oostanaula** (Plate 42).—To conform to Grant's campaign in Virginia, Sherman's forward movement was to begin on May 3. The Army of the Tennessee had however started for Chattanooga some days before.

The first movement contemplated the concentration of the XXIII, IV, XIV and XX corps in front of *Johnston's* position at Dalton. The Army of the Cumberland was to capture Tunnel Hill divide west of Chattoogata Range, the XXIII corps was to advance and connect with the left of the Army of the Cumberland and face south. The Army of the Tennessee was to march from Chattanooga via Rock Spring Church, Villanow and Snake Creek Gap on Resaca.

One brigade of McCook's cavalry was to precede the XXIII corps, and one the IV corps. Kilpatrick was on the right of the Army of the Cumberland to connect it with the Army of the Tennessee.

Stoneman's cavalry division was still in rear, as was also Garrard's.

**May 3-7.**—The first movement was completed on May 7, with no other opposition than that offered by *Wheeler's* cavalry on Tunnel Hill divide. The head of the Army of the Tennessee reached Taylor Ridge on that day.

As soon as *Johnston* was satisfied that Sherman had begun the campaign, he ordered the brigade at Rome, Ga., to entrain for Resaca and requested the War Department to send him reinforcements both from *Polk's* army, then near Montevallo and Tusca-

loosa, Ala., and from Mobile. The brigade from Rome and one from Mobile reached Resaca on the 7th and 8th.

**May 8-9.**—The 8th and 9th were spent by the XXIII, IV, XIV and XX corps in reconnoitering the Confederate line covering Dalton; one division of the XX corps advanced over Dug Gap on the 8th but was repulsed.

The head of the Army of the Tennessee advanced through Snake Creek Gap on the 9th but finding too much opposition, failed to reach the railroad, and McPherson contented himself by intrenching the outlet of the gap.

It was the brigade from Rome, some regiments from Mobile, and a dismounted cavalry brigade, that prevented McPherson from capturing Resaca.

**May 10-11.**—*Polk* responded to *Johnston's* call with his entire available force. The first brigade of *Loring's* division of *Polk's* army reached Rome on the 10th and at once entrained for Resaca.

From the reports of his corps commanders Sherman decided that an assault of *Johnston's* line covering Dalton gave little promise of success. As McPherson held the outlet of Snake Creek Gap, Sherman decided to leave the IV corps in front of Mill Creek Gap and move the XX, XIV and XXIII corps through Snake Creek Gap to attack Resaca.

Stoneman's cavalry, which had just arrived, was to replace the XXIII corps, and McCook's cavalry was to watch Dug Gap.

Kilpatrick was attached to McPherson's army, and Garrard, who had just reached Villanow, was to protect the trains.

**May 12.**—This movement, begun on the 12th, compelled *Johnston* to evacuate Dalton on the night of the 12th and morning of the 13th and fall back to Resaca. There he found *Polk* himself with one brigade of *Loring's* division and two brigades of *Cantey's* division.

At Resaca, *Johnston* had an intrenched bridge-head with flanks resting on the Conasauga and Oostanaula rivers.

**May 13-14.**—On the 13th, Sherman deployed his corps in front of this bridge-head, where the IV corps joined him from Dalton. During the 14th and 15th Sherman tested the Confederate line but made no serious attempt to take it by assault.

**May 15.**—On the 15th, the XVI corps succeeded in throwing a

bridge across the Oostanaula at Lay Ferry below Resaca and in protecting it by a bridge-head.

That night *Johnston* evacuated Resaca and retired towards Adairsville.

*Wheeler*, who had protected the right flank of the Confederate army during these operations, defeated a brigade of McCook's cavalry on the 8th and one of Stoneman's on the 12th. Both engagements took place near the Cleveland-Dalton railroad.

**From the Oostanaula to the Etowah River.**—While at Resaca, Sherman ordered Garrard to move south from Villanow, cross the Oostanaula, and destroy the railroad at some point between Rome and Kingston. At the same time he ordered Stoneman to cross the Coosawattee above Resaca and destroy the railroad at some point between Resaca and Cassville.

Neither cavalry commander could perform the task allotted him. Garrard could discover no ford along the river, and Stoneman was unable to drive *Wheeler* from his front.

**May 16.**—Sherman took up the pursuit on the 16th. From Resaca and from a point on the river between Field Mill and Resaca, the Army of the Cumberland moved on Adairsville; the Army of the Tennessee moved along the Rome road from Lay Ferry; the XXIII corps moved on the Cassville road from Field Mill. Jefferson C. Davis' division of the XIV corps was sent to Rome by the west bank of the Oostanaula.

Garrard's cavalry division crossed the river at Lay Ferry and rejoined the Army of the Tennessee; Kilpatrick's cavalry division accompanied the Army of the Cumberland; the divisions of McCook and Stoneman accompanied the XXIII corps.

*Johnston* resisted Sherman's advance only with his cavalry and rear guard; from Adairsville, *Hood* and *Polk* retired on Cassville while *Hardee* retired on Kingston.

At Adairsville, *W. H. Jackson's* cavalry division of *Polk's* army reported to *Johnston* and was posted on the left flank of the army. *French's* division reported to *Polk* at Cassville. The armies of *Johnston* and *Polk* were now united.

From Adairsville, the IV and XIV corps moved on Kingston and the XX corps moved to Cassville. The Army of the Tennessee left the Rome road at Hermitage and moved on Kingston. The XXIII corps continued its march on Cassville.

*Polk* and *Hood* were directed to attack the XX corps moving from Adairsville on Cassville, but failed to do so. *Johnston* then decided to accept battle behind a fortified position at Cassville, but *Hood* and *Polk* protested that the position could be enfiladed by the Union artillery. He thereupon retired behind the Etowah River to Allatoona, leaving *Wheeler* and *W. H. Jackson* to cover the retreat and destroy the bridges.

**May 20.**—Sherman's armies followed the retreating Confederate and on May 20, occupied both Kingston and Cassville.

**From the Etowah to Acworth.**—At Kingston, Sherman, who was familiar with the defensive features of Allatoona Pass, decided to leave the railroad, move in the direction of Dallas and compel *Johnston* to evacuate the pass. He therefore waited three days on the Etowah until the railroad in his rear was repaired and his army had twenty days' rations in wagon trains.

In the meantime a brigade of the XV corps was sent to Rome, Ga., captured by Brig. Gen. J. C. Davis of the XIV corps, to hold that place and allow Davis' division to rejoin the Army of the Cumberland via Van Wert. Kilpatrick's cavalry division was detached from the army and left between the Oostanaula and Etowah rivers to guard the railroad; McCook's cavalry division rejoined the Army of the Cumberland.

**May 23.**—On May 23, Sherman again advanced. The Army of the Cumberland moved on the Kingston-Dallas and Stilesburg-New Hope roads; the Army of the Tennessee on the Kingston-Van Wert-Dallas road, and the XXIII corps on the Pickett Mill road. As the XXIII corps was marching from Cassville to the Etowah, *Wheeler* attacked Cassville and captured 70 wagons belonging to the XXIII corps train.

As soon as *Johnston* learned that Sherman was moving on Dallas, he moved his own army westward to intercept the Union columns. With his cavalry guarding the crossings of Pumpkinvine Creek, *Johnston* posted his corps to cover the roads crossing that creek and running in the direction of Dallas and Atlanta; *Hardee* on the left, *Polk* in the center, and *Hood* on the right.

**May 25.**—On May 25, the XX corps, which was in advance, crossed Pumpkinvine Creek and attacked part of *Hood's* corps at New Hope Church, and was repulsed.

The following day all of Sherman's troops, including Davis'

division that had joined from Rome, were across Pumpkinvine Creek and began intrenching themselves in front of the Confederate position.

The Army of the Tennessee was at Dallas; the Army of the Cumberland in the center, and the XXIII corps on the left.

**May 27.**—On the 27th, two divisions of the IV and XIV corps under Howard made an attack on *Cleburne's* division of *Hardee's* corps which had been sent to Pickett Mill. They were repulsed. *Hood* was withdrawn from the line that night and ordered to make a counter-attack on the following day to turn Sherman's left flank. He found this left flank well intrenched and did not attack.

As *Johnston* had been obliged to give up the railroad, Sherman now decided to shift his army to the east and seize it.

McPherson was therefore directed to withdraw from Dallas and relieve the Army of the Cumberland, which, with the XXIII corps, was to be moved by the flank eastward.

**June 2.**—On June 2, the cavalry divisions of Stoneman and Garrard took possession of Allatoona Pass, and on the 3d, part of the Union infantry was on the railroad at Acworth.

Sherman now established his headquarters at Allatoona and continued to move his troops eastward.

**June 4.**—This flank movement of Sherman's compelled *Johnston* to evacuate the New Hope Church line. On the night of June 4, he fell back to the line of Lost, Pine and Brush mountains. *W. H. Jackson's* cavalry held Lost Mountain, then in order came *Hardee, Polk, Hood* and *Wheeler*.

Sherman now shifted the Army of the Tennessee from the extreme right to the extreme left of the line and the Army of the Cumberland from the right to the left of the XXIII corps. The XXIII corps was now astride the Atlanta road running between Pine and Lost mountains. Stoneman's cavalry returned to the XXIII corps to guard the right flank and Garrard returned to the Army of the Tennessee to guard the left flank.

Sherman did not advance against *Johnston's* new line until June 10. The detachments he had been obliged to make to protect the railroad in his rear had so weakened his force that he decided to await the arrival of the XVII corps.

The XVII corps, 10,500 men, under Maj. Gen. Frank P. Blair, was assembled at Huntsville, Ala. Preceded by the third brigade

of Garrard's cavalry, 2,500 men, Blair<sup>T</sup> crossed the Tennessee River at Decatur, Ala., May 25, and marching through northern Alabama reached Rome, Ga., June 5, and Acworth, June 8. One brigade of 1,500 men was left at Allatoona Pass to fortify and hold that place.

About this time also Brig. Gen. J. E. Smith's division of the XV corps which had been left at Huntsville, Ala., was brought up to the vicinity of Cartersville to guard the river crossings, the XXIII corps was reinforced by 4,000 men, and *Johnston* was reinforced by *Cantey's* third brigade from Mobile.

**Acworth to the Chattahoochee.**—The Union armies advanced against the Confederate line June 10, came in contact with the Confederate pickets on the 11th, and intrenched themselves.

**June 10-26.**—Almost continuous rain for two weeks made the operations slow. On the 15th, *Johnston* evacuated Pine Mountain, which formed a salient in his line, as it was held by a single division and was partially enveloped by the XXIII and IV corps.

On the night of the 17th-18th, *Johnston* abandoned the Lost Mountain-Brush Mountain line whose flanks were threatened by the Army of the Tennessee on the east and the Army of the Ohio on the west and fell back to the Kenesaw Mountain line. *Hood* was on the right, *Bragg* on the left, and *Polk's* corps now commanded temporarily by *Loring*, was in the center.\*

Sherman advanced against *Johnston's* new line, intrenched his position, and began to extend his right so as to outflank *Johnston's* left. *Johnston* met this movement by transferring *Hood's* corps from his right to his left. By extending *Hardee* and *Loring*, the latter occupied the trenches vacated by *Hood*.

When moving into his new position, *Hood* had an unimportant engagement with the XX corps which formed the right of the Army of the Cumberland.

**June 26.**—Sherman decided that he had extended his troops as far as was wise. He therefore determined to assault *Johnston's* line which he thought must be weakly held.

Each corps was to attack the troops in its front, but the main attack was to be made by two divisions of the IV corps aided by one of the XIV. This main attack, made June 26, fell near the

\*Polk was killed on Pine Mountain by the Union artillery June 14.

junction of the corps of *Hardee* and *Loring* on Kenesaw Mountain and was repulsed with severe loss.

Sherman now decided to maneuver *Johnston* out of his position by transferring McPherson's army from the extreme left to the extreme right of his line, and thus turn *Johnston's* left flank. In order to abandon the railroad temporarily, each corps was to supply itself with rations for the movement.

**July 1.**—The movement began on July 1, and on the night of the 3d, *Johnston* felt compelled to evacuate the Kenesaw Mountain line and retire to the Smyrna line, five miles farther south.

**July 4.**—The Army of the Cumberland deployed along the front of the Smyrna line while the Army of the Tennessee threatened its left flank. This compelled *Johnston* to evacuate the line July 4 and retire to his strong bridgehead on the north bank of the Chattahoochee River.

The Army of the Cumberland invested *Johnston's* bridgehead and the Army of the Tennessee threatened to cross the river below the bridgehead. In the meantime the XXIII corps moved up the Chattahoochee in rear of the Army of the Cumberland to the mouth of Soap Creek.

**July 8.**—On the 8th, the XXIII corps crossed the Chattahoochee at the mouth of Soap Creek and constructed a bridgehead. On the same day Garrard's cavalry crossed at Roswell, farther up the river.

**July 9.**—To meet this new situation, *Johnston* evacuated his bridgehead and crossed the river on the night of July 9.

During the advance from Acworth to the Chattahoochee, the cavalry division of Stoneman had remained on the right flank and that of Garrard on the left flank. McCook's cavalry division had been employed both in guarding the trains and in reinforcing Stoneman when necessary.

Of *Johnston's* cavalry, *Wheeler's* corps covered the front and right flank of the army, while *W. H. Jackson's* division covered the left flank. Towards the close of the operations, one of *Wheeler's* divisions was sent to reinforce *W. H. Jackson* and guard the crossings of the Chattahoochee threatened by Stoneman and the Army of the Tennessee.

**From the Chattahoochee to Decatur.**—Before moving south of the Chattahoochee River, Sherman desired if possible to have the



Atlanta-Montgomery railroad destroyed at some point west of Atlanta. Stoneman was directed to cross the Chattahoochee for this purpose.

**July 13.**—Stoneman succeeded in capturing the bridge southeast of Carrollton, Ga., on the 13th. Being confronted by a part of *Jackson's* cavalry division, he gave up the attempt to reach the railroad and returned to Villarica.

In the mean time Sherman decided to have the Army of the Cumberland cross the Chattahoochee between Soap Creek and the railroad and the Army of the Tennessee at Roswell.

To carry out this plan, Thomas ordered the construction of the necessary bridges below Soap Creek and McPherson sent the XVI corps to Roswell to construct bridges at that place. The XV and XVII corps of the Army of the Tennessee remained below the railroad until Stoneman returned and relieved them, when they joined the XVI corps at Roswell.

**July 16.**—By the 16th the armies of the Cumberland and Tennessee were ready to cross the river.

On the morning of the 17th, while the cavalry divisions of Stoneman and McCook held the north bank of the Chattahoochee west of the railroad, the Army of the Cumberland crossed the river between the railroad and Soap Creek and advanced on Peach Tree Creek, which it reached on the 19th. The IV corps, on the left, was astride the Buck Head road while the XX and XIV corps prolonged the line to the Chattahoochee River.

The XXIII corps advanced from its bridgehead to Peach Tree Creek, keeping to the left of the IV corps.

The Army of the Tennessee moved southward on the Cross Keys road and roads to the east, keeping to the left of the XXIII corps.

Garrard's cavalry advanced on the left flank of the Army of the Tennessee to the railroad station at Stone Mountain and proceeded to wreck the railroad.

**July 18.**—On the 18th, *Johnston* was relieved from the command of the *Army of Tennessee* because of his failure to check the advance of Sherman. Lieut. Gen. *John B. Hood* was given the temporary rank of general and was assigned to the command of that army. Maj. Gen. *Benjamin F. Cheatham* temporarily succeeded to the command of *Hood's* corps. About the same

time *Alexander P. Stewart*, who had been promoted to the grade of lieutenant general, took command of *Polk's* corps relieving *Loring*.

**July 20.**—On the 20th, the Army of the Cumberland and XXIII corps began crossing Peach Tree Creek. The Army of the Tennessee, passing through Decatur, moved on Atlanta by the railroad and the roads to its south.

On that day, *Hood* attacked the Army of the Cumberland to drive it back across Peach Tree Creek and was repulsed.

**July 21.**—On the 21st, Sherman's army closed in on the outer line of works about the city and intrenched its position. In this movement the XVII corps had a severe engagement with *Cleburne's* division of *Hardee's* corps south of the Atlanta-Augusta railroad.

On the night of the 21st, *Hood* withdrew his troops from his outer line to an inner and shorter one and sent *Hardee's* corps with *Wheeler's* cavalry to attack the flank and rear of the XVII corps. This corps was south of the railroad just east of Atlanta, on the left flank of the Union army. Its flank was unprotected by cavalry, because Sherman had sent Garrard's cavalry on the 20th to destroy a long railroad bridge near Covington, Ga., on the Augusta railroad.

*Cheatham*, who was on *Hardee's* left, was to cooperate with him and drive the Army of the Tennessee back across Peach Tree Creek.

**July 22.**—*Hardee* succeeded in getting on the flank and in the rear of the XVII corps, but he had not outflanked the Army of the Tennessee since the XVI corps was in reserve behind the XV and XVII corps.

Attacked in flank and rear, the left wing of the XVII corps changed front from west to south until it was on line with the XVI corps. The two corps then brought *Hardee's* attack to a stand-still, while the XV corps, with the remainder of the XVII corps, repulsed *Cheatham's* attack near the angle in the new line.

In this engagement, Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson and Maj. Gen. *Wm. H. T. Walker* were killed.

At the request of Sherman, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard was assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee and Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley to the command of the IV corps.

As Hooker was senior to Howard, he requested to be relieved of the command of the XX corps; this request was granted and Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, who had formerly commanded the XII corps, was ordered from Vicksburg to command the XX corps.

*Wm. H. T. Walker's* division was broken up and its brigades were assigned to the other three divisions of *Hardee's* corps.

**Rousseau's Raid.**—At Sherman's request and with troops drawn mainly from Kilpatrick's third cavalry brigade which had been left near Chattanooga, Maj. Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau left Decatur, Ala., July 9, with 2,500 cavalry to destroy the railroad between Montgomery, Ala., and Columbus, Ga.

Marching through Blountsville, Ashville and Talladega he reached the railroad near Opelika, the junction west of Columbus July 17, and held the railroad for 36 hours during which time his troops were engaged in completely wrecking it.

He returned via Carrollton, Ga., to Marietta where he reported July 22, on the day of *Hardee's* attack on the XVII corps.

**Decatur to East Point.**—The Army of the Tennessee and Garrard's cavalry having thoroughly crippled the railroad running from Atlanta to Augusta, Ga., and Rousseau having wrecked the railroad running from Atlanta to Montgomery, Ala., there remained but the railroad running from Atlanta to Macon. Sherman believed that if this railroad were thoroughly wrecked *Hood* would have to evacuate Atlanta.

He therefore directed Stoneman to take his own cavalry division, 2,200 men, and Garrard's cavalry division, 4,500 men, and move from Decatur to some point on the railroad between Jonesboro and Griffin.

McCook was to take his own cavalry division of 1,500 men and 1,500 men of Rousseau's cavalry and strike for the same point from the Chattahoochee below Sandtown.

**July 27.**—Both Stoneman and McCook were to start on the 27th of July, and as the distance to the railroad for either force was less than 40 miles Sherman assumed that the work would be accomplished in two or three days.

Before starting on his raid, Stoneman had requested permission to capture Macon, Ga., and then to release the Union prisoners in Andersonville, Ga., after he had wrecked the railroad. Sherman gave him the desired permission.

In the meantime the Army of the Tennessee was to move from the extreme left, where it was no longer needed, to the extreme right. Siege guns were also ordered up to bombard Atlanta and its defenses.

Stoneman started out on the 27th, but instead of complying with his instructions and moving south from Decatur with his whole force, he started Garrard southward to draw off the Confederate cavalry, while he with his small force of 2,200 men started for Macon, Ga., via Covington.

Garrard moved a short distance south of Decatur on the 27th, and on the 28th was attacked by *Wheeler*. He withdrew northward and *Wheeler* sent one of his brigades to watch him while the others were sent after Stoneman and McCook.

Stoneman reached the vicinity of Macon July 30 and found it in the possession of the State militia which was intrenched. He now decided to circle around Macon to the southward, cross the Ocmulgee River, go to Andersonville and release the prisoners there. Before he had crossed the Ocmulgee River, however, he learned that a large force of Confederate cavalry was moving on Macon. This cavalry force consisted of three brigades of *Wheeler's* cavalry temporarily under the command of Brig. Gen. *Alfred Iverson* who commanded the Georgia State cavalry.

Stoneman now endeavored to retreat northward by the route he had come. Being cut off by the Confederates, he gave permission to two of his brigade commanders to cut their way out while he himself held the Confederates at bay with his third brigade of 700 men until compelled to surrender.

In this manner half his command succeeded in reaching the Chattahoochee northeast of Atlanta; Stoneman and the remainder were captured.

McCook crossed the Chattahoochee River about 20 miles below the railroad and on the 29th reached the railroad between Jonesboro and Griffen. Here McCook remained about four hours destroying the track, station, rolling stock, supplies, etc. He then started back over the route he had come but was obliged by the Confederate cavalry to turn off towards Newnan, Ga.

He soon found himself attacked by *Wheeler* and *W. H. Jackson* with five brigades of their commands. His march being impeded by a large pack train, the Confederates succeeded in getting in

his front with half of their command. Being surrounded at Newnan, July 30, McCook ordered his brigade commanders to cut their way out independently and with a part of his command made his way to the Chattahoochee near Franklin where he crossed.

Eventually McCook's command was reunited north of the Chattahoochee, having lost about 500 men, its pack train, two guns and a large number of horses. It had done but little damage to the railroad but had destroyed a large number of wagons and their contents belonging to *Hood's* supply trains.

While the cavalry was thus engaged, the Army of the Tennessee moved around in rear of the other corps and on the 28th was intrenched west of the railroad and northwest of Atlanta.

**July 28.**—On the 28th, the XV corps which was now on the right flank of the line and not protected by cavalry, was unsuccessfully assaulted by parts of the corps of *S. D. Lee\** and *Stewart* near Ezra Church.

**July 31.**—The last of July saw Sherman with 85,000 infantry present for duty facing the inner line of defenses around Atlanta, held by 37,000 infantry aided by 5,000 Georgia State militia; the militia was under the command of Maj. Gen. *Gustavus W. Smith*.

Sherman's cavalry was more or less demoralized. McCook's division had been dispersed and its fractions were seeking safety at various points on the Chattahoochee below the railroad; Stoneman had surrendered with a half of his force and the remainder was seeking safety in retreat but closely pursued. Garrard's division and a cavalry brigade which had reported to Schofield after Stoneman left, were the only Union cavalry forces at the front capable of taking the field.

As Sherman had no cavalry to protect his right flank, he now ordered Kilpatrick's division which had been guarding the railroads in his rear to exchange duties with McCook's. Kilpatrick, who had been wounded at Resaca, had just rejoined his division.

**August 2.**—On August 2, Sherman ordered the XXIII corps which now formed his left to evacuate its position and move in rear of the line to the extreme right. Garrard's troops, dismounted, were to occupy the trenches of the XXIII corps.

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\*Lieut. Gen. Stephen D. Lee was now in command of Hood's old corps which had been temporarily commanded by Cheatham.

The XXIII corps took its place on the right of the Army of the Tennessee and a few days later was reinforced by the XIV corps. The trenches of the XIV corps were filled by the thinning of the lines of the XX and IV corps.

Sherman hoped by the use of the XXIII and XIV corps to extend his line around Atlanta and cut the railroad running south. To enable them to act together he placed the XIV corps under the orders of Schofield. This gave offence to Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer who was the senior by commission; Palmer asked to be relieved and his request was granted. On the recommendation of Sherman, Bvt. Maj. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis was placed in command of the XIV corps.

By thinning the lines of the Army of the Tennessee, Schofield was able to rest his right flank opposite East Point, but was unable to reach the railroad junction since *Hood* had extended his intrenched line to protect it.

In this movement the XXIII and XIV corps had engagements on Utoy Creek with *Hardee* and *S. D. Lee*.

**From East Point to Jonesboro.**—On August 12, Sherman decided that he could extend his lines no farther without making them unduly weak and that it was not advisable to assault.

He therefore determined to evacuate his lines east of the Atlanta-Marietta railroad and concentrate his army west of Atlanta with the XXIII on his left, the IV and XIV in the center, and the Army of the Tennessee on the right. He then proposed to move southward until he had passed the Confederate flank and thence to the railroad. The supply trains of the army were to be left in charge of the XX corps which was to take up a defensive position near the railroad and guard the bridges over the Chat-tahoochee.

Before he issued his orders, Sherman's attention was diverted by a raid undertaken by *Wheeler* to destroy the railroad in Sherman's rear.

Having disposed of Stoneman and McCook, *Hood* decided that *W. H. Jackson's* division with the dismounted cavalry of *Wheeler* would be sufficient for the protection of his army and decided to send *Wheeler* with all his mounted men to raid Sherman's communications.

**August 10.**—*Wheeler* assembled his corps at Covington, Ga., on August 10, and moved northward east of the Atlanta-Chattanooga railroad.

On the 13th, a small Confederate force appeared on the railroad south of Acworth, tore up about 200 feet of track and destroyed the telegraph line.

On the 14th, a drove of 1,000 cattle with its guards was captured by a Confederate force near Adairsville.

On the 15th, *Wheeler's* force destroyed a mile of railroad between Resaca and Dalton and invested the latter place.

On the 16th, *Wheeler's* cavalry was reported east of Dalton, Ga., and Cleveland, Tenn., moving northward.

Sherman was now satisfied that the greater part of the Confederate cavalry which had been giving him trouble was away. To make certain, Kilpatrick was ordered to reconnoiter from the right flank of the army while Garrard reconnoitered from the left. The reports made by the two commanders on the 16th convinced Sherman that *W. H. Jackson's* division was the only cavalry with *Hood*.

Sherman now decided to reinforce Kilpatrick with two brigades of Garrard's division and send him to destroy the railroad between Jonesboro and Griffin and compel *Hood* to retreat.

**August 18.**—Kilpatrick started from Sandtown at sunset August 18 and reached Jonesboro the following evening. After destroying a mile or more of track he was attacked by the Confederate cavalry and about midnight moved in a southeasterly direction.

The following day, the 20th, Kilpatrick attempted to recross the railroad near Lovejoy Station south of Jonesboro but found that point in the possession of Confederate infantry. Turning on *W. H. Jackson's* cavalry, that had been pursuing him from Jonesboro, he broke through this command and eventually reached Decatur on the 22d.

As no Confederate movement resulted from Kilpatrick's raid, Sherman finally gave the order for his infantry to move.

**August 25.**—On the night of the 25th, the IV corps moved across the Atlanta-Marietta railroad and the XX corps moved to take up its position covering the bridges.

On the following night, the Army of the Tennessee withdrew from its intrenchments and started to get into position. The IV corps joined the XIV corps.

**August 28.**—On the 28th, the Army of the Tennessee was on the Atlanta-Montgomery railroad at Fairburn and the IV and XIV corps on its left. The XXIII corps was in rear of the left flank.

**August 30.**—On the 30th, the movement towards the Atlanta-Macon railroad was continued and the Army of the Tennessee encamped close to Jonesboro. The other corps were farther north and not so close to the railroad.

Being aware of the position of the Army of the Tennessee but not of the other Union troops, on the night of the 30th, *Hood* sent the corps of *Hardee* and *S. D. Lee* to Jonesboro to defend that place.

**August 31.**—On the 31st, the IV, XIV and XXIII corps all reached the Macon railroad north of Jonesboro. West of that place, *Hardee* and *Lee* made an unsuccessful attack on the intrenched position of the Army of the Tennessee. After this attack, *S. D. Lee* was ordered to return to Atlanta.

**September 1.**—On September 1, at 5 p. m., *Hood* evacuated Atlanta and on the following morning the XX corps took possession of the town.

It was Sherman's intention to attack *Hardee* at Jonesboro on September 1 with his entire command, but only the XIV corps arrived in time to take part in the engagement. *Hardee* was defeated with great loss and retreated to Lovejoy Station. Sherman pursued but finding the entire Confederate army at Lovejoy in a strong position did not attack.

**September 4-8.**—September 4-8 the Union forces returned to Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee took station at East Point, the Army of the Cumberland at Atlanta, and the Army of Ohio at Decatur.

*Casualties of the Campaign.*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Union . . . . .	4,988	24,827	4,708	34,523
Confederate . . . . .	3,044	18,957	8,683	30,684

About one-half of the casualties in the Confederate army occurred under the command of Gen. *Johnston* and one-half under Gen. *Hood*.



**Comments.**—The distance from Ringgold to Atlanta is about the same as that traversed by Grant in going from Culpeper to the James River which the latter reached about the middle of June. The advance in Georgia was slower than that in Virginia because of the dependence of the Union armies on the single line of railroad which the Confederates destroyed as they retreated.

*Johnston* in Georgia pursued the same tactics as *Lee* in Virginia, intrenching positions along the Union line of advance and compelling Sherman to resort to turning movements. Sherman's tactics varied from those of Grant only in making fewer assaults. He intrenched his army in front of that of his adversary and then made a thorough reconnaissance of his adversary's lines. If persuaded that they were too strong to assault, he extended one of his wings until *Johnston's* position was turned and the latter fell back.

The Confederates were unfortunate in changing commanders, since *Hood's* offensive tactics resulted only in increasing the casualty list of the Confederate armies without stopping Sherman's advance. *Hood* also made the mistake of sending *Wheeler's* cavalry on a raid which produced no other result than to wear out its horses. This cavalry might have been of value in checking Sherman's turning movement about Atlanta.

It is of course impossible to say just how long *Johnston* could have held Atlanta had he not been removed from command, but it is quite certain that Sherman would have made slower progress than he did. At Atlanta, *Johnston* had three railroads for supply and this would have given him a better opportunity for maneuvering against his adversary than he had in the campaign north of the Chattahoochee.

**Wheeler's Raid** (Plates 3 and 6).—Maj. Gen. *Joseph Wheeler* started from the right flank of the Confederate army at Atlanta on August 10, shortly after the capture of Stoneman, to make a raid on the railroads connecting Sherman's armies with Nashville. His force consisted of eight brigades.

His command first struck the railroad north of Marietta, then near Cassville, then at Calhoun; it tore up the track at each place. From Calhoun he sent back one of his brigades with a large herd of cattle and the prisoners he had captured.

His cavalry next struck and wrecked the railroad south of Dalton and entered that place. Being driven out of Dalton, *Wheeler* moved northward and destroyed the railroad at various points between Dalton and Loudon, Tenn. Thence, being prevented by high water from crossing the Tennessee River below Loudon, he circled around Knoxville and crossed the rivers above that place.

Here he detached two brigades to destroy the railroad bridge over the Holston and with the remainder of his command crossed the Cumberland Mountains to attack the Nashville-Chattanooga railroad. After destroying part of the Nashville-Chattanooga railroad west of McMinnville, Tenn., he moved to the vicinity of Franklin and wrecked the Nashville-Decatur railroad. He finally crossed the Tennessee River near Tusculum September 10, a month after starting on his raid. The two brigades he had left in east Tennessee were unable to rejoin him and with a part of a third brigade returned to east Tennessee.

Although *Wheeler* did much damage en route, his raid had no other effect on Sherman's operations than to remove this active cavalry commander from Sherman's front at Atlanta and facilitate the latter's turning movement.

## OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN GEORGIA AND ALABAMA IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER.

### PLATE 42.

After his retreat from Atlanta September 1, *Hood* remained at Lovejoy, on the Atlanta-Macon railroad 25 miles south of Atlanta, until the 18th, resting and reorganizing his army. As it soon became evident that Sherman had no intention of moving farther south for the present, *Hood* decided to assume the offensive himself. His plan was to cross the Chattahoochee below Sherman's army and move against the railroad between Marietta and Dalton. If Sherman pursued him with his whole army, *Hood* would try and draw him as far north as possible.

On the 18th of September, *Hood* began to move his army from Lovejoy to Palmetto on the Atlanta-Montgomery railroad, 25 miles west of Atlanta. Here he remained until the end of the month while supplies were being collected at Blue Mountain, the terminus of the Selma-Talladega railroad.

President *Davis* visited *Hood* at Palmetto to confer about future operations. *Hood's* appointment having met with some disapproval, the *President* decided to appoint *Beauregard* to command the territorial department which included the *Army of Tennessee* and the *Department of Alabama, Mississippi* and *east Louisiana*. President *Davis* thus hoped to unite all the Confederate forces between South Carolina and the Mississippi River in the contemplated campaign.

At *Hood's* request, *Hardee* was relieved from the *Army of Tennessee* and assigned to the *Department of South Carolina, etc.*, and was succeeded by Maj. Gen. *Cheatham*. The organization of *Hood's* army was now as follows:

*Army of Tennessee, General John B. Hood.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
	Maj. Gen. John C. Brown . . . . .	5	—
	Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne . . . . .	4	—
Benjamin F. Cheatham	Maj. Gen. William B. Bate . . . . .	3	—
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	9
	Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson . . . . .	4	—
	Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson . . . . .	4	—
Lieut. Gen. Stephen D. Lee	Maj. Gen. Henry D. Clayton . . . . .	3	—
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	9
	Maj. Gen. William W. Loring . . . . .	3	—
	Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French . . . . .	3	—
Lieut. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart	Maj. Gen. Edward C. Walthall . . . . .	3	—
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	9
Cavalry Corps	Maj. Gen. Will T. Martin . . . . .	2	—
Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler	Brig. Gen. William Y. C. Humes . . . . .	2	—
	Brig. Gen. John H. Kelley . . . . .	4	—
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	5
Cavalry Division	Brig. Gen. William H. Jackson . . . . .	4	3

The total strength of the army, on September 30, is given as 47,000 present for duty; each of the three army corps numbered about 11,000 men.

At the opening of the campaign, *Wheeler's* cavalry corps had not yet rejoined the army; *W. H. Jackson's* division was the only cavalry with the army.

Since the opening of the Atlanta campaign, there had been no change in the organization of the *Army of the Cumberland*; Brig. Gen. *Grenville M. Dodge* having been wounded, *Howard* reduced

the number of corps in the Army of the Tennessee at Atlanta by assigning the two divisions belonging to the XVI corps to the XV and XVII corps, respectively; in the Army of the Ohio, the remnants of Stoneman's cavalry division became a single brigade, which, with Col. Israel Garrard's brigade which joined at Atlanta, became the cavalry division of the Army of the Ohio.

During the latter part of September, *Forrest* appeared in northern Alabama and made raids on Sherman's railroads in Tennessee throwing the troops in that State into confusion. This led Sherman to send Thomas back to Chattanooga and Nashville to restore order in his department and to prepare for *Hood's* movement which Sherman had foreseen. One division of the IV corps and one of the XIV corps were sent to Chattanooga, Tenn., and one division of the XV corps was sent to Rome, Ga.

**October** (Plate 42).—About the last of September, the *Army of Tennessee*, preceded by *W. H. Jackson's* cavalry division, crossed the Chattahoochee north of Palmetto and marched in the direction of Lost Mountain.

**October 4.**—On October 4, *Stewart's* corps struck and wrecked the railroad in the vicinity of Acworth and from that point *Stewart* sent *French's* division to capture Allatoona. As soon as Sherman became aware that the Confederates were on the railroad, he sent a message by signal over their heads to Allatoona directing the division of the XV corps at Rome to reinforce Allatoona at once. One brigade of this division under the division commander, Brig. Gen. John M. Corse, reached Allatoona on the 5th just before the arrival of *French's* division. The garrison now numbered 2,000 men.

*French's* division made several desperate assaults on the 5th all of which were repulsed. The casualties on the Union side were 700, and in *French's* division, 800.

**October 10.**—As soon as Sherman had discovered *Hood's* movement, he started in pursuit with his whole force save the XX corps which he left to hold Atlanta.

As Sherman's forces were now moving northward on Dallas and along the railroad, and as *Hood* was not confident of his ability to cross the Etowah River above Rome, he withdrew all his forces to Van Wert and moved via Cedartown and Cave Springs to Coosaville, where he crossed the Coosa River October

10. Circling around Rome on the north, *Hood* reached Armuchee Creek valley and followed up that stream to Villanow. *Wheeler's* cavalry, which joined *Hood* at Coosaville, now preceded the army while *W. H. Jackson's* cavalry division remained south of the Coosa River in front of Rome.

**October 12-13.**—On the 12th and 13th, the corps of *S. D. Lee* and *Cheatham* captured the entire length of railroad from Resaca to Tunnel Hill including the town of Dalton. The Union troops at Resaca held the bridgehead but the troops forming the Dalton garrison retired either towards Cleveland or towards Chattanooga.

*Hood* now assembled his army at Lafayette and moved down the valley of Chattooga River to the Coosa River and thence down the Coosa to Gadsden, Ala.

**October 20** (Plate 6).—*Hood* arrived at Gadsden October 20, and remained there two days to rest and supply his army. Here he was joined by *Beauregard* to whom he submitted his plan of continuing his northern movement by crossing the Tennessee River and moving on Nashville. *Beauregard* approved the plan but directed that the greater part of *Wheeler's* cavalry remain to watch Sherman. *Forrest*, who was in the *Department of Alabama, Mississippi and east Louisiana* was directed to report to *Hood* with his cavalry corps which was to be reinforced by two brigades of *W. H. Jackson's* division.

From Gadsden, *Hood* moved to Tuscumbia, Ala., where the crossing of the Tennessee River was protected from attack by Union gunboats by shoals above and below. En route he spent three days in front of Decatur but did not attack.

Leaving the XX corps to hold Atlanta, Sherman pursued *Hood* with his remaining troops via Rome, Resaca, Lafayette and Summerville. When *Hood* was at Gadsden, Sherman was near the Coosa River midway between Rome and Gadsden. Here the divisions of the IV and XIV corps that had been sent to Chattanooga rejoined their corps.

When *Hood* moved towards Tuscumbia, Sherman gave up the pursuit and began preparations for his march from Atlanta to Savannah. To enable Thomas to meet *Hood*, he directed the IV corps to march to Chattanooga via Lafayette and later sent the XXIII corps to the same place from Resaca. The other corps, he started in the direction of Atlanta. He reinforced Kilpatrick's

cavalry division to 3,500 well mounted men from the other divisions and sent the remaining cavalry to Nashville, Tenn., where it was to be mounted and reorganized by Bvt. Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson who had been sent from the Army of the Potomac for this purpose.

**November.**—*Hood* reached Tuscumbia November 1 with his three corps and two brigades of *W. H. Jackson's* cavalry. One corps and one brigade of cavalry were at once sent across the river to occupy Florence. *Hood* remained at Florence and Tuscumbia until November 20. *Forrest* who was on his raid in west Tennessee did not join with his entire command until the 17th. In the meantime the Meridian-Corinth-Tuscumbia railroad was repaired as far as possible, supplies were brought to the front, and Corinth was again fortified.

## OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI AND WEST TENNESSEE.

PLATES 7 and 43.

The capture of Vicksburg, Chattanooga and Knoxville in 1863 had placed military affairs in the Division of the Mississippi in a very satisfactory condition. President Lincoln was therefore desirous that the next operation should be the recovery of the States of Louisiana and Arkansas by a joint advance from New Orleans, Vicksburg and Little Rock on Shreveport, La., to be supported by a fleet of gunboats on the Red River. Sherman was requested to cooperate in this campaign with Banks and Steele.

Sherman went to Memphis in January to consider the matter and found the western rivers so low that no fleet could move up the Red River before March. He decided therefore to complete the Vicksburg Campaign by assembling a strong command at Vicksburg and moving eastward along the railroad as far as Meridian. By destroying the railroads and resources of central Mississippi, he would make it possible to hold Vicksburg and other towns by small garrisons and relieve the XVII corps of this duty.

To reinforce the XVII corps for this campaign, he ordered one division of the XVI corps from Columbus, Ky., and another from Corinth, Tenn., to Vicksburg. Of the other two divisions of the XVI corps, one remained at Memphis and the other at Athens,

Ala. He abandoned the Memphis-Corinth railroad east of Memphis.

To oppose Sherman's movement, Lieut. Gen. *Leonidas Polk* had two divisions of infantry under Maj. Gens. *Wm. W. Loring* and *Samuel G. French* near Jackson and Meridian, a cavalry corps under Maj. Gen. *Stephen D. Lee* near Jackson, and another under Maj. Gen. *Nathan B. Forrest* in northern Mississippi. *Polk's* force numbered about 20,000 men almost equally distributed in the four units.

**February** (Plate 7).—Sherman left Vicksburg with 25,000 men on February 2, and reached Meridian on the 14th. *Polk* did not oppose the movement but retired with the infantry divisions of *Loring* and *French* into Alabama. *S. D. Lee's* cavalry retreated northward from Meridian. Sherman spent five days at Meridian, wrecking railroads, etc., and then returned to Vicksburg to prepare the troops that he was to lend to Banks for the Shreveport Campaign.

A cavalry force of 7,000 men had been organized at Memphis under Brig. Gen. *Wm. Sooy Smith*, chief of cavalry of the Division of the Mississippi, which was to move overland and join Sherman at Meridian. One of the objects of the overland movement was to disperse *Forrest's* corps. This movement was frustrated by *Forrest*, who with 4,000 men, placed himself astride *Smith's* line of march near West Point, Miss. Finding *Forrest* in his front and hearing that *S. D. Lee's* cavalry corps was moving northward from Meridian, *Smith* retired on Memphis pursued and attacked by *Forrest*. Although *Smith* lost less than 400 men, *Forrest's* daring added greatly to the prestige he had already gained by his operations in 1862 and 1863.

**March**.—In March, Sherman sent 10,000 of his Vicksburg army under Brig. Gen. *Andrew J. Smith* to Banks in Louisiana and sent the veteran regiments of the XVII corps and of his cavalry corps in west Tennessee to their homes to reenlist and recruit. Sherman himself went to Nashville to take command of the Division of the Mississippi.

After his exploit in February, *Forrest* retired to Columbus, Miss., where he received Brig. Gen. *Abraham Buford's* brigade of Kentucky infantry from *Polk*. For this brigade he proposed to

find mounts in Kentucky. His division commanders were now Brig. Gens. *James R. Chalmers* and *Abraham Buford*.

About the middle of March, *Forrest* moved into west Tennessee with *Buford's* division. This movement met with no opposition, since Sherman had withdrawn the Union troops from Corinth. At Union City, *Forrest* captured a Union regiment and later made an unsuccessful assault on the defenses of Paducah.

**April.**—About the first of April, *Chalmers' division* joined *Forrest* in west Tennessee and on the 12th, with *Chalmers' division*, *Forrest* captured *Fort Pillow* by assault and killed or captured its garrison of 550 men. As this garrison was composed of equal numbers of colored troops and of Union troops raised in Tennessee, and as nearly one-half of this force was killed in the assault, the North believed that the garrison was purposely massacred. This impression seemed to be confirmed by *Forrest's* report made a few days after the assault but was later denied.

Having sent his prisoners to Columbus, Miss., *Forrest* remained in west Tennessee until the end of the month recruiting his command.

About the middle of April, *Polk* moved to Montevallo and Tuscaloosa, Ala., with the divisions of *Loring* and *French* and *W. H. Jackson's* division of *S. D. Lee's* cavalry, leaving a single cavalry brigade in southern Mississippi. This movement was caused by the assembling of the Army of the Tennessee at Athens and Huntsville for the Atlanta Campaign.

## FORREST'S OPERATIONS DURING THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

### PLATES 7 and 43.

**May.**—Early in May, *Forrest* returned to Tupelo, Miss., to rest and reorganize his command.

At this time *Polk* went to Georgia with the infantry divisions of *Loring* and *French* and *W. H. Jackson's* cavalry division to reinforce *Johnston* and Maj. Gen. *Stephen D. Lee* was left in temporary command of the *Department of Alabama, Mississippi and east Louisiana*. *Chalmers' cavalry division* of *Forrest's* corps was ordered to northern Alabama to replace *Polk's* army.

As Sherman was anxious to dispose of *Forrest* before the latter could attack the railroads in central Tennessee, he directed the



commander of the XVI corps at Memphis to organize a force to operate against him.

The force as organized consisted of a cavalry division of 3,000 men under Brig. Gen. Benj. H. Grierson, an infantry division of 4,800 men, and 18 pieces of artillery. It was placed under the command of Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis.

**June.**—Sturgis' column left the vicinity of Memphis June 2 and marched to Ripley, Miss.; from this place it marched in the direction of Fulton. At Brice Crossroads near Baldwyn, on June 10, Sturgis was attacked by *Forrest* who was marching northward from Tupelo with 5,500 men. Sturgis was badly defeated and lost about 2,000 men in killed, wounded and missing. He was obliged to abandon 16 guns and 200 wagons and retreat in haste to Memphis.

In the latter part of June, Banks returned to Sherman, A. J. Smith's corps which Sherman had loaned him in March; Sherman now directed that this force be sent to Memphis and a new expedition be sent against *Forrest* lest the latter should cross the Tennessee River into central Tennessee.

The new field force numbered 11,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. It included the cavalry and part of the infantry of the Sturgis expedition and was commanded by Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith.

**July.**—To meet this force, *S. D. Lee* united the cavalry of *Forrest*, *Chalmers* and *Roddey*, 10,000 men, at Columbus, Miss.

A. J. Smith's column left Grand Junction July 2, and was attacked by *Lee's* command near Tupelo July 14. *Lee's* attack was repulsed with heavy loss. As Smith had however exhausted his supplies and could not forage in the presence of *Lee's* command, he returned to Grand Junction.

Shortly after the engagement at Tupelo, *S. D. Lee* was ordered to Atlanta to command *Hood's* corps in the *Army of Tennessee* and *Forrest* was left in command of northern Mississippi.

**August.**—As *Forrest* had not yet been disposed of and Sherman wanted to keep him in Mississippi, he directed A. J. Smith to reorganize his expedition and again attack *Forrest*.

On the 3d of August, with a corps similar to that employed in his Tupelo expedition, Smith started southward from Grand Junction for Oxford. He intended to repair the railroad to Oxford and there gather supplies for a movement on Columbus, Miss.

*Forrest* sent *Chalmers* to Holly Springs to delay Smith's column and followed with the rest of his command.

When the Union troops reached the Tallahatchie River, *Forrest* decided to try the effect of diversion. Selecting 2,000 of his best mounted men, he started for Memphis via Panola. He entered Memphis at dawn on August 31, and almost succeeded in capturing the commanders of the XVI corps and of the District of Memphis. As a result of this diversion, Smith's column was recalled.

When A. J. Smith returned to Memphis, Sherman decided that it was useless to pursue *Forrest* with infantry and Smith was ordered to embark his command for Nashville.

**September.**—Having disposed of the Union forces in west Tennessee, early in September *Forrest* began to prepare his command to go on the very raid that Sherman had feared.

Leaving *Chalmers* with one brigade in northern Mississippi, with his other three brigades he moved to Tusculum where he found *Wheeler* and *Roddey* who had just come from raids in Tennessee. *Wheeler's* corps was too exhausted from its month's raid to assist him, but *Roddey* gave him a brigade, making his force 4,500 men.

*Forrest* first attacked Athens, Ala., and captured its garrison of 600 men; he then moved northward and captured a large detachment that was guarding the railroad trestles north of that place. Finding Pulaski too well protected to warrant assault, he went to Fayetteville intending to wreck the Nashville-Chattanooga railroad. He was unable to reach this road and being pursued was obliged to recross the Tennessee near Florence.

In his two weeks' raid he captured 1,200 men, 800 horses, 7 pieces of artillery and caused Sherman to send Thomas back to Chattanooga with two divisions of the Army of the Cumberland.

**October.**—About the 15th of October, *Forrest* moved to Jackson, Tenn., where he was joined by *Chalmers*; he now had 3,500 men. Moving down the Tennessee River he set a trap for the Union transports on the Tennessee by constructing two masked batteries of siege guns at two different points of the river. By this means he trapped and captured a river gunboat and three loaded transports en route for the railroad terminus at Johnsonville.

With the boats on the river and the cavalry moving up the west bank, he started to capture Johnsonville. As the Union com-

mander had not occupied the west bank, *Forrest* placed his siege guns in a masked battery on the west bank opposite that town.

**November.**—On November 4 he opened fire on the Union gunboats, wharves and stores and so alarmed the commander of the gunboats that he burned his boats, which in turn set fire to and destroyed the stores. Over \$2,000,000 worth of property was thus destroyed. *Forrest's* captured boats had however been previously recaptured and he was unable to cross the river to seize any of the supplies. Having accomplished his task of interfering with Sherman's river communications, he marched southward and endeavored to cross the Tennessee River opposite Lexington. After 400 men had crossed, he was obliged to abandon the attempt and march down the west bank to join *Hood*. His command reached Tusculumbia November 17.

The destruction of the river fleet at Johnsonville to prevent their capture by cavalry was a striking tribute to the moral effect of *Forrest's* reputation.

## THE FRANKLIN-NASHVILLE CAMPAIGN.

### PLATES 3, 24, 44 and 45.

**November** (Plate 3).—While *Hood* was at Florence and Tusculumbia waiting for supplies and for *Forrest* to join him, the military situation in middle Tennessee was undergoing the following changes:

**November 1.**—On the 1st of November the leading division of the IV corps reached Pulaski from Chattanooga and on the 5th the entire corps was concentrated at that point.

Ruger's division of the XXIII corps reached Nashville on the 4th and was at once sent to Johnsonville to protect that place against *Forrest*. The following day one of its three brigades was sent to Columbia; the other two remained at Johnsonville. Cox's division of the XXIII corps was sent from Nashville to reinforce the IV corps at Pulaski, and reached the vicinity of that place November 15.

A cavalry brigade was near Florence when *Hood* reached Tusculumbia and was reinforced a few days later by a division of two brigades. These three brigades remained in contact with the Confederate outposts and kept the commander at Pulaski in-

formed of *Hood's* movements. A fourth cavalry brigade was at Waynesboro, patrolling the roads running from that place south and west.

**November 14.**—On the 14th, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield took command of all these forces with headquarters at Pulaski.

#### UNION ORGANIZATION AT OPENING OF CAMPAIGN.

*Commander of the field forces, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
IV	Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. George D. Wagner.....	3	—
David S. Stanley	Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	4
XXIII			
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Ruger.....	3	3
John M. Schofield	Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox.....	3	3
Cavalry Corps			
Bvt. Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Edward Hatch.....	2	1
James H. Wilson	Independent brigades.....	2	—

Schofield had 25,000 men present for duty in the IV and XXIII corps and 5,500 in his four cavalry brigades.

Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, under whom Schofield was operating, had in addition about 40,000 men at the important points of the railroad between Dalton, Ga., and Nashville, Tenn., in Wilson's cavalry that was being organized, and on the Tennessee or Cumberland rivers.

At this time neither Thomas nor Schofield thought that *Hood* would advance into Tennessee. They thought that *Hood* would probably send *Forrest* on a raid against the railroads but withdraw his infantry and follow Sherman who was concentrating at Atlanta.

Thomas was awaiting the arrival of Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith with his corps; when Smith joined him Thomas expected to assume the offensive. Smith was in western Missouri where he had been operating against *Sterling Price*. He was marching to St. Louis to take the transports. Grant's chief of staff had telegraphed to Thomas from St. Louis, November 7, that Smith's troops would begin to leave St. Louis on the 10th. Heavy rains between the 8th and 12th however delayed Smith's march to St. Louis so that he did not reach that place until November 20. His command left St. Louis November 28.

## CONFEDERATE ORGANIZATION.

*Army of Tennessee, General John B. Hood.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
	Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson . . . . .	4	—
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Henry D. Clayton . . . . .	3	—
Stephen D. Lee.	Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson . . . . .	3	—
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	9
	Maj. Gen. William W. Loring . . . . .	3	—
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French . . . . .	3	—
Alexander P. Stewart	Maj. Gen. Edward C. Walthall . . . . .	3	—
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	9
	Maj. Gen. John C. Brown . . . . .	4	—
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne . . . . .	4	—
Benjamin F. Cheatham	Maj. Gen. William B. Bate . . . . .	3	0
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	9
Cavalry Corps	Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers . . . . .	2	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Abraham Buford . . . . .	2	—
Nathan B. Forrest	Brig. Gen. William H. Jackson . . . . .	2	6

On November 6, *Hood* reported the strength of his infantry and artillery as about 33,000 present for duty. It is probable that *Forrest* had about 6,000 cavalry.

*Hood* had hoped to move on Nashville early in November, but was prevented by the need of supplies and the absence of *Forrest*.

**Tuscumbia.**—On the 17th, two days after Sherman had started from Atlanta for Savannah, *Beauregard*, who was at Corinth, Miss., urged *Hood* to move as soon as possible. *Hood* at once ordered all the troops that were still at Tuscumbia to cross the river.

**November 19.**—On the 19th, *Forrest* began the campaign; on the 20th, *S. D. Lee's* corps followed *Forrest*, and on the 21st, the whole army was in motion. By following three separate roads that led to Columbia, 80 miles distant from Florence, *Hood* hoped to reach that place before Schofield.

The Union cavalry warned Thomas and Schofield of the movements of the Confederate troops and as early as the 20th Schofield had decided on his plans. He requested that one of Ruger's brigades from Johnsonville be sent to Columbia to reinforce the one already there and to assist it in intrenching that place. He began sending back his stores from Pulaski so that he could evacuate that place as soon as it was deemed necessary.

**November 22.**—On the 22d, the Union troops began evacuating Pulaski and on the 24th Schofield was at Columbia with the IV corps and all but one brigade and two regiments of the XXIII corps. The detached brigade had been sent by Thomas overland to Centerville on the Duck River, 30 miles west of Columbia, to guard the crossing in that vicinity. The two regiments had been sent from Columbia to Williamsport, 12 miles below, to guard the crossings near that town. The four brigades of cavalry, now under the command of Bvt. Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson, were guarding the crossings east of Columbia as far as the Franklin-Lewisburg turnpike, 12 miles distant. (Plate 24.)

In order to hold the bridges over the Duck River for a possible advance, Schofield intrenched a line covering the ponton bridge at the town, as well as the railroad bridge two miles farther down the stream.

**November 24.**—*Forrest*, who had taken the center route with *Chalmers'* division, was driving the Union cavalry brigade which had been at Waynesboro into Columbia, when he was intercepted by the arrival of the advance guard of Schofield's troops from Pulaski.

*Hood* with the infantry did not reach Columbia until the morning of the 26th.

As soon as *Hood* appeared with his infantry Schofield made his plans to withdraw to the north bank of the river. He effected this crossing on the night of the 27th and destroyed the bridges. He was convinced by *Hood's* movements on the 26th and 27th that the latter was planning to cross the river at some point above Columbia.

Having crossed the river, the XXIII corps was detailed to guard the fords near the town and the IV corps was held in reserve to act against any force that succeeded in crossing the river. At this time Schofield was under the impression that A. J. Smith's troops were on their way from Nashville to join him as Thomas had telegraphed him on the morning of the 27th that some of Smith's troops were expected that day and would be sent forward at once.

**Columbia to Franklin.**—On the afternoon of the 28th, *Forrest* crossed the river between Columbia and the Franklin-Lewisburg pike and drove the Union cavalry towards Franklin.

**November 29.**—That night a ponton bridge was constructed a few miles above Columbia and *Cheatham's* corps crossed and marched for Spring Hill; *Stewart's* corps and *Johnson's* division of *S. D. Lee's* corps followed *Cheatham*.

In the mean time, *S. D. Lee* with the divisions of *Stevenson* and *Clayton* was to keep up the threat of crossing the river at Columbia and below. *S. D. Lee* had under his charge the trains and all the artillery but two batteries. Because of the bad condition of the roads *Cheatham* and *Stewart* had each but one battery.

*Hood* himself rode with *Cheatham* at the head of the latter's corps and reached the vicinity of Spring Hill an hour or an hour and a half before dark. *Hood* pointed out the position he wanted taken and directed *Cheatham* to attack at once. Whatever may be the reasons, only *Cleburne's* division at the head of the column attacked that evening. It was nearly midnight before all the troops were disposed for the morning attack; they then bivouacked about a half mile from the Columbia-Franklin pike.

On the morning of the 29th, Schofield received a message from Wilson informing him that the Confederate infantry was crossing the Duck Creek above Columbia and advising him to retire at once on Franklin and be at Spring Hill by 10 a. m. Similar information having been sent by Wilson to Thomas, the latter directed Schofield to withdraw to Franklin. Thomas' message to Schofield was however captured by *Forrest's* men and was delivered to *Hood*, instead of Schofield.

Schofield thought it more probable that *Hood*, after crossing would march down the river to uncover the fords at Columbia and unite his army on the north bank than that he would march on Spring Hill. He had just received word from Thomas that A. J. Smith's troops could not reach Nashville for three days and that Thomas wanted him to delay *Hood* as long as possible. Schofield therefore decided to remain in position for another day.

To comply with Wilson's suggestion, Schofield sent Stanley with one of his divisions, his corps artillery, and the army trains to Spring Hill where he expected to make his next stand. To make certain of the direction of *Hood's* movement, he sent an infantry reconnoissance up the river. He had no cavalry available for this purpose since *Forrest* was now between Schofield and Wilson. It was not until about 3 p. m. that Schofield became convinced

that *Hood* was marching in force on Spring Hill; he then gave orders for the withdrawal at dark and the retreat of his force on Franklin. His pickets were not to leave the river until daylight.

The head of the Union column left Columbia about 7 p. m. and arrived at Spring Hill about 11 p. m.

Stanley with Wagner's division reached Spring Hill between 1 and 2 p. m. just in advance of *Forrest* who had been engaged with Wilson on the Franklin-Lewisburg turnpike. *Forrest* at once attacked the Union troops, but had made no headway until *Cleburne* joined him about sunset. The Union troops were now driven back from their advanced position but still held Spring Hill. In the defense of this position Wagner's division was assisted by the corps artillery of the IV corps.

Brig. Gen. Cox with his division formed the advance guard in the retreat from Spring Hill and Ruger's division formed a flank guard for the trains. These were followed in turn by the divisions of Kimball and Wood. Wagner's division of the IV corps was the rear guard. The head of the Union column left Spring Hill about 11 p. m. and reached Franklin about dawn. Wagner's division left about daylight and reached Franklin about noon.

A brigade of *Forrest's* cavalry had crossed the turnpike at Thompson's station three miles north of Spring Hill that afternoon and captured the Spring Hill railroad station, a mile west of Spring Hill. This brigade with other troops of *Forrest's* cavalry attacked the Union trains at Thompson's station during the night and captured a few wagons.

Wilson's cavalry after its engagement with *Forrest* retired to the Harpeth River as Wilson expected to find Schofield at Franklin that night.

**Battle of Franklin** (Plate 44).—Schofield's troops reached Franklin after a continuous march of 25 miles, most of it made at night.

**November 30.**—When Schofield reached Franklin at the head of his troops about dawn, he directed Cox to halt his division for rest and food while he himself inspected the river crossing.

Schofield had naturally planned to cross the river at once and had requested Thomas as early as the 28th to have a ponton bridge constructed at Franklin. Thomas, not knowing that Schofield had destroyed his boats, suggested to Schofield that he



should send back some of the pontoons taken up at Columbia. On the 29th, Schofield repeated his request and a ponton train was sent, but did not reach Franklin until the morning of the 30th when its material was used in repairing the fixed bridges.

When Schofield reached the river he found that the only means of crossing was by an indifferent ford whose approaches needed improvement. While his engineers were repairing the ford, flooring the railroad bridge and a pile bridge which had been burned, he directed Cox to put the troops in position as they came up. In the mean time the trains and the artillery of the XXIII corps began crossing by the ford.

Cox at once began placing the troops in position and gave instruction for the intrenchment of the line. His own division was directed to intrench a line selected by Cox, extending from the Columbia turnpike eastward to the Harpeth River. When Ruger's division reported a short time thereafter, it was assigned to the line extending from the Columbia turnpike to the Carter Creek turnpike. Kimball's division of the IV corps, which was next to arrive, was sent to prolong Ruger's to the Harpeth River below the town. When Wood's division of the same corps arrived it was sent to the north bank of the river to guard against any attempt made by *Hood* to turn the position by crossing the river above the town. There were two lines of troops all along the defensive line on the south bank of the river, except along the right wing of Ruger's division. In many places the second line was also intrenched.

Wagner's division did not reach the vicinity of Franklin until noon. Wagner fought rear guard actions with *Forrest* nearly all the morning and finally took up a position with two brigades on a ridge a half mile in front of Cox's line, but brought Opdyke's brigade, which had been the rear guard of his division, into the inner line to report to Cox. For some reason Wagner seems to have decided to fight his other two brigades on his advanced line although his orders were simply to conduct his division to Franklin delaying the enemy en route as much as possible without compromising the safety of his troops.

Wilson reported to Schofield at Columbia and was directed to prevent *Forrest* from turning the left of the Union position. Some of Wilson's cavalry were sent across the river to meet and guard

the trains; this force skirmished with *Forrest* and recrossed the river when the last of the infantry reached Franklin.

On the morning of the 30th, *Hood's* army took up the pursuit as soon as it was discovered that the whole Union force had escaped. With the divisions of *Buford* and *Jackson*, *Forrest* was in advance and was followed by the corps of *Stewart* and *Cheatham*. *S. D. Lee's* corps which marched from Columbia with the trains was somewhat in rear.

Having learned from *Thomas's* intercepted message that some Union regiments were at the fords below Columbia, *Chalmers's* cavalry division had been sent to intercept their retreat; he therefore marched on a road west of the main column.

About two and a half miles south of Franklin, the Columbia turnpike runs over *Winstead Hill* from which the town and the Union troops were plainly visible. When *Stewart's* corps reached this position about 2 p. m., he was directed to move off to the right and deploy his corps to attack, with his right flank resting near the *Harpeth River*. *Cheatham*, who was immediately behind *Stewart*, was directed to deploy one division to the right and two to the left of the Columbia pike. Each of these corps had a single battery. *S. D. Lee*, who was on the ground with *Edward Johnson's* division, was directed to support *Cheatham*. *Clayton's* division of the same corps was coming up as the battle began. The cavalry divisions of *Buford* and *Jackson* moved to the right flank while that of *Chalmers* remained on the left.

The cavalry divisions of *Jackson* and *Buford* crossed the river and attacked *Wilson's* cavalry about 3:30 p. m. The contest here was a stubborn one but the Confederates gave way after dark and recrossed to the south bank of the river.

It was nearly dark when the infantry moved to the assault. On the Confederate right, *Stewart's* corps assaulted the left wing of the XXIII corps, which was well intrenched and had obstacles covering part of the front. This wing was also well supported by artillery. The Confederates reached but were unable to capture the intrenchments and were repulsed with heavy loss.

The divisions of *Cleburne* and *Brown* drove back *Wagner's* advanced brigades and followed them to *Cox's* line, which they struck near the Franklin pike. The Confederates carried the outer line but could not reach a second line, some 70 yards in rear,

being driven back by the reserves and Opdyke's brigade. The fighting was kept up after dark and the Confederates seem to have held the ditches of parts of the Union line all night. *Johnson's* division attacked west of the Columbia pike after dark but without success.

*Bate's* division and *Chalmers's* division of cavalry attacked the left wing of the XXIII corps and *Kimball's* division of the IV corps, and were repulsed without much effort.

*Clayton's* division was not engaged.

Early in the evening, *Stevenson's* division with *Hood's* artillery arrived, and *Hood* prepared to storm the Union lines in the morning. *Schofield* however had already sent his trains towards Nashville and after dark withdrew his troops across the river and moved to that place.

**Strength and Casualties.**—The total strength of the two armies present for duty is given in the following table. Of *Schofield's* army, *Wood's* division of the IV corps and a brigade of *Wilson's* cavalry, which had recently joined and was on the extreme left of his line were not engaged. Of *Hood's* army, two divisions of *S. D. Lee's* corps, and one brigade each of *Stewart's* and *Cheatham's* corps took no part in the battle.

*Strength.*

	Inf. & Art'y	Cavalry	Casualties
Union . . . . .	27,000	6,000	2,200
Confederate . . . . .	32,000	6,000	6,200

Maj. Gen. *Stanley* was wounded in the battle and his corps was thereafter commanded by Brig. Gen. *Thomas J. Wood*.

Of the Confederate general officers, Maj. Gen. *Patrick R. Cleburne* and Brig. Gens. *John Adams*, *States R. Gist*, *Arthur M. Manigault* and *Hiram B. Cranbury* were killed; Maj. Gen. *John C. Brown* and five brigadier generals were wounded and one brigadier general was captured. Forty-four field officers were killed, wounded or captured. Thirteen Confederate flags were captured.

After the battle of Franklin, *Schofield* retired into the intrenched position of Nashville with all his forces and *Thomas* took personal command. In addition to the forces that had been under *Schofield* at Franklin, *Thomas* had at Nashville about 10,000 troops under Maj. Gen. *A. J. Smith* who had reached there on November 30 and December 1, and 5,000 men under Maj. Gen. *James B. Steedman* from Chattanooga. *Thomas* had now about 40,000 infantry and artillery.

Thomas was under the impression that *Hood's* infantry and artillery were about equal to his own and that *Forrest* had about four times as much cavalry as Wilson. It was not an unnatural conclusion, when the rapidity of *Hood's* advance on Nashville is considered. Thomas therefore decided to remain on the defensive until Wilson could more thoroughly reorganize, mount and equip his cavalry. There was a strong bridgehead at Nashville which could easily be held by his infantry; the river below could be patrolled by gunboats; Murfreesboro, Decherd, Stevenson, Bridgeport and Chattanooga were held by strong garrisons well intrenched. *Hood* could therefore do but little damage while Thomas remained on the defensive.

The IV corps, XXIII corps, A. J. Smith's corps and Steedman's division were therefore put in the bridgehead and Wilson's cavalry crossed to the north bank of the Cumberland to watch the river, above Nashville, as well as to reorganize (plate 45).

*Forrest's* cavalry appeared before Nashville on the 2d and *Hood's* infantry on the 3d.

The three corps of *Hood's* army at once began intrenching the position (plate 45), extending from the Nashville-Murfreesboro railroad to the Hillsboro pike. *Chalmers'* division operated in the country between the Cumberland River and the left of the Confederate line while *Forrest* with the divisions of *Buford* and *W. H. Jackson* operated on the right flank of the army.

Since all the Union cavalry was on the north bank of the river there was nothing to interfere with *Chalmers'* movements and he succeeded in capturing some transports below Nashville by means of siege batteries constructed on the south shore of the Cumberland River.

*Forrest* being likewise free to operate in his section began capturing the blockhouses and stockades along the railroad. By the 4th of December he had captured the first three in order from Nashville towards Murfreesboro. He was then directed to move on Murfreesboro (plate 24); en route he captured blockhouse No. 4 near Lavergne.

In the vicinity of Murfreesboro, *Forrest* found *Bate's* division of *Cheatham's* corps which had been ordered to that point from Franklin to destroy the railroad between Murfreesboro and Nashville and thus prevent Thomas from receiving reinforcements

from the south. *Hood* directed *Forrest*, if possible, to destroy the Union force at Murfreesboro which *Hood* believed to be about 5,000 men and to be trying to reach Nashville. As a matter of fact the Union force at Murfreesboro numbered over 10,000 men and was under the command of Maj. Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau; its duty was simply to hold that important depot.

Upon receiving word from *Bate* that the garrison was larger than had been reported, *Hood* also sent to *Forrest* one brigade from *Stevenson's* division and one from *French's* division.

On the 7th, while in front of Murfreesboro, *Forrest's* troops were attacked and defeated by a sortie force under the command of Maj. Gen. Robert H. Milroy.

On the 9th, *Bate's* division and the brigade of *French's* division returned to their corps. A brigade of *Smith's* division was sent to *Forrest* who now had two divisions of cavalry and two brigades of infantry. These troops were near Murfreesboro when the battle of Nashville took place and rejoined *Hood's* army at Columbia via Eagleville and Berlin, between the 18th and 20th.

On the 9th of December Thomas was ready to move and ordered Wilson's cavalry to cross to the south bank of the Cumberland River. This movement was later postponed on account of a sleet storm and took place on the 12th; the cavalry bivouacked between the inner and outer lines of fortification in rear of A. J. Smith's position.

On the 14th, the ground was considered in condition for a movement and Thomas ordered the attack to be made on the 15th.

According to the plan, the main line of intrenchment from its most southern point northeast to the Cumberland River was to be held by a part of Steedman's troops and the local troops; the inner line west of the town, by a division formed of quartermaster employees; the outer line west of the town, by a picket line of the troops of A. J. Smith's corps and of the IV corps.

Steedman, with three brigades made up principally of colored troops, was to threaten the extreme right of the Confederate line. The main attack was to be made on *Stewart's* corps by the corps of A. J. Smith and Wood in the first line, Schofield in the second, and Wilson on the right flank. (For organization see p. 380.)

**December 15.**—Steedman was the first to reach the enemy's line and kept *Cheatham* engaged all day although the Union troops could make no headway.

*Stewart's* line rested on two redoubts on detached hills south of Richland or Sugartree Creek. From the creek it followed a stone wall bordering the Hillsboro road northward about a mile, where it connected with the advance line extending across his front. His main line was on a ridge one-fourth of a mile in rear of his advance line. *Stewart's* corps had but 6,500 men present for duty. One of his brigades was detached and was on the Richland or Harding turnpike near the creek; another was with the trains.

There was a dense fog on the morning of the 15th which delayed the movements, and it was long after noon before *Stewart's* main position was reached.

Hatch's cavalry division, dismounted, moved on the right of A. J. Smith's corps; it first drove away *Stewart's* detached brigade and then with Smith's troops captured the two redouts west of the Hillsboro turnpike. Hatch then moved off to his right and Schofield came into line between A. J. Smith and Hatch. To meet this flank attack, *Johnson's* division of *S. D. Lee's* corps was sent to *Stewart*. The movement of Schofield and Hatch to cut off *Stewart's* retreat by the Granny White turnpike was prevented by darkness. In the center, Wood captured *Stewart's* advance line and then with A. J. Smith captured *Stewart's* main line. *Stewart* retreated under cover of darkness to a new line some two miles in rear.

In this first day's fight, Hatch's division was the only cavalry engaged in the battle proper. The remainder of Wilson's cavalry was engaged with *Chalmers* who was covering his river batteries.

Although he was in no condition to continue the contest, *Hood* decided to make another effort and withdrew his troops to a range of hills two miles in rear of the first; there he hastily intrenched his army. As two divisions of *S. D. Lee's* corps had not been engaged on the 15th, he placed this corps on the right to guard his main line of retreat. *Cheatham's* corps, which had not been seriously engaged on the 15th, was placed on the left; *Stewart's* corps occupied the center.

**December 16.**—The morning of the 16th was employed in getting the Union troops in position for a general attack. The attack itself began in the afternoon, and was a repetition of that of the preceding day.

*S. D. Lee's* corps on the right repulsed an assault made by two brigades of the IV corps and two brigades of Steedman's division.

On the left, however, Wilson's cavalry succeeded in turning *Cheatham's* line and an assault by McArthur's division of A. J. Smith's corps carried the salient at the junction of *Cheatham's* and *Stewart's* corps shortly before dark. The whole Confederate line now gave way from left to right and sought safety by the Franklin turnpike.

Two brigades of *Stewart's* corps prevented Wilson's cavalry from reaching this road before dark and *Clayton's* division covered the retreat of the army through the gap in the Brentwood Hills.

By the morning of the 16th, *Chalmers* had reached the left flank of the Confederate line and was directed to guard the roads leading to the rear of the army.

On the 16th, on the Union right, Wilson had Hatch's division of two brigades at daylight, and in the course of the day three other brigades reported to him. Towards evening he captured one of *Chalmers'* brigade commanders.

**December 17-20.**—The corps of *Stewart* and *Cheatham* started for Columbia on the Duck River on the night of the 16th. *S. D. Lee's* corps marched in rear, *Clayton's* division being the rear guard to Franklin and *Stevenson's* from Franklin to Columbia. On the 20th, *Hood's* army was on the south bank of Duck River. Until *Hood's* army reached the Duck River, the rear guard was greatly harassed by Wilson's cavalry, since *Chalmers'* cavalry division had become wholly disorganized. At Columbia, *Forrest* joined the army and a special rear guard was organized under Maj. Gen. *Walthall* from brigades of the corps of *Stewart* and *Cheatham*.

**December 21-27.**—On the 21st, *Hood* retreated from Columbia for Florence via Pulaski and crossed the river east of Florence. His entire army was on the south bank on the 27th.

The pursuit of *Hood's* army was begun on December 27 by Wilson's cavalry followed by the other troops. Rains set in shortly after the battle which made all the streams unfordable.

Not having a well equipped bridge train and *Hood* having destroyed the bridges over the Harpeth River at Franklin, Rutherford Creek north of Columbia, and the Duck River at Columbia, the infantry was unable to overtake the Confederate army. When *Hood* crossed the Tennessee, the IV corps was south of Pulaski, A. J. Smith's was at Pulaski, and the XXIII corps, at Columbia. Wilson's cavalry was in advance of Wood. At this point the pursuit terminated. Steedman's division moved from Franklin to Murfreesboro and there took train for Decatur, Ala. It was at that place when *Hood* reached the south bank of the Tennessee River.

OPPOSING FORCES IN THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, DECEMBER  
15 AND 16, 1864.

*Union, Maj. Gen. George B. Thomas.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
IV	Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball . . . . .	3	—
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Washington L. Elliott . . . . .	3	—
Thomas J. Wood	Brig. Gen. Samuel Beatty . . . . .	3	—
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	7
XXIII			
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch . . . . .	3	2
John M. Schofield	Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox . . . . .	3	2
	Brig. Gen. John McArthur . . . . .	3	3
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard . . . . .	3	3
Andrew J. Smith	Colonel Jonathan B. Moore . . . . .	2	2
	Maj. Gen. James B. Steedman . . . . .	3	—
Cavalry Corps	Brig. Gen. Edward Hatch . . . . .	2	1
	Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson . . . . .	2	1
	Brig. Gen. Joseph F. Knipe . . . . .	1	1
	Brig. Gen. Edward M. McCook . . . . .	1	1

Brig. Gen. Knipe was present with the brigade of Brig. Gen. John H. Hammond; his other brigade was at Murfreesboro. Of McCook's division, only Brig. Gen. John T. Croxton with his brigade was present; McCook with the other brigades was in Kentucky.

In the defenses of Nashville was a provisional division of three brigades made up of detachments belonging to the four corps of Sherman's army; it was under Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft and was assigned to Steedman's command. Besides this force there were two brigades under Brig. Gen. John F. Miller, commanding the post of Nashville and the division of quartermaster employees under Brig. Gen. James L. Donaldson.



*Army of Tennessee, General John B. Hood.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
	Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson.....	4	—
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson.....	3	—
Stephen D. Lee	Maj. Gen. Henry D. Clayton.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	9
	Maj. Gen. William W. Loring.....	3	—
Lieut. Gen.	Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French.....	3	—
Alexander P. Stewart	Maj. Gen. Edward C. Walthall.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	9
	*.....	4	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. James A. Smith.....	4	—
Benjamin F. Cheatham	Maj. Gen. William B. Bate.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	9
Cavalry Corps	Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers.....	2	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Abraham Buford.....	2	—
Nathan B. Forrest	Brig. Gen. William H. Jackson.....	2	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	6

\*Of the five general officers of this division two were killed, two badly wounded and one captured at the battle of Franklin. The colonel commanding is not given.

Of the Confederate army, one brigade in each corps was absent from the battlefield, as well as Forrest with the cavalry divisions of Buford and Jackson.

	Strength	Casualties
Union.....	48,000 equipped	3,000
Confederate.....	24,000 equipped	not known

*Hood* claims in "Advance and Retreat", that he had 18,500 men in his three infantry corps and 2,306 in *Forrest's* cavalry after the army recrossed the Tennessee; or 20,806 of the 39,000 with which he marched from Florence.

About 70 pieces of artillery were lost by *Hood's* army in this campaign. Many of them had to be abandoned on the roads.

**Comments.**—In his "Advance and Retreat" *Hood* gives his reasons for his movements after the fall of Atlanta. They are in substance that his army was too weak and too discouraged to offer any great resistance to Sherman should the latter advance from Atlanta. The Confederate authorities could promise him no reinforcements and he would become weaker daily through the desertions of his discouraged troops. His only hope of success lay in raising the morale of his army and in causing Sherman to divide his forces. Both results he hoped to accomplish by a forward movement.

His original intention was, after destroying Sherman's communications between the Chattahoochee and Etowah rivers, to move westward and wait for Sherman near the Georgia-Alabama line near his base of supplies at the end of the Selma-Talladega railroad. Should Sherman move southward he would follow him.

Finding however that Sherman was moving northward, he sent his trains and most of his artillery to Jacksonville, Ala., and to draw Sherman still farther northward he continued his own northward movement to Dalton. From Dalton he moved westward towards the Tennessee River, hoping to compel Sherman to send troops to Stevenson, Bridgeport and Guntersville to defend that river. In that case he proposed to offer battle in the vicinity of Lafayette. Sherman however was not alarmed about the Tennessee River, and, instead of weakening his army, increased it by recalling the two divisions he had sent to Tennessee to deal with *Forrest's* raid. *Hood's* corps commanders therefore opposed the idea of a battle, and he withdrew to Gadsden, Ala., the locality in which he had originally intended to place his army.

*Beauregard* joined him at Gadsden, and *Hood* proposed to cross the Tennessee River at Guntersville, Ala., its most southern point and destroy the railroads in northern Alabama. To this *Beauregard* assented but directed that all the cavalry save two brigades under *Jackson* should remain to observe Sherman. *Forrest* was directed to report to *Hood*.

Instead of moving to Guntersville, *Hood* later decided to march to Decatur. This change was due to the information which he received that *Forrest* could not at once join him. *Forrest* was at this time at Jackson, Tenn., recruiting his forces and watching Hatch's cavalry division which was at Clifton on the Tennessee River threatening to cross into west Tennessee. *Forrest* had just started on an expedition to interrupt communication on Sherman's main line of supplies via the Tennessee River and Johnsonville. In the orders sent *Forrest* he was directed to join *Hood* after he had finished the work upon which he was then engaged.

Had *Hood* pursued the bold course of crossing the Tennessee at Guntersville, with his three corps and *W. H. Jackson's* cavalry division, which he might easily have done as the river was reported fordable by cavalry at this time, he would have found no Union force in Tennessee to oppose him. The small Union garrison of

Decatur would probably have evacuated that place and he could have had a week in northern Alabama practically undisturbed to wreck the railways.

*Hood* might have crossed at Guntersville on the 24th. On the 26th Sherman, who was still in doubt what course to pursue, telegraphed Thomas that if *Hood* crossed at Guntersville he, Sherman, would be after him; but if he crossed west of Decatur he must turn *Hood* over to Thomas and continue his own movement into southern Georgia. Had *Hood* crossed at Guntersville, therefore, he would have drawn Sherman back into Tennessee.

Even had *Hood* moved on Columbia as soon as he reached Tuscumbia, he would probably have drawn Sherman back into Tennessee, as Sherman was near Rome, Georgia, on October 30th and had not yet started his army back for Atlanta. *Hood* says he started from Gadsden with 20 days' supplies, so he was as well prepared to move on November 1 as he was on the 20th when he did move. He says he intended to move at once from Tuscumbia but was detained by want of supplies; it is more probable that he did not want to move without *Forrest*.

By his various delays, *Hood* allowed Sherman to get to Atlanta, cut the wires behind him, start for Savannah, and thus remove the possibility of recall. He had however succeeded in making Sherman divide his force and leave two of his six corps in Tennessee.

When Thomas selected Pulaski as his concentration center he thought *Hood* might either move on Decatur or on Columbia. This position of Schofield's forces gave *Hood* an advantage in the opening operations. *Hood* moved more rapidly than was thought possible from the condition of the roads, and had Schofield been slow to decide or act, *Forrest* would have taken Columbia and destroyed the bridges.

Had *Hood* selected a point a few miles south of Spring Hill as his objective, he might have reached the turnpike without opposition and been between Stanley's single division and Schofield's four. The difficult roads made his turning movement a slow one and having no cavalry with him, he did not reach his destination in time to study the situation and select the best point of attack. It is probable that *Cheatham* did not make the best use of his troops considering the importance of securing pos-

session of the turnpike. *Cleburne*, who was the only division commander that made an attack, drove back the Union advance line which was a half mile from the turnpike about sunset but being unsupported did not follow up his attack.

Schofield held Columbia longer than was safe with the force he commanded but it was with a desire to comply with the wishes of Thomas.

*Hood* was naturally angry at Schofield's escape and having criticised his subordinates, the desperate assault of Franklin resulted. Although the safety of the Union army was imperilled by the fault of *Wagner* in leaving his brigades in advance of the line with orders to fight, it was saved by the skill with which the lines were intrenched and the troops posted.

*Hood's* army never recovered from its repulse at Franklin. He admitted that he could not hope to attack Thomas successfully or to cross the Cumberland River without reinforcements from the *Trans-Mississippi Department*. Any material reinforcement from that department was very improbable. His retreat however at this time would be an admission that the continuation of the war was useless and this he was unwilling to admit. *Hood* therefore advanced on Nashville hoping that Fortune might favor him in some unforeseen way.

His opponent, Thomas, however was not one given to taking chances. Having been led to believe that *Hood's* army was stronger than it actually was, he decided to wait until his own cavalry was thoroughly reorganized. Though repeatedly urged to take the offensive and even threatened with the loss of his command, Thomas did not move until he felt that his army was ready to win. *Hood* could not have resisted Thomas' army but he would have offered greater resistance had not *Forrest* been absent from the battlefield.

## OPERATIONS IN EAST TENNESSEE.

### PLATE 3

When active operations began in Virginia and Georgia in May, 1864, the *Department of Western Virginia and East Tennessee* was under the command of Brig. Gen. *John H. Morgan* with headquarters at Abingdon, Va. The Union troops in east Tennessee

confined themselves to the occupation of the territories about Cumberland Gap and Knoxville.

In August, *Morgan* sent some troops to occupy Tennessee east of Morristown and Brig. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem was sent from Nashville with a brigade of Tennessee cavalry to drive him out. Gillem was near Morristown when *Wheeler* passed between him and Knoxville in the latter part of August.

On September 4, at Greenville, Tenn., *Morgan* was surprised and killed by Gillem's cavalry. Just before his death he had been relieved of the command of his department by Brig. Gen. *John Echols* who assigned Brig. Gen. *John C. Vaughn* to the command of the troops in east Tennessee.

Towards the end of September, Maj. Gen. *John C. Breckinridge* assumed command of the department.

Nothing of importance occurred in east Tennessee until the latter part of October, when *Vaughn* was badly defeated by Gillem near Morristown. *Breckinridge* now decided to move into east Tennessee with his entire field command. Early in November he routed Gillem's brigade near Morristown and compelled him to retreat to Knoxville. *Breckinridge's* force was too small to attack Knoxville.

*Breckinridge* was in east Tennessee when *Hood* appeared in front of Nashville and the authorities in Washington were alarmed lest they should unite in Kentucky. This was one of the reasons why they wanted Thomas to attack *Hood* at once before the latter had time to cross the Cumberland River.

At Schofield's suggestion, Maj. Gen. Stoneman, who had been exchanged, was sent to east Tennessee. With Gillem's brigade and a cavalry brigade from Kentucky, in December, Stoneman drove the Confederates out of east Tennessee, captured Saltville and Wytheville in Virginia, and destroyed the salt works and lead mines. The Union brigades then returned to Kentucky and Tennessee.

## THE SAVANNAH CAMPAIGN OR "THE MARCH TO THE SEA."

### PLATE 6

Sherman waited in his camps in the Chattooga Valley, south of Summerville, until he ascertained that *Hood* had left Gadsden.

Having sent the IV corps to Thomas, on the 28th he ordered the other corps to the vicinity of Rome. Having learned that *Hood* had left Decatur and was moving westwards, on the 30th he ordered the XXIII corps to Resaca, the XIV corps to Kingston, and the Army of the Tennessee to Dallas.

**November.**—About the first of November, all breaks in the railroad between Atlanta and Chattanooga having been repaired, the necessary supplies for the new campaign were forwarded to Atlanta and the XXIII corps, the cavalry with the exception of Kilpatrick's division, and all material not needed in the campaign were returned to Tennessee.

On the 11th, Corse's division at Rome destroyed its fortifications, factories and bridges and started for Atlanta to join its corps.

On the 12th, Sherman received a message from Thomas saying, "I have no fear that *Beauregard* (meaning *Hood's* army) can do us any harm now." "If he does not follow you I will then thoroughly organize my troops and I believe that I shall have men enough to ruin him, unless he gets out of the way very rapidly." Thus reassured as to Tennessee, Sherman cut the wires in his rear and started for Atlanta.

On the 13th, the IV corps crossed the Etowah River, destroyed the bridges, and followed the railroad to Atlanta wrecking it en route.

On November 15, after destroying the military resources of Atlanta, Sherman started for Savannah with a thoroughly equipped army of 68,000 men; 55,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 2,000 artillery with 64 guns was his combatant force.

Commander in Chief, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman.  
 Right Wing, Army of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
XV	Brig. Gen. Charles R. Woods.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. William B. Hazen.....	3	—
Peter J. Osterhaus	Brig. Gen. John E. Smith.....	2	—
	Brig. Gen. John M. Corse.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	4
XVII	Maj. Gen. Joseph A. Mower.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Mortimer D. Leggett.....	2	—
Frank P. Blair	Brig. Gen. Giles A. Smith.....	2	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	3
<i>Left Wing, Army of Georgia, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum.</i>			
XIV	Brig. Gen. William P. Carlin.....	3	—
Bvt. Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. James D. Morgan.....	3	—
Jefferson C. Davis	Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	4
XX	Brig. Gen. Nathaniel J. Jackson.....	3	—
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John W. Geary.....	3	—
Alpheus Williams	Brig. Gen. William T. Ward.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	4
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick.....	2	1

To oppose Sherman's operations, there were *Wheeler's* cavalry corps reinforced by one of *W. H. Jackson's* brigades, the Georgia militia and State troops under Maj. Gen. *Gustavus W. Smith*, the available troops of the *Department of South Carolina, Georgia and east Florida*, under *Hardee*, and such troops as could be spared from the *Department of North Carolina*.

The Confederate authorities did all they could to stop Sherman; and at one time, *Beauregard, Bragg, Hardee, Taylor, G. W. Smith* and *McLaws* were all in Georgia. Their efforts however were of no avail since the Confederate government could not furnish them with sufficient troops.

From Atlanta, Howard marched to Jonesboro and thence to the railroad junction at Gordon, south of Milledgeville; Slocum marched via Covington and Madison to Milledgeville. The two wings united November 23d. After uniting, Howard moved on Savannah by the roads parallel to the railroad and south of it while Slocum moved by similar roads north of the railroad. En route, the railroads were destroyed from Atlanta to Jonesboro and Madison and from Gordon to Savannah.

**December.**—By the 10th of December, Sherman was in front of Savannah; on the 13th, Hazen's division of the XV corps captured *Fort McAllister* by assault and Sherman opened communication with the navy under Admiral Dahlgren, and with Port Royal to which Grant had sent supplies for Sherman's army.

Savannah having refused to surrender and an assault not being deemed advisable, Sherman sent to Port Royal for siege guns. Before a regular siege could be undertaken, *Hardee*, who was now in command, evacuated Savannah on the 21st and retired across the Savannah River.

Sherman's operations against Savannah were assisted by Maj. Gen. John G. Foster, who commanded the Department of the South. A force of 5,000 men under Foster landed near the head of Port Royal Sound on the 29th of November. Though defeated in its efforts to capture the railroad, this force remained in a threatening position near that road and compelled *Hardee* to divide his forces.

Sherman's casualties from Atlanta to Savannah were less than 2,200.

**Comment.**—Sherman had proposed this movement on Savannah October 1, when he decided that *Hood* was contemplating a movement on his communications. It was not however until he was in the vicinity of Lafayette, Ga., that Grant gave his consent.

Sherman felt that it was unnecessary as well as injudicious to allow *Hood* to draw him back into Tennessee unless there was a good prospect of destroying *Hood's* army. He believed that the moral effect of his march through Georgia would be great and he had no fear that his army starting with twenty days' rations would have any difficulty in reaching the coast. By destroying the railroads in Georgia, he would seriously interfere with the supply of *Lee's* army. From Savannah he could march northwards through South and North Carolina and if necessary unite with Grant in Virginia.

The results justified his reasoning. Sherman reached Savannah just before the battle of Nashville, and the two events taken together had a very discouraging effect upon the people of the Confederate States.



OPERATIONS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER  
AND ON THE GULF OF MEXICO.

RED RIVER CAMPAIGN.

**Military Situation** (Plate 8).—January 1, 1864, Lieut. Gen. *E. Kirby Smith* was in command of the Confederate *Trans-Mississippi Department* with headquarters at Shreveport, La. Lieut. Gen. *Theophilus H. Holmes* commanded the *District of Arkansas* and had 10,000 men in the vicinity of Camden. Maj. Gen. *John B. Magruder* commanded the *District of Texas* where he was holding the coast line from the Sabine to the Brazos rivers with a force of 10,000 men. Maj. Gen. *Richard Taylor* commanded the *District of Louisiana* and had about 10,000 men. Maj. Gen. *John G. Walker's* infantry division of three brigades was on the south bank of the Red River near Fort de Russy; Brig. Gen. *Alfred Mouton's* infantry division of two brigades was on the Washita River near Harrisburg; a small cavalry brigade was with *Mouton's* division and a cavalry regiment was near Vermillionville. In the latter part of February, *Kirby Smith* heard rumors of a proposed Union movement up the Red River valley and on March 5, directed *Magruder* to send a division of cavalry from his district to report to *Taylor* at Alexandria.

For political reasons, President Lincoln wanted the Union forces to undertake operations in Arkansas and Louisiana early in 1864 with a view to the occupation of Texas. In January therefore Arkansas was made a separate department under Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele and Halleck directed Banks, who was the senior of the three department commanders, to confer with Sherman and Steele and agree on a joint movement against *Kirby Smith's* forces in Arkansas and Louisiana. The first objective in these operations was to be Shreveport, La.

In accordance with the plan as finally agreed upon (plate 8), Banks was to concentrate at Franklin, La., all the troops of the XIII and XIX corps that could be spared for field service and at the proper time move to Alexandria on the Red River. Sherman was to send a corps of 10,000 men by transport from Vicksburg, Miss., to Alexandria, La., to reinforce Banks when the latter reached that point. Steele was to advance with as strong a force as possible from the Arkansas River and was to join Banks at Alexandria, Natchitoches or Shreveport, as seemed best.

When Sherman returned to Vicksburg after his Meridian Campaign, he formed for this new campaign a corps of 10,000 men and placed it under the command of Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Smith. He then visited Banks at New Orleans and it was arranged between them that Banks should start his column on March 5. Banks expected to reach Alexandria by March 17 and Sherman agreed to have his troops there on that day.

For various reasons Banks' column, 5,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry, was concentrated more slowly than anticipated and it was not until March 14, that its cavalry was ready to move from Franklin. Steele's column did not leave Little Rock and Fort Smith until March 23; in this campaign his troops got no farther than Camden, Ark. It therefore fell to Sherman's troops to open the campaign.

#### CAMPAIGN IN LOUISIANA.

**Fort de Russy and Alexandria.**—A. J. Smith's corps embarked at Vicksburg on March 10 and was convoyed by Admiral Porter with a fleet of twenty-two naval vessels, eleven of which were river ironclads.

**March.**—After starting, A. J. Smith learned that Banks' column had not yet left Franklin and that the Red River was obstructed by a raft covered by the guns of *Fort de Russy* twenty miles below Alexandria. He therefore landed his force at Simsport to attack *Fort de Russy* from the land side. The Confederates offered little opposition to Smith's operation and he captured *Fort de Russy* on the 14th and occupied Alexandria on the 16th.

As soon as *Taylor* learned that Smith had debarked at Simsport he ordered *Walker* and *Mouton* to Alexandria. Not feeling strong enough to hold that place, on the approach of Smith, *Taylor* fell back to Natchitoches.

As soon as *Kirby Smith* heard of the capture of *Fort de Russy* and Alexandria, he directed *Magruder* to send him another cavalry division from Texas and directed Maj. Gen. *Stirling Price*, who had just relieved *Holmes* of the command of the *District of Arkansas*, to send him two divisions of infantry.

On March 24, Banks reached Alexandria in person and two

days later his entire command was in its vicinity. (For organization see p. 393.)

When Banks reached Alexandria he found his farther advance endangered by the low waters in the Red River which made it barely possible for the river fleet to ascend the double rapids just above that town. Should the fleet pass these rapids it would find the upper river impeded by shoals, and should the river fall still more the fleet would be unable to descend the rapids and return to the Mississippi River.

He also received an order here from Grant directing him to return Smith's corps to Sherman not later than April 15, as it was to take part in the Atlanta campaign.

Notwithstanding these unfavorable conditions, Banks decided to continue his campaign, hoping to reach Shreveport by a rapid march.

**April.**—Leaving Grover's division of the XIX corps at Alexandria, Banks moved the army and fleet up the Red River to Natchitoches, which he reached April 2 and 3.

**Wilson Farm, Sabine Crossroads and Pleasant Hill.**—On April 6, Banks moved out of Natchitoches for Shreveport. His main column was to march via Pleasant Hill and Mansfield; a division of A. J. Smith's corps escorted by the gunboats was to be transported up the river.

Upon Banks' approach, *Taylor* fell back to Pleasant Hill where he was joined by Brig. Gen. *Thomas Green's* cavalry division from Texas. Leaving *Green* at this point, with the divisions of *Walker* and *Mouton* he continued his retreat to Mansfield. Here he was joined by Brig. Gen. *Hamilton P. Bee's* cavalry division from Texas and was only twenty miles from *Churchill's* corps from Arkansas which was encamped midway between Mansfield and Shreveport.

On April 7, the Union cavalry division encountered *Green's* cavalry division at Wilson Farm near Pleasant Hill and repulsed an attack made by the Confederates. Not feeling able to drive back the Confederate cavalry, Brig. Gen. Lee requested the support of a brigade of infantry. During the night, a brigade of *Landram's* division of the XIII corps was sent to him; it reported at daylight.

**April 8.**—Banks was not expecting an engagement on the 8th;

he expected his cavalry only to clear the way for the infantry which was to bivouac near Pleasant Hill. About 10 a. m. his cavalry commander asked for another brigade of infantry and the remaining brigade of Landram's division was sent him. Cameron's division of the XIII corps with Emory's division of the XIX corps, both under Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, went into bivouac before noon. A. J. Smith's corps had been delayed by bad roads and was somewhat in rear.

The Union advance guard drove back *Green's* cavalry division to Sabine Crossroads, three miles from Mansfield, where the infantry divisions of *Walker* and *Mouton* with *Bee's* cavalry division were occupying a position selected by *Taylor*. *Taylor* had ordered *Churchill's* corps to join him there that day, but it could not arrive before dark. (For organization see p. 393.)

The two forces were deployed opposite each other when Banks visited his advance guard that afternoon. Banks at once ordered up the troops in rear. *Taylor* had not intended to attack that afternoon, but his troops involved him in an engagement between 4 and 5 p. m. Just as Cameron's division of the XIII corps reached the field, the Confederates attacked and routed the Union cavalry and Landram's division of the XIX corps. Cameron's division tried to check the Confederates but being outflanked on both wings it too was compelled to retreat. Two miles in rear of the field, Emory's division of the XIX corps, that was moving to the front, halted and deployed and checked the pursuit.

**April 9.**—That night the Union troops retired to Pleasant Hill where a line was formed by Emory's division and two divisions of A. J. Smith's corps. During the night *Taylor* was reinforced by *Churchill's* corps and on the afternoon of the 9th he assaulted the Union forces at Pleasant Hill and was repulsed with great loss.

Banks now decided to abandon the attempt to capture Shreveport as he had already detained Smith's corps longer than had been expected and there was little prospect of aid from Steele. Furthermore, in the engagement at Sabine Crossroads he had lost 20 guns and the entire wagon train of his cavalry division. Banks therefore retired to Natchitoches and sent word to the division that had gone by water to return to that point.

**May.**—From Natchitoches, Banks returned to Alexandria which he reached April 25. The water over the rapids was now so low that

the fleet could not pass and it was necessary to construct dams to raise the water level. This detained Banks at Alexandria until May 16. After the fleet passed Alexandria, the army marched to Simsport and crossed the Atchafalaya Bayou about May 20.

*Kirby Smith* arrived on the field at the close of the battle of Pleasant Hill and found *Taylor's* army completely demoralized. Orders were issued for a retreat to Mansfield. The following morning, however, it was discovered that Banks had retired and the order was countermanded.

Having compelled Banks to withdraw, *Kirby Smith* decided to operate against Steele who was advancing across Arkansas. He therefore returned to Shreveport with *Walker's* division and the troops sent him by *Price*, and left *Taylor* with *Mouton's* division and the cavalry to harass Banks. *Taylor* remained in touch with the Union army until it crossed the Atchafalaya Bayou at Simsport but was unable to do any material damage.

#### OPPOSING TROOPS IN THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN.

##### *Union, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks.*

Corps.	Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
XIII			
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron.....	2	2
Thomas E. G. Ransom	Colonel William J. Landram.....	2	2
XVI and XVII	Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower.....	2	—
Brig. Gen.	Colonel William F. Lynch.....	3	—
Andrew J. Smith	Brig. Gen. T. Kilby Smith.....	2	—
XIX			
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. William H. Emory.....	3	3
William B. Franklin	Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover.....	2	4
Reserve artillery	.....	—	2
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. Albert L. Lee.....	4	2
Unattached	.....	—	4 reg'ts

##### *Confederate, Lieut. Gen. E. Kirby Smith.*

Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. John G. Walker.....	3	3
Richard Taylor	Brig. Gen. Alfred Mouton.....	2	?
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Mosby M. Parsons.....	2	2
Thomas J. Churchill	Brig. Gen. John C. Tappan.....	2	?
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. Thomas Green.....	2	?
	Brig. Gen. Hamilton P. Bee.....	—	?

	<i>Union.</i>	<i>Confederate.</i>
Strength.....	30,000	15,000
Casualties.....	5,000	3,976

## CAMPAIGN IN ARKANSAS.

### PLATE 8.

When the Red River Campaign was begun by Sherman's troops, there were in Arkansas two Confederate divisions of infantry near Spring Hill in the southwestern part of the State under Maj. Gen. *Sterling Price* and three divisions of cavalry in the vicinity of Camden and Princeton.

Steele had a large force at Little Rock and a smaller one at *Fort Smith* besides numerous small garrisons. It was his intention to move a column of 8,000 men from Little Rock and one of 4,000 from *Fort Smith*; these columns were to unite at Arkadelphia.

**March.**—Had Steele started his troops by the 1st of March as Sherman desired him to do, he would have been concentrated at Arkadelphia by the 10th and would have drawn *Price's* infantry northward to oppose him. This in itself would have assured the success of Banks' movement on Shreveport. His columns however left the Arkansas River only on March 23, three days after *Price's* infantry under *Churchill* had started on their march to Shreveport. (For organization see p. 395.)

*Price*, who had relieved *Holmes* on March 15, remained behind to watch the movements of Steele.

**April.**—Steele's main force reached Arkadelphia March 29 and his *Fort Smith* column a few days later. From this point he decided to move directly on Spring Hill and draw the Confederate forces out of Camden which was his first objective. In this he was successful and on March 9, when Banks was engaged in the battle of Pleasant Hill, Steele was in the vicinity of Prescott with the Confederate cavalry in his front.

He remained in this vicinity a short time and then moved eastward to Camden which he entered April 15. Here he learned that Banks had abandoned his movement on Shreveport.

While Steele was advancing southward, *Price* employed his cavalry to threaten Steele's communications and impede his march. He followed Steele to Camden and on March 18 succeeded

in capturing a Union supply train of 177 wagons that was returning from a foraging expedition.

As previously stated, when *Kirby Smith* was assured that Banks had abandoned his attempt to reach Shreveport, he at once marched to *Price's* assistance with the two infantry divisions sent him by *Price* reinforced by Maj. Gen. *John G. Walker's* infantry division.

*Smith* reached Camden April 20, and at once sent a force to cross the Washita below Camden and intercept Steele's communications. On the 25th, this force captured a wagon train of 211 wagons en route from Camden to Pine Bluff.

Finding himself in a dangerous position without the possibility of aiding Banks, Steele evacuated Camden on the 26th and retired via Princeton to Little Rock. En route he was obliged to abandon his pontoon train at the crossing of Salida River.

#### OPPOSING FORCES IN ARKANSAS.

*Union, Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele.*

Divisions.	Bri- gades.	Batter- ies.
Brig. Gen. Frederick Salomon . . . . .	3	3
Brig. Gen. Eugene M. Thayer . . . . .	3	2
Cavalry Division		
Brig. Gen. Eugene A. Carr . . . . .	2	—
<i>Confederate — Gen. E. Kirby Smith.</i>		
— <i>Maj. Gen. Sterling Price.</i>		
Maj. Gen. John G. Walker . . . . .	2	?
Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Churchill . . . . .	3	?
Brig. Gen. Mosby M. Parsons . . . . .	2	2
Cavalry		
Brig. Gen. James F. Fagan . . . . .	3	1
Brig. Gen. John S. Marmaduke . . . . .	2	2
Brig. Gen. Samuel Maxey . . . . .	2	1

**Comment.**—Even if successful, the Shreveport Campaign would have been of little value since all that could have been accomplished was the destruction of the cotton in this rich territory. Banks could not have held Shreveport after A. J. Smith had left him and Steele could have given him little support. Grant did not approve of this movement and thought the troops might better be employed in a movement on Mobile, Ala.

When Sherman was consulted about it, he stated that he believed that a combined movement on Shreveport might succeed

if the columns started on time and the spring floods in the Red River gave ample depth of water over the rapids and shoals below Shreveport. Neither of these conditions had been fulfilled when Banks reached Alexandria. Sherman recommended that the movement be abandoned if the water over the rapids was not sufficient to admit of the easy passage of the fleet.

Steele and Banks were slow in beginning operations through the necessity of superintending certain State elections ordered from Washington.

Banks might still have reached Shreveport had he moved his army from Natchitoches in a better formation. Until the engagement at Sabine Crossroads the Union troops had been everywhere successful and the Confederates had an exaggerated idea of their numbers.

In the march to the battlefield of Sabine Crossroads, the Union cavalry division was followed by its train of 156 wagons which should have been with the wagon train in rear of the infantry. As a result, this wagon train blocked the road between the line of battle of the advance guard and the infantry which was coming to its support, and made it impossible to withdraw the artillery of the advance guard when the latter was compelled to retreat. The entire cavalry train of 156 wagons with its teams and 20 pieces of artillery were captured by the enemy, through this neglect of the ordinary precautions which should be taken when making a tactical march.

## CAPTURE OF FORTS AT ENTRANCE TO MOBILE BAY.

### PLATE 6.

**Mobile Bay.**—On May 7, while Banks' army was at Alexandria on its return from Pleasant Hill, the Department of the Gulf and the Department of Arkansas were united into the Division of West Mississippi under Maj. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby. A short time thereafter the Department of Missouri and the troops at Memphis, Vicksburg, and other points on the Mississippi were placed under his orders.

**June.**—About the 1st of June, A. J. Smith with his command was sent to Memphis and on the 11th, the XIII corps was broken up and its troops were employed to reinforce the XIX corps and the different garrisons of the Gulf.



Canby had two plans of operation under consideration. One was an attack on Mobile, Ala., and the other was an advance on Shreveport by the overland route from Vicksburg via Monroe. In the latter movement he proposed to repair the railroad from the Mississippi River to Monroe and extend it to Shreveport.

**July.**—About the last of June, however, before either plan could be put in operation, he was directed to send the XIX corps to Gen. Grant at *Fortress Monroe* and remain on the defensive west of the Mississippi River.

In the latter part of July, after the XIX corps had left him, a joint land and sea attack was undertaken against the three Confederate forts guarding the entrance to Mobile Bay. This attack was suggested by Admiral Farragut.

**August.**—The entrance to Mobile Bay from Cedar Point to Mobile Point is nine miles wide. In this entrance lies Dauphin Island which divides the waterway in two nearly equal parts; the island has a frontage on the bay of three miles. Between Dauphin Island and Mobile Point is the main ship channel. This channel is a mile wide with the deep water close to Mobile Point. Between Dauphin Island and Cedar Point are some minor channels seven to eighteen feet deep.

The main ship channel is under the guns of *Fort Morgan*, a masonry fort of the prevailing type whose largest guns were cast-iron 10-inch smooth bores and 8-inch rifles. The channel itself was obstructed by mechanical submarine mines which left a free channel only 160 yards wide close to the fort. On the eastern end of Dauphin Island was a smaller masonry fort, *Fort Gaines*, which commanded the shoal water, eight to nine feet deep, between the ship channel and Dauphin Island. This stretch was obstructed by several rows of piles. The minor channels between Dauphin Island and Cedar Point were commanded by a small work, *Fort Powell*, constructed on an island, and the shoal waters on either side of these channels were obstructed by piles. In rear of the line of forts was the Confederate ironclad *Tennessee* and three small wooden gunboats.

Admiral Farragut was confident of his ability to run past *Fort Morgan* and destroy the Confederate navy in its rear, as he had done at New Orleans, but he desired the assistance of the army in reducing the forts and assuring his communications.

On August 3, Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger with a force of about 1,500 men landed on the western end of Dauphin Island and proceeded to invest and bombard *Fort Gaines*.

On the morning of the 5th, the fleet ran past *Fort Morgan* and destroyed the Confederate fleet in the bay. The Union fleet consisted of four monitors and fourteen wooden vessels. The monitors moved on the flank nearest *Fort Morgan* and thus covered the wooden vessels. The monitor *Tecumseh* was destroyed by a submarine mine but the other vessels passed the fort without serious injury.

*Fort Powell* was abandoned by the Confederates on the following day and on the 8th, *Fort Gaines* surrendered.

The troops were then transferred to the land side of *Fort Morgan* and as a result of a bombardment by the fleet and by the land guns this fort surrendered August 23.

## PRICE'S RAID IN MISSOURI.

### PLATE 4.

In July, 1864, when the Union troops in Louisiana had been reduced by the transfer of A. J. Smith's corps and the XIX corps, *Kirby Smith* was directed to send *Taylor* with his two divisions to the east side of the Mississippi. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to carry out this order but only *Taylor* with his staff succeeded in crossing.

Being obliged to abandon this movement, *Smith* then decided if possible to recover Missouri by sending into it *Price* with as large a cavalry force as could be spared.

In the meantime he reorganized his territorial division by assigning Maj. Gen. *Simon B. Buckner* to command the *District of Louisiana*, Maj. Gen. *John G. Walker* to command the *District of Texas* and Maj. Gen. *John B. Magruder* to command the *District of Arkansas*. While *Price* was absent on his raid, *Magruder* was reinforced by the greater part of the Confederate troops in Louisiana.

**September.**—*Price* started from Princeton, Ark., in August with the cavalry divisions of Maj. Gen. *James F. Fagan* and Brig. Gen. *John S. Marmaduke*. He crossed the Arkansas River above

Little Rock and marched through Batesville to Pocohantas where he was joined by the cavalry division of Brig. Gen. *Joseph O. Shelby*. He now had a force of nine brigades, 12,000 men with 14 guns.

Marching on a broad front through southeast Missouri he concentrated his corps at Fredericktown September 25. He attacked Ironton on the 28th and was repulsed.

**October.**—On the 1st of October, *Price* was within ten miles of St. Louis but was prevented from attacking that place by the arrival of A. J. Smith's corps; he now turned westward to capture the towns on the south bank of the Missouri River. In moving westward he captured Herman, Booneville, and Independence besides a number of towns south of the river.

West of Independence, *Price* was confronted by the troops of the Department of Kansas under Maj. Gen. Samuel G. Curtis and while engaged with them he was attacked in rear by a corps of Missouri cavalry under Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. He now moved southward, and on the banks of the Osage River the divisions of *Fagan* and *Marmaduke* were defeated by Pleasonton who captured *Marmaduke* and one of his brigade commanders.

**November.**—*Price* now retreated to Fayetteville, Ark., which he reached about November 1. To avoid the Union troops at *Fort Smith*, he crossed into Indian Territory and finally reached his camp near Camden, Ark., about the 1st of December.

In this raid the Confederates destroyed much property and paroled a large number of prisoners. The raid had, however, no material effect on conditions west of the Mississippi River, but it did divert A. J. Smith's corps from the State of Tennessee where it was much needed.

When *Price* began his raid, A. J. Smith's corps, with a brigade of cavalry that had been operating against *Forrest* in Mississippi, was in transports on the Mississippi en route for Nashville. Smith was at once ordered to Missouri to assist in the defense of that State. In the course of the operations his corps marched to the vicinity of Kansas City where it was when *Price* was defeated by Curtis and Pleasonton and turned southward. From this point Smith was ordered to join Thomas at Nashville.

Not being satisfied with the conduct of operations in Missouri and Arkansas, in November Grant requested the relief of the two

department commanders; Maj. Gen. Grenville Dodge succeeded Rosecrans and Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds succeeded Steele.

**Results of Campaigns of 1864.**—As a result of the campaigns of 1864, armed resistance was practically destroyed in the West. Alabama was the only important State which had not been overrun by the Union armies, and Mobile was the only fortified city still in the possession of the Confederate troops. West of the Mississippi River *Kirby Smith's* force was disintegrating by desertion, and east of the Mississippi the *Army of Tennessee* had almost lost its powers of resistance, due to its disastrous campaign in Tennessee.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1865.

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The principal military operations in 1865 were.

- January . . . . Capture of Fort Fisher, North Carolina.  
February . . . Cavalry raid in Northern Virginia.  
                  Campaign in the Carolinas.  
March . . . . Campaign in Virginia.  
                  Campaign in the Carolinas.  
                  Cavalry raids in North Carolina and Alabama.  
                  Siege of Mobile.  
April . . . . . Surrender of Lee and Johnston.  
                  Cavalry raids in North Carolina, Alabama and Georgia.  
                  Capture of Mobile.  
May . . . . . Surrender of Taylor and E. Kirby Smith.

### MILITARY SITUATION JANUARY 1, 1865.

#### PLATE 1.

**Confederate.**—On December 31, 1864, the strength of the Confederate troops present for duty was approximately as follows:

Army of Northern Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee . . . . .	60,000
Dept. of Western Virginia, Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge . . . . .	3,000
Dept. of Richmond, Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell . . . . .	5,000
Dept. of North Carolina, Gen. Braxton Bragg . . . . .	7,000
Dept. of South Carolina, etc., Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee . . . . .	12,000
Wheeler's cavalry corps . . . . .	6,000
Army of Tennessee, Gen. John B. Hood . . . . .	19,000
Dept. of Alabama, Mississippi, etc., Lt. Gen. Richard Taylor . . . . .	12,000
Trans-Mississippi Dept., Gen. E. Kirby Smith . . . . .	30,000
	<hr/>
Total . . . . .	154,000
Total present . . . . .	197,000

**Union.**—On December 31, 1864, the strength of the Union troops present for duty was approximately as follows:

Middle Military Division, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.....	64,000
Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.....	84,000
Dept. of Virginia and North Carolina, Maj. Gen. Benj. F. Butler... .	50,000
Dept. of the South, Maj. Gen. John G. Foster.....	7,000
Army of Georgia, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman.....	61,000
Dept. of the Ohio, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield.....	32,000
Dept. of the Cumberland, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas.....	38,000
Wilson's cavalry corps, Bvt. Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson.....	23,000
Detachment Army of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith... .	10,000
Division of West Mississippi, Maj. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby.....	101,000
Dept. of Kansas, Maj. Gen. Samuel G. Curtis.....	4,000
	<hr/>
Total.....	474,000
Total present.....	590,000

The departments of the East, the Northwest and New Mexico are omitted from the table.

### CAMPAIGN IN THE CAROLINAS.

The Confederate troops engaged in the campaign in the Carolinas in 1865 consisted of the three corps of the *Army of Tennessee*; Lt. Gen. *William J. Hardee's* troops of the *Department of South Carolina, Georgia, etc.*, formed into a corps of two divisions under Maj. Gen. *Lafayette McLaws* and Brig. Gen. *William B. Taliaferro*; Gen. *Braxton Bragg's* troops of the *Department of North Carolina*, consisting mainly of Maj. Gen. *Robert B. Hoke's* infantry division; Maj. Gen. *Joseph Wheeler's* cavalry corps of the *Army of Tennessee*; and Maj. Gen. *Mathew C. Butler's* cavalry division of the *Army of Northern Virginia*.

At the beginning of the year these forces were widely separated. The *Army of Tennessee* was near Corinth, Miss., having just returned from its disastrous campaign in Tennessee; *McLaws'* division was on the railroad near the head of Port Royal Sound and *Taliaferro's* division was in and around Charleston; *Hoke's* division which was sent from the *Army of Northern Virginia* in December for the relief of *Fort Fisher* was between *Fort Fisher* and Wilmington, N. C. The other troops of *Bragg's* department were mainly in *Fort Fisher*. *Wheeler's* cavalry had its base at Augusta, Ga., and was watching *Sherman's* troops. *Butler's* cavalry division was still with *Lee's* army. One division of

*Wheeler's* cavalry under Brig. Gen. *Alfred Iverson* remained in Georgia during the campaign; it was later commanded by Maj. Gen. *Pierce M. B. Young*.

*Confederate Forces, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.*

*Army of Tennessee, Lieut. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart.*

Corps	Divisions	Brigades	Batteries
Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill	Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson.....	3	(artillery did not take part in campaign)
	Maj. Gen. Henry D. Clayton.....	3	
	Brig. Gen. William F. Brantley.....	4	
Maj. Gen. Edward C. Walthall	Maj. Gen. William W. Loring.....		
	Brig. Gen. George D. Johnston.....		
Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham	Maj. Gen. William B. Bate.....		
	Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley.....		
	Brig. Gen. James A. Smith.....		

*Department of South Carolina, Georgia, etc.*

Lieut. Gen. William J. Hardee	Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws.....	4	3
	Brig. Gen. William B. Taliaferro.....	2	—

*Department of North Carolina.*

Gen. Braxton Bragg	Maj. Gen. Robert E. Hoke.....	5	2
	Maj. Gen. William H. C. Whiting....		

*Cavalry, Lieut. Gen. Wade Hampton.*

Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler	Maj. Gen. William W. Allen.....	3	—
	Brig. Gen. William Y. C. Humes.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	4
	Maj. Gen. Mathew C. Butler.....	2	2

**Union.**—The Union troops engaged in the Carolina Campaign consisted of the X, XIV, XV, XVII, XX, and XXIII corps and Kilpatrick's cavalry division.

On the 1st of January, the XIV, XV, XVII and XX corps with Kilpatrick's cavalry were in the vicinity of Savannah, Ga.; the XXIII corps was in the vicinity of Columbia, Tenn.; the X corps was organized during the campaign from troops belonging to the XXIV and XXV corps, which were in front of Richmond at the beginning of the year, and from the garrison of Newbern, N. C.

*Union Army, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman.**Right Wing—Army of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard.*

Corps	Divisions	Bri- gades	Batter- ies
XV.	Brig. Gen. Charles R. Woods.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Maj. Gen. William B. Hazen.....	3	—
John A. Logan	Brig. Gen. John E. Smith.....	2	—
	Brig. Gen. John M. Corse.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	4
XVII.	Maj. Gen. Joseph A. Mower.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Mortimer Leggett.....	2	—
Frank P. Blair	Brig. Gen. Giles A. Smith.....	2	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	3

*Center—Army of the Ohio, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield.*

XXIII.	Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Ruger.....	3	1
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Nathaniel C. McLean.....	3	2
Jacob D. Cox	Brig. Gen. James W. Reilly.....	3	2
X.	Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames.....	3	1
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Henry W. Birge.....	1	1
Alfred H. Terry	Brig. Gen. Charles J. Paine.....	3	1

*Left Wing—Army of Georgia, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum.*

XIV.	Brig. Gen. William P. Carlin.....	3	—
Bvt. Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. James D. Morgan.....	3	—
Jefferson C. Davis	Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	4
XX.	Brig. Gen. Nathaniel J. Jackson.....	3	—
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John W. Geary.....	3	—
Alpheus Williams	Brig. Gen. William T. Ward.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	4
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick.....	4	—
	Division Artillery.....	—	2

Howard's command was designated as the "right wing" and Slocum's as the "left wing" until the army reached Goldsboro, N. C. At that point, the Army of Georgia was formed by an executive order. At the same time Terry's command was made the X corps and Cox was formally assigned to the command of the XXIII corps. Sherman now designated Schofield's army as the Army of the Ohio or the "center."



## CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER, NORTH CAROLINA.

## PLATE 5.

The first operations in the Carolinas was the capture of *Fort Fisher* by Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry with five of the six brigades which afterward became the X corps. Terry's command operated under orders from Grant.

Grant had not been satisfied with the operations against *Fort Fisher* carried on by Butler in December, 1864, and therefore ordered a new expedition to be organized at once from the XXIV and XXV corps in which the troops engaged in December were to take part. He assigned Bvt. Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry of the XXIV corps to the command.

The new force consisted of six brigades, 8,000 infantry, with two field batteries and was accompanied by three companies of siege artillery equipped with 24 siege guns and 20 small mortars. Under the protection of the navy this force was to land and intrench its position on the peninsula at the end of which *Fort Fisher* was located. If unable to take the fort by assault it was to capture it by regular siege.

**January.**—The expedition left *Fort Monroe* on the morning of January 6, and sailed for Beaufort, N. C., where it was to meet Admiral David D. Porter's fleet of nearly 60 naval vessels of various types carrying over 600 guns. Because of unfavorable weather, the expedition did not reach *Fort Fisher* until January 13, when the naval bombardment began and the troops were landed. During the 14th, the troops secured their position by intrenchments across the peninsula, the navy continued its bombardment, and Terry and his engineers reconnoitered the land front.

It was decided that after a continuous bombardment until 3 p. m. on the 15th, the land front was to be assaulted in two columns; an army column consisting of Ames' division of the XXIV corps and a naval column consisting of 2,200 men. The former was to attack the land front near the river and the latter near the sea.

The naval force was repulsed, but the land force succeeded in entering the work and being reinforced by the remaining brigade of the XXIV corps captured the entire garrison of 2,000 men,

including Maj. Gen. *William H. C. Whiting*, the commander of the district, who was severely wounded.

## PLATE 5.

## OPPOSING LAND FORCES AT FORT FISHER.

*Union, Bvt. Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry.*

Divisions.	Brigades.	Batteries.
XXIV Corps.	Col. Newton M. Curtis.....	—
Brig. Gen.	Col. Galusha Pennypacker.....	—
Adelbert Ames	Col. Louis Bell.....	—
	Col. Joseph C. Abbott.....	—
XXV Corps.	Col. John W. Ames.....	—
Brig. Gen.	Col. Elias Wright.....	—
James J. Paine		
	Field Artillery.....	2

*Confederate, Maj. Gen. William H. C. Whiting.*

Garrison commander, Col. William Lamb.

**Comment.**—The success of the second attack on *Fort Fisher* was due primarily to the better employment of the naval fire. In the first attack the fire was diffused and did very little damage to the land front. Had an assault followed this bombardment it would probably have been repulsed. In the second attack an enfilade and reverse fire was directed on the land front, which dismounted many of the guns and destroyed the line of palisades, which formed the obstacle on this front.

Although *Bragg* had *Hoke's* division, 6,500 men present for duty, at Wilmington and points between Wilmington and *Fort Fisher*, he made no attempt to relieve the fort by attacking the rear of the Union troops. When it was too late, he sent some regiments into the fort by water, but only to be captured. He was too confident that the place could not be taken by assault.

The capture of *Fort Fisher* not only prevented blockade runners from entering the Cape Fear River, but gave a base for operations against Wilmington.

## THE CAPTURE OF WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA.

## PLATE 5.

On January 7, when Thomas reported that *Hood* had moved southward from Corinth, Miss., Grant directed Thomas to send the XXIII corps to Washington or Annapolis.

**February.**—Schofield's corps began to arrive in the latter part of January and on the 31st he was assigned to the command of the Department of North Carolina. On the 9th of February he landed at *Fort Fisher* with the first of his troops.

At the same time that the XXIII corps came to Washington, a temporary division formed of men belonging to the four corps of Sherman's army at Savannah was sent from Nashville to Annapolis en route for Savannah; this division was placed under Schofield's orders. Schofield now had a force of about 30,000 men. Schofield's instructions were to capture Wilmington and Goldsboro.

In distributing his troops, Schofield sent two divisions of the XXIII corps to *Fort Fisher* and one division of that corps, with the provisional division of Sherman's troops, to Newbern via Beaufort.

When Schofield reached *Fort Fisher*, *Hoke's* division was between him and Wilmington; four brigades on the east bank of the Cape Fear River and one on the west bank. *Hoke's* position was about midway between *Fort Fisher* and Wilmington.

Schofield first advanced up the east bank of the river until he came in touch with *Hoke* and there intrenched part of his command; he then sent two divisions under Cox up the west bank. There being but one Confederate brigade on this bank, Cox had no difficulty in reaching the railroad. *Bragg* evacuated Wilmington February 21, and Schofield entered it on the 22d. The report of a large Union force gathering at Newbern hastened the evacuation of Wilmington.

Having captured Wilmington and discovered that *Hoke's* division had retired to a point on the railroad twenty miles north of that town, on the 25th of February, Schofield directed Cox to assume command of the forces at Newbern and advance on Goldsboro, repairing the railroad. The railroad construction corps employed by Sherman in northern Georgia was sent east for this purpose.

**March.**—Cox reached Newberne on the 28th of February and organized the troops for the field into three divisions. On the 4th of March he bivouacked 10 miles from Newbern to cover the construction of the railroad in his rear. This caused *Bragg* to move *Hoke's* division to Goldsboro and Kinston. Schofield now

ordered the two divisions of the XXIII corps that were at Wilmington to march to Onslow and then join Cox. Schofield left Terry in command at Wilmington and started to join Cox at Newberne. At this stage of the operations, *Bragg* came under the orders of *Johnston* and Schofield under the orders of Sherman.

## SHERMAN'S MARCH THROUGH THE CAROLINAS.

### PLATE 5.

**January.**—Early in January, 1865, a division of the XIX corps was sent from Winchester, Va., to Savannah, Ga., to relieve the division of the XX corps then in charge of that city, so that Sherman would again have his entire army. Sherman's plan was to unite his army north of the Savannah River between the head of Port Royal Sound or Broad River and the Savannah River, and move on Columbia, S. C. Howard's two corps were to be moved by water to the head of Port Royal Sound; the XX corps was to cross the Savannah River near the railroad bridge; the XIV corps was to cross the Savannah River about thirty miles above the railroad.

The movement of the troops from Savannah began early in January and Sherman hoped to begin his movement on Columbia by the middle of the month. Rainy weather however interfered with the movement and the plan had to be modified in some details; the opening of the campaign was thus delayed until the 1st of February. On that day however he began his march with an army of 60,000 men, of whom 4,500 were cavalry. His trains consisted of 2,500 wagons and 600 ambulances.

To oppose Sherman, *Hardee* had the divisions of *McLaws* and *A. R. Wright*, 8,000 men, near the head of Port Royal Sound and *Taliaferro's* division of 5,500 men at Charleston. *Hardee* also had Maj. Gen. *Mathew C. Butler's* cavalry division of two brigades from the *Army of Northern Virginia* and Maj. Gen. *Wade Hampton* to direct the cavalry operations. The cavalry had been sent to South Carolina in February.

At Augusta, Ga., Maj. Gen. *D. H. Hill* was in command of Maj. Gen. *G. W. Smith's* Georgia militia and of *Wheeler's* cavalry corps of 8,000 men. Two divisions of the cavalry were in South Carolina and one in Georgia. *D. H. Hill* was under the orders of *Hardee* until *Beauregard* reached Augusta.

The *Army of Tennessee* was ordered from Tupelo, Miss., where it was being reorganized after the Nashville campaign, to Augusta, Ga., to assist in the defense of South Carolina. As Lt. Gen. *Richard Taylor* remained in Mississippi to command his department, the *Army of Tennessee* was under the command of Lt. Gen. *Alexander P. Stewart*. *Stevenson's* corps left Tupelo January 19, and reached Augusta January 30 and 31.

**February.**—*Beauregard* reached Augusta, Ga., February 3, and in conference with *Hardee*, *D. H. Hill* and *G. W. Smith* it was learned that the available Confederate forces were:

	Infantry		Cavalry
	Regular	Militia	
<i>Hardee</i> .....	8,000	3,000 S. C.	1,500
<i>Smith, G. W.</i> .....	.....	1,500 Ga.	.....
<i>Army of Tennessee</i> .....	10,000	.....	.....
<i>Wheeler</i> .....	.....	.....	6,700
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	18,000	4,500	8,200

Of the *Army of Tennessee* only *Stevenson's* corps, 4,000 men, had reached Augusta; only the South Carolina militia was available in that State.

As *Sherman's* troops were already in motion, it was decided to send *Stevenson's* corps to the railroad junction near Bamberg to cooperate with *Hardee*. *Beauregard* was to go to Columbia to supervise operations in that vicinity while *D. H. Hill* was to remain at Augusta and organize the troops of the *Army of Tennessee* and send them on to Columbia.

*Sherman* did not permit the Confederate commanders to complete their concentration. On February 1, the Union forces started from their concentration camps south of Gilsonville to march to the Augusta-Charleston railroad. *Howard* moved in the direction of Bamberg, *Slocum* in the direction of Windsor. *Kilpatrick* moved on the left of *Slocum*. On the 7th, *Sherman* reached the railroad and remained on it a few days to complete its destruction.

*Sherman's* movement compelled *Hardee* to withdraw his troops across the Edisto River to points northwest of Charleston, and *Stevenson* to withdraw to Orangeburg.

*Sherman's* next move was on Columbia; *Howard* moved through Orangeburg on Columbia and *Slocum* from Windsor to Lexington. They reached their objectives February 15. This movement wholly separated the Confederate forces. *Hardee* was still near

Charleston; *Stevenson* with *Wheeler* fell back towards Chester; the corps of *Stewart* and *Cheatham* of the *Army of Tennessee* had not yet left Augusta, Ga.

At this stage in the operations, President *Davis* assigned *Beauregard* to the command of all the troops operating in South Carolina, and at *Beauregard's* request promoted *Hampton* to the grade of lieutenant general, to command all his cavalry

*Beauregard* at once ordered *Hardee* to evacuate Charleston and move all his troops to Cheraw, S. C. He also directed *D. H. Hill* to send the corps of *Stewart* and *Cheatham*, which were about ready to move from Augusta, to Chester.

Sherman remained near Columbia a few days destroying the railroads and then started for Cheraw. He crossed the Wateree River midway between Camden and Lancaster. In this march Sherman was delayed by heavy rain storms and only reached Cheraw on March 3.

The Confederate Congress had not been entirely satisfied with the manner with which military affairs had been conducted by President *Davis* in 1864 and in January passed an act creating a general in chief. President *Davis* assigned *Lee* to this new office and at *Lee's* request, on February 22, assigned *Johnston* to the command of operations in South Carolina. *Beauregard* became second in command.

*Johnston* and *Beauregard* met for a conference at Charlotte, N. C., February 23, at which time the military situation in the Carolinas was as follows:

Sherman's army was crossing the Wateree River en route for Cheraw. Schofield's troops had just taken possession of Wilmington, evacuated by *Bragg*. *Beauregard* was uniting the *Army of Tennessee* at Chester, S. C., where he had sent *D. H. Hill* to take command of the *Army of Tennessee* until *Stewart's* arrival; *Hardee* was moving his forces as rapidly as possible to Cheraw; *Bragg* had withdrawn *Hoke's* division to a point between Wilmington and Goldsboro.

It was clear to both Confederate generals that if Sherman was marching to Cheraw, *Hardee* would be obliged to fall back to Fayetteville and that if possible the *Army of Tennessee* and *Bragg* should unite with him at that place.

*Johnston* therefore went to Raleigh, N. C., and directed *Beauregard* to send the troops belonging to the *Army of Tennessee* as rapidly as possible by rail to Smithfield, the nearest railroad station to Fayetteville. This movement was however much delayed because the corps of *Stewart* and *Cheatham* had not yet reached Chester and the railroad from Chester to Smithfield was engaged in carrying supplies to the *Army of Northern Virginia*.

**March.**—When Sherman reached Cheraw on March 3, *Hardee* who had barely had time to bring all his troops to Cheraw, retreated towards Fayetteville. Sherman remained at Cheraw three days and it was at this time that Schofield's troops began advancing on Kinston from Newbern. This caused *Bragg* to withdraw *Hoke's* division from the railroad between Wilmington and Goldsboro and send it to Kinston. When *Johnston* established his headquarters at Raleigh he asked for and received the command of *Bragg's* forces also.

Sherman left Cheraw on March 6, and on the 12th his leading divisions entered Fayetteville.

While Sherman was upon this march there occurred an engagement at Kinston between the forces under Cox marching from Newbern and those under *Bragg*. Cox's advance division reached the vicinity of Kinston on the 7th at the time that *D. H. Hill's* (*Stevenson's*) corps of the *Army of Tennessee* was arriving at Smithfield. *Bragg* requested that *Hill* be sent to Kinston to unite with *Hoke* and attack Cox. *Johnston* consented and gave orders that all of the troops of the *Army of Tennessee* as they arrived be sent on to Kinston.

On the 8th, 9th and 10th, *Bragg* attacked Cox, but without material success. Cox succeeded in intrenching his position by the night of the 8th and then held it successfully. He knew that there were two divisions of the XXIII corps marching from Wilmington, which would reach him by the 12th. On the 10th, *Bragg* admitted that further attempts without considerable reinforcements were useless; *Johnston* therefore directed him to withdraw from Kinston to Goldsboro where he would be nearer Fayetteville. The operations at Kinston and the delay in the transportation of the *Army of Tennessee* compelled *Johnston* to change the point of concentration from Fayetteville to Smithfield, where the troops of the *Army of Tennessee* were now detained. On the

morning of the 14th, *Bragg* started with his command from Goldsboro and reached it on the 16th. *Hardee* retreated in the direction of Smithfield when he retired from Fayetteville.

It was assumed by *Johnston*, that Sherman would move from Fayetteville either on Raleigh or Goldsboro. On the 15th, *Johnston* received a letter from *Lee* in which he stated that if Raleigh were captured he did not see how he could supply the *Army of Northern Virginia* and advised *Johnston* to attack one of Sherman's columns if it could be done without serious risk. If an attack was to be made, it was advisable to make it before Sherman and Schofield united their forces.

Sherman began his march from Fayetteville to Goldsboro on the morning of March 15. The advance was made on three roads. The northern road which first ran towards Smithfield and then turned eastward and ran through Bentonville was the route of five divisions of Slocum's corps; his other division was with the trains of his two corps; the middle road was the route of the XV corps; the southern road was the route of the XVII corps.

On the 16th, the XX corps had an engagement on the Smithfield road with *Hardee's* troops near Averysboro. During the night *Hardee* retreated towards Smithfield. On the 17th, Slocum moved off in the direction of Bentonville with the XIV corps in advance.

*Johnston* had learned from his cavalry that Sherman was moving on several roads and he decided to attack the force moving on the northern road in the vicinity of Bentonville, although *Cheatham's* corps of the *Army of Tennessee* had not yet reached Smithfield. On the 18th, *Johnston* reported to *Lee* that he had at Smithfield *Bragg's* forces 6,500 effectives; *Army of Tennessee* 4,000 effectives; and *Hardee* 7,500 effectives. *Hampton* estimated the cavalry as 3,000. *Johnston's* total effective force was therefore about 21,000.

On the 18th, *Johnston* had ordered *Bragg*, *Hardee* and *Stewart* to march to Bentonville; *Bragg* and *Stewart* reached Bentonville that night but *Hardee* was obliged to bivouac some miles away. On the morning of the 19th, *Hampton* with the cavalry was to occupy the road in front of Slocum's troops until *Johnston* got his corps in position astride it. This was accomplished early in the day.

On the 19th, Slocum was moving with Kilpatrick's cavalry in front and on his exposed flank, followed by two divisions of the XIV corps and two divisions of the XX corps. One division of



the XIV corps was with the supply trains on another road and one division of the XX corps was some distance in rear. Sherman had been with Slocum the day before and both concluded that the march to Goldsboro would be made without other opposition than that offered by the Confederate cavalry as *Hardee* had probably retired in the direction of Raleigh.

In the morning, *Hampton's* cavalry was encountered and slowly driven back to a line which was obstinately held. The leading division of the XIV corps now deployed and had hardly gotten into position before *Johnston* attacked. The left wing of the Union line was turned and driven for some distance to the rear. The two divisions of the XX corps now came up and a new line was established and intrenched. A brigade of the third division of the XX corps reached the field and was placed in line just as the Confederates made a desperate attempt to carry the Union position. The attack however failed. *Johnston* fell back a short distance and intrenched his position.

During the night, the other divisions of the XIV and XX corps as well as one division of the XV corps reached the field, but there was no renewal of the fight. On the 21st, Sherman's entire army was in *Johnston's* front but there were no important operations. That night *Johnston* fell back towards Smithfield.

On the 22d, Sherman's army marched to Goldsboro which it reached on the 23d. Cox's corps reached the same point on the 23d. Terry's troops which had marched from Wilmington on the 15th, joined Sherman west of Goldsboro on the 22d, and went to Goldsboro with Sherman.

Sherman now had at Goldsboro six corps combined into three armies and numbering about 80,000 men.

**April.**—Sherman planned to remain at Goldsboro until April 10, reorganizing and supplying his forces, and then move on Raleigh. In the meantime he went to Petersburg to confer with Grant.

While *Johnston's* army was at Smithfield, Lieut. Gen. *S. D. Lee* joined it and *Johnston* reorganized all the troops under his command as the *Army of Tennessee*. It was now composed of three corps under Lieut. Gens. *Hardee*, *A. P. Stewart* and *S. D. Lee*.

Sherman returned to his command and began his movement on Raleigh the day *Lee* surrendered at Appomattox. Considering his

situation hopeless, *Johnston* requested an armistice on the 13th as he was moving towards Greensboro.

This terminated the campaign as *Johnston* surrendered without a renewal of hostilities.

## THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.

### PLATES 2, 12, 34 and 46.

**Confederate.**—The Confederate troops engaged in the campaign in Virginia in 1865 consisted of the *Army of Northern Virginia*, which at the beginning of the year was defending Richmond and Petersburg, and a small force under Lt. Gen. *Jubal A. Early* in the Shenandoah Valley.

#### *Army of Northern Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee.*

Corps	Divisions	Bri- gades	Batter- ies
Lt. Gen. James Longstreet	Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett.....	4	—
	Maj. Gen. Charles W. Field.....	5	—
	Maj. Gen. Joseph P. Kershaw.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	9
Lt. Gen. John B. Gordon	Maj. Gen. Bryan Grimes.....	4	—
	Maj. Gen. John Pegram.....	3	—
	Brig. Gen. Clement A. Evans.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	18
Lt. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill	Maj. Gen. Henry Heth.....	4	—
	Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox.....	4	—
	Maj. Gen. William Mahone.....	5	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	18
Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson	Maj. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson.....	4	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	15
Cavalry Corps Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee	Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Munford.....	3	—
	Maj. Gen. William H. F. Lee.....	3	—
	Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser.....	2	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	4
Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell	Maj. Gen. George W. Custis Lee.....	2	—

The strength of the army on the 20th of February is given as 45,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry with a large force of artillery. It was, however, so difficult to supply the army that desertions were becoming alarmingly frequent. *Lee* reports, "I have the honor "to report as the number of desertions from the 9th to the 18th "of March, both inclusive, 1,061. This embraces full reports "from the infantry but only partial reports from the artillery and "cavalry, which would increase the numbers considerably."

During the months of January and February, *Ewell*, who commanded the *Department of Richmond*, held the line about the city with *G. W. C. Lee's* division and local troops; *Longstreet* held the line from Richmond to the Appomattox River with *Field* and *Kershaw* north of the James, and *Pickett* between the James and Appomattox rivers; *R. H. Anderson* held the line in front of Petersburg with *B. R. Johnson's* division; *A. P. Hill's* corps was on the right of *B. R. Johnson* and *J. B. Gordon's* corps was on the right of *Hill*.

*Fitz Lee's* cavalry division was on the left flank of the army and *W. H. F. Lee's* division was on the right flank; both were scattered for supply. Two brigades of *M. C. Butler's* cavalry division, dismounted, had been sent to South Carolina and Georgia in January to be remounted under the supervision of Maj. Gen. *Wade Hampton*. *Early's* force in the Shenandoah Valley was so scattered at the time of this campaign that only a small force, less than 2,000, actually took part in it.

**Union.**—The Union troops engaged in the Virginia Campaign consisted of the Army of the Potomac, the Army of the James and the cavalry corps of the Army of the Shenandoah.

*Union, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.**Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.*

Corps	Divisions	Bri- gades	Batter- ies
II.	Brig. Gen. Nelson A. Miles.....	4	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. William Hayes.....	3	—
Andrew A. Humphreys	Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	8
V.	Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.....	3	—
Gouverneur K. Warren	Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	6
VI.	Brig. Gen. Frank Wheaton.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. George W. Getty.....	3	—
Horatio G. Wright	Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour.....	2	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	8
IX.	Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter.....	2	—
John G. Parke	Brig. Gen. John F. Hartranft.....	2	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	6
Bermuda Hundred	Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero.....	3	6
Cavalry Division	Maj. Gen. George Crook.....	3	—
<i>Army of the James, Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord.</i>			
XXIV.	Brig. Gen. Robert S. Foster.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Charles Devens.....	3	—
John Gibbon	Brig. Gen. John W. Turner.....	3	—
	Corps Artillery.....	—	11
XXV.	Brig. Gen. August V. Kautz.....	3	—
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. William S. Birney.....	3	—
Godfrey Weitzel	Corps Artillery.....	—	13
Cavalry Division	Brig. Gen. Ranald S. Mackenzie.....	2	1
<i>Army of the Shenandoah, Maj. Gen. Philip S. Sheridan.</i>			
Cavalry Corps.	Brig. Gen. Thomas C. Devin.....	3	1
Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen. George A. Custer.....	3	—
Wesley Merritt			

During the winter of 1864–1865, the X and XVIII corps had been disbanded and in their places the XXIV and XXV corps were formed. The XXV corps was composed of colored troops. A division of each of these corps was with Terry in North Carolina.

In the operations south of the James River, Sheridan was put in command of all the cavalry. Gregg's division was now commanded by Crook and Kautz's by Mackenzie.

The total strength of the three armies was about 105,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, with a large proportion of artillery.

At the beginning of the year, the Army of the James was north of the James River; the Army of the Potomac held the line from the Appomattox River to Forts Cummings and Siebert, with the IX corps on the right, the VI corps astride of the Petersburg-Weldon railroad, the II corps west of the railroad, and the V corps in reserve south of Globe Tavern. Gregg's cavalry was on the left flank of the Army of the Potomac; Sheridan's cavalry was at Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley.

## SHERIDAN'S RAID IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

### PLATES 2 and 12.

On the 1st of January, 1865, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan was in command of the Middle Military Division, consisting of the Departments of Pennsylvania, Washington, West Virginia and the Middle Department. He had at Winchester, Va., under his personal command the Army of the Shenandoah now reduced to two divisions of the XIX corps and two divisions of his own cavalry corps.

**February.**—Early in February, one of the divisions of the XIX corps was sent to Sherman at Savannah, Ga. In the latter part of the same month, Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock was assigned to the command of the Middle Military Division, in order to relieve Sheridan for active field operations. As Sheridan now had 10,000 well mounted and well equipped cavalry in his two divisions and as there was but a small Confederate force in the Shenandoah Valley, Grant believed that it would be possible for Sheridan's cavalry to capture Lynchburg and destroy its factories, mills and railroads. If it seemed best, Sheridan could then move southward from Lynchburg to Danville, destroy the railroad at

that point, and then join Sherman in North Carolina. By destroying the military resources en route he would deal a severe blow to *Lee's* army.

In order to bring the war to a close, Grant decided to begin operations in 1865 just as soon as possible without waiting for the roads to dry, as in previous years. On February 27, therefore, Sheridan moved up the Shenandoah Valley from Winchester and reached Staunton March 2.

**March.**—Lt. Gen. *Jubal A. Early*, who was still in command in the Shenandoah Valley, had only two brigades of *Wharton's* infantry division, 2,000 men, with two battalions of artillery, to resist Sheridan. One brigade of *Wharton's* division was in western Virginia near the Tennessee line; *Lomax's* cavalry division was dispersed in winter quarters; of *Fitz Lee's* cavalry division, two brigades had been returned to the *Army of Northern Virginia* and *Rosser's* brigade had been temporarily disbanded. *Early* with *Wharton's* division was near Waynesboro at the gap of the Blue Ridge mountains east of Staunton.

At Staunton, Sheridan learned that *Early* was at Waynesboro with two brigades and decided to dispose of this force before moving on Lynchburg. He therefore moved at once on Waynesboro where Custer attacked and defeated *Early's* force, capturing 1,600 men and 11 pieces of artillery. *Early*, *Wharton* and a few others made their escape. From Waynesboro the Union cavalry pushed on to Charlottesville where it took a short rest March 4 and 5.

Having been informed that Lynchburg was fortified and garrisoned, Sheridan decided not to attempt its capture. He sent Custer's division to destroy the railroad from Charlottesville to a point 16 miles north of Lynchburg and then to move eastward to the James River. Devin's division was to move directly to the James River and destroy the canal and the mills on its banks. When the two divisions were united Sheridan hoped to capture a bridge and cross to the south bank of the James.

When Sheridan reached Columbia March 10, he learned that all the bridges over the James had been destroyed. Not having sufficient bridge material to span the river, he decided to join Grant via White House and sent a messenger through the Confederate lines to give him this information. On the 12th, he moved north-

ward to the Gordonsville-Richmond railroad and followed that road to Ashland Station, wrecking it en route.

At Ashland, he learned that *Longstreet* with the divisions of *Fitz Lee* and *Pickett* was moving northward from Richmond to attack him. He therefore moved northward, crossed the North Anna River and followed it down to White House. Here he received supplies and horses and rested his command for a week. His two divisions then crossed the James and Appomattox behind the Bermuda Hundred line, and bivouacked south of Petersburg March 28.

The roads in Virginia at this season were barely passable and Sheridan's command lost a large number of its horses; otherwise his losses were trifling.

## OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN VIRGINIA.

### PLATES 34 and 46.

**February.**—No movement was made by the Union troops in Southern Virginia until February 5, when Gregg was ordered to reconnoiter Dinwiddie Court House via Malone's bridge to capture any Confederate trains in the vicinity; the V corps was to support him by moving via Monk's bridge and the II corps was to move to Hatcher Run via the Squirrel Level road.

In this movement which occupied the 5th, 6th and 7th, Gregg's cavalry and the V corps had an engagement south of Hatcher Run with *Gordon's* corps in which Maj. Gen. *John Pegram* was killed. The II corps had at the same time an engagement with *Mahone's* division of *Hill's* corps.

After these engagements the Union line was extended to Hatcher Run and this part of the line was held by the II corps. The VI corps occupied the works about the signal station and as far east as *Fort Howard*. The V corps with Gregg's cavalry became a reserve in rear of the II corps.

**Fort Stedman.**—As early as February 21, *Lee* had become convinced that with his half-fed and rapidly diminishing army he could not hope to prolong the defense of Richmond and Petersburg much longer, and that if the war was to be prolonged he must evacuate his lines and try to join *Johnston* in North Carolina. He suggested this plan to President *Davis*, but the latter was not willing to evacuate the capital at this time.

**March.**—Early in March, it became evident to *Lee* that he would soon have *Sheridan* threatening his communications; he therefore decided to make a bold attempt to break through the Union lines in front of Petersburg. As *A. P. Hill* was on sick leave, he directed *J. B. Gordon* to bring his corps to Petersburg and replace the troops in the trenches, and then with a strong force, made up of *Pickett's* division of *Longstreet's* corps and troops from *Hill's* corps, to make the assault. It took some time to move the troops and prepare the plan; the assault was finally made at dawn of March 25, when *Fort Stedman* and the neighboring Union batteries were captured by some of *Hill's* troops. *Pickett*, who had been north of the James, did not reach Petersburg in time to join in the attack. All attempts made by the Confederates to capture neighboring redouts, as well as the line in rear, however were repulsed.

Supported by artillery, the Union troops in the immediate vicinity retook the captured works by 8 a. m. the same day and with them about 2,000 prisoners. The Union loss was about 1,000.

**Five Forks.**—At the time of the assault on *Fort Stedman*, Grant had already made his plans for turning *Lee* out of his defenses; the order for the movement was issued the day before the assault, though the movement was not to begin until March 27, the day *Sheridan's* cavalry crossed the James.

On the latter day, two divisions of the XXIV corps, one of the XXV corps, and *Mackenzie's* cavalry division of the Army of the James, under the command of Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, moved from the extreme right of the Union position, crossed both the James and the Appomattox rivers and moved to the extreme left, to replace the II corps which was to take part in the turning movement. Only one division of the XXIV corps with one division of the XXV corps were left north of the James River.

**March 29.**—The real movement began on the 29th under the supervision of Grant and Meade. *Sheridan* with his three cavalry divisions moved from the vicinity of Reams Station via Malone bridge to Dinwiddie Court House; the V corps moved via Monk bridge, the Vaughan and Quaker roads, towards Burgess Mill and the II corps crossed Hatcher Run and moved by the Dabney



Mill road towards Burgess Mill; one division of the XXIV corps moved on the right flank of the II corps.

When this movement began, the right of the Confederate infantry line along the White Oak road consisted of the divisions of *Pickett* and *Johnson* under Lt. Gen. *Richard H. Anderson*. *Lee* in person directed the operation of this wing. The cavalry divisions of *W. H. F. Lee* and *Rosser* were about 12 miles south of Reams Station near Stoney Creek Station on the railroad; *Fitz Lee* with *Munford's* cavalry division was on his way to Five Forks from the extreme left of the Confederate line north of the James River.

The V corps had a skirmish with *Anderson's* troops in the afternoon.

*Lee* met the Union movement by ordering the concentration of his cavalry divisions near Five Forks to move with five brigades of infantry under *Pickett* to occupy Dinwiddie Court House and secure the Vaughan road.

**March 30.**—On March 30, Sheridan held Dinwiddie Court House with two divisions while his third division remained at Malone Bridge to assist in bringing up the trains and covering his rear. The V corps reconnoitered the Confederate line along the White Oak road. The II corps pressed up to the Confederate line south of Hatcher Run and east of the Boydton Road.

*Fitz Lee* reached Five Forks this day with *Munford's* division and had a skirmish with Sheridan. *W. H. F. Lee* and *Rosser* joined him towards evening. *Pickett* was detached from the White Oak Road line with five brigades and joined *Fitz Lee* at Five Forks. The infantry thus removed from the White Oak Road line was replaced by brigades from the divisions of *Heth* and *Wilcox* of *Hill's* corps.

A severe rain storm having begun on the evening of the 29th and continued through the 30th, Grant ordered a temporary cessation of the forward movement.

**March 31.**—The Confederate forces under *Fitz Lee* and *Pickett* attacked Sheridan, and the Confederate forces under *Anderson* along the White Oak Road attacked the V corps in flank west of the Boydton Plank Road. Sheridan was obliged to fall back to Dinwiddie Court House, but there held the enemy. The V corps was driven back almost to the Boydton Plank Road in the morn-

ing but recovered its position in the afternoon. That evening one division of the V corps and Mackenzie's cavalry division, which was guarding the trains, were sent to reinforce Sheridan. The other two divisions of the V corps were ordered to reinforce Sheridan by moving down the Crump Road to attack *Pickett* in rear in the morning, but the order was received so late at night that the movement was postponed by Warren until the morning.

**April 1.**—On the 31st of March, *Lee* learned that the XXIV corps was on the left of the Union line; he therefore ordered *Longstreet* to move *Field's* division from the works in front of Richmond by rail to Petersburg and to go there in person on April 1.

*Pickett* having reported that his left was threatened (by the V corps), *Lee* directed him to fall back to his intrenchments at Five Forks. *Munford's* cavalry division was on his left, *W. H. F. Lee* on his right and *Rosser* in reserve.

In the morning, Sheridan's cavalry followed *Pickett* to Five Forks and two of his divisions deployed along *Pickett's* front. When the V corps reported to Sheridan at the intersection of the Five Forks and Crump roads, Sheridan made his plan of attack.

The cavalry divisions of Custer and Devin were to attack the Confederate line in front, the V corps was to attack it in flank and rear from the east, while Mackenzie's cavalry division was to move to the intersection of the Crump and White Oak roads to prevent *R. H. Anderson* from assisting *Pickett*.

It was 4 p. m. when the V corps was in position to attack and it was dark when the forces of *Pickett* and *Fitz Lee* were routed with a loss of about 2,500 men.

That night *Pickett* and *Fitz Lee* rallied their defeated forces at the railroad where the remaining brigades of the divisions of *Pickett* and *B. R. Johnson*, under *R. H. Anderson*, joined them from the intrenchments on White Oak Road.

Sheridan's cavalry and the V corps bivouacked at Five Forks.

When Grant heard of Sheridan's success, he directed the II corps to attack the Confederate line on White Oak Road, but that corps was unable to drive the Confederates from their works that night.

**April 2.**—Having learned from deserters that *Lee* had been compelled to weaken his line south of the Appomattox to meet

Sheridan, Grant ordered the IX, VI, XXIV and II corps to assault at daybreak on the 2d. The IX corps made a lodgment in the Confederate works at the Jerusalem Plank Road but could not break through. The VI corps broke through opposite *Fort Fisher* and swept the entire line from that point southward to Hatcher Run. The XXIV corps broke through near Hatcher Run and then moving northward past the VI corps assaulted and captured *Fort Gregg* and a neighboring work. The II corps captured the works at the Crow salient, and then learning that the Confederates to the left were withdrawing from their works, began the pursuit by the Claiborne Road. This movement was countermanded by Meade and only Miles' division was left to pursue, the others were ordered to march to Petersburg. Miles' division had an engagement with the retreating Confederates under *Heth* near Sutherland Station and although first repulsed was eventually successful in compelling the Confederates to retreat north of the railroad.

Early on the 2d, *Lee* informed President *Davis* that Richmond and Petersburg must be evacuated that night, and in the afternoon he gave the order for the withdrawal of the Confederate forces to Amelia Court House on the Richmond and Danville railroad, a short distance southwest of the Appomattox River.

**April 3.**—On the 3d, Maj. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel took possession of Richmond and the other corps commanders started in pursuit of *Lee*. By securing possession of Burkeville, Grant compelled *Lee* to retreat westward from Amelia Court House and recross the Appomattox River.

On April 9, Sheridan's cavalry, supported by the V and XXIV corps, reached Appomattox Court House in advance of the Confederates, who had lost many prisoners, guns and wagons in their hurried retreat; the other Union corps were close in his rear.

On April 7, Grant had written to *Lee* requesting the surrender of his army, and on April 9, the terms of surrender were agreed on at Appomattox Court House. This closed the campaign. At the time of the surrender the Army of Northern Virginia numbered only 28,000 men.

## CAMPAIGN IN ALABAMA.

## PLATE 6.

**Confederate.**—On the 19th of January, 1865, *Stevenson's* corps, of the *Army of Tennessee* left Tupelo, Miss., for Augusta, Ga., and was soon followed by all the other troops of that army save *French's* division of *Stewart's* corps and *Gibson's* brigade of *Stevenson's* corps which were sent to strengthen the Mobile garrison. The last of the *Army of Tennessee* did not get off until early in February.

Lt. Gen. *Richard Taylor*, who remained in command of the *Department of East Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama*, established his headquarters at Meridian, Miss.

Maj. Gen. *Forrest* was placed in command of all the cavalry in the department which comprised mainly the divisions of *Chalmers* and *W. H. Jackson* of his former corps. *Forrest* began energetically to reorganize and recruit his cavalry corps, which had been much depleted in the Nashville campaign, and in February was rewarded by the grade of lieutenant general. His corps, as finally reorganized, consisted of *Chalmers's* division of Mississippi cavalry and *W. H. Jackson's* division of Tennessee cavalry. Each division was composed of three brigades. *Chalmers's* division had about 3,500 and *Jackson's* 2,500.

*Jackson* was near Tupelo and *Chalmers* at Columbus, Miss., near *Forrest's* headquarters at West Point.

Besides these cavalry commands, *Crossland* had a small brigade of Kentucky cavalry at Columbus, Miss. *Roddey* had a brigade of about 1,000 men in northern Alabama with headquarters at Selma; two small brigades were in the *District of the Gulf* and one in eastern Louisiana. *Forrest* had intended to form a division of the three brigades in Alabama, but was prevented by the Union movements.

In the *District of the Gulf*, for the defense of Mobile, there were about 10,000 men, including *French's* division now under Brig. Gen. *Francis M. Cockrell*, *Gibson's* brigade, and the two brigades of cavalry.

A small force of militia were at Selma and Montgomery, Ala. Including militia, *Taylor* had about 20,000 men in his department.

**Union.**—At the termination of the Nashville Campaign in

January, 1865, Thomas had in the southern part of Tennessee and the northern part of Alabama the IV, XXIII and A. J. Smith's corps, as well as Wilson's cavalry corps.

Maj. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby, who commanded the Military Division of West Mississippi comprising the departments of the Gulf, Arkansas, Missouri and west Tennessee, had about 40,000 troops in Louisiana, and on the Gulf Coast at Pensacola and at the entrance of Mobile Bay.

Early in January, Grant ordered Thomas to send Schofield's XXIII corps to the East and when he heard that the *Army of Tennessee* was being moved eastward to reinforce the Confederate forces in South Carolina, he directed that operations should be undertaken in Alabama if possible to relieve Sherman. Canby was to move from Pensacola and the mouth of Mobile Bay northward, while Thomas moved from the Tennessee River southward.

When the plan was proposed to Thomas, he reported that the condition of the roads in northern Alabama made it impossible for his infantry to move. He suggested that A. J. Smith's corps with cavalry be sent to Canby to assist in his movement, and he would hold northern Alabama with the IV corps at Huntsville.

Grant therefore directed Thomas to send A. J. Smith's corps with 5,000 cavalry to Canby, but to keep the remainder of the cavalry corps to cooperate with Canby, by moving southward on Tuscaloosa and Selma.

Canby's plan was to send two divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry to Pensacola to operate from that point; to operate from the mouth of Mobile Bay with two army corps and some cavalry; and to cooperate with Wilson's cavalry corps by sending cavalry columns into Mississippi from Memphis, Vicksburg and Baton Rouge.

Grant expected the movement to begin early in February, but various causes delayed the movement until the middle of March. On account of the condition of the roads, the cavalry operations from Vicksburg and Baton Rouge were abandoned.

Canby's force as finally organized was as follows:—

*Union, Maj. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby.*

Corps	Divisions	Bri- gades	Batter- ies
XIII.	Brig. Gen. James C. Veatch . . . . .	3	2
Maj. Gen.	*Brig. Gen. Christopher C. Andrews . . . . .	3	2
Gordon Granger	Brig. Gen. William P. Benton . . . . .	3	2
XVI.	Brig. Gen. John McArthur . . . . .	3	2
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard . . . . .	3	—
Andrew J. Smith	Brig. Gen. Eugene A. Carr . . . . .	3	—
	Corps Artillery . . . . .	—	5
Cavalry	Brig. Gen. Joseph F. Knipe . . . . .	2	1
	Engineer Brigade and Siege Train . . . . .	2	
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. John P. Hawkins . . . . .	3 (col.)—	
Frederick Steele	Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Lucas . . . . .	2 (cav.)1	

The strength of the command at the opening of the campaign was:—XIII corps, 18,500; XVI corps, 16,000; Hawkins' division, 5,500; cavalry division, 2,500; engineer brigade, 1,500; siege artillery, 1,000. Total, 45,000.

In the column moving from the mouth of Mobile Bay were 32,000, including the engineers and siege artillery; in the column moving from Pensacola were 13,000, including the cavalry division.

After the capture of Mobile the entire cavalry was reorganized into a single division of two brigades under Brig. Gen. Benjamin H. Grierson. Brig. Gen. Knipe was sent to Baton Rouge to organize a cavalry brigade to operate from that point.

\*Two brigades of this division served with Gen. Steele.

In 1865 the Cavalry Corps of the Division of the Mississippi was constituted as follows:—

Corps	Divisions	Bri- gades	Batter- ies
	Brig. Gen. Edward M. McCook . . . . .	2	1
	Brig. Gen. Eli Long . . . . .	2	1
Maj. Gen.	Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick . . . . .	2	1
James H. Wilson	Bvt. Maj. Gen. Emory Upton . . . . .	2	1
	Brig. Gen. Edward Hatch . . . . .	2	1
	Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson . . . . .	2	1
	Brig. Gen. Joseph F. Knipe . . . . .	2	1

Each division had two brigades of cavalry and a battery of four guns. Its total strength when fully organized was about 5,000 men.

Of these divisions, Kilpatrick was with Sherman in the Carolinas, Knipe was sent to Canby, Johnson was retained by Thomas

for the defense of middle Tennessee, and Hatch was delayed in northwestern Alabama awaiting remounts. Wilson took on his campaign only the divisions of McCook, Long and Upton.

With these mounted divisions numbering 12,500 men he had a dismounted brigade of 1,500 men guarding the train of 250 wagons and the ponton trains of thirty canvas boats. These men were to be mounted on captured horses.

**January and February.**—There were no active operations during the months of January and February, as both sides were preparing for the coming campaign. Through an error in the transmission of orders, A. J. Smith's corps was landed at Vicksburg, which caused the Confederates to believe a strong movement was to be made from that point. This kept *Forrest* in Mississippi. Later however A. J. Smith's corps was reembarked for New Orleans, from which point it was sent to the mouth of Mobile Bay.

**March.**—In accordance with Canby's original plan, a cavalry force of 2,500 men left Memphis early in March and reached Ripley, Miss., on the 6th. After reconnoitering for a few days it retired to Memphis.

*Forrest* had prepared a force to go to meet it when he learned that it had retired. At this time *Chalmers'* cavalry division was ready for field service but *W. H. Jackson's* had not yet completed its reorganization.

## CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN ALABAMA.

### PLATE 6.

On the 17th of March, Canby with 32,000 men started up the east side of Mobile Bay and the head of his column reached *Spanish Fort* on the east side of Mobile Bay, five miles south of Blakely. This was a strong bridge-head held by a brigade of infantry, which was at once strengthened to 4,000 men. It took some time to invest this position and bring up the siege guns. Constant skirmishing was engaged in until the night of April 7th, when the fort was evacuated by the Confederates, who retired across the bay to Mobile.

In the mean time, Steele's column of 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry moved northward along the railroad from Pensacola to its junction with the Mobile-Montgomery railroad and thence along

that railroad to Blakely and invested that place. En route a Confederate cavalry brigade was routed and its commander captured.

After the evacuation of *Spanish Fort*, the forces under Canby and Steele united in front of Blakely, another bridge-head held by two Confederate divisions. Blakely was taken by assault on April 9th, the day of *Lee's* surrender, and resulted in a loss to the Confederates of nearly 4,000 prisoners including the two division commanders.

As *Maury* had now no adequate force to hold Mobile, he evacuated that place and retired in the direction of Meridian, Miss. The XIII corps took possession of Mobile while the XVI corps and a cavalry force of 6,000 men moved on Montgomery and the railroad between Montgomery and Columbus, Ga.

Having heard of the surrender of *Lee* and *Johnston*, in the latter part of April, Lt. Gen. *Richard Taylor* signed a truce with Canby, which preceded the formal surrender of all the forces of his department. This closed the campaign; the formal surrender took place May 4.

## CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN ALABAMA.

### PLATE 6.

**March.**—On the 22d of March, five days after Canby's command began its northern movement, Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson with the cavalry divisions of McCook, Long and Upton began his movement on Selma, Ala., from the southern bank of the Tennessee River in the extreme northwest part of Alabama.

Moving in three columns to deceive the enemy's scouts, his command was concentrated at Jasper March 27. Here Wilson learned from scouts that *Forrest's* men were starting to intercept his march near Montevallo. He therefore left all his trains in charge of his dismounted men and pushed ahead with his mounted command. He reached Elyton, now Birmingham, on the 29th and 30th and Montevallo on the 31st. He had thus far encountered no resistance, save that offered by small bodies of *Roddey's* cavalry brigade.

From Elyton he detached Croxton's brigade of McCook's division, to capture Tuscaloosa and destroy its bridge.



From the vicinity of Columbus, Miss., two brigades of *Chalmers'* division had started for Selma via Marion and two brigades of *Jackson's* division via Tuscaloosa. Not appreciating the rapidity of Wilson's movement and being delayed by bad roads, only one brigade of *Chalmers'* division succeeded in crossing the Cahawba River, which runs south through Centerville and empties into the Alabama River below Selma. *Chalmers'* third brigade remained at Columbus. *Jackson's* two brigades crossed the Black Warrior at Tuscaloosa and had just passed through Trion when Croxton appeared in his rear and between *Jackson* and his trains. This caused *Jackson* to turn back to attack Croxton and drive him up the Black Warrior River to a point west of Elyton, where Croxton recrossed that river.

*Forrest* himself with a small bodyguard and *Crossland's* cavalry brigade passed through Centerville en route for Montevallo the very day that Wilson reached Elyton. *Forrest* hastily moved to Centerville to check Wilson's march until *Chalmers* should arrive.

On the 31st Wilson's cavalry reached Montevallo and routed *Forrest's* small command south of that place.

**April.**—On April 1, Wilson moved to Randolph and en route his men captured one of *Forrest's* officers bearing important dispatches to *Jackson* outlining *Forrest's* plans and giving the position of his troops.

Knowing that *Jackson's* division was fighting Croxton near Trion, Wilson detached McCook with his other brigade to join Croxton via Centerville and with the divisions of Long and Upton moved on Selma.

Near Plantersville, *Forrest* had hastily assembled a force of 2,000 men, consisting of the cavalry brigades of *Crossland* and *Roddey* and some militia under Brig. Gen. *Daniel Adams*.

Wilson attacked this force on the afternoon of April 1, and routed it. *Forrest* retired to Selma. On the evening of this day he was joined by one of *Chalmers'* three brigades.

Selma was the most important military center in Alabama, being the site of a large armory, gun factories, foundries and warehouses. To guard it against possible raids, it was protected by a continuous bastion line of works of strong profile about five miles long. It formed a bridge-head on the north bank of Alabama River.

To defend this position *Forrest* had three small brigades of cavalry, probably 2,500 men, and perhaps as many militia. The position was assaulted by the divisions of Long and Upton, dismounted, on the afternoon of April 2, and carried about dark. The Confederate cavalry made a strong resistance, but the militia abandoned their posts.

In the darkness, *Forrest* and most of his cavalry escaped to the north and then made their way to Marion, where they united with *Chalmers'* second brigade.

This was the last encounter of the troops. Wilson remained at Selma where McCook with one brigade and the trains joined him on the 5th. McCook had gone to Centerville and scouted to the north; not being able to learn anything definite concerning *Jackson* or *Croxtan* he burned the bridge at Centerville and then moved to Selma.

Wilson remained at Selma until the 9th of April, the day of *Lee's* surrender, and then marched on Montgomery. He captured that place on the 12th, Columbus, Ga., on the 16th, and Macon, Ga., on the 20th. Here he learned of the armistice made between Sherman and *Johnston* and his campaign ended.

Some of Wilson's troops were later engaged in the pursuit of *President Davis* and his party, which resulted in their capture in Georgia.

*Croxtan's* brigade became wholly separated from Wilson's command after Montevallo. Being driven northward by *Jackson*, *Croxtan* crossed the Black Warrior River, and when *Jackson* moved south, *Croxtan* moved south and captured Tuscaloosa April 4. He then started to join Wilson, but was intercepted by *Chalmers'* third brigade and retired to Elyton. He finally made his way eastward and joined Wilson at Macon, Ga., on the 20th.

After the engagement at Selma, *Forrest* united his entire command at Marion and retired to the vicinity of Livingston near the Mississippi State line, where his command was included in the troops surrendered by Lt. Gen. *Richard Taylor* to Maj. Gen. Canby on May 4.

In his last campaign, *Forrest's* cavalry had, for the first time, been outmarched and outmaneuvered by the Union cavalry. Wilson was fortunate in capturing *Forrest's* orders, but even had the two commands met on even terms it is almost certain that Wilson's men, with their repeating arms and superior numbers, would have defeated their opponents.

## STONEMAN'S RAID IN NORTH CAROLINA AND WESTERN VIRGINIA.

### PLATES 2, 3 and 5.

Just before Sherman started on his campaign in the Carolinas, he suggested to Thomas that Stoneman with 2,000 cavalry, should penetrate North Carolina from east Tennessee and attract the attention of the Confederates to this section of their territory. Grant later approved this plan and suggested Columbia, S. C., as the objective.

Thomas at once gave orders to collect the requisite cavalry force from Kentucky and east Tennessee, but it was not until March 23, that Stoneman was ready to move from Jonesboro in east Tennessee with a cavalry division and a battery, or 4,000 men. An additional brigade was to be left in the mountain passes in his rear. The IV corps had been moved from Huntsville, Ala., to Knoxville, Tenn., to hold that part of the State and to advance into western Virginia en route for Lynchburg.

When Stoneman left Jonesboro with his four brigades, Sherman was already at Goldsboro, N. C., and *Johnston* was at Smithfield. Stoneman therefore took as his objectives the Lynchburg-Chattanooga railroad between Wytheville and Salem and the Richmond-Danville railroad in North Carolina.

The only forces opposed to Stoneman were the remnants of *Early's* command in western Virginia, now under Brig. Gen. *John Echols*, and some small detached commands in western North Carolina. These were reinforced by militia. As soon as Stoneman's movement developed, *Lee* requested *Beauregard* to go to Greensboro, N. C., to take command and guard the Richmond-Danville railroad over which he hoped to retreat.

**March.**—Leaving Jonesboro March 6, Stoneman crossed the mountains to Wilkesboro, detaching a brigade to guard the passes. He then moved northeast into Virginia and wrecked the railroad between Wytheville and Salem. He then returned to North Carolina, which he reached the day *Lee* surrendered at Appomattox; here he wrecked a part of the railroad between Danville and Greensboro and finally captured Salisbury on the 12th. From this point he moved westward to Asheville, N. C., and thence to Hendersonville, where the command learned that *Johnston* had made an armistice with Sherman. In his raid Stone-

man captured most of the forces in North Carolina not with *Johnston's* army.

Later some of his troops engaged in the pursuit of President *Davis*.

#### TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT.

There were no important operations west of the Mississippi River during 1865. On March 26, after the surrender of *Lee*, *Johnston* and *Richard Taylor*, Gen. *E. Kirby Smith* surrendered to Maj. Gen. Edward O. S. Canby.

This practically terminated the American Civil War.

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